Aquinas, Morality and Modernity: The Search for the Natural Moral Law and the Common Good by Peter Critchley
Dr Peter Critchley		Being and Knowing


AQUINAS, MORALITY AND MODERNITY





By Dr Peter Critchley





This book traces the collapse in the idea of an overarching objective moral framework in a line of development that proceeds from the Protestant Reformation to liberalism, secularism, relativism and atheism. The analysis charts the dissipation of objective morality from the intersubjectivism and universalism of Immanuel Kant to the nihilism of Nietzsche. The book identifies Max Weber as a key figure in giving sociological expression to the moral impasse which characterises the modern world. Weber’s much vaunted polytheism is shown to be an heterogeneity of values, the reduction of morality to value judgements, a conflict of irreducible value positions in which there is no objective way of deciding between them. The modern world is not so much a Nietzschean world which is beyond good and evil so much as a world in which objective moral criteria no longer apply. 





Dr Peter Critchley is a philosopher, writer and tutor with a first degree in the field of the Social Sciences (History, Economics, Politics and Sociology) and the degree of PhD in the field of Philosophy, Ethics and Politics. Aquinas, Morality and Modernity was written from research notes made in response to a call for papers from Harvard Divinity School on the theme of ‘Being and Knowing’. Peter works in the tradition of Rational Freedom, a tradition which sees freedom as a common endeavour in which the freedom of each individual is co-existent with the freedom of all. In elaborating this concept, Peter has written extensively on a number of the key thinkers in this ‘rational’ tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Dante, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Habermas). Peter is currently engaged in an ambitious interdisciplinary research project entitled Being and Place. The central theme of this research concerns the connection of place and identity through the creation of forms of life which enable human and planetary flourishing in unison. Peter tutors across the humanities and social sciences, from A level to postgraduate research. Peter particularly welcomes interest from those not engaged in formal education, but who wish to pursue a course of studies out of intellectual curiosity. Peter is committed to bringing philosophy back to its Socratic roots in ethos, in the way of life of people. In this conception, philosophy as self-knowledge is something that human beings do as a condition of living the examined life. As we think, so shall we live. Living up to this commitment, Peter offers tutoring services both to those in and outside of formal education.

The subject range that Peter offers in his tutoring activities, as well as contact details, can be seen at http://petercritchley-e-akademeia.yolasite.com (​http:​/​​/​petercritchley-e-akademeia.yolasite.com​) 
The range of Peter’s research activity can be seen at 
http://mmu.academia.edu/PeterCritchley (​http:​/​​/​mmu.academia.edu​/​PeterCritchley​) 






AQUINAS, MORALITY AND MODERNITY
 TOC \o "1-3" \h \z INTRODUCTION	10
1 WHY AQUINAS MATTERS	12
2 The Return of Virtue	36
3 Morality and Modernity	42
Moral Knowledge	42
The inward turn of the Cogito	48
Reconnecting Morality with Ontological Nature	50
4 The Need for Moral Unity	51
Naturalist and Supernaturalist Ends	53
Participatory Metaphysics	56
The Veneration of Means as the loss of Ends	58
Eudaimonia and Beatitude	59
The Ultimate End	63
The Science of Being and the Objectivity of Knowledge	69
Bringing the Intellect Back to its Object	82
Aquinas and the Aristotelian Framework	87
5 Kant, Virtue and the Good	90
The Revival of Virtue Ethics	90
Kant and his Communitarian Critics	92
Kant on Virtue	99
The Good Will	105
Maxims as Underlying Intentions	109
The Doctrine of Morally Necessary Ends	114
Virtue and the Highest Good	117
Kant’s Natural Teleology	120
Rational Nature as an End in Itself	124
Kant’s Achievement	127
6 Hegel, Marx, Immanence and Transcendence	130
The attempts to reconcile the Individual and the Community	130
The high road of modernity	134
The Humanised World and its Moral Foundations	138
Materialist Immanence	143
The Instrumentalisation of the World	145
The Need for Transcendence	148
Revaluation is not Nostalgia	149
7 The Impasse of Modern Ethics and Nietzsche’s challenge	151
The Loss of Moral Truth	151
The Search for the Common Good on the ground of modernity	153
Human Beings as Rational Beings	157
The Gay Science	162
Back to and Beyond Modernity	166
8 Max Weber and the Rationalisation of Modernity	169
Natural Law and The Ultimate Origin of Political Authority	182
The natural order needs to be open to the divine and transcendent	183
The modern Gnosticism	184




Thomism and the intelligibility of the universe	190
The modern distinction between science and morality	191
Agnosticism, scepticism and nihilism – Weber in the aftermath of Kant	204
Radical Individualism and Totalitarianism	208
Science and Ultimate Meaning	209
The Need for a Rational Metaphysics	211
Value judgements as lacking objective foundation	213
Modernity unable to uphold a philosophical morality	214
The separation of politics and morality – the state as coercion	217
Protestantism, liberalism, secularism and nihilism	220
Protestantism as pure rationalism – the individual as god	222
Weber and Modernism	224
Natural Law as a Work of Reason	224
The rational science of human and social order	224
Polytheism as a secularised ideology of mutual incompatible gods	225
Individualism brings about collectivism in politics and conformism in society.	225
Private Conscience and Moral Knowledge	229
Conscience lacks objective moral, philosophical or theological knowledge	229
The Ontological Instability of Modernity	230
The separation of reason and revelation, natural order and supernatural order	230
Rationalism, voluntarism and empiricism	233
The Dissolution of Liberal Society and Liberal Ideology	237
A Neutral Ethics is Not Practicable	242
Weber's rationalistic 'disenchantment' of the world	242
Rationalisation and Subjective Values	243
Polytheism – heterogeneity of values	244
The Need for Essentialism	245
Theistic Wisdom	245
9 AQUINAS' EPISTEMOLOGY	247





The Four Causes Developed and Articulated	252
Priority Among the Causes	253











11 Aquinas and Kant Contrasted	271
Necessary presuppositions, reason as its own end	271
Knowing and being	273
The epistemological impasse of modern philosophy	275
Thomism and Kantianism	277
Sense experience and the mind – Aquinas’ moderate realism	281
The teleological conception of the world	289
Things and mind – realism and idealism	292
The Concept in Epistemological Realism	294
Ontological and Sensational Knowledge	294
12 THE DIVINE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE	295
God as the Source of Being	295
Creation	296
The Created Order	297
Providence and Human Freedom	302
Conservation	303
Necessity and Freedom	303
To be in Accord with Creation	308
13 BODY AND SOUL	309
Human Uniqueness	309
The Soul as a Principle of Life	310
Hylomorphism – matter and form related as body and soul	311
Organic versus Reductive Materialism	312
Where in the Body Is the Soul?	316
Beyond Dualism	318
14 SENSE AND INTELLECT	319
The Nature of Cognition	319
Cognitive Powers	320
Sensation	321
The Immateriality of Cognition	322
Cognitive Functions	325
The Objects of Intellect	326
Abstraction	329
Illumination	332
The Cooperation between the Senses and the Intellect	333
15 THE END OF HUMAN LIFE	333
Fulfilment	333
That There Is a Human End	336
Happiness	337
What Happiness Is Not	338
What Happiness Is	342
Happiness and Blessedness – Aquinas’ Beatific Vision	345
Happiness and Telos	349
16 Being and Ends	350
Theoretical and practical truth	350
The Is and the Ought	352
The Last End	355
The Highest Good	358
Happiness and the Complete Good	362
The Three Categories of Rational Activity	367
Heidegger - Ethics as Ethos	372
Being as Being	373
Ways of Being and Ways of Knowing	375




Speculative Knowledge and Practical Knowledge	380
The Hidden God	381




Nature and the Eternal Law	388
Natural Inclinations	392
Virtue	405
Why Virtue is Needed	405
Acquiring Virtue	408
Prudence and the perfection of virtue	410
Aquinas’ Comprehensiveness	416
18 The Eudaimonistic conception	418
Hedonistic enjoyment and eudaimonistic fulfilment	418
The social context of flourishing well	422
The Person and the Common Good	425
The Final Good	432
The Means for Attaining the Final End	433
Virtue Ethics in a Demoralised World	439













Aquinas: Faith and Reason	487
The Autonomy of Philosophy	492
Consciousness and Social Being	494









The following abbreviations have been used:

Aristotle






De aeter. 		De aeternitate mundi
De ente		De ente et essentia
De pot.		De potential
De prin. nat.		De principiis naturae
De ver.		De veritate
De virt.		De virtutibus in communi
In De an.		In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium
In De caelo		Commentarium in libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo
In Eth.			Sententia libri Ethicorum
In Meta.		In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria
In peri herm.		Commentarium in Aristotelis libros peri hermeneias
In Phys.		In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio
Quodl.			Quaestiones quodlibetales
Sent.			Scriptum super libros Sententiarum
SG			Summa contra Gentiles
Super ad Rom.	Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura
Super De Trin.	Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate
Super ev.		Super evangelium S. loannis lectura
Super Isaiam		Postilla super Isaiam
Thess.			Super primam epistolam ad Thessalonicenses lectura





CPuR		Critique of Pure Reason
CPrR		Critique of Practical Reason
CJ 		Critique of Judgment
PP		Perpetual Peace
UH		Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose 
CF		Contest of the Faculties
TP		Theory and Practice
WE		What is Enlightenment?
GMM		Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
R		Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone
DV		Doctrine of Virtue
LE		Lectures on Ethics
A		Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
MEJ 		The Metaphysical Elements of Justice Saw On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in Practice

Max Weber
ESI 		Economy and Society vol 1 
ES2 		Economy and Society vol 2 
S 		Socialism 
SV 		Science as a Vocation








The central thesis of this book is a simple one. It is that the modern world stands in need of morality but subverts its objective foundations. Modernity can generate its own conceptions of morality, it’s just that it can offer no good reasons for taking them seriously. Of course, every society in various times and places constructs its own morality. My contention is, that to be viable, such morality is not merely relative in relation to habit and custom but is founded upon universal moral principles and values, expressing those objective foundations in a particular form. 
My argument is not simply that modernity subverts the ground upon which universal moral principles and values stand but that it can supply no good reason for believing in the conceptions of morality it engenders. Modernity rests upon a specific social identity which entails a certain conception of rational action; this conception is individualistic, the individual agent acting out of self-interest, a concern with the self-maximisation and gratification of personal pleasures. The result is that the laws of morality, which Kant thought imperative, lack social relevance; that is, they appeal to a social identity which does not exist, the social identity which ensures the necessary connection of egoism and altruism so that when one acts for oneself one also acts for the good of others. I take Kant, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx as the most sophisticated, ambitious and intellectually and morally satisfying attempts in the modern age to recover the common good on the modern terrain. The problem is the impossibility of recovering the common good on this terrain. Modernity has constructed a conception of reason which denies the possibility of moral truth and moral knowledge. At this point, the book examines the social theory of Max Weber. Weber emerges as the key theorist in the way that he delineates the untranscendability of modernity and its central institutions. Weber makes clear the extent to which morality in the modern world is not a matter of objective truth, but subjective opinion. Weber explicitly rejects rationalist metaphysics and the natural moral law. His view is that the modern world is antithetical to faith and belief, indeed, to rational belief and moral truth; in such conditions, morality can exist only as a matter of private belief or dogmatic conviction – irreducible subjective opinion in which competing moral viewpoints are equally right and equally wrong. Morality loses the authority it requires to play its central role in social and individual life.

I examine the ethical system of Immanuel Kant as the closest modernity has come to a viable and enduring morality. Kant attempted the impossible, and came close in succeeding in his ambitions. But the price of failure has been high. Kant came so close and yet so far. The result has been a progressive assimilation of the Kantian system to the modernity he sought to supply with moral imperatives. The book charts the descent from Kant’s intersubjectivism and universalism to the subjectivism and relativism that characterises morality in the modern world. At this point, I consider Nietzsche’s challenge to morality. Close analysis reveals Nietzsche to be right about modern morality – its claims to universal validity are a mere ideological mask for power and interests – but wrong about morality as such. Throughout the book, I argue for the philosophical/theological synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas, grounded in rationalist metaphysics, realist epistemology and the natural moral law, as capable of overcoming the moral failures of modernity and supplying a viable and enduring objective foundation for morality. From a Thomist perspective, I read Kant as a virtue theorist, showing what Kant requires in order to make good his ethical claims concerning the highest good. However much Kant identifies the summum bonum central to moral philosophy, Kant, ultimately, is agnostic on the good, on account of his rejection of rationalist metaphysics and the natural law. This book demonstrates, through a reconstruction of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, that the highest good for human beings cannot be grounded in reason alone, but reason and nature in necessary relation. I claim no originality with respect to my presentation of the thought of St Thomas Aquinas. There are several excellent studies available and I have relied on these heavily – Davies, Copleston, McInerny, Pasnau and Shields, Gilson and Maritain. My brief has been to use these works in order to engage critically with modernity, modern thought and modern morality from a Thomist perspective. In other words, this book sets out the thought of St Thomas Aquinas with a view to exposing the moral hollowness at the heart of modernity. The book, therefore, is characterised by a structure that alternates between exegesis and engagement. I will set up the problem of morality within modernity, then introduce the thought of Thomas Aquinas. I will argue why morality matters and why Aquinas matters. I will examine Kant, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, then cut back to Aquinas, presenting his epistemology and metaphysics, and then compare and contrast Aquinas and Kant, returning to Aquinas on body and soul, sense and intellect, before concluding on ethics and the eudaimonistic order. In fine, the argument will constantly switch between discussions of morality and modernity, presentations of specific aspects of the thought of Aquinas, and comparative analysis. I should like to begin with a straight and clear argument as to why St Thomas Aquinas matters.

1 WHY AQUINAS MATTERS

I would like to start with a brief commentary on G.K. Chesterton’s remarkable little book St Thomas Aquinas, for the reason that Chesterton is so clear and pertinent that his exposition helps to make clear the importance of the Thomist synthesis in philosophy and theology. Throughout, I have relied heavily on Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Kenny, Midgley, Pasnau and Shields, McInerny, Davies and many other substantial figures in the field. I do not claim originality, only that I attempt to show why St Thomas Aquinas remains pertinent, indeed, why he has the solution to the problems of moral and political philosophy in the modern world. The themes are heavy, the arguments are often profound. But I want to turn the attention of people to St Thomas Aquinas rather than deter them with the profundity and complexity of his argument. Aquinas, it should be stated clearly, addressed the natural moral law that is imprinted in us all, which we may all understand and employ in the pursuit of the good. So I start with Chesterton because, in a book of barely one hundred words, he shows why Aquinas’ output of eight million words matters to each and all of us, regardless of whether or not we are philosophers or theologians. Knowledge is important, and Aquinas gives us that. But a good person is a good person on account of employing his or her innate moral faculties. It is in that sense that Aquinas is the most complex as well as the most simple of philosophers.

It is in these terms that Chesterton appeals:

it follows that in any such simplification I can hardly say much of the philosopher beyond showing that he had a philosophy. I have only, so to speak, given samples of that philosophy. Lastly, it follows that it is practically impossible to deal adequately with the theology. A lady I know picked up a book of selections from St. Thomas with a commentary; and began hopefully to read a section with the innocent heading, "The Simplicity of God." She then laid down the book with a sigh and said, "Well, if that's His simplicity, I wonder what His complexity is like."  With all respect to that excellent Thomistic commentary, I have no desire to have this book laid down, at the very first glance, with a similar sigh. I have taken the view that the biography is an introduction to the philosophy, and that the philosophy is an introduction to the theology; and that I can only carry the reader just beyond the first stage of the story.

Chesterton begins by comparing and contrasting the figures of St Francis and St Thomas. He points out that whilst St Thomas and St Francis form a contrast in almost every feature, ‘they were really doing the same thing. One of them was doing it in the world of the mind and the other in the world of the worldly.' Yet it was 'the same great medieval movement, still but little understood. In a constructive sense, it was more important than the Reformation. Nay, in a constructive sense, it was the Reformation'. 

This medieval movement shows the lie in accusations of superstition, Dark Ages and Scholastic sterility. Not so. The age was ‘in every sense a movement of enlargement, always moving towards greater light and even greater liberty.’ The Protestant Reformation, in contrast, was a reaction against this enlargement. Chesterton explains his reasoning: the Protestant Reformation was merely a ‘sixteenth century schism’ rather than a genuine Reformation, 'a belated revolt of the thirteenth-century pessimists. It was a back-wash of the old Augustinian Puritanism against the Aristotelian liberality.' 

That genuine liberality remains available to us since the Reformation of St Francis and St Thomas was not 'a backwash' at all. 'The Saint is a medicine because he is an antidote. Indeed, that is why the saint is often a martyr; he is mistaken for a poison because he is an antidote. He will generally be found restoring the world to sanity by exaggerating whatever the world neglects, which is by no means always the same element in every age.' The saint gives 'not what the people want, but rather what the people need.' 

It is therefore 'the paradox of history that each generation is converted by the saint who contradicts it most'. The 'popular poetry of St Francis and the almost rationalistic prose of St Thomas appear most vividly as part of the same movement' in that both contributed to 'the development of the supreme doctrine, which was also the dogma of all dogmas'. They were 'both great growths of Catholic development, depending upon external things only as every living and growing thing depends on them; that is, it digests and transforms them, but continues in its own image and not in theirs'. 

Yes; in spite of the contrasts that are as conspicuous and even comic as the comparison between the fat man and the thin man, the tall man and the short; in spite of the contrast between the vagabond and the student, between the apprentice and the aristocrat, between the book-hater and the book-lover,  between the wildest of all missionaries and the mildest of all professors, the great fact of medieval history is that these two great men were doing the same great work; one in the study and the other in the street.

St Francis and St Thomas brought something back to Christianity, something which the great schools and authorities had lost, the sense of nature and reason which had come to be associated with heresy or paganism. 

They were not bringing something new into Christianity, in the sense of something heathen or heretical into Christianity; on the contrary, they were bringing Christianity into Christendom. But they were bringing it back against the pressure of certain historic tendencies, which had hardened into habits in many great schools and authorities in the Christian Church; and they were using tools and weapons which seemed to many people to be associated with heresy or heathenry. St. Francis used Nature much as St. Thomas used Aristotle; and to some they seemed to be using a Pagan goddess and a Pagan sage.

St Francis thus brought Nature back into Christianity whilst St Thomas reconciled Aristotle with Christian cosmology. To their critics, both seemed to be heretical, even Pagan. Aristotle was held in suspicion, particularly in light of the work of Islamic philosophers. In retrospect, it is now clear that St Francis and St Thomas succeeded in reconciling natural and supernatural ends. In recovering Aristotle, St Thomas, saved us from an intimidating Platonism, that eschews the evils of matter for the pure contemplation of spirit. The recovery of Aristotle allowed St Thomas to bring God back to earth. In the process, he recovered the true meaning of the Incarnation.

Perhaps it would sound too paradoxical to say that these two saints saved us from Spirituality; a dreadful doom. Perhaps it may be misunderstood if I say that St. Francis, for all his love of animals, saved us from being Buddhists; and that St. Thomas, for all his love of Greek philosophy, saved us from being Platonists. But it is best to say the truth in its simplest form; that they both reaffirmed the Incarnation, by bringing God back to earth.

Chesterton points out that 'the historical Catholic Church began by being Platonist; by being rather too Platonist'. As a consequence, the spiritual aspect had come to dominate over the material aspect, so that body and the flesh came to be held evil, sinful, a prison of the soul. 
Chesterton is worth quoting at length here, since he shows us Aquinas’ great achievement in reconciling immanence and transcendence through incarnation:

the purely spiritual or mystical side of Catholicism had very much got the upper hand in the first Catholic centuries; through the genius of Augustine, who had been a Platonist, and perhaps never ceased to be a Platonist; through the transcendentalism of the supposed work of the Areopagite; through the Oriental trend of the later Empire and something Asiatic about the almost pontifical kinghood of Byzantium; all these things weighed down what we should now roughly call the Western element; though it has as good a right to be called the Christian element; since its common sense is but the holy familiarity of the word made flesh. Anyhow, it must suffice for the moment to say that theologians had somewhat stiffened into a sort of Platonic pride in the possession of intangible and untranslatable truths within; as if no part of their wisdom had any root anywhere in the real world. Now the first thing that Aquinas did, though by no means the last, was to say to these pure transcendentalists something substantially like this.

"Far be it from a poor friar to deny that you have these dazzling diamonds in your head, all designed in the most perfect mathematical shapes and shining with a purely celestial light; all there, almost before you begin to think, let alone to see or hear or feel. But I am not ashamed to say that I find my reason fed by my senses; that I owe a great deal of what I think to what I see and smell and taste and handle; and that so far as my reason is concerned, I feel obliged to treat all this reality as real. To be brief, in all humility, I do not believe that God meant Man to exercise only that peculiar, uplifted and abstracted sort of intellect which you are so fortunate as to possess: but I believe that there is a middle field of facts which are given by the senses to be the subject matter of the reason; and that in that field the reason has a right to rule, as the representative of God in Man. It is true that all this is lower than the angels; but it is higher than the animals, and all the actual material objects Man finds around him. True, man also can be an object; and even a deplorable object. But what man has done man may do; and if an antiquated old heathen called Aristotle can help me to do it I will thank him in all humility."

Of course, what Aquinas did actually write is more complicated than this, and represents one of the great achievements of philosophy. But here Chesterton gives us the essence of Aquinas’ reconciliation of immanence and transcendence, the toughest nut to crack in the whole of philosophy and theology.

As a result, St. Thomas ‘was making Christendom more Christian in making it more Aristotelian.’

This is not a paradox but a plain truism, which can only be missed by those who may know what is meant by an Aristotelian, but have simply forgotten what is meant by a Christian. As compared with a Jew, a Moslem, a Buddhist, a Deist, or most obvious alternatives, a Christian means a man who believes that deity or sanctity has attached to matter or entered the world of the senses.

It is in this sense of bringing religion down to earth that Chesterton values the work of both St Frances and St Thomas.

They will talk of the readiness of St. Francis to learn from the flowers or the birds as something that can only point onward to the Pagan Renaissance. Whereas the fact stares them in the face; first, that it points backwards to the New Testament, and second that it points forward, if it points to anything, to the Aristotelian realism of the Summa of St. Thomas Aquinas. They vaguely imagine that anybody who is humanising divinity must be paganising divinity without seeing that the humanising of divinity is actually the strongest and starkest and most incredible dogma in the Creed. 

St Francis's readiness to learn from nature and the animals was not Paganism but a recovery of the New Testament, all of which chimed with the recovery of Aristotelian realism in the realism of St Thomas. Thus, 'humanising divinity' is not the same as 'paganising divinity', since 'the humanising of divinity is actually the strongest and starkest and most incredible dogma in the Creed':

St. Francis was becoming more like Christ, and not merely more like Buddha, when he considered the lilies of the field or the fowls of the air; and St. Thomas was becoming more of a Christian, and not merely more of an Aristotelian, when he insisted that God and the image of God had come in contact through matter with a material world. 

Thus, for Chesterton claims that St Francis and St Thomas were Humanists for the extent they came to place on the immense importance of the human being, articulating a Christian Humanism in that their work revealed the real meaning of Incarnation. 

These saints were, in the most exact sense of the term, Humanists; because they were insisting on the immense importance of the human being in the theological scheme of things. But they were not Humanists marching along a path of progress that leads to Modernism and general scepticism; for in their very Humanism they were affirming a dogma now often regarded as the most superstitious Superhumanism. They were strengthening that staggering doctrine of Incarnation, which the sceptics find it hardest to believe. There cannot be a stiffer piece of Christian divinity than the divinity of Christ.

St Francis and St Thomas therefore became more ‘orthodox, when they became more rational or natural.’ 
Both 'the Thomist movement in metaphysics' - with its recovery, thanks to Aristotle, whom Thomas had 'baptised' and miraculously 'raised... from the dead', of 'the most defiant of all dogmas, the wedding of God with Man and therefore with Matter' — and also 'the Franciscan movement in morals and manners' were 'an enlargement and a liberation', both were 'emphatically a growth of Christian theology from within' and 'emphatically not a shrinking of Christian theology under heathen or even human influences'. 

The Franciscan was free to be a friar, instead of being bound to be a monk. But he was more of a Christian, more of a Catholic, even more of an ascetic. So the Thomist was free to be an Aristotelian, instead of being bound to be an Augustinian. But he was even more of a theologian; more of an orthodox theologian; more of a dogmatist, in having recovered through Aristotle the most defiant of all dogmas, the wedding of God with Man and therefore with Matter.

Later, I shall discuss Max Weber and his heterogeneity of values at length. Weber envisages a world in which ancient gods arise from their graves and take the form of vast impersonal forces enslaving one and all. It sounds like Dante’s Inferno to me, Lucifer petrified in ice, in the same way that Weber characterises the modern world as a ‘mechanised petrification’. 

St Thomas Aquinas offers us something better, not even a Renascence but a Nascence.

Nobody can understand the greatness of the thirteenth century, who does not realise that it was a great growth of new things produced by a living thing. In that sense it was really bolder and freer than what we call the Renaissance, which was a resurrection of old things discovered in a dead thing. In that sense medievalism was not a Renascence, but rather a Nascence. It did not model its temples upon the tombs, or call up dead gods from Hades. It made an architecture as new as modern engineering; indeed it still remains the most modern architecture. Only it was followed at the Renaissance by a more antiquated architecture. In that sense the Renaissance might be called the Relapse. Whatever may be said of the Gothic and the Gospel according to St. Thomas, they were not a Relapse. It was a new thrust like the titanic thrust of Gothic engineering; and its strength was in a God who makes all things new.

There are those who claim that Max Weber is a philosopher who gives us a philosophy of life. Weber gives us nothing to compare with Aquinas, only the pessimistic assertion that there are no solutions to the problems of a modernity, after he has ruled out the conditions of those solutions.

Both St Francis and St Thomas 'felt subconsciously' that the 'hold' of Christians was 'slipping on the solid Catholic doctrine and discipline, worn smooth by more than a thousand years of routine; and that the Faith needed to be shown under a new light and dealt with from another angle'. The Faith had become 'too Platonist to be popular. It needed something like the shrewd and homely touch of Aristotle to turn it again into a religion of common sense.' 

Both the motive and the method are illustrated in the war of Aquinas against the Augustinians.

Christian theology 'tended more and more to be a sort of dried up Platonism; a thing of diagrams and abstractions... not sufficiently touched by that great thing that is by definition almost the opposite of abstraction: Incarnation'. The Platonic influence was definitely tending towards a Manichaean philosophy, which existed outside the Church in the 'fiercer' form of the Albigensian heresy and inside the Church in the 'subtler' form of an Augustinianism that 'derived partly from Plato'. (TA 419, 424, 426-9, 432-3, 436-7, 464, 466-7, 485-6, 492).

‘Their Logos was the Word; but not the Word made Flesh.’

It thought of God too exclusively as a Spirit who purifies or a Saviour who redeems; and too little as a Creator who creates. That is why men like Aquinas thought it right to correct Plato by an appeal to Aristotle; Aristotle who took things as he found them, just as Aquinas accepted things as God created them. In all the work of St. Thomas the world of positive creation is perpetually present. Humanly speaking, it was he who saved the human element in Christian theology, if he used for convenience certain elements in heathen philosophy. Only, as has already been urged, the human element is also the Christian one.

The 'Optimism' of St Thomas ran in entirely a contrary direction to the Platonist pessimism concerning the body and the material world conceived as a tomb of the soul: 

He did, with a most solid and colossal conviction, believe in Life: and in something like what Stevenson called the great theorem of the livableness of life. It breathes somehow in his very first phrases about the reality of Being. If the morbid Renaissance intellectual is supposed to say, "To be or not to be-- that is the question," then the massive medieval doctor does most certainly reply in a voice of thunder, "To be - that is the answer." The point is important; many not unnaturally talk of the Renaissance as the time when certain men began to believe in Life. The truth is that it was the time when a few men, for the first time, began to disbelieve in Life.

For Aquinas, there was nothing to debate between being and not-being, it was a non-question. The question ‘to be or not to be’ could never even has arisen in a properly ordered universe. The question is why thanatos has come to stalk the modern world.

Never until modern thought began, did they really have to fight with men who desired to die. That horror had threatened them in Asiatic Albigensianism, but it never became normal to them--until now.

Aquinas is an existentialist. He goes beyond essence as some passive state to affirm be-ing. St Thomas was 'vitally and vividly alone in declaring that life is a living story, with a great beginning and a great close; rooted in the primeval joy of God and finding its fruition in the final happiness of humanity; opening with the colossal chorus in which the sons of God shouted for joy, and ending in that mystical comradeship, shown in a shadowy fashion in those ancient words that move like an archaic dance; "For His delight is with the sons of men."

The Thomist system is firmly grounded in 'one huge and yet simple idea, which does actually cover everything there is, and even everything that could possibly be.’ Aquinas represents this ‘cosmic conception’ in the word Ens, 'being'. Chesterton doesn’t like the word ‘being’, preferring the Latin Ens. Here, he asserts language over logic, since Ens 'has a sound like the English word End': 'It is final and even abrupt; it is nothing except itself.' And it was upon 'this sharp pin-point of reality' that 'There is an is', that Thomas had reared 'the whole cosmic system of Christendom'. (TA 489, 491, 517-18, 529.) 

Well, when it comes to logic, St Thomas’ work is full of ends. But Chesterton’s instincts are right. Aquinas does not rest with being but instead affirms act-of-being. Aquinas affirms the primacy of existence over essence, out of essence. He emphasises agency and act over rules, he claims virtuous activity to be the end of philosophy, active reason, argues that all potency is ordered to its act, emphasises flourishing well as acting morally, shows how human beings act on the basis of dispositions, organises these dispositions through the acquisition of virtues, habits and habitus, defines the human good as rational virtuous activity. In fine, Aquinas emphasises human agency. To act is to be. The question to be or not to be only arises when we have lost touch with our roots in rational metaphysics and ontological nature. What needs to be explained is the reason for our confusion on the matter.

St Thomas was not 'ashamed' to point out that his reason was 'fed' by his senses, and that, with respect to his reason, he felt 'obliged to treat all this reality as real'. He was clear that there was nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses. Aquinas did not set reason against the senses; he put them together. The rationalist and empiricist debate that has kept modern philosophers for a few hundred years did not arise for Aquinas.

For him there was 'this primary idea of a central common sense that is nourished by the five senses'. 

But at this stage, the point of the story is not only that this was a Thomist doctrine, but that it is a truly and eminently Christian doctrine. For upon this point modern writers write a great deal of nonsense; and show more than their normal ingenuity in missing the point. Having assumed without argument, at the start, that all emancipation must lead men away from religion and towards irreligion, they have just blankly and blindly forgotten what is the outstanding feature of the religion itself.

The war between science and religion, knowledge and ignorance, reason and superstition is a phoney war. It keeps the semi-clever in an occupation but sheds little light on substantive matters. 

The sectarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were essentially obscurantists, and they guarded an obscurantist legend that the Schoolman was an obscurantist. This was wearing thin even in the nineteenth century; it will be impossible in the twentieth. It has nothing to do with the truth of their theology or his; but only with the truth of historical proportion, which begins to reappear as quarrels begin to die down.

If these quarrels should ever die down. Extremes tend to breed extremes and the voice of reason cannot be heard in the noise.

As 'one of the great liberators of the human intellect', Aquinas 'reconciled religion with reason ... expanded it towards experimental science... insisted that the senses were the windows of the soul and that the reason had a divine right to feed upon facts, and that it was the business of the Faith to digest the strong meat of the toughest and most practical of pagan philosophies'. 

In all of this, Aquinas emerges as the real 'Reformer', a liberator who affirmed the connection between reason and freedom. 

It is a fact, like the military strategy of Napoleon, that Aquinas was thus fighting for all that is liberal and enlightened, as compared with his rivals, or for that matter his successors and supplanters. 

It was the Schoolman who was the true Reformer. The later reformers like Martin Luther were 'by comparison reactionaries', denigrating reason as 'utterly untrustworthy'. St Thomas 'stood up stoutly for the fact that a man's body is his body as his mind is his mind; and that he can only be a balance and union of the two', making him a materialist in the true sense, a sense that modern materialists would emphatically reject.

Now this is in some ways a naturalistic notion, very near to the modern respect for material things; a praise of the body that might be sung by Walt Whitman or justified by D. H. Lawrence: a thing that might be called Humanism or even claimed by Modernism. In fact, it may be Materialism; but it is the flat contrary of Modernism. It is bound up, in the modern view, with the most monstrous, the most material, and therefore the most miraculous of miracles. It is specially connected with the most startling sort of dogma, which the Modernist can least accept; the Resurrection of the Body.

Further, whilst St Thomas's argument for revelation is 'quite rationalistic', it is also 'decidedly democratic and popular'.

His argument for Revelation is not in the least an argument against Reason. On the contrary, he seems inclined to admit that truth could be reached by a rational process, if only it were rational enough; and also long enough. Indeed, something in his character, which I have called elsewhere optimism, and for which I know no other approximate term, led him rather to exaggerate the extent to which all men would ultimately listen to reason. In his controversies, he always assumes that they will listen to reason. That is, he does emphatically believe that men can be convinced by argument; when they reach the end of the argument. Only his common sense also told him that the argument never ends.

Aquinas thought that 'the souls of all the ordinary hard-working and simple-minded people' were 'quite as important as the souls of thinkers and truth-seekers', wondering how the masses as opposed to the intellectuals could 'find time for the amount of reasoning that is needed to find truth'. Aquinas valued 'scientific enquiry' but also had 'a strong sympathy with the average man', holding the necessity of Revelation since 'men must receive the highest moral truths in a miraculous manner; or most men would not receive them at all'. 

His argument for Revelation is not an argument against Reason; but it is an argument for Revelation. The conclusion he draws from it is that men must receive the highest moral truths in a miraculous manner; or most men would not receive them at all. His arguments are rational and natural; but his own deduction is all for the supernatural; and, as is common in the case of his argument, it is not easy to find any deduction except his own deduction.

Since he had a 'strong sense of human dignity and liberty', affirming ‘a noble humanistic liberality’, Aquinas insisted on ‘Free Will, or the moral responsibility of Man’: 'Upon this sublime and perilous liberty hang heaven and hell, and all the mysterious drama of the soul.' (TA 429-30, 434-5).

The 'materialism' of St Thomas Aquinas articulates a 'Christian humility', since he was 'willing to begin by recording the facts and sensations of the material world, just as he would have been willing to begin by washing up the plates and dishes in the monastery'. 

The point of his Aristotelianism was that even if common sense about concrete things really was a sort of servile labour, he must not be ashamed to be servus servorum Dei. Among heathens the mere sceptic might become the mere cynic; Diogenes in his tub had always a touch of the tub-thumper; but even the dirt of the cynics was dignified into dust and ashes among the saints. If we miss that, we miss the whole meaning of the greatest revolution in history. There was a new motive for beginning with the most material, and even with the meanest things.

In this, Aquinas inaugurated a revolution in the human attitude towards the senses, steering Christianity clear of a Platonist asceticism and intellectualism and towards 'the sensations of the body and the experiences of the common man', which could now be regarded 'with a reverence at which great Aristotle would have stared, and no man in the ancient world could have begun to understand':

The Body was no longer what it was when Plato and Porphyry and the old mystics had left it for dead. It had hung upon a gibbet. It had risen from a tomb. It was no longer possible for the soul to despise the senses, which had been the organs of something that was more than man. Plato might despise the flesh; but God had not despised it.

The senses had truly become sanctified; as they are blessed one by one at a Catholic baptism. "Seeing is believing" was no longer the platitude of a mere idiot, or common individual, as in Plato's world; it was mixed up with real conditions of real belief. Those revolving mirrors that send messages to the brain of man, that light that breaks upon the brain, these had truly revealed to God himself the path to Bethany or the light on the high rock of Jerusalem. These ears that resound with common noises had reported also to the secret knowledge of God the noise of the crowd that strewed palms and the crowd that cried for Crucifixion. 

Since 'there was in Plato a sort of idea that people would be better without their bodies; that their heads might fly off and meet in the sky in merely intellectual marriage, like cherubs in a picture', it should come as no surprise that the Augustinian world developed 'an emotional mood to abandon the body in despair'. However, once 'the Incarnation had become the idea that is central in our civilisation, it was inevitable that there should be a return to materialism, in the sense of the serious value of matter and the making of the body. When once Christ had risen, it was inevitable that Aristotle should rise again.’

Thomas expressed an unambiguously 'positive' attitude to creation, a mind 'which is filled and soaked as with sunshine with the warmth of the wonder of created things'. Aquinas was positively 'avid in his acceptance of Things; in his hunger and thirst for Things':

It was his special spiritual thesis that there really are things; and not only the Thing; that the Many existed as well as the One. I do not mean things to eat or drink or wear, though he never denied to these their place in the noble hierarchy of Being; but rather things to think about, and especially things to prove, to experience and to know.

Aquinas was a rationalist to the core, seeking to give reasons and account for everything in the world; but he was clear that 'everything that is in the intellect has been in the senses'. 

And he was a philosopher who remained 'faithful to his first love', which was 'love at first sight': 'I mean that he immediately recognised a real quality in things; and afterwards resisted all the disintegrating doubts arising from the nature of those things.' Aquinas was not a sceptic. The truth existed and could be found and known. At the heart of his philosophical realism was 'a sort of purely Christian humility and fidelity', which ensured that Aquinas remained 'true to the first truth' and refused 'the first treason'. 

He will not deny what he has seen, though it be a secondary and diverse reality. He will not take away the numbers he first thought of, though there may be quite a number of them.

This in contrast to those philosophers who 'dissolve the stick or the stone in chemical solutions of scepticism; either in the medium of mere time and change; or in the difficulties of classification of unique units; or in the difficulty of recognising variety while admitting unity'. St Thomas remained 'stubborn in the same obstinate objective fidelity. He has seen grass and gravel; and he is not disobedient to the heavenly vision.' Even 'the doubts and difficulties about reality' drove him 'to believe in more reality rather than less': 'If things deceive us, it is by being more real than they seem.' If things seemed 'to have a relative unreality', it was because they were 'potential and not actual', 'unfulfilled, like packets of seeds or boxes of fireworks'. 

He has seen grass; and will not say he has not seen grass, because it today is and tomorrow is cast into the oven. That is the substance of all scepticism about change, transition, transformism and the rest. He will not say that there is no grass but only growth. If grass grows and withers, it can only mean that it is part of a greater thing, which is even more real; not that the grass is less real than it looks. St. Thomas has a really logical right to say, in the words of the modern mystic, A. E.: "I begin by the grass to be bound again to the Lord".

Chesterton maintains that no other thinker was 'so unmistakably thinking about things and not being misled by the indirect influence of words'. There was an 'elemental and primitive poetry that shines through all his thoughts; and especially through the thought with which all his thinking begins. It is the intense lightness of his sense of the relation between the mind and the real thing outside the mind.' The 'light in all poetry, and indeed in all art' was the 'strangeness of things'—that is, their 'otherness; or what is called their objectivity'. 

Aquinas avoids the inward turn of philosophy that came to afflict modern philosophy after Descartes. To repeat, for Aquinas, there is nothing in the intellect that has not been in the senses first.

This is where he began, as much as any modern man of science, nay, as much as any modern materialist who can now hardly be called a man of science; at the very opposite end of enquiry from that of the mere mystic. The Platonists, or at least the Neo-Platonists, all tended to the view that the mind was lit entirely from within; St. Thomas insisted that it was lit by five windows, that we call the windows of the senses. But he wanted the light from without to shine  on what was within. He wanted to study the nature of Man, and not merely of such moss and mushrooms as he might see through the window, and which he valued as the first enlightening experience of man. And starting from this point, he proceeds to climb the House of Man, step by step and story by story, until he has come out on the highest tower and beheld the largest vision.

‘In the subjectivist, the pressure of the world forces the imagination inwards.’ For Aquinas, 'the energy of the mind forces the imagination outwards', since 'the images it seeks are real things'. The 'romance and glamour' of these images in the mind lies in the fact that they are 'real things; things not to be found by staring inwards at the mind'. ‘The flower is a vision because it is not only a vision. Or, if you will, it is a vision because it is not a dream.’

According to Aquinas, the object becomes a part of the mind; nay, according to Aquinas, the mind actually becomes the object. But, as one commentator acutely puts it, it only becomes the object and does not create the object. In other words, the object is an object; it can and does exist outside the mind, or in the absence of the mind. And therefore it enlarges the mind of which it becomes a part. The mind conquers a new province like an emperor; but only because the mind has answered the bell like a servant. The mind has opened the doors and windows, because it is the natural activity of what is inside the house to find out what is outside the house. If the mind is sufficient to itself, it is insufficient for itself. For this feeding upon fact is itself; as an organ it has an object which is objective; this eating of the strange strong meat of reality.

Aquinas springs the mental trap and avoids the snare that to which all philosophers are prone to step into, that of becoming walled up in concepts. Far from the mind being 'sufficient to itself’, it was 'insufficient for itself’. Aquinas rejects Kant’s self-sufficiency of reason: ‘For this feeding upon fact is itself; as an organ it has an object which is objective; this eating of the strange strong meat of reality.' 
No less than Kant is Aquinas aware of the activity of the mind in making sense of the world around us. Aquinas understood that the mind was 'not merely receptive, in the sense that it absorbs sensations like so much blotting-paper; on that sort of softness has been based all that cowardly materialism, which conceives man as wholly servile to his environment'. But Aquinas does not go to the other extreme of arguing that the mind was 'purely creative, in the sense that it paints pictures on the windows and then mistakes them for a landscape outside': 'In other words, the essence of the Thomist common sense is that two agencies are at work; reality and the recognition of reality; and their meeting is a sort of marriage. Indeed it is very truly a marriage, because it is fruitful; the only philosophy now in the world that really is fruitful. It produces practical results, precisely because it is the combination of an adventurous mind and a strange fact.' (TA 487, 492-4, 505, 525, 536-42.)

M. Maritain has used an admirable metaphor, in his book Theonas, when he says that the external fact fertilises the internal intelligence, as the bee fertilises the flower. Anyhow, upon that marriage, or whatever it may be called, the whole system of St. Thomas is founded; God made Man so that he was capable of coming in contact with reality; and those whom God hath joined, let no man put asunder.

Chesterton states clearly that it is 'a matter of common sense' that Thomism was 'the philosophy of common sense'. For Thomas did not 'deal at all with what many now think the main metaphysical question; whether we can prove that the primary act of recognition of any reality is real'. This was because Aquinas 'recognised instantly... that a man must either answer that question in the affirmative, or else never answer any question, never ask any question, never even exist intellectually, to answer or to ask'. Certainly, it is possible that a person could be 'a fundamental sceptic', but s/he couldn’t be 'anything else'. A sceptic cannot be 'a defender of fundamental scepticism', since that would amount to a claim to knowing the truth. In exposing the inadequacies of scepticism, Chesterton is concerned to show the extent to which St Thomas aligns himself with 'the ordinary man's acceptance of ordinary truisms'. 

The only point I am stressing here is that Aquinas is almost always on the side of simplicity, and supports the ordinary man's acceptance of ordinary truisms. For instance, one of the most obscure passages, in my very inadequate judgment, is that in which he explains how the mind is certain of an external object and not merely of an impression of that object; and yet apparently reaches it through a concept, though not merely through an impression. But the only point here is that he does explain that the mind is certain of an external object. It is enough for this purpose that his conclusion is what is called the conclusion of common sense; that it is his purpose to justify common sense; even though he justifies it in a passage which happens to be one of rather uncommon subtlety. The problem of later philosophers is that their conclusion is as dark as their demonstration; or that they bring out a result of which the result is chaos.

In complete contrast with those intellectuals who speak over the heads of the masses, privately and sometimes publicly holding them in contempt, St Thomas, 'the one real Rationalist', given to 'the unusual hobby of thinking', was 'arguing for a common sense which would... commend itself to most of the common people'. (TA 478, 513, 517, 519, 522).

He is arguing for the popular proverbs that seeing is believing; that the proof of the pudding is in the eating; that a man cannot jump down his own throat or deny the fact of his own existence. He often maintains the view by the use of abstractions; but the abstractions are no more abstract than Energy or Evolution or Space-Time; and they do not land us, as the others often do, in hopeless contradictions about common life. The Pragmatist sets out to be practical, but his practicality turns out to be entirely theoretical. The Thomist begins by being theoretical, but his theory turns out to be entirely practical. That is why a great part of the world is returning to it today.

Chesterton concludes on a critical note. He refers to the Reformation, the day when, 'in one sense, perhaps, the Augustinian tradition was avenged after all', although neither Augustine nor the medieval Augustinians 'would have desired' to see that day. Martin Luther, an Augustinian friar, was responsible for taking a belated revenge on Thomism, with consequences which proved disastrous for Christianity, fracturing the universal Church into myriad sects.

For there was one particular monk in that Augustinian monastery in the German forests, who may be said to have had a single and special talent for emphasis; for emphasis and nothing except emphasis; for emphasis with the quality of earthquake.

And that Lutheran emphasis was really the old Augustinian emphasis on 'the impotence of man before God, the omniscience of God about the destiny of man, the need for holy fear and the humiliation of intellectual pride, more than the opposite and corresponding truths of free will or human dignity or good works'. It was this tradition that

came out of its cell again, in the day of storm and ruin, and cried out with a new and mighty voice for an elemental and emotional religion, and for the destruction of all philosophies. It had a peculiar horror and loathing of the great Greek philosophies, and of the scholasticism that had been founded on these philosophies. It had one theory that was the destruction of all theories; in fact it had its own theology which was itself the death of theology. Man could say nothing to God, nothing from God, nothing about God, except an almost inarticulate cry for mercy and for the supernatural help of Christ, in a world where all natural things were useless. Reason was useless. Man could not move himself an inch any more than a stone. Man could not trust what was in his head any more than a turnip. Nothing remained in earth of heaven, but the name of Christ lifted in that lonely imprecation; awful as the cry of a beast in pain.

In fine, all that Thomas Aquinas had put together with respect to nature and reason and faith was torn asunder. The great Thomist synthesis was lost and we have been searching for the common ground of the common good ever since.

One of the 'huge, hinges of history', Luther's 'broad and burly figure' was 'big enough to block out for four centuries the distant human mountain of Aquinas'. And to what end? Chesterton states that Luther's pessimistic theology which insists on 'the hopelessness of all human virtue' is not a theology that modern Protestants would be 'seen dead in a field with; or if the phrase be too flippant, would be specially anxious to touch with a barge-pole'. 

That Protestantism was pessimism; it was nothing but bare insistence on the hopelessness of all human virtue, as an attempt to escape hell.

He describes all that Lutheranism as 'now quite unreal', however much 'Luther was not unreal': 'He was one of those great elemental barbarians, to whom it is indeed given to change the world.' Luther’s achievements have proven destructive and negative. Whilst on 'a great map like the mind of Aquinas, the mind of Luther would be almost invisible', nevertheless, it is 'not altogether untrue to say.. .that Luther opened an epoch; and began the modern world'. That is the world we are in. It took a mind as mighty as that of Kant to attempt to recover the summum bonum, but his own Pietism ensured he remained in Luther’s world. Hegel made the point by distinguishing between the self subject to positive religion and the Kantian self: 'the former carries his master outside himself, while the latter carries his master within himself and is in bondage to himself’ (Hegel ETW 1971:211). 

(I discuss the connection between Martin Luther and Kant’s exchanging of an external religiosity for an internal religiosity, an inner priest or constraint, in Kant and the Ethics of Rational Nature (2007).

Chesterton reports that Luther 'publicly-burned the Summa Theologica and the works of Aquinas'. And with it, Christianity lost touch with the man who had succeeded in putting nature, reason, faith and revelation together. In burning Aquinas, Luther demolished the foundations of the universal Church and paved the way for modern secularism, relativism, subjectivism and atheism:





Well, frankly, that has been our loss. We live in a world that evinces a great wealth of means and an absence of ends. 

For a time it seemed that the destruction was final. It is still expressed in the amazing fact that (in the North) modern men can still write histories of philosophy, in which philosophy stops with the last little sophists of Greece and Rome; and is never heard of again until the appearance of such a third-rate philosopher as Francis Bacon. 

I shall have to plead guilty here. My PhD thesis began with Plato and Aristotle and then jumped centuries to Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx. I now realise that these modern philosophers were searching for the lost promise of the natural law and the common good. We need to go backwards to Aquinas in order to move forwards beyond the moral and political impasse of modernity. 

So maybe Chesterton was right all along and ‘the tide has turned once more.’ ‘It is four hundred years after; and this book, I hope (and I am happy to say I believe) will probably be lost and forgotten in the flood of better books about St. Thomas Aquinas, which are at this moment pouring from every printing-press in Europe, and even in England and America. Compared with such books it is obviously a very slight and amateurish production; but it is not likely to be burned, and if it were, it would not leave even a noticeable gap in the pouring mass of new and magnificent work, which is now daily dedicated to the philosophia perennis; to the Everlasting Philosophy.’

I shall in the course of this book return to the work of Etienne Gilson. Gilson was a scholar of the highest order, and his knowledge of Aquinas far surpassed that of Chesterton. But Gilson spoke in the highest terms of Chesterton’s little book. To Father Kevin Scannell, Gilson wrote: 'My reason for admiring his "Thomas Aquinas" as I do, precisely is that I find him always right in his conclusions about the man and the doctrine even though in fact, he knew so little about him.' Gilson felt that Chesterton was 'nearer the real Thomas' than he was even 'after reading and teaching the Angelic Doctor for sixty years'. (Etienne Gilson to Kevin Scannell, 7 Jan. 1966, BL Add. MS 73472, fo. 105.)

And that is why it is worth opening the book with a short essay in which G.K. Chesterton makes it clear why St Thomas Aquinas will always matter.

2 The Return of Virtue
Interest in public philosophy and practical ethics have been increasing in recent years, largely inspired by Alasdair MacIntyre’s forthright – and I believe fundamentally correct - After Virtue (MacIntyre 1981; Foot 1978; O Neill 1984; Louden 1984). The most extensive book length treatment of virtue ethics comes from Michael Slote (1992). Virtue ethics has come from seemingly nowhere to offer a serious rival to the dominant deontological and utilitarian theories.

In a paper from 1988, David Solomon argues that 'the most striking feature of virtue ethics is the near universality of its rejection in contemporary ethical theory and in modern ethics generally'. (Solomon 1997). Just three years later, Rosalind Hursthouse could claim that '[VE] is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories'. (Hursthouse 1997). From a place out in the wilderness, virtue ethics has come to be ‘prominent, if not pre-eminent, in contemporary moral philosophy.' (Cordner 1994: 291). John Cottingham goes so far as to claim that 'the revival of [virtue theory] seems to be one of the most promising recent developments in philosophical ethics'. (Cottingham 1994: 177).
Much work here has focused on the practical philosophy of Aristotle and Kant. I believe that the work of Thomas Aquinas should receive much greater prominence in this company. Not only is Aquinas a central figure in the Aristotelian tradition which forms the core of virtue ethics, his work clarifies and resolves certain antinomies in Kant’s own position. 

In the way that he links epistemology, ontology and anthropology within a realist metaphysics, Aquinas offers strong arguments upon which to buttress the revival of virtue ethics and practical philosophy. The failure of marxism to redeem its promise to transcend the capital system from within has exposed the moral nihilism at the heart of modernity, pointing to the need to clarify the fundamental opposition between the Aristotelian-Thomist ethics concerning the good and the rationalist, individualist liberal ethics which is expressed by various forms of relativism, ultimately ending in nihilism and irrationalism.

The underlying assumption of this book is a simple one. Modernity is parasitic upon past forms of morality and is morally unsustainable. Modernity dissipates the moral capital that has been built over generations whilst doing nothing to replenish the stock. Modernity makes the conditions of morality impossible. The claim is not that modernity lacks morality. There are many conceptions of morality in the modern world. It’s just that they lack ontological significance and social relevance. (Ross 1955; Scheffler 1982; Ayer 1946.)

If any one philosopher bears responsibility for the impoverishment of moral philosophy in the twentieth century, then it has to be the analytical philosopher G. E. Moore. Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903) did more than any other work to divert the attention of philosophers away from the substantive questions which formed the stuff of morality towards the analysis of moral judgements. Ethics came to be displaced by 'meta-ethics.' Moore is also responsible for the argument that it is impossible to define moral concepts by reference to empirical (natural) concepts - the 'naturalistic fallacy.' The view was certainly influential, although why is anyone’s guess. In retrospect it merely looks like a loss of philosophical nerve in face of scientific advance. The result was the dissolution of morality into value judgement. For reasons to be given, this, for Immanuel Kant, spelled the end of moral philosophy. Unfortunately, modern moral philosophers have been culpable in the demise of moral philosophy. For Moore, the truth of moral judgements is to be ascertained by the intuitive apprehension of non-natural moral properties in the world. How we may distinguish these intuitions in terms of good and bad, right and wrong, is less than clear in the absence of the objective criteria that grounding in nature provides. Intuition, it soon became clear, provides no help at all when it comes to deciding between moral positions and settling moral disputes within a culture, and that’s before we even come to the problem of moral divergence between cultures. The idea, however, commanded the widespread allegiance of a number of influential philosophers and spawned any number of varieties. Emotivism is the idea that moral judgements are merely the expressions of the speaker's emotions. (Stevenson 1937: 14—31; Stevenson 1963; Ayer 1946). R. M. Hare's 'prescriptivism' continued in the spirit of emotivism, arguing that moral judgements work more like commands than expressions of emotion. They express overriding commitments which apply to everyone, the speaker included (Hare 1952; Hare 1963).

My case is not that modernity lacks moral principles and values. The problem is that modernity generates its own moralities. Emotivism is a morality that certainly fits the sceptical temper of the modern age. The problem is not that modernity cannot generate moralities, it is that it can offer no good reason for believing in them. Kant argued that there would be no moral philosophy if we lost the conception of morally necessary ends. (Kant 1964 43, Ak. 384). I say modern morality has lost precisely that concept of morally necessary ends.

The problem is that Kant himself was working within a modern moral tradition that stripped ontological nature of its moral significance. Where Aquinas could ground such necessary ends in purposive nature, Kant located morality in reason. For Kant, reason is its own justification. This is not a stable situation at all. Kant is working within modern constraints that threaten to overwhelm his case for a universal, intersubjective morality. 





Unless Kant can ground morally necessary ends in nature, he can offer no good reasons to obligate individuals, other than an apparently abstract reason. That is not Kant’s view, of course, in that Kant did attempt to connect reason and nature in a necessary and teleological sense. But this separation and abstraction leading to arbitrariness and ultimately subjectivism and relativism is a highly probable outcome of the impossibility of securing the grounds of morality in modern conditions. For modernity is organised around a conception of knowledge that denies the very possibility of moral knowledge. In these conditions, morality ceases to be a matter of rational principle located in objective reality, but value judgements, mere subjective opinion. In a world in which reason and faith have parted company, morality may linger on as a matter of private conscience. But that is very different from morality as something authoritative within public life, playing an active role in integrating social and individual life. And it is very different from the idea of ethics and politics as practical reason.

This book reads the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant in light of the universal moral principles and values of Thomas Aquinas. Many would question the point and even the possibility of such a reading. Jacques Maritain refers to ‘the great Kantian heresy’ and contrasts Kant and Aquinas ‘as two worlds in irreducible conflict’. (Maritain The Apostle of Modern Times).

Maritain focuses in particular upon Kant’s rejection of metaphysics as knowledge and argues instead for the reintegration of the philosophy of being into Western civilization. I, too, am concerned to argue for this reintegration of being and knowing. Despite a background that favours Aristotle and Hegel, I am not, however, so hostile to Kant. I shall declare my sympathies immediately with the Aristotelian Thomists. That said, the transcendental Thomists are not wrong in believing that Kant has plenty to offer Thomism, certainly when one replaces Kant’s epistemological idealism with Aquinas’ realism. Kant is a good man fallen in the world of mechanistic science. Ends, purposes, efficient causality, finality, the lot can all be restored to strengthen Kant’s emphasis on practical reason, buttress his ethic of ends and support his pursuit of the summum bonum.

McInerny proposes a threefold division into three Thomisms: transcendental Thomism, existential Thomism, and Aristotelian Thomism. (McInerny 2004 Pt 3).

Transcendental Thomism may be roughly characterized as based on the belief that the Kantian critique is justified. Consequently, if Thomism is to gain a hearing from a world in which that view of Kant is shared, a post-critical Thomas must be fashioned. Marcechal can be considered the father of this movement, which includes such figures as Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, all Jesuits. Maurice  Blondel's influence on Henri de Lubac is a variant of transcendental Thomism. To simplify even further, transcendental Thomism, having abandoned epistemological realism, seeks to find in the workings of the human mind warrant for objective truths. This type of Thomism is favored by theologians rather than philosophers, as even its proponents acknowledge. (McInerny 2004 Pt 3).

I follow Kant in pointing to the active role of the cognitive apparatus of the human mind in shaping reality. But I reject Kant’s epistemological idealism for Aquinas’ realism. The mind is active in working upon something that exists in the first place. As St Thomas argues, there is nothing the mind that wasn’t in the senses first. The mind nevertheless retains an active role.

Existential Thomism, while it bears some incidental relation to postwar Existentialism, is based upon the conviction that the real composition of essence and existence in everything but God is the clef de voute of Thomism. Etienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro are the giants of this school, but there are significant differences between them. What is shared is the assumption that the distinction of essence and existence provides a warrant for metaphysics without any dependence on a philosophy of nature. Peculiar to Gilson is his insistence that the order of theology is the order of philosophy for Thomas and that his relation to Aristotle is ultimately antagonistic. In the eyes of critics, existential Thomism, in its final Gilsonian phases, is the abandonment of philosophy in favour of a Christian philosophy indistinguishable from theology. (McInerny 2004 Pt 3).

I agree that Thomas Aquinas is an existential, in that he goes beyond Being as a passive state to emphasise the act-of-being, existence. The connection with ontological nature remains, however, in my view.

Aristotelian Thomism is exemplified in Part II of this presentation. It seems to me clearly to be the most faithful and fruitful approach to Thomas. Moreover, by emphasizing the autonomy of philosophy - though of course for the believer philosophizing is never separate from his faith - it is better able to enter the wider philosophical marketplace. Of course, Aristotle is not in the ascendancy in contemporary philosophy, though he remains a permanent point of reference. Obviously, there are merits in the other approaches to Thomas, and it is a mark of Aristotelian Thomism that it is always on the qui vive for such merits since it aspires to assimilate in the principled way of Thomas himself. (McInerny 2004 Pt 3).





3 Morality and Modernity

Moral Knowledge
Ethics in the Aristotelian tradition is an applied science. (Eudemian Ethics in Ackrill 1987; Vella 2008 ch 5; Edel 1982 ch 16; Shields 2007 ch 9; Evans 1987 ch 8). Whilst not an empirical science in the manner of physics or chemistry, ethics is still a science in the sense that it yields knowledge, particularly knowledge of the human good. (Kraut 1989). There is such a thing as moral knowledge. And ethics is an applied science in the sense that it concerns the application of abstract principles within the concrete reality of human action. Ethics combines knowledge and action showing what the moral person has to aim at and what s/he has to do in order to act moral and be moral. To act well is to live well and to flourish well (Shields 2007 ch 8; Kraut 2002 ch 3).

Thus, Etienne Gilson analyses the human act. 

It is common to regard the creative act as having no other effect than to produce all created being from non-being. Such a view of creation is incomplete. The efficacy of the creative act cannot be restricted to that impulse which causes beings to issue forth from God. At the very moment when creatures receive the movement which gives them a being relatively independent of and exterior to the Creator's, they receive a second movement which puts them on their way back to their point of departure and tends to return them as close as possible to their first source. We have examined the order by which intelligent creatures come forth from God and have denned their characteristic operations. It now remains to establish the terminus toward which these operations tend and the end to which they are ordered.

The truth of this conclusion is obvious. It is manifest that the end corresponds to the principle. If, therefore, we know the principle of all things, it is impossible not to know their end. Now we have already demonstrated that the first principle of all things is a Creator who transcends the universe which He has created. The end of all things, then, must be a good, since only the good, and a good exterior to the universe, can play the role of end. This end is God. It still remains to know how creatures not endowed with intellect can have an end outside themselves. In the case of an intelligent being, the end of its operation is established by what it proposes to do or by the goal toward which it tends.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 Ch 1

Gilson goes on to show that the end of all things is good. However, with respect to human beings, there is nothing inevitable about the realisation of the good. Human beings have a moral autonomy, a capacity to choose good, which they must exercise if they are to realise the end of good. Arguing that intelligence and will are a matter of voluntary inclination, Gilson breaks down the structure of the human act to emphasise the importance of intention, the will moving the faculties to their end. 

The case of human beings differs from other natural beings in that ‘he has free-will, that is, intelligence and will.’ 

The inclination which God implanted in him at the moment of his creation is not natural. It is a voluntary inclination. It follows, therefore, that man is a creature who, though an image of God like all the others and more excellently than many of them, is master over his choice of acts. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1

Gilson establishes that the human being is a rational and free agent endowed with freewill. Moral liberty arises from the gap encountered here below between the will and its object. Gilson proceeds to demonstrate what the last end of human beings is – universal being and universal good through reunion with God, beatitude - and the means by which it is attained. ‘In conjunction with an understanding open to universal being, the will tends toward universal good. Actually, however, it always finds itself in the presence of particular goods. These particular goods are incapable of satisfying its desire and do not constitute, so far as the will is concerned, absolutely necessary ends, and so the will remains entirely free in respect to them.’

As St Thomas writes:

If the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity.

ST, I-II, 10, 2.

Having stated the general principle governing the rational activity of human beings, we need to demonstrate its mechanism and how it functions in practice. This is the field of politics. The natural law shows what is natural for human beings to aim at as rational beings. 

Aristotle's moral and political theory is naturalistic in that it views the human good in terms of what is considered to be natural for human beings, as rational beings, to aim at. The conception of the good is rooted in human nature. For Aristotle, human beings are political animals, politikon zoon, and individuate themselves in a politikon bion, a public life in which individuals live in relation to each other. (Aristotle 1981: Bk I 58-61). Aristotle presents nature in terms of some strong social and political imperatives with respect to living well, the ‘best’ life as flourishing well in the polis (Aristotle 1981: Bk III 185ff).

Human beings living in society public beings governed by – governing themselves by - human laws. These laws are an image of the divine law that governs the universe. However, individuals are, in themselves, active members of an analogous system which is subject to laws governing the relationships between their parts. This system is governed by the natural law, which lays down what must be done and not done to further and attain the ends of man. As with human laws, the natural law is prescriptive, but the basis of what is prescribed is to be sought in what is natural for human beings. The natural law stands above positive law and evaluates it in accordance with what enhances rather than inhibits natural human ends. Aquinas thus follows Aristotle is attempting to derive the moral laws that govern human conduct from a conception of human nature and what human beings ought to do in order to realise their natural ends.

In this natural law conception, ethics and politics are inextricably connected.

Moral knowledge is distinguished from other forms of human knowledge in that its concern for good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, is applied to persons acting as persons and not merely to this or that capacity in which people act. For instance, a piano-tuner's essential objective as a piano-tuner is to tune a piano well, to be a good piano-tuner. The same goes for a doctor, or a teacher, or a footballer - their aim is to be good at what they do. With morality, the aim is different, not to be good at a particular thing but to be a good person. And to be a good person is to act in the right way as a human being. (Oderberg 2000: 2). 

The objection of a modern moral philosopher to the Aristotelian conception is to deny that notions of good and bad, right and wrong, are objective concepts like high and low, square and round, red and green. The objection amounts to the claim that the kind of objectivity required by notions of good and bad is available only to scientific knowledge. As a result, morality loses its connection with reason and becomes a matter of subjective opinion. Notions of good and bad or right and wrong become mere value judgements and personal preferences. This conception of knowledge thus precludes the possibility of moral knowledge.

Others argue that morality is merely a matter of convention and culture, habit and custom, changing according to time and place. The implication is that we are products of our time, our culture, our environment. Others deny notions of free will and responsibility, arguing that we are the products of our genes and our neurons. Neuroscientist Francis Crick (1966) reduces consciousness to the firing of neurons. 

'You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased it: 'You're nothing but a pack of neurons.'

It’s not so much the assertion of the importance of neural networks that is wrong so much as the stress, that all those things which define human life as human are ‘no more than’ the behaviour of nerve cells. That seems to imply that politics and ethics, the fields of practical reason and human choice, don’t matter. One could read the statement in a more charitable frame as implying a more informed view of what it is to be natural, that is, what kind of moral and political framework is natural for human beings. Here, the science informs the conception of the human good. But the phrase that human beings are ‘nothing but’ a pack of neurons suggests a reduction of human beings to physical properties, not the strengthening of ethical human agency. Thus, in the words of neuroscientist Patricia Churchland, consciousness is 'explained away', just as heat in physics was explained away once it was recognized as the energy of molecules in motion. Another neuroscientist, Susan Greenfield, examined an exposed brain in an operating theatre and commented, 'This was all there was to Sarah, or indeed to any of us ... We are but sludgy brains, and ... somehow a character and a mind are generated in this soupy mess.' (Greenfield 2000: 12-15.) Far from culture achieving an autonomy of biology, Susan Blackmore develops Richard Dawkins's idea of the meme to propose a mechanisation of the mind sphere (1999). This is a world that has been shorn of purpose, life and ends. Such a science may succeed in explaining the physical world; it can never suffice to build a civilisation.

When Francis Crick died, his son Michael claimed that what made him tick was not the desire to be famous, wealthy or popular, but 'to knock the final nail into the coffin of vitalism'. Vitalism is the theory that the organisms of the world are truly alive, and cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry alone. Crick failed. As biologist Rupert Sheldrake argues in The Science Delusion: ‘The problems of development and consciousness remain unsolved. Many details have been discovered, dozens of genomes have been sequenced, and brain scans arc ever more precise. But there is still no proof that life and minds can be explained by physics and chemistry alone (Sheldrake 2012: 10-11 also Chapters 1, 4 and 8).

The mechanistic conception of science has impacted on the sphere of human action, with notions of moral autonomy coming to be increasingly subverted by scientific explanation. Ultimately, the idea of objective morality can no longer be sustained in a scientific sense, with morality coming to be reduced to value judgement. 
These claims populate modern moral discourse and are characterised by relativism, subjectivism and scepticism. The denial that there is such a thing as objective morality and moral knowledge within a ‘dead’ material reality leaves nowhere for morality to go but irreducible subjective opinion.

I argue that there is such a thing as moral knowledge, that morality is a matter of objective, rational truth and that, therefore, notions of good and bad, right and wrong are meaningful, realistic and discoverable by rational beings.

We see here the consequences of the ‘inward turn’ of philosophy, the price that is to be paid when we start from ideas and move to things instead of vice versa. My argument in this book is that Kant’s practical ethics has plenty to offer with respect to but is undermined by Kant’s epistemological idealism. Kant ends up being walled in by concepts and is unable to break through to reality.

For too long, philosophy has been exclusively concerned with what is going on inside the human mind to the neglect of what is going on within the reality of natural and social worlds. This is reflected in modern philosophy's myopic focus upon the nature of language, how we know, consciousness and the mind. (Zeman 2002; Pinker 1997; Carter 2010; Penrose 1987; Longair 1997).

Much of the philosophical concern here is misplaced in remaining too close to the science. Science can describe and explain at the level of physio-chemical processes but is at a loss when it moves from fact to value. (Damasio 2006; Lipton 2008; Frayn 2006). To this day, philosopher John Searle’s question to neuro-determinists and reductionists remains unanswered: 'How is it possible for physical, objective, quantitatively describable neuron firings to cause qualitative, private, subjective experiences?' (Searle 1995.) 

The inward turn of the Cogito
The inward turn in modern philosophy stems from the rejection of traditional metaphysics in favour of a myopic focus on epistemology. This epistemological concern began with Descartes. Kant, however, is the key figure in the whole tradition in that he offers the most intellectually coherent and satisfying attempt to reconcile the claims of rationalism and empiricism on the modern terrain. The problem is that Kant severed the connection between practical reason and theoretical reason, leaving us unable to know in any clear way what beliefs about the world we are rationally entitled to have, how we can be certain in those beliefs. 

The question of how certain our knowledge is goes back to the problem of how the prisoners can escape from Plato’s cave of illusion. Descartes’ evil demon in Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) is an update of Plato’s allegory of the cave. In the Meditations, Descartes sought to establish the certain foundations on which to build the edifice of human knowledge. 

'I shall suppose . . . that some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgment.'

Descartes employed the 'method of doubt' to identify and discard any beliefs susceptible to the slightest degree of uncertainty. The senses are unreliable and dreams are confusing. Descartes sheds all those former beliefs and opinions which are unable to withstand the method of doubt, until we come to the one thing that cannot be doubted - Cogito ergo sum – ‘I am thinking, therefore I am’. It is on this sure foundation that Descartes sets about reconstructing the edifice of human knowledge.

Here, we see the extent to which the concern with epistemology on the part of modern philosophy has encouraged scepticism. After all, the epistemological obsessions of philosophers relentlessly turn over whether and how we can have any genuine knowledge of reality, let alone whether we can have moral knowledge. Indeed, Descartes seems to have escaped his problem of the malicious demon spreading delusions of dreams only by a cheat – he invokes God, a move which rather begs the question. On the level of epistemology, Descartes has greater success in stating the problem than in solving it. The mere fact that ‘I am thinking’ says nothing about the quality of thought that results. How does the mind connect with the real world out there?

The philosophers of the modern age seem trapped within their minds. For Wittgenstein, this modern preoccupation with epistemology is a distortion of philosophy, a view which, in the consideration of Anthony Kenny, ‘has removed one great barrier to the understanding of Aquinas, whose epistemological interests were comparatively slight.’ (Kenny 1969: 5).

The conventional picture of morality in the modern age comprises a number of claims that work to undermine the notion of moral knowledge and truth: that we cannot have genuine knowledge of right and wrong, good and bad; that morality differs from natural science or history; that there is no objective reality from which to read good and bad; that all morality is relative; that rational argument is impossible since morality is merely a matter of opinion; there can be no objective moral truth in a world that is forever changing.

There is no need to add more claims. They are many and familiar, and express no more than varying degrees of relativism, subjectivism, scepticism, solipsism, nihilism. In my view they are rationalisations of the moral vacuity of modernity. (Smith 2008: ch 9; Trigg 2005).

I propose to read Kant in light of St Thomas Aquinas in order to show that such positions are shallow and superficial and are based on no more than a statement of the impoverished condition of morality in modern times. What I hope to achieve in this book is to show the case for moral truth, moral knowledge, and moral objectivity is strong once we restore the connection to the ontological nature out there. That is, once we restore the connection between mind and reality, the connection that was there for Aristotle and for Aquinas before the inward turn of modern philosophy. That we can redeem the promise of Kant’s practical philosophy only by recourse to Aristotelian-Thomist notions.

Reconnecting Morality with Ontological Nature
In this essay, I shall pose Weberian modernity and the Thomist moral order as stark alternatives. (Midgley 1983). The argument which leads to such a contrast is based on the awareness that modernity, in dissipating the moral resources created in pre-modern times, not only fails to replenish the moral stock but is incapable of so doing. Faced with both economic and ecological implosion, modernity, above all, is confronted with a moral implosion. The moral disorder of modernity is characterised by what Max Weber called a polytheism of values, an irreducible subjective opinion in which arguments and conflicts are incapable of being settled according to morality and which thus continue in a state of arbitrariness between the forever contending parties. In seeking to supply such a terrain with a universal morality, Kant was attempting the impossible. The fact that he very nearly succeeded demands that we salvage much that is viable in Kant and put it on a firmer basis that is available within a diremptive, polytheistic modernity.

4 The Need for Moral Unity
In many respects we are dealing with the aftermath of the break-up of Christian culture in light of the humanism – and paganism - of the Renaissance, the individualism of the Protestant Reformation, the mechanicism of the scientific revolution and the rationalism of the Enlightenment. In the secularising process of these developments, human beings have come to see themselves as the centre of their own history, gods in a world of their own making. We live in what Charles Taylor calls ‘a secular age’ (2012). For philosopher Giambattista Vico, the condition of knowing something is to have made it – verum ipsum factum. This idea of the world as being a creation of human agency was developed further by German idealism. Kant’s achievement is to have shown how the human mental apparatus shapes the world presented to the senses, so that the world is no longer conceived to be an objective datum, but is humanly material, infused with human consciousness and purpose and will. Hegel went further to conceive this active shaping of the world in terms of the philosophy of alienation. Building on both, Marx produced an active materialism infused with idealism (Dunayevskaya 1988:42). Marx presented a vision of human freedom as a self-determination through the practical reappropriation of alienated powers and their exercise as human social powers. In many respects, that vision is Aristotelian (Meikle 1985; Ferraro 1992; Elster 1985 ch 7; Kain 1988). It’s a powerful vision, cogent even. But from another angle, the reappropriation and exercise of human social powers, the realised society of realised human beings, can go awry if, detached from the Aristotelian end of flourishing, freedom takes the form of idolatry – the veneration of human powers as ends in themselves. At this stage, the assertion of human power transgresses the natural law and rebounds on human beings. The pursuit of economic growth to infinity sooner or later meets and transgresses natural limits. This is a denial of the natural law, the displacement of the true human end by the endless expansion of technical power.





Human beings are the sorcerer’s, the creative agents who have has yet to master their praxis for the human good. For Marx, this situation of unconscious apprentices designates a condition of alienation, the human creators being controlled, determined, by their creations; objects come to acquire existential significance as human subjects are reduced to being mere appendages.

Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells.

Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party in 1848 1973: 73





This deification of human power through scientific, technical and industrial progress becomes the ultimate end of human action on earth. Such a view departs from the ultimate end, whether defined in naturalist terms by Aristotle or supernaturalist terms by Aquinas.

Naturalist and Supernaturalist Ends
From a Thomist perspective, a social eudaimonism invites degeneration through becoming enclosed in matter. Aristotle himself understands that there is a natural virtue beyond human positive law. It is possible to be a good person independently of being a good citizen. ‘This modification, however, does not affect the nature of the last end, which is the rule of moral action. Good and evil can still be determined from the point of view of the common good. A man is virtuous when he obeys reason spontaneously and simply, behaving as the common good demands, and as his moral conscience prescribes. Friendship will ease the rigors of justice, and the long list of personal virtues will bring bare respect for law to its fullest perfection. The common good will also be served because nothing is of greater advantage to the State than to be able to count among its citizens only virtuous men. We are all of us so aware of this that, in the conduct of our lives, we do all we can to regulate our acts by the prescriptions of morality. We live under the law better than the letter of the law demands because our will accepts beyond the law the very principle of law.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5). 

There is no contradiction between natural and supernatural ends for Thomas Aquinas. We are not required to choose between nature and grace, but to perfect nature through grace. There is no need to choose between natural virtues and theological virtues; ‘we have only to ask the theological virtues to help the natural virtues to realize fully their proper perfection as virtues.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5).

There is therefore no need to distinguish supernatural ends from the virtues of the personal and social life. At the same time, these social virtues need to be related to supernatural ends in order to draw natural eudaimonistic ends to their true fulfilment.

The soul thus affected is still a soul endowed with reason and intelligence. It is because it is capable of intellectual knowledge and therefore of friendship with God, that the human soul is able to receive this divine, supernatural gift. Thus it can be seen that grace, in spreading from the essence of the human soul into its various faculties, first affects the highest of all the soul's faculties, its intellect or knowing faculty, along with reason which is actually only its movement. What makes the nature of man an intelligent nature, or, better perhaps, the nature of man insofar as it is intelligent, is designated by "mind" or wens, the term associated with his thinking. It is this which permits man, unlike creatures lacking reason, to be called the created image of God. 
This quality of being the image of God is co-essential to man because it is one with the rationality of his nature. To be a mind is to be naturally capable of knowing and loving God. To be able to do this is one with the very nature of thinking. It is as natural for man to be the image of God as to be a rational animal, that is, as to be man. The first effect of grace is, therefore, to perfect this resemblance of man to God by divinizing his soul, his mind and consequently his whole nature. From the moment he has grace, man can love God with a love worthy of God since this love is divine in its origin. God can accordingly accept it. By the grace of God man has become holy and just in the eyes of God. The life of grace consists therefore in the knowledge and love of God by a rational soul that has been made a sharer in the divine nature and capable of living in society with Him.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5

Discarding belief in any supernatural realm, human beings have come to conceive progress in terms of a self-sufficiency in which all ends are self-given. We see the result in the vast deployment of instrumental power over a nature denuded of moral significance and detached from ultimate ends, natural and supernatural. Indifferent to ends and blind to purposes, human beings come to erect a machine over the dead matter of nature. In the process of the technical and industrial subjugation of matter, human beings subject themselves to a management and manipulation of their own making. Marx referred to this as alienation, a condition in which human subjects are made predicates of things which have acquired existential significance. (Ferraro 1992; Thomas 1994; Walton and Gamble 1972; Meszaros 1975).

In truth, the instrumental domination which characterises the modern world is a spiritual usurpation, human beings seeking the ultimate end in their own self-made world. Alienation marks a separation not only from one’s own human powers, but most of all from God the Creator.

When grace divinizes the human soul it not only re-establishes the balance which had once been destroyed, but causes a new life to spring up, a life freely given to nature. This life participates in the divine and so, by reason of its source, will move spontaneously into the order of the eternal. It is called the "spiritual life," a term which implies that absolute transcendence of body and time which is characteristic of divine things. And since it is by charity that man's participation in the divine is accomplished, the spiritual life is the supernatural life of a soul divinized by charity.





Gilson refers to the soul divinized through ‘man's participation in the divine.’ Theoretical physicist John Wheeler argues that we should think not of being passive observers in the world, but active participants. The mind plays an active role in the universe. Human beings are actively involved in producing the world we see around us. Being and knowing are part of this same process. For Wheeler, the difference between observation and participation might be 'the most important clue we have to the genesis of the universe':

The phenomena called into being by these decisions reach backward in time in their consequences ... back even to the earliest days of the universe .... Useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say that the world exists 'out there' independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which this is a 'participatory universe'. (Wheeler in Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 194).

But here, physics is catching up with metaphysics. The French philosopher-physicist Bernard d'Espagnat has spoken of the veiled nature of quantum reality. John Polkinghorne notes that Werner Heisenberg, the most truly philosophically reflective of the founding figures of quantum theory, employed Aristotle’s concept of potentia to make sense of the quantum world. Heisenberg wrote that

In experiments about atomic events we have to do with things that are facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But the atoms or elementary particles are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than of things or facts. 









There is no ‘incidentally’ in this comment. Polkinghorne’s brief reference makes the point that the old metaphysics is back. Immanuel Kant had too readily accepted that modern mechanistic science had driven purpose from nature. Science is now moving back in the direction of the living universe. The veiled potentiality of quantum reality reveals the latent power and promise of essentialist metaphysics.

Gilson emphasises the human participation in the divine as key to the reunion with God. The idea is central to Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas writes that the natural law is nothing other than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law. (STI-II, 91,2: "Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rational creatura.") (Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

The Veneration of Means as the loss of Ends
The problem is that human beings have come to venerate their technical and instrumental powers to the neglect of true ends. The spiritual life has been usurped by a narrow focus on the personal and the social life in the here and now. Under the optimistic sign of a progress conceived in light of a bogus teleology – the promise of freedom and happiness through the endless accumulation of material quantities – an illusory general interest has emerged which unites human beings in pursuit of a history become conscious of itself through the conquest of nature. In truth, the domination of nature, the denigration of ontological nature, goes hand in hand with a diminution of human morality and freedom. 

It is in this light that it is interesting to compare the arguments of C.S. Lewis and Karl Marx, the one from a spiritual perspective, the other from a humanist perspective. 

Man's conquest of nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on man's side. Each power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as well as stronger. In every victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is also the prisoner who follows in the triumphal car. 

C.S. Lewis The Abolition of Man 1947

Compare this argument with that of Karl Marx. ‘Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over men.’(Marx EW EPM 1975). Lewis would argue that this condition is an inevitable result of the divorce from God. Marx would argue that it is a condition of alienation which results from the divorce of the human creators from their creations. Marx argues for the practical reappropriation of alienated social powers – the state, capital, commodities, money – and their reorganisation as social powers under associative democratic control. Marx’s realised human society is an Aristotelian social eudaimonism, the fulfilment of natural ends. The implication of the spiritual argument of Lewis is that this is an incomplete good that invites idolatry in the shape of the veneration of human powers and creations.





Lex naturalis restores balance:

Natural wisdom is, accordingly, a virtue for which the intellect is not only the seat but the cause. The root of this Wisdom is, then, less a cognitive intuition than a communion between nature as knowing and the divine. Its effect, "rectitude of a judgment made according to divine reasons," is not in this case produced by the metaphysician's habit of using his reason correctly in such matters. Its rectitude of judgment comes from elsewhere, from its supernatural relationship in the family of divine things.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5

The possession of intelligence and reason denote a capacity on the part of human beings for knowing God.

Endowed with intelligence and reason, man is capable of knowing that God exists, that He has created us and invited us to share these goods in communion with Him. Hence there is a natural love of man for God, a sort of first natural friendship by which man naturally loves God above all things. Perhaps we should say, should love Him, because man's nature is no longer sound. The first effect of grace is to restore this natural love of God above all things. It will not destroy it but integrate it with the supernatural love of man for God. Supernatural friendship, based on the sharing of divine beatitude, restores to man the natural friendship which he originally had with God. Then the whole natural morality returns with its order and hierarchy of virtues. But it will not last if deprived of the conditions which brought about its rebirth. For man in his fallen state, grace alone makes possible that firm willing of the good which, even in nature, seeks only the will of God. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5

In fine, Aquinas follows Aristotle in his personal and social eudaemonism, interpreting ethics in the context of agents' pursuit of happiness. Marx, too, follows Aristotle. Scott Meikle writes that Marx’s view is ‘remarkably Aristotelian’. Marx’s view is Aristotelian. ‘Thus, the realised human society is a society of realised humans. The full realisation of the potentiality inherent in human society as an essence, is at the same time the society in which the potentiality of the social essence of the human natural species is fully realised. A fully realised human essence, and the fully realised essence of human society, are products of one and the same process.’ (Meikle 1985: 55ff). Indeed, since human beings are social beings, the realisation of the human essence entails both a personal and a social eudaimonism as one and the same thing. Marx thus warns that it is 'necessary to avoid once more establishing "society" as an abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being.'

It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing 'society' as an abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being. His vital expression - even when it does not appear in the direct form of a communal expression, conceived in association with other men - is therefore an expression and confirmation of social life. Man's individual and species-life are not two distinct things, however much - and this is necessarily so - the mode of existence of individual life is a more particular or a more general mode of the species-life, or species-life a more particular or more general individual life. 

Marx EW EPM 1975: 351

Aquinas’ view follows but modifies Aristotle. For Aquinas, social eudaimonia is the imperfect happiness of the temporal world; the highest happiness is the vision of the divine essence: the beatific vision. Three key things follow from this. 
First, as against the worldly summum bonum of Aristotle, Aquinas proposes an otherworldly summum bonum. The emphasis is therefore shifted from earth to heaven. The temporal life offers merely a foretaste of the beatific vision. 
Second, the highest good comes to depend on divine grace and not just nature. 
Third, the idea of God as final cause does much more than Aristotle’s God, magnetically drawing forth the directions of the cosmos, attracting creatures back to their source (Smart 2008 ch 9). 

The Thomist vision is one of unity through reunification with the divine. 

In complete contrast, modernity is a realm of diremption. Social theorist Max Weber made separation the key figure of modernity, extending across all areas of social life.





Weber locates this separation in 'the expropriation of the autonomous and "private" bearers of executive power . . who in their own right possess the means of administration, warfare and financial organisation'. Weber argues that the whole process of state making 'is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through gradual expropriation of the independent producers' (Weber 1970:82).

For Weber, modernity is characterised by a general 'separation' which plunges the individual into the iron cage, the mechanised petrification of modern society, imposing a discipline which moulds individual subjectivity (Turner 1993:207; Weber in Lassman and Speirs 1994:314: Schroeder 1992:114/6). Weber focused upon the social consequences of expropriation, arguing that the subordination of the worker to the capitalist through expropriation forms the necessary condition for rational calculation and discipline.

For Weber, however, this expropriation as the basis of discipline and calculation went beyond simple economic expropriation but embraced all aspects of life (Turner 1993:201/2).





The most fundamental separation of all in the modern world is the separation of ethics from metaphysics, of reason from ontological nature, of human beings from their common ground and culture as human beings. On this fundamental division rests a whole series of secondary divisions – individuals against individuals, classes against classes, nations against nations. Human beings have lost the sense of the universal. The end result of the elevation of the separated self is the dissolution of the human personality. Weber, and Marx before him, focus on the institutional separations which constitute capitalist modernity. The basic separation is that of means from ends, resulting in the instrumentalisation of society and the elevation of means to the status of ends. Modernity is disenchanted and demoralised in the process. Morality survives, if it survives at all, as private conscience and value judgement, opinion.

The task before us is to recover the common good by restoring the connection between human beings as social beings united by common ends. This is not a reactionary call to turn the clock back, but a demand to fashion essential, eternal truths in new forms. The perennial philosophy of Aquinas is beyond time and place and hence possesses a continued relevance. And the most essential truth here is that the universal good, which is the aim of all rational action, is fully realized in God as the infinite good. This is where Aquinas transcends Aristotle and avoids the danger of becoming enclosed within the imperfect happiness available on earth. Aquinas is able to envisage human beings participating in God’s provident direction of creation in such a way as to preserve human freedom and moral responsibility. 

The Ultimate End
Aquinas, following Aristotle, holds that every human act is undertaken for the sake of an end. There is, therefore, an ultimate end for the sake of which any action is undertaken. "First, he shows from what has already been said that there is some best end in human affairs" (Ethics 1.2, n. 19). Aquinas cites this passage from Aristotle as a proof that there is an ultimate end. 
Aristotle and Thomas are agreed, and are correct, in arguing that the ultimate end is an inescapable fact of human action. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50). Aquinas therefore invokes Aristotle when it comes to addressing such questions as the ultimate end, virtue, justice, prudence, and contemplation. Aquinas agrees in all fundamentals with Aristotle’s views of happiness as a life lived according to virtue, with his hierarchical arrangement of the virtues as constituents of that happiness. But, ultimately, Aquinas reconciled the Aristotelian naturalist conception of happiness within the supernaturalist Christian conception. Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s notion of ultimate end or happiness as flawless, related to natural ends. As a Christian, however, Aquinas argues that the promise of a perfect realization of happiness goes beyond the happiness commensurate with our nature. But this is not to oppose nature and supernature as antithetical. On the contrary, grace, the supernatural, does not destroy nature but perfects it. In Thomas's theology, natural knowledge becomes part of a wider whole defined by revelation. ‘Thomas holds that there is a perfect realization of the notion of ultimate end, albeit in the next world, but that is where we're heading.’ (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

The ultimate end is the complete fulfilment or perfection of the agent. That there is an ultimate end of human action is an absolute requirement of its being reasonable. Anything sought under the aegis of the good, sub ratione boni, is either ultimate or a constituent of the ultimately fulfilling good. The question, then, is what is our ultimate fulfilment? In what does happiness consist? Aquinas argues that we all have the same ultimate end but seek it in different places. 

I reply that it must be said that we can speak of ultimate end in two ways, either according to the notion of ultimate end or in terms of that in which this notion is thought to be realized. With respect to the notion of ultimate end everyone seeks it because everyone seeks to achieve his perfection which is what ultimate end means, as has been said. But with respect to that in which this notion is thought to be realized men are not in agreement, for some seek wealth as the consummate end, some pleasure, some other things. 

ST,  q. 1, a. 7

But Aquinas argues more than that all seek to be happy, just in different ways. The task of moral philosophy is to discover that which can truly function as our ultimate end. And this will turn out to be an ordered amalgam rather than some single thing (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

A central component of the Thomasian holism is its view of the human being; man is an integral being, a whole where all the parts are integrated to the same end, namely, human good, and its transcendence in divinity. Most importantly, on this view is no opposition between reason and will, or between soul and body, but all are parts of one man equally directed to good. A man's life is a whole, rather than a series of disconnected accidents. A man's life has a single end in view, happiness, or beatitude as Aquinas has it, and all one's actions are to be integrated to that end. It follows that, from the Thomasian point of view, the focus of morality is on the quality of a man's life as a whole, rather than on his single actions. Therefore, morality cannot merely be about maximizing one's interests, or about abiding by a set of deontological rules: it must give adequate attention to the moral growth of a man's personality. This attention can only be provided by a theory of virtue. (Rentto in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

The acquisition and exercise of the virtues brings human beings to the ultimate end, the last end. As Aquinas conceives it: "Everything tending to its own perfection, tends to a divine likeness."


All creatures come from one cause and move toward one end. Each being is defined by its own essence and will have its own way of realizing the end common to all. ‘We can expect, therefore, that the same principle will regulate both moral action and physical laws. It is the same deep cause which makes the stone fall, the flame rise, the heavens turn and men to will.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6). Each of these beings is seeking by its operation to achieve its own perfection and, at the same time, to realize its end which is to represent God. 

Man is a voluntary and free being. He always acts in view of an end, and his acts are specified by this end, that is, his acts are arranged into various species according to the ends which are both their principle and end. Now it cannot be doubted that there exists, over and above the host of particular ends, a last end of human life looked at as a whole. One end is ordained and willed because of another, and, if there were no last end, the series of ends would have to be taken to infinity. It would be the same as if the series of movers and of things moved were infinite, and nothing would ever be desired and no action would ever be brought to an end. Every act starts from an end and comes to rest in it. Therefore we have to conclude that there is a last end.
At the same time it can be seen that whatever man wills, he wills in view of this last end. The last end moves the appetite in the same way as the first mover moves all other moveable things. Now it is clear that while the second cause transmits movement, it can only do so in so much as it is itself moved by the first mover. In the same way, second ends are only desirable and only move the appetite inasmuch as they are ordered toward the last end, which is the first of all desirable objects.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6

In coming to know how to act, joining intellectual and practical knowing, human beings attain moral freedom and grow to their full stature as human beings. Aquinas appreciates that human beings do not find unity in themselves and in their own works alone, which is what the purely naturalist position holds, but outside themselves. Aquinas transcends the natural position concerning the ultimate end and instead emphasises that true fulfilment comes in the universal sphere beyond natural ends.

It is actually impossible that man's last end be the human soul or anything belonging to it. If we consider the soul in itself, it is only in potency. Its knowledge, its virtue have to be reduced from potency to act. What is in potency is related to its act as the incomplete to the complete. Potency only exists in view of act. It is manifest, therefore, that the human soul exists in view of something else and that as a consequence it is not its own last end. And it is even more manifest that no good of the soul constitutes its Sovereign Good. The Good which constitutes the last end can only be the perfect good, the good which fully satisfies the appetite. Now the human appetite, the will, tends toward universal good, as we have shown. But, as we know from elsewhere, every good inhering in a finite human soul like ours is by that very fact a finite and participated good. Hence no such good can be man's Sovereign Good nor become his last end. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6

With the split between nature and reason, secular modernity has come to lose this sense of the transcendent. The result is a temporal happiness which envelops the individual self in self-enclosed matter or a self-created world, cutting human beings off from their ultimate end. Morality is left without foundation. It is in being satisfied with a narcissistic self-sufficiency that human beings have come to lose themselves. Human beings will recover their personality only by rediscovering the principles of being – matter, form, efficient cause and final cause – and seeking an order which transcends them. 
This is the transcendence that Aquinas offers.

Let us say then, as a general thesis, that man's beatitude cannot consist in any created good. It can only reside in a perfect good, one fully satisfying the appetite, for indeed it could not be the last end if, once acquired, it still left something further to be desired. Now, since nothing can fully satisfy the human will save universal good, which is its proper object, no created and participated good can constitute the Sovereign Good and last end. Therefore man's beatitude is in God alone, who is the first and universal good, the source of all other goods. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6

The implication is that true and essential beatitude is beyond this world and can be found only in the clear sight of God's being. This means that human beings are not perfectly happy unless they have something to wish for and to seek. That is God, drawing human beings out of their egoistic selves to seek participation in a greater being.

Pure materiality is an immanentism that engulfs the person, accompanied by a pure subjectivity that dissolves the person. The condition of the unity of personality within the common good is the recovery of the metaphysics which has objective reality at its centre. Divorced from metaphysics, human beings are cut off from the ontological roots and transcendent objects that feed the person and draw them towards the eternal realm. Instead, within modernity, the self has come to replace the person as human beings have sought their centre within. 

'Today, a particularly insidious obstacle to the task of educating is the massive presence in our society and culture of that relativism which, recognizing nothing as definitive, leaves as the ultimate criterion only the self with its desires. And under the semblance of freedom it becomes a prison for each one, for it separates people from one another, locking each person into his or her own "ego".' 

Pope Benedict XVI, June 2005

The self and sensuous desires separating individuals from one another, locking each into his or her own ego and turning liberty into a licence that becomes a prison for each and all. In this passage one can recognise Aristotle (the perils of individual liberty as a licence that constrains all), Kant and Rousseau (natural inclinations and desires chaining individuals to empirical necessity), Marx (the universal separation and antagonism of individuals within atomistic bourgeois society meaning that all become playthings of alien powers), Plato’s cave and Weber’s iron cage as psychic prisons, Foucault’s carceral society, Adorno’s administered society. Far from being ‘traditional’ in any simple, reactionary sense, Pope Benedict’s message is timely. With the wealth of a philosophical and socio-theoretical tradition behind such a view, the most interesting question is why it is left to the Pope to defend the universal position which affirms a common humanity above and beyond the immediacy of self and ego, desire and inclination?

The era of positivism, scepticism, relativism, subjectivism is drawing to a close with the dismal experience of a world with a wealth of means misfiring through an absence of ends. No doubt the bankrupted relativisms of the modern world will be around for a little longer, although the danger posed by counterfeit communities and collective fantasies should not be underestimated, feeding a frustrated desire for the common good which is our natural yearning. The sooner we recover a genuine commonality the better. The world stands in desperate need for a genuine metaphysics, a realist metaphysics that is capable of recovering morality and freedom through the restoration of ontological nature. The world which wishes to be, the world which wishes to emerge in the future, is not a world of positivism but a world of metaphysics.

The Science of Being and the Objectivity of Knowledge
Aquinas is able to reconcile the claims of empiricism and rationalism, avoiding the one-sided errors of both. Like idealism, Aquinas respects the active role of agent intellect in knowing the world but, like empiricism, he makes sense experience the basis of knowledge. There is nothing in the intellect that has not already been in the senses. Again, Aquinas here follows Aristotle, arguing that all our rational knowledge of this world is acquired through sensory experience, upon which the mind comes to reflect.

If at any future time [the facts] are ascertained, then credence should be given to the direct evidence of the senses rather than the theories.

Aristotle De Generatione Animalium 

Aquinas’ epistemology is not concerned with the justification of claims to knowledge in general. Instead, Aquinas develops a cognitive psychology, involving an account of how knowledge is acquired, including the role of reason in this. Aquinas is an empiricist in that he holds that all our concepts, all our understanding of things, derive from sense-perception. He is also a realist with respect to the universals, holding that there has to be a foundation for our conception of what is general - of, in his terms, species - in the world in which we find ourselves. (Hamlyn 1987: 109-110).

Aquinas proceeds from sense knowledge to intellectual knowledge, with agent intellect making sense of natural data, so as to make reason the root of freedom. Aquinas, that is, recognises the centrality of both experience and the innate and the constructive activity of the mind in coming to know the real world. 





Alongside metaphysics as concerned with being as universal and transcendent, being as being, Aquinas founds the science of being in the objectivity of knowledge. Against the immanentism of Hegelian deification of human power, marxist atheism, pragmatic instrumentalism and scientific materialism, Aquinas offers transcendence, reconciling divine providence and human freedom so that human beings become sharers in the divine nature. For Aquinas, natural moral virtue is a supernatural infused moral virtue which enables human beings to attain communion between nature as knowing and the divine.

Participation plays a key role in Aquinas’ metaphysics and the grounding of ethics. The moral law governing human conduct, the natural law, is one of the ways in which "the rational creature" shares in the divine order, that is, in God's eternal law. Law is not therefore primarily a category of social thought. Aquinas understands it metaphysically as the "rule and measure" which is constitutive of all natures, the eternal law which impresses upon all things their tendencies toward their own proper acts and ends (ST I-II, 91, 2 c). 

As creaturely, human nature is ordered to a divine plan by Providence, and as rational, its very understanding of this order is crucial to the degree of perfection to be achieved in the process of participation. This text thus speaks immediately to one of the questions current in the natural law discussions taking place today as to whether any propositions in ethics depend on propositions in metaphysics, let alone whether there is any systematic dependence. 

Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992

In spelling out this relationship in terms of participation, and in articulating natural law, Koterski emphasises the need to stay mindful of (1) the human being as creature, (2) the ongoing dependence of the creature on the Creator, and (3) the humility involved in "being measured," in contrast to the hubris of some Protagorean conception of "man as the measure" of all things. (Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992). Not only is there a need to avoid becoming engulfed in an Aristotelian naturalism, there is no less need to avoid becoming self-enclosed within a humanism that focuses myopically upon human power and creation, to the neglect of the ultimate end.

A purely naturalist code of ethics identifies the common good of the city as the final end of human beings. Aquinas incorporates this social eudaemonism within a greater end. Koterski draws attention to St Thomas's term "rational creature's participation." The uniqueness of rationality in differentiating the human being from other animals has received the greatest emphasis, but Koterski argues that the thoroughgoing significance of "creature", the fact of our creatureliness, needs to be given similar import. ‘This is possible because of a certain antinomy in Thomistic metaphysics; at the level of material beings Thomistic thought insists on the autonomy of finite substances and the genuine efficacy of secondary causes, but it also insists that there is a larger picture in which creatures have only a relative independence and autonomy.’ (Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

Such a view serves to check hubris with respect to power. The idea of a culture which, through the expansion of technical and material powers, gives human beings complete independence and autonomy – the age old delusion of men as gods – is checked and replaced by a humility that recognises we are part of and participate within a greater whole.

Endowing the soul with reason and intelligence, Aquinas identifies the human capacity for knowing that God exists. Aquinas argues that the rational soul, the soul that includes reason, must be immaterial. 

Therefore the intellectual principle, which is called mind or intellect, has an activity of its own in which the body is not involved. Only that which subsists on its own can act on its own. 

ST, la, q. 75, a. 2

In fine, the human soul has an activity, intellection, which is immaterial. And a soul that has this capacity is itself immaterial (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 11-29).

Knowing thyself becomes the realisation of personality through the substantial union of intellect and body. Spiritual life is thus attained as human participation in the divine.

“If it is a question now of ethical values, and of the conduct of human life, then it is only too easy to see to what an extent the contemporary world is, as a rule, a world of selfishness, meanness and coldness. And how could it be otherwise, from the moment that man undertook to be self-sufficient?” (J Maritain)

The moral problem of modernity is that there is a polytheism of values with no principled way in which the conflicts between warring gods may be resolved. There is a subjectivism of moral values and modernity can supply no good reason to either accept or deny any of the disputing positions. 

For Weber, modernity is characterised by a split between two types of rationality: Wertrationalitat, or value orientated rationality, and Zweckrationalitat, or instrumental rationality. Wertrationalitat refers to substantive goals, Zweckrationalitat  refers to formal procedures. The application of scientific rationality to all areas of human life has undermined the idea that a single objective meaning could be ascribed to the nature of things. Science is able to discern the best means to a given end, but can offer no guidance as to the choice of ends themselves. The result is the 'disenchantment of the world' and the displacement of substantive rationality by instrumental rationality. (Weber, 'Science as a Vocation' 1989 1991: 138/44, 147/55). Divorced from natural essences and purposes, Weber sees no hope for meaning, other than the one that human beings make up for themselves.

The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself.

Weber, '"Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy' 1904 in Shils ed Methodology 57

The substantive rationality supporting a singular, overarching conception of the good is dissolved by scientific rationality, but science itself is incapable of proving or disproving the ultimate validity of any particular position which an individual may come to hold. The result is a pluralist universe in which the individual is compelled to answer moral questions alone and unaided: 'What shall we do, and how shall we arrange our lives?’ The individual alone has to decide 'Which of the warring gods should we serve?' (Weber Science as a Vocation 1989 1991: 152/3).

The "disenchantment of the world" described by Weber undermines the substantive conception of the good but does not and cannot generate a morality that gives meaning and unity to life. On the contrary, the world is stripped of ethical meaning; objectified and instrumentalised in the rational pursuit of particular interests. Any advance that is made with respect to value-neutral rational control is offset by a concomitant loss of meaning. Instrumental potential can be activated from any number of value perspectives. The moral unity of the world is shattered through the subjectivisation of values. Where once God existed as the unitary ground of morality, now there is an irreducible plurality of competing value orders: “over these gods and their struggles it is fate, and certainly not any 'science’ that holds sway”. (McCarthy Introduction to Habermas 1991:xix/xx).

The end of the substantive rationality that brought about moral unity amounts to the end of the non-coercive, unifying power of collectively shared convictions. Instead, restricted to the cognitive-instrumental dimension, reason takes the form of subjective self-assertion. 'Many old gods arise from their graves, disenchanted and in the form of impersonal forces; they strive to gain power over our lives and resume again their eternal struggle with one another’ (Weber 1991: 147/8). Weber sees the fate of the age in the rise of a new polytheism taking the depersonified, objectified form of an irreconcilable antagonism among irreducible orders of value and life. As a result, the rationalised world has become meaningless (Habermas 1991:246).





The dominant form of reason in this world is instrumental reason, embodied in the institutions of the market, the capitalist organisation of production and becoming increasingly pervasive in human activities and relationships. Instrumental rationality drives substantive reason from the field, drives it into the private sphere and, slowly but surely, eats away at it even there. It is a corrosive force, a universal acid. So complete has been the victory of instrumental rationality that many philosophical and sociological discussions identify it with rationality as such (see the editorial introduction to Elster ed. 1986). At the same time, it became well nigh impossible to introduce and discuss substantive rationality, that is, until MacIntyre and the rediscovery of virtue ethics.

Instrumental rationality has supplanted morality in the modern world and it shows. The world has a perfection of means and a confusion of ends, said Einstein, putting his finger on the nature of the modern predicament. Instrumental rationality is a form of reason which is concerned not with ends but with the efficient organisation of the means attaining given ends. Who or what gives those ends is an irrelevance. G.E. Moore persuaded any number of philosophers that his ‘naturalist fallacy’ was correct in holding that morals cannot be derived from empirical nature. If this is true, the question is begged as to from where ethics come from. No wonder Moore inspired any number of subjectivisms and relativisms in ethics, a variety of moralities, with no way of deciding between them. But ends were supplied from somewhere, not from nature, not from human nature, but from power interests in the instrumentally rational world.

It is no longer possible in the rationalised world to find the larger significance of individual actions, nor discern the values that lie behind such actions. The natural sciences are unable to teach us anything about the meaning of the world (Weber 1991: 142). In yet another Fall of Man, religion and morality come to be expelled from the domain of knowledge, and have to find some other status. They lose social relevance and cease to play active roles in ordering the world. 

Hence the claim that the world is "disenchanted", lacking intrinsic meaning. The moral philosopher J.L. Mackie highlights the "queerness" of the view that the world could contain values. Mackie questions how objective values could relate to or co-exist with those characteristics revealed by science; by what means we could come to know of them; what possible relevance they could have to our existence (Mackie 1977:38/42). Such scepticism holds out no prospect of reconstituting substantive morality. Within the frame of modernity, philosophers acknowledge that values and meanings exist only insofar as they are created by human beings. Which begs the question as to why anyone should accept the values and meanings of others. Such a view is the end of morality as a force for regulating human affairs. It is a moral disarmament that leaves only power to decide disagreement and conflict.

The argument contained in this Thomist reading of Kant is concerned to repudiate this domination of instrumental rationality as entailing a distorted relationship to nature and to society, and is developed in terms of a search for a substantive rationality concerning ultimate ends. In the process, it identifies the inversion between means and ends inherent in an alienated social order as responsible for the destruction of morality and distortion of moral philosophy.

Each of the competing moralities offers a view of what individuals ought to do, but none are able to give good reasons for these individuals to take them seriously. In a market society of atomised individuals, where good is identified with individuals pursuing happiness as they see fit, moral appeals to the good lack social relevance. Given this market conception of human action, the universal claims made by morality will be rejected by the rational individual. The social identity supporting universal moral principles and values is lacking. In these conditions it becomes easy to agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the interests of the strongest. But that is power as might, not morality as right. Bernard Mandeville’s view in the eighteenth century that morality is merely a system of illusion applies specifically to modern morality, not morality as such. My argument is that rather than attempt to do the impossible and supply modernity with a viable universal morality – which is what Kant attempted to do – we need to recover objective morality rooted in ontological nature, thus making good all that is valid in Kant (which is plenty). That, I argue, is what Aquinas offers. The alternative is a continued collapse into subjectivism and solipsism. A world without morality will not be a happy or fulfilling place to live. We need a morality worthy of the name.

The modern rejection of Aristotelian essentialism and teleology, the idea of a purpose-driven universe, has had moral philosophers engaged in an increasingly desperate and apparently futile search for a secular account of the nature and status of morality, that is, an account that conforms to the canons of scientific rationality and materialism. No such account is possible, hence the prevalence of the view that morality is a matter of value judgements. Science cannot pronounce on ethics. Taking the scientific view of the world as forming the basis of knowledge as such, moral philosophers have been deprived, and have deprived themselves, of the objective grounds of morality.

There is therefore a crooked path which leads from Immanuel Kant’s agnosticism with respect to the good to the polytheism and subjectivism of Max Weber. Crooked, because Kant’s morality is intersubjective and universal, not subjective. Kant believed in morally necessary ends and held that morality was more than arbitrary subjective opinion. Yet Kant was attempting to supply a modernity that has robbed the world of moral significance with a viable modernity. He failed. Max Weber theorised a modernity that could no longer subscribe to an overarching, objective conception of the good. Of all moral philosophers, Nietzsche was the most clear and the most honest in seeing the extent to which the moral tradition had collapsed in the modern world. In which case, the question turns on whether an answer to Nietzsche is possible. I argue that Nietzsche is fundamentally correct in his repudiation of what passes for morality in the modern age. Modernity is thoroughly amoral in that the moralities it generates cannot offer good reasons to support its positions. (MacIntyre 1983; Pearson ed 2009; Hollingdale 1973; Stauth and Turner 1988).

In retrospect, it looks as though Rousseau’s social contract, Kant’s republic of ends, Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and Marx’s ‘truly human society’ are ambitious, even ingenious, attempts to recover the common good from within a diremptive, bifurcated, atomised modernity that is immunised against such a collective morality. It’s not that such attempts are failures but that they could only have been failures within the modern terrain. It is impossible to generate communitarian ends from libertarian premises, it is impossible to supply moral ends from within a disenchanted modernity. There is no communitarian ideal concerning the common good immanent within modernity. 

In this world of self-sufficiency, reason ceases to participate in the divine order and instead closes in on itself and becomes irrational. "The error of the modern world has been to claim to assure the reign of reason over nature by refusing the reign of super-nature over reason." Kant’s self-legislated reason is not enough.

Proceeding from a scientific Cartesian rationalism, the modern world denies the existence of anything beyond the level of reason only to come to deny reason itself. Losing its foundation in theoretical reason, practical reason crumbles. Matter is absorbed into flesh and spirit succumbs to irrationality. The same applies to Marx’s notion of human self-emancipation through the practical reappropriation of alienated human powers. The commitment to overcome alienation is worthy but still begs the question of idolatry as the veneration of human power. Power to what end? Human self-realisation is fine if Marx’s claim for ‘the universal class’ can be made good – a united humanity in which the freedom of each is coincidental with the freedom of all. Marx’s universal is confined within a self-made social world, the world as a human product. A world of human power. Idolatry.

Against this, Aquinas offers a unity achieved through a realist metaphysics that makes possible a common philosophical structure and moral attitude. That is, a common idea of an objective reality makes possible a common scale of values, of which moral and social life, linguistic and juridical structures are embodiments.

This metaphysical unity has long been broken -- not completely destroyed, certainly, but broken and, as it were, effaced in the West. What constitutes the drama of Western culture is that its common metaphysical basis has been reduced to an absolutely insufficient minimum, so that it holds together now primarily through matter, and matter on its own is incapable of keeping a moral order together. The natural law is the law of nature seen through the eyes of reason. Shadia Drury writes of ‘the lost promise of the natural law’, (Drury 2008), blaming Aquinas for this loss for his subordinating of natural law to the ends of religious dogma. There is plenty wrong with Drury’s argument. The tendentious and superficial nature of the charges she mounts against Aquinas rather clouds the good things she has to say about the natural law. She is too concerned to argue that organised religion has been most responsible for the demise of the natural law than present the positive case for the natural law. I agree with much that Drury writes concerning the potential of the natural law to create and sustain a social order which corresponds to and enhances the human good. It’s Aristotle’s view, after all. But what stands in the way of the natural law is not religion and faith at all. Aquinas did not subordinate natural ends to supernatural ends, but agreed with Aristotle’s view of the ultimate end on every point within the natural and temporal world. Aquinas’ achievement was to canalise the natural end into the supernatural end, thus uniting immanence and transcendence. The end of the natural law was not Aquinas and religion but the rise of mechanistic science, the industrialisation and commodification of the world and the domination of the capitalist megamachine. For all of Drury’s supposed radicalism, there is no critique of political economy and no sustained sociological critique of modernity. She writes of the ‘subjugation of reason’, but there is no discussion of the form that rationality has taken in the modern world. 
All that Drury gives here is a mock dialogue between Aquinas and Modernity, with Modernity admitting that ‘The combination of freedom with capitalism has unwittingly led me astray. For capitalism cannot resist the exploitation of sexuality in an endless quest for profits. My world does indeed resemble an endless pornographic merry-go-round. As a result, the distinction between freedom and licentiousness has become blurred.’ (Drury 2008: 127 ff).
As if sex is the only thing that capitalism exploits. Drury should know that the distinction between liberty and licence is basic to Aristotle. Aristotle’s ethics are repeated in all fundamentals in Aquinas. The question is which force really bears most responsibility for the demise of the natural law? The Catholic Church or the capital system? Indeed, natural law as such was only developed after Aristotle. It was the Catholic Church which codified the natural law in the first place. Any promise that has been lost is a promise that the Church made in the first place.

I certainly agree with Drury’s basic thesis concerning ‘the lost promise of the natural law’, implying a potential within human nature that is certainly capable of being rediscovered. That’s precisely what I am arguing in this thesis. But Drury’s myopic secular-humanist perspective is so bereft of intellectual curiosity, good will and generosity of spirit that it will ensure that the promise of the natural law will remain lost. The recovery of the natural law will require a thoroughgoing, informed and sustained critique of the structures and institutions of capitalist modernity, not the abuse of an institution – the Catholic Church – which alone has kept the natural law alive through the centuries in which most individuals and groups have proved more than willing to make Faustian bargains with the modern gods/devils of industry and commerce, science and military, state and bureaucracy.

The responsibility of philosophers in this respect has been of prime importance. From the sixteenth century, and especially from the time of Descartes, the interior hierarchies of the virtues of reason began to crumble. Philosophy separated itself from theology to claim the title of supreme knowledge; then, as a natural result, the mathematical science of the sensible world and its phenomena came to take precedence over metaphysics. The history of modern philosophy shows us how the human intellect has progressively affirmed its own independence with respect to God and with respect to Being: that is to say, with respect to the supreme Object of every intelligence, and with respect to the connatural object of the intellect as such.

The due order between the intellect and its object has thus been shattered. 

Intelligence fancies it affirms its own strength by denying and rejecting as genuine knowledge, first theology, and then metaphysics; by abandoning any attempt to know the First Cause and non-material realities; by cultivating a more or less refined doubt which wounds at once the perception of the senses and the principles of reason, that is to say, the very things all our knowledge depends on. This presumptuous lowering of human knowledge may be described in one word: agnosticism.
At the same time intelligence refuses the rights of First Truth, and repudiates the supernatural order, which it regards as impossible -- and such a denial is a denial of the whole life of grace. In one word: naturalism.
Finally, intelligence lets itself be deceived by the mirage of a mythical conception of human nature, which assigns to that nature conditions peculiar to the pure spirit, supposes it to be in each one of us as perfect and complete as the angelic nature in the angel, and therefore claims for man, as a gift of nature, full self-sufficiency and absolute independence.

Scrutinizing the metaphysical secrets of knowledge, the original nature and the mysterious immateriality of which it alone perfectly respects, putting our ideas in continuity with things through the intuition of the senses, and resolving all our knowledge in the evidence of being and the first principles, whose transcendental value enables it to ascend even to God, the doctrine of St Thomas is a wisdom high enough to save the intelligence from the deceptions of agnosticism, and to oppose to the idealist demon (already quite decrepit) a realism not naive but soundly critical.

Maritain The Apostle of Modern Times

Bringing the Intellect Back to its Object
Throughout this study I shall mount a defence of the realism of Thomas Aquinas against idealism, naturalism and agnosticism. But I will do so in a way that recognises and incorporates the achievements of Aristotle and Kant. This is not to choose between a transcendental, existential or Aristotelian Thomism but to recognise that Aquinas’ synthesis is capable of uniting all these strands.

St Thomas succeeds in bringing the intellect back to its object, orientating it toward its true end, restoring it to its nature. He affirms that the intellect is made for being. The eye is made to see, wings are made to fly. Likewise, the intellect finds itself again in recovering its object; ‘it orders itself entirely to being; in accordance with the sovereign inclination that things have for their first principle, it tends, above all, towards Subsistent Being Itself.’ (Maritain).

The liberal justification of pluralism and tolerance does nothing to resolve the issue, since such a view cannot supply a rational criterion of choice. Without clarity with respect to the universal upon which the good is founded, there can be no common rational base upon which to deliberate and choose between rival positions. This is not a moral position at all, merely a relativism which entails tolerance for all positions.

That liberal fantasy world has never existed and, in a world of power and power struggles, can never exist. Instead, there is a polytheism of values, a moral wasteland in which conflicts are decided by power, not by morality. That’s a Weberian world, indeed, a Nietzschean world beyond good and evil. And it is not sustainable. Power is not an argument. Might does not entail right. When it is power as force that counts, the principle of right is redundant. This is not a moral position at all. Morality reduced to value judgements merely rationalises the law of the strongest. Rousseau had seen this clearly in The Social Contract: ‘If we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly the word ‘right’ adds nothing to force: in this connection, it means absolutely nothing.’ (Rousseau SC I.III).

In taking his cue from Rousseau, Kant is an important figure in the attempt to realise moral ends in the disenchanted modern world. The problem is that Kant’s rejection of metaphysics has served to detach morals from nature and natural purposes and thus confirms modernity’s disenchanted, dis-godded conception of reality. Ethics has become a moral ‘science’ in which "nature" ceases to be purpose driven and instead is conceived as merely physical nature, a mechanical complex of causal phenomena subjected to determinism, completely separated from the moral world. 

Here, I argue, is the great weakness of the Kantian system. Kant accepts the mechanistic Newtonian conception of nature, with the result that every ontological connotation and finality have come to be extinguished. This results in a world in which Hume's distinction between the "is" and the "ought-to-be" can gain plausibility.

That world is passing. In the absence of the natural law, biologists and neuroscientists are currently eyeing up the potential for science to expropriate ethics. 
The growing backlash against the philosophical convention that one cannot derive an ought-to-be from an is indicates that the time is coming when it will be once again possible to ground morality and freedom in nature and human nature, being and telos. This is the case for the recovery of the natural law. In The Moral Landscape (2010), Sam Harris argues in favour of a conception of moral truth. He believes that this conception is possible and can be defended via biological science. In a similar vein, the biologist E.O. Wilson argues that biology should come to ‘cannibalise’ ethics.

E.O. Wilson, a scientist I have plenty of time for, especially his idea of biophilia, makes some extraordinary claims here. 





Morality has been driven from the public sphere and its absence is glaring. Science is clearly intent on stepping into the big hollow hole where morality once was. Can science do this? Weber thought not. The natural law tradition from Aristotle to Aquinas affirms that ethics can be derived from nature, an ought-to-be can be derived from an is. Aristotle’s ethics and politics, it should be remembered, were the conclusions he drew for practical affairs from his scientific studies. My objection to Wilson is not the old philosophical convention that one cannot derive an ought-to-be from an is. It’s that Wilson seems less to be defining first principles of ethics and politics than to be displacing the moral sciences by biology and neuroscience. The problem is that a neuronal explanation of the human brain, however full, cannot establish first principles for psychology or sociology, ethics or politics, only neuro-science. A neuronal explanation of the brain reveals nothing about the things that human beings do, the choices they make, the ideas they generate. Wilson’s neuronal determinism is far removed from the natural law. In cannibalizing ethics in this way, science will cannibalize humanity itself, reducing it to physical existence by stripping away the values and meaning added by creative human agency. The natural law, it should be emphasised, is not unadulterated nature as a physical thing, but nature as mediated by reason and culture.

Philosophers are being thrown out of their own home and, frankly, they have been asking to be evicted for a long time. Moral philosophers have been so lost within subjectivism that they have forgotten what their subject is about. One can quote Daniel Dennett here. 

If "ought" cannot be derived from "is," just what can it be derived from?... ethics must be somehow based on an appreciation of human nature—on a sense of what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to have or want to be. If that is naturalism, then naturalism is no fallacy (Dennett, p. 468).

Naturalism is indeed no fallacy at all. Things are afoot. It is a sad comment on the state of modern moral philosophy that it takes thinkers coming from the field of biology to encourage us to shake off the deleterious influences of Hume and G.E. Moore and the various subjectivisms, irrationalisms and nihilisms they have spawned in morality. 

Naturalism was not a fallacy to either Aristotle or Aquinas and has never been a fallacy to those inspired by those traditions. Freedom and morality are grounded in Being. Freedom is one of the attributes of human nature. It should come as no surprise, then, that modernity has been floundering in a moral sense, given the rejection of a purpose-driven metaphysics of being. Modern moral philosophers have been attempting to solve a moral problem that is incapable of resolution on modern premises. The result, inevitably, has been relativism, emotivism and irrationalism.

So is the future inevitably one of moral nihilism, morality reduced to irreducible subjective opinion? Much depends on whether we can regain a realism that restores teleology and sees the unfolding of purposes and realisation of ends at work. That would be to restore the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of the virtues and see the modern scientific assault on that tradition as misconceived. Sam Harris acknowledges Aristotle’s centrality here, but only in the most cursory fashion in the footnotes to his book. The point is, that philosophy itself has always had the resources to hold the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’ together, locating the ideal within the real, seeing nature through the eyes of reason.

The argument of this book is that this Aristotelian-Thomist tradition can be rationally vindicated, that a rational natural teleology can be defined in such a way as to support morality, moral agency and moral order, that Kant’s moral system can prevail over and above the modern world within which it is confined.

Failure to define such a teleology leaves us hopelessly imprisoned in the Weberian iron cage, a world which functions, in Weber’s apposite phrase, ‘without regard for persons’. A world which functions without regard for morality. Such a world is individualistic at the level of self, but it lacks the moral and philosophical anthropology required to support personality as an integral, holistic conception. It is the world of the bureaucrat, the manager and administrator, the passive consumer, and is utterly denuded of moral agency. 

My argument is that the modern approach to morality is misconceived, in being an attempt to define a situation in which atomised individuals think and act and justify in the absence of morality. Kant cannot ground his universal ethic in such conditions. In light of this moral failure, morality fractures into myriad positions - emotivism, expressivism, perspectivism etc. These are not moral positions at all but rationalisations of individual subjective opinion and preference. Most of all, I want to argue that the modern attack upon the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition is mistaken. 

Aquinas and the Aristotelian Framework
In this book I wish to focus upon Thomas Aquinas rather than Aristotle. There are those like Shadia Drury (2008) who argue for the lost promise of the natural law, that Aquinas’ supernaturalism has distorted the potential of Aristotelian naturalism. More substantial works than Drury’s say otherwise (Finnis 1988; Raskin 1988; MacIntyre 1980).

Aquinas isn’t Aristotle and does modify his view, and departs from it completely with respect to the transcendence of beatitude. But it is more accurate to argue that Aquinas complements, adds to and completes the promise of Aristotle’s natural law in that, within the earthly realm, Aquinas is in fundamental agreement with Aristotle’s conception of fulfilment and flourishing, only to go beyond it in the spiritual realm. 

In what follows I shall focus on Aquinas rather than Aristotle. I have written extensively on Aristotle, and my views on Aristotle are laid out there (Critchley 1995; Critchley 2001; Critchley 2004; Critchley 2011). Suffice to say, I don’t see Aquinas as distorting Aristotle at all. Rather, Aquinas works within the Aristotelian tradition and did more than any thinker to recover Aristotle within the western world.

Aquinas is an Aristotelian, but with a supernatural dimension added to the naturalism. This gives us a transcendental end that enables us to avoid the danger of our becoming self-enclosed in matter. That is the case against a purely naturalist position in ethics. Aquinas draws us out of our own egos and enjoins us to look beyond material power, its veneration, possession and use. There is an ultimate end beyond the material world. Aquinas, that is, gives us the lost promise of the natural law – what philosophers from Aristotle to Vico, Rousseau, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche etc have sought to give us – and then some more. There is a reality that is more ultimate than the self-made social world of human beings; there is a world beyond human history. 

Modernity is parasitic upon a moral capital generated in past civilisations, doing nothing to replenish the stock. Much of what passes as morality in the modern world derives from an older tradition. Modern moral philosophers have been party to the systematic rejection of that tradition, replacing it with theories of varying levels of implausibility. The increasing sterility of the debates between deontology and utilitarianism suggest that the search for a specifically modern morality has come to an end.

Here is why the Aristotelian tradition as it is developed by Aquinas is so important. The rules and the consequences of acts, which are central to modern conceptions of morality, both Kantian and utilitarian, are, in the Thomist conception, integrated within a greater scheme in which habits, habitus, the acquisition of virtues, ends and the common good have central place.
Hence the importance of establishing that Nietzsche’s rejection of morality applies specifically to modern deontology and utilitarianism, not to morality as such. The origins of this modern moral nihilism, arguably, lies in Kant’s own rejection of Aristotelian teleology. Kant’s idealism stripped nature of moral purpose. The result is a disenchanted Weberian world denuded of moral significance. Where Kant saw self-legislated reason supplying the moral content of the world, Weber saw a polytheism of values, with no way of deciding between them. Rather than Kant’s idea of a realm of ends as a universe of rational co-legislators, the world collapses into subjectivism of legislating selves.

One of the most important contentions of this book is that Kant’s philosophy does not have to end in this Weberian world. On the contrary, read in light of an earlier Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, a rational-natural teleology can be identified in Kant and put on an Aristotelian-Thomist basis in order to make good Kant’s commitment to the summum bonum. But that would be to place Kant on the realist grounds on Aristotle and Aquinas, not just self-legislated reason.

One of Kant’s greatest achievements is said to have been the way that he overcomes the separation of rationalism and empiricism. My argument is that this separation was the product of the modern world in the first place. The importance of Aquinas’ thought lies in the way it deals with problems which rationalism and empiricism have proved unable to resolve. 

This book addresses in passing many of the major Thomist themes – efficient and final cause, potency and act, essential being and participated being, act-of-being, intellect, appetite and will, natural law and natural inclination, practical knowledge, virtue, happiness and the human person.





5 Kant, Virtue and the Good

The Revival of Virtue Ethics
In recent years, as awareness of the inadequacies of utilitarian and deontological ethics has grown, there has been a turn to normative theories whose primary focus is on persons rather than decision-making and consequences. The revival of virtue ethics has been an important part of this normative turn, with the emphasis coming to be placed upon agents and the sorts of lives they lead rather than upon atomic acts and the rules for making choices, even less upon the consequences of such acts.

The proponents of virtue ethics thus differentiate their normative approach from the two dominant forms of modern ethics — utilitarianism and deontologism. In this normative turn, the characters of agents and their morally relevant traits matter more than laws of obligation.

I propose to read Kant’s philosophy so as to place him closer to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition of the Natural Law and virtue theory. This reading is less a reinterpretation of Kant as a recovery of a significant part of his work that has been buried. Kant’s work on virtue has been underdeveloped for centuries, with the dominant emphasis coming to be placed on his deontological rules ethic. Recovering Kant’s conception of the virtues goes someway towards correcting the Hegelian and communitarian view that sees Kant’s morality as an empty formalism. The truth of that critical view lies in the way that Kant's morality of duty, the deontological conception, has come to be institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom' which serves to constrain human behaviour, in contrast to a virtue ethics which serves to shape human character. In conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest (Hume’s ‘passions’), Kant's deontological ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality of duty designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the prevailing structures of private property and the minimal state. Such a conclusion leaves us a long way from Kant’s summum bonum.

I will argue that Kant sought to build an ethical theory based not just on rules but upon agents and the kinds of lives they lead. Kant, that is, is a virtue philosopher as well as a deontologist; his ethics therefore pay close attention to both the life plans of moral agents and to their discrete acts. Kant’s great achievement was to have created a moral theory which combined rule ethics and virtue ethics.

I start by presenting what Kant actually writes about virtue, underlining not only Kant’s high estimation of virtue but the centrality of virtue to Kant’s practical ethics.

I then move on to argue that Kant's position on the good will offers clear evidence of an agent-centred ethics as against the merely act-centred ethics for which Kant is known and both celebrated and criticised. My Thomist reading considers it to be significant that Kant, whose philosophy is most frequently identified with the doctrine of formal duty, proceeds not from a deontological statement of duty concerning what we ought to do but from a judgment of the highest good.

I will show that virtue lies at the core of Kant’s ethics, forming the foundation of all judgments of moral worth. I go on to argue that this conception of virtue is in complete accordance with the moral law, which is for Kant the supreme principle of morality.

In contrast to John Rawls, who argues for the priority of the right over the good, I argue that Kant affirms a conception of the good which is much more than subjective individual preference. Kant sets autonomy within universality. To understand this requires that we see how Kant’s deontological emphasis upon rules and duties concerning discrete acts and decisions is buttressed by a fundamental concern with agency and long-term characteristic behaviour, by a virtue ethics. I show how the doctrine of morally necessary ends in The Doctrine of Virtue offers the clearest evidence for this centrality of virtue in Kant’s ethical position. I conclude that in arguing for freely chosen ends which are morally necessary, Kant succeeds in balancing the obligation to obey the moral law with free human agency. 

The final section establishes the connection between virtue and the highest good. I argue that Kant’s notion of the good is directly connected with virtue, so that his ethical theory assesses not merely discrete acts but, above all, agents' characters and ways of life. For Kant, the moral law enjoins us to transform society to realise the highest good, the highest good being a final purpose towards which we are obliged to strive. I therefore conclude that in arguing that agents have a duty to adopt certain ends, Kant’s achievement is to have combined both virtue ethics and rule ethics to develop an ethical position that is more than the sum of both.

Having reconstructed Kant’s ethics in this way, I will go on to argue that Kant can only make his claims good by being grounded in a realist metaphysics and epistemology. Kant’s epistemological idealism and his separation of knowledge from ontological nature leaves his practical reason ungrounded. In other words, the centrality of virtue to Kant requires a stronger foundation than Kant’s idealism can supply.

Kant and his Communitarian Critics

At first glance, it would seem that Kant has nothing to offer the contemporary recovery of virtue ethics. Kant, indeed, could be considered to be the philosopher most responsible for the modern turn away from virtue ethics. Kant was the first moral theorist to place a non-derivative conception of duty at the centre of the philosophical stage and the first to establish a non-consequentialist decision procedure through his universalisability test. Kant is therefore considered the first and the greatest philosopher of deontology. As I shall argue shortly, there is more to Kant than this. 
Further, whilst contemporary communitarian philosophers such as Michael Sandel are attempting to reinstate the warm, affective ties of individuals within community, Kant is associated with Enlightenment efforts to emancipate the individual from such ties and from the pull of traditions and communities. Human beings are social beings, they live and thrive in connection to each other within communities and cultures that have evolved over time. No individual other than an abstracted self lives independently of these ties and bonds. Historian Royden Harrison describes this abstract individual as 'sexless, raceless, classless, the great bourgeois nothing’.
Kant’s universalistic conception of morality is considered asocial and ahistorical for this reason, a deficiency which Hegel sought to remedy in his conception of Sittlichkeit.

There are, then, both conceptual and historical reasons as to why Kant is a, even the, principal target for criticism on the part of virtue theorists . Indeed, in arguing that only actions done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (Kant GMM 1991:62/5; 1956:84 85 37/8; DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25), Kant has been criticised by both neo-Kantians (Rawls) and anti-Kantians (Sandel) for being indifferent to ends. Sandel, indeed, constructs the ‘libertarian’ alternative to utilitarianism in distinctly Kantian terms, proceeding to repudiate it thoroughly:

If rights don't rest on utility, what is their moral basis? Libertarians offer a possible answer: Persons should not be used merely as means to the welfare of others, because doing so violates the fundamental right of self-ownership. My life, labor, and person belong to me and me alone. They are not at the disposal of the society as a whole…




Sandel recognises that this ‘libertarian’ reading is contrary to Kant’s position. But it nevertheless remains possible to develop such a conception of autonomy from Kant’s view that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means. This, however, this is a distortion of Kant’s position. Kant is not a libertarian. Kant’s key principle is universality, not autonomy.

How that universality is grounded is the central concern of my argument.

I shall begin with the reading of Kant as a deontologist. 
Sandel rightly points out that Kant’s account of rights and duties ‘does not depend on the idea that we own ourselves, or on the claim that our lives and liberties are a gift from God. Instead, it depends on the idea that we are rational beings, worthy of dignity and respect. (Sandel 2009: ch 5). 

Sandel presents Kant as a deontologist, opposed to utilitarianism (maximising welfare) and to virtue theory, (allocating goods to reward and promote virtue). As a deontologist, Kant connects justice and morality via a ‘demanding’ idea of freedom. Since empirical considerations, such as interests, wants, desires, and preferences, are variable and contingent, they cannot serve as the basis for universal moral principles—such as universal human rights. The moral law, the supreme principle of morality, is therefore attained through the exercise of "pure practical reason."

Kant’s argument is based on the close connection between our capacity for reason and our capacity for freedom. Every person is worthy of respect as an end, and not merely as a means, not on account of self-ownership of life, labour and person, but on account of being rational beings. This capacity for reason means that we are also autonomous beings, capable of acting and choosing freely. (Sandel 2009 ch 5). Bentham was right to observe that human beings like pleasure and dislike pain, but wrong to argue that these are "our sovereign masters." Human beings are sentient creatures responding to the senses but, for Kant, human beings are also rational creatures, and reason ought to be and can be sovereign. When reason governs our will, we are using our distinctive rational capacity to achieve freedom, setting us apart from obeying appetite in a mere animal existence. 

For Kant, to act freely is to act autonomously according to a law that is self-given, rather than according to the dictates of nature or social convention. Kant’s autonomy contrasts with heteronomy. To act heteronomously is to act according to determinations external to the person – natural and social. To act freely is not to choose the best means to a given end but to choose the end itself, for its own sake (Kant GMM 1991: 453/4). Unlike those things which are a matter of physical causality and biological necessity, this choice of ends is a choice that only human beings can make, on account of the distinctive capacity for reason.

Sandel thus presents Kant as offering a deontological rules ethics in which the moral worth of an action consists in the intention from which the act is done, not in the consequences of that action. ‘What matters is the motive, and the motive must be of a certain kind. What matters is doing the right thing because it's right, not for some ulterior motive.’ (Sandel 2009: 112/3).

Sandel is correct, insofar as he goes. As Kant writes: "A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes." A good will is good in itself, whether or not it prevails. "Even if ... this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this value." (Kant 1991: 61)

This is a clear statement of a deontological rules ethics. For Kant, to act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (Kant GMM 1991:66). Kant’s seems clearly to be a deontologist. In the words of communitarian philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre: 'In Kant's moral writings we have reached a point at which the notion that morality is anything other than obedience to rules has almost, if not quite, disappeared from sight'. (MacIntyre 1981:219. Cf. 42,112. 

This is a familiar charge against Kant. Hegel criticised Kant's morality as an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R). For Hegel, Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake’ providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R). Hegel criticises Kant as offering a purely formal standard of universality which cannot generate substantive social and political prescriptions and is therefore unable to provide an 'immanent doctrine of duties'. 

Against Kant’s abstract morality of duty, formalised in terms of external rules and codes, Hegel offers an embodied morality that proceeds within a thick welter of institutions and relations of ‘concrete freedom’ within a conception of Sittlichkeit, the system of the ethical life (Hegel PR para 260). Whilst Kant offers morality as a set of formal practices and procedures, Hegel's ethical life is rooted in the very fabric of the community, in its way of life, building organically up to the universality of the state (Wood 1990:206). Hegel’s state achieves the unity of individuals not out of self-interest but out of a solidaristic sense of community (Avineri 1972:134). In contrast to the Kantian self-determination of the will, Hegel relates the will to the proper objects of its activity (Smith 1991:122). Hegel's distinctive claim in this respect is that the duties of the individual form part of the rational social order, achieving freedom not as autonomy from the institutional fabric of human life, but as freedom through participation within and membership of that fabric (PR para 149). Whereas the central preoccupation of contemporary political thought and action is the winning and retaining of rule through an appeal to the self-interest of an atomised and passive electorate, Hegel's state is rooted not within its own potestas publica alone, as with the French republic, but in the corporate bodies which bind individuals together in composing society. Hegel’s conception of the ‘democratic corporation’ – comprising churches, municipal and regional governments, and other civil institutions – mediates between the individual and the state so as to create a universal citizen identity (MacGregor 1998:132), Hegel’s state does not impose universality from the outside but allows it to emerge from below through its internal relation to civil society. Communitas ‘grows organically within civil society itself’ (Avineri 1988:171). This fabric 'is my own objectivity, in the true sense, which I fulfil in doing my duty: in doing my duty, I am with myself and free' (Hegel PR para 133A). 

From this perspective, it would seem clear that Hegel rather than Kant offers much more to those attempting to develop a virtue ethics relevant to the modern age. (I argue precisely this in my doctoral thesis Marx and Rational Freedom 2001). For Hegel, Kant’s pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from the real desires, interests, and needs of real individuals. There is simply no way of bracketing out the characters of the agents in the way that Kant’s deontological ethics requires. Instead, the good needs to be made an integral part of the everyday empirical life of individuals. This is the case for my Thomist reading of Kant. It is significant that at this point, Hegel follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons through feeling pleasure or pain at certain things (Hegel PR para 150R; Aristotle NE 1980:35/9).





For Hegel, this Aristotelian virtue transcends Kant's dualism of duty and inclination. I will go on later to show how St Thomas Aquinas structures the good life and shows how we may attain the highest good through the acquisition of virtues, the cultivation of habits and the canalising of dispositions and inclinations in a habitus that qualifies as good in realising human ends. At the moment, I want to pursue Hegel’s Aristotelian critique in a Thomist sense to highlight the extent to which the presentation of Kant as a deontologist has served to conceal the virtue ethics at the core of Kant’s ethical system.

The current normative turn, in which virtue ethics is prominent, is going in the way of Hegel against Kant. Philippa Foot singles out Kant for particular criticism in being one of the key philosophers whose 'tacitly accepted opinion was that a study of the topic [of the virtues and vices] would form no part of the fundamental work of ethics'. (Foot 1978: 1).

This is the crucial issue – is Kant indifferent to ends and virtues? On the reasoning so far, far from having anything to contribute to virtue ethics, Kant is condemned as the philosopher most responsible for philosophy’s subsequent neglect of virtue. In treating agents in abstraction from character, Kantian moral philosophy stands charged with not only misrepresenting persons but also morality and practical deliberation (Williams 1981: pp. 14, 19.) 

In fine, Kant’s deontological rule ethics perspective is considered by a large body of philosophical opinion to be primarily responsible for the abandonment of agent-centred ethics. 

I would argue that this criticism is warranted against the Kant who is considered a deontologist and nothing more. I propose to argue, however, that there is more to Kant than an ‘empty formalism’. The criticisms of Kant in this respect are valid only if the categorical imperative is identified with the Formula of Universal Law, emphasising the universality of its form. Kant's morality may be formal, but it is not empty. Contrary to the criticisms made by communitarian and virtue theorists, Kant is not indifferent to ends. The categorical imperative to treat humanity as an end and never as a means puts some 'non-heteronomous teleological flesh' upon 'the bare bones of universality’ (Riley 1982:49). Kant’s standard of universalisation is not left adrift but is instead attached to an ethic which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect they expect to receive in return. This has practical implications, ruling out all those institutions and practices which treat human beings as means to external ends.





Kant’s The Doctrine of Virtue (1964) is the key document which supports the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy as a practical ethics. The Doctrine of Virtue (1964) is a substantial work. The work forms the second part of Kant's Metaphysics of Morals and represents the culmination of the work on the ethical questions with which Kant had been grappling with for years. The work makes clear the extent to which Kant took a keen interest in virtue.

The Doctrine of Virtue is central to Kant’s work and the extent to which this aspect of Kant has been neglected is remarkable. It is here that my Thomist reading of Kant will focus, exposing aspects of Kant as a teleological thinker and virtue theorist concerned with the realisation of ends, human character and the good that owe more to the natural law tradition than to a rules based deontology.

In giving The Doctrine of Virtue the critical attention it merits, Gary Banham defines Kantian virtue as a combination of teleology with perfectionism. In the prefatory material to The Doctrine of Virtue, Kant makes the clear case for viewing ethical considerations in terms of teleological standards that involve an orientation towards perfectionism. This is the language of natural law, not merely natural right. Kant contrasts the Doctrine of Right with the Doctrine of Virtue and comments:

The doctrine of right dealt only with the formal condition of outer freedom (the consistency of outer freedom with itself if its maxim were made universal law), that is, with right. But ethics goes beyond this and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an end of pure reason which it represents as an end that is also objectively necessary, that is, an end that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have. (Ak. 6:380)

Gary Banham spells out precisely what this means:





It marks Kant’s ethics as having much more in common with Aristotle and Aquinas than the deontological reading would allow. This distinction between right and virtue highlights what is wrong with the conventional presentation of Kant as a deontologist for whom all that matters is ‘the motive of duty’. That is what I meant when I argued that Sandel’s criticisms of Kant as a deontologist are correct insofar as they go. My argument is that Kant is more than a deontologist.

Kant’s distinction between right and virtue also spells out what is wrong with John Rawls’ procedural (re)interpretation of Kant as being concerned with right rather than good. There is more to Kant than right, rules and duty for duty’s sake. Kant repudiates the utilitarian happiness principle in terms which make it clear that for Kant good and virtue are closely connected. The ‘principle of personal happiness’ is ‘the most objectionable’

not merely because it is false and because its pretence that well-being always adjusts itself to well-doing is contradicted by experience; nor merely because it contributes nothing whatever towards establishing morality, since making a man happy is quite different from making him good and making him prudent or astute in seeking his advantage quite different from making him virtuous; but because it bases morality on sensuous motives which rather undermine it and totally destroy its sublimity, inasmuch as the motives of virtue are put in the same class as those of vice and we are instructed only to become better at calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice being completely wiped out.

Kant GMM 1991: 103

Basing morality on interests and preferences destroys its dignity. In arguing that utilitarianism doesn’t teach us how to distinguish virtue from vice, "only to become better at calculation," Kant makes it clear that his concern is not just with right but with virtue as connected with the good. Yet, in commenting on this passage, Sandel has Kant repudiate utilitarianism because ‘it doesn't teach us how to distinguish right from wrong’ (Sandel 2009 ch 5). To repeat, Kant is explicitly referring to virtue, not to right, and brackets virtue with the good.

Gary Banham’s achievement is to have established the Doctrine of Virtue in closer relation to the Doctrine of Right so as to provide a unitary conception of Kant's practical doctrine related to the key notions of his critique of morality and presentation of ethics proper (Banham 2006: 211).

The reasoning proceeds thus. In setting out his ethical position, Kant is necessarily concerned with purposes, but not purposes as such, only particular types of purpose, namely purposes that it is a duty to have. In describing ethics as 'the system of the ends of pure practical reason' (Ak. 6:381), Kant makes it clear that ends that are also duties are the province of the account of virtue. This statement makes it clear that Kant understood his ‘treatment of moral philosophy in his critical works is no more than a propaedeutic to the discussion of ethics proper, a discussion conducted necessarily in terms of ends.’ (Banham 2006: 182). This does not mean that ends are treated as a pre-existent given to which the categorical imperative is expected to adapt. There was such an adaptation of the principles of morality to ends in the Doctrine of Right, with an allowance that ends could be selected according to whatever principle a person wished, so long as these ends in execution conformed to a general rule of conduct. The situation is different with respect to ethics. In ethics 'the concept of duty will lead to ends and will have to establish maxims with respect to ends we ought to set ourselves' (Ak. 6:382). ‘So the categorical imperative has to enable us to think of how to connect the concept of duty with that of an end in general.’ (Banham 2006 182). 

Banham’s book is a substantial piece of work that goes against the conventional reading of Kant to recover the practical orientation of Kantian ethics. By setting Kant’s deontological rule ethics within a teleology of perfectionism, Banham enables us to recover and highlight the centrality of virtue in Kant’s ethics. 

That Kant’s high estimation of virtue has been overlooked is mystifying, given the extent to which expressed himself so clearly, so many times on the matter.





[I]t is only by means of this idea [of virtue] that any judgment as to moral worth or its opposite is possible . . .

Kant CPR 1982 A 315/B 372

But all good enterprises which are not grafted on to a morally good attitude of mind are nothing but illusion and outwardly glittering misery.

UH Reiss ed 1996:49

Kant could not be more clear: whatever is not based on morally good disposition is merely pretence and glittering misery.

I would argue that a proper understanding of Kant on this issue would serve to strengthen the contemporary recovery of virtue ethics markedly. In 'Kant After Virtue' (1984), Onora O’Neill responded to Alasdair MacIntyre’s criticisms of Kant in After Virtue. O’Neill argues in the most forthright terms that 'what is not in doubt... is that Kant offers primarily an ethic of virtue rather than an ethic of rules'. (O'Neill 1984: 397. Cf. 396). That is an overly strong statement. Warner Wick also stresses the prominence of virtue in Kant’s moral philosophy, but does not in such strident terms as O’Neill and the way she asserts virtue against rules (Wick 1983).

There is no necessary reason why a rule ethic and a virtue ethic should be mutually exclusive alternatives in Kant. In response to criticisms from a certain Professor Garve, Kant spells out his position clearly, identifying duty with virtue.

I had provisionally designated the study of morals as the introduction to a discipline which would teach us not how to be happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. Nor had I omitted to point out at the same time that man is not thereby expected to renounce his natural aim of attaining happiness as soon as the question of following his duty arises; for like any finite rational being, he simply cannot do so. Instead, he must completely abstract from such considerations as soon as the imperative of duty supervenes, and must on no account make them a condition of his obeying the law prescribed to him by reason. He must indeed make every possible conscious effort to ensure that no motive derived from the desire for happiness imperceptibly infiltrates his conceptions of duty. To do this, he should think rather of the sacrifices which obedience to duty (i.e. virtue) entails than of the benefits he might reap from it, so that he will comprehend the imperative of duty in its full authority as a self-sufficient law, independent of all other influences, which requires unconditional obedience. 

Kant TP Reiss ed 1996: 64

My argument is that we do not need to choose between rules or virtue and that Kant’s morality is able to combine both equally. (Kant TP Reiss ed 1996: 64).

The most salient characteristic of virtue ethics is its strong agent orientation. In virtue ethics, the primary object of moral evaluation is the agent, not the intentional act or its consequences. Virtue ethics proceeds from the notion of the morally good person. This person is not defined in terms of performing obligatory acts ('the person who acts as duty requires') or end-states ('the agent who is disposed to maximise utility through his acts'). Rather, whether acts are right or wrong is determined according to what the good agent would or would not do. Ends are considered worthy or unworthy according to what the good agent would or would not aim at. It follows from this that virtue ethics is based on a conceptual shift in which 'being' receives greater prominence than 'doing'. 

Virtue ethics is thus an agent-ethics rather than an act-ethics. The character of the agent rather than the act and its consequences are the primary focus. Where virtue theorists are concerned with the character of agents and the kinds of lives they lead, act theorists focus on discrete acts and are therefore more concerned with formulating decision procedures for making practical choices.





Kant builds his moral position on a conception of ‘character’ linked to the need for ‘the good will’: 





Kant continues that ‘power, wealth, honour, even health and that complete well-being and contentment with one's state which goes by the name of 'happiness'’ produce only ‘boldness’ and even ‘over-boldness’, ‘unless a good will is present by which their influence on the mind—and so too the whole principle of action—may be corrected and adjusted to universal ends’ (Kant GMM 1991:60). Kant therefore concludes that ‘a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy.’ (Kant GMM 1991:60).

Kant's position on the good will offers clear evidence of an agent-centred ethics as against an act-centred ethics. This contradicts the familiar view of Kant as a rules-centred deontologist. Robert Paul Wolff remarks that it is 'noteworthy that the philosopher most completely identified with the doctrine of stern duty should begin, not with a statement about what we ought to do, but rather with a judgment of what is unqualifiedly good'. (Wolff 1973: 56-7.) Further, it is clear that what counts as unqualifiedly good for Kant is not some end-state like pleasure or the performance of certain discrete acts in conformity to rules, but a condition of ‘character’ forming the basis for all of a person's actions. Worthiness to be happy is determined by universal ends. This answers the question of what it is to be a human being.

Since the question of ‘the good will’ can never be answered with certainty given the opacity of our intentions, it is necessary to look beyond discrete acts and decisions to assess the lives that agents live. A person cannot be 'morally good in some ways and at the same time morally evil in others'. (Kant 1960: 20.) Likewise, a person cannot exhibit a good will in one instance and an evil in another. A steadfastness of character must be apparent at all times.

It follows from Kant's assertion of the unqualified goodness of the good will that agents rather than acts must be fundamentally important in his ethical position. This begs the question of the relationship of 'good will' to virtue. In The Doctrine of Virtue, the Tugendlehre, Kant defines virtue (Tugend) as 'fortitude in relation to the forces opposing a moral attitude of will in us'. (Kant DV 1964: 38, Ak. 380.) A good will is one which constantly acts from the motive of respect for the moral law. As natural beings, however, human beings always possess urges and inclinations which may lead them to act contrary to reason. Human wills are therefore in a perpetual state of tension. It follows from this that the virtuous agent is one who, on account of his or her 'fortitude', is able to resist and rise above those natural urges and inclinations which are opposed to the moral law. This ‘fortitude’ is strength (Starke) or force (Kraft) of will, (Kant DV 1964: 49-50, Ak. 389, 54/393, 58/397, 66/4114, 70—1/408—9; Kant 1974: 26-7, Ak. 147; Kant 1963: 73.) not in terms of the ability to accomplish the goals one sets out to achieve, but in terms of achieving mastery over one's inclinations and constancy of purpose. (Kant 1959 10, Ak. 394.)

Whilst some wills are better than others, only a holy will, with no wants that are contrary to reason, possesses an absolutely good will. Kant thus concludes that 'human morality in its highest stages can still be nothing more than virtue'. (Kant 1964: 41, Ak. 382.; CPR 1956, 86-7, Ak. 84-5; Kant 1959: 30-1, Ak. 414.)

Given the inherent conflict in human wills, virtue is only an approximation of the good will. Kant's virtuous agent is therefore a human approximation of a good will who, through strength of mind, continually acts out of respect for the moral law while nevertheless being subject to the presence of those natural inclinations which could lead him to act from other motives.

I will return to the way that Kant sets morality and natural inclination against each other here. Both Aristotle and Aquinas avoid such dualism and are thereby able to have reason persuade nature, guide the inclinations to the good, from the inside. Kant has reason educate nature from the outside. His teleological conception and his doctrine of virtue stumbles on the basis of this dualism. I shall return to this point later. At the moment, I am more concerned to establish the case for Kant as a virtue theorist, coming later to what more needs to be done to make good Kant’s moral claims in this regard.

Having established the good will as the only unqualified good for Kant, and having defined virtue as the human approximation to the good will, one can conclude that moral virtue is foundational for Kant, and not a concept of merely derivative or secondary importance, as it is in a strictly deontological theory. Kant expresses himself very clearly in favour of a morally good disposition: ‘But all good enterprises which are not grafted on to a morally good attitude of mind are nothing but illusion and outwardly glittering misery.’ From this perspective, 'the essence of [Kant's] moral philosophy is quite different from what it has commonly been supposed to be, for on the basis of this enquiry one must conclude that it is the concept of the good will that lies at its foundation'. (Harbison 1980: 59.)

However, Kant’s philosophy cannot be read as a virtue ethics alone. There is little to be gained from bending a stick that has gone too far in one direction, too far back in the other direction. There is much more to Kant’s ethical position than this rules versus virtue antagonism and failure to transcend that antagonism leads to a confusion in which Kant’s position is misrepresented. Kant defines both the good will and virtue in terms of obedience to moral law; they are both wills which conform to the moral law and act out of respect for the moral law. In beginning with the good will, Kant is attempting to discern 'the supreme principle of morality'. This is the categorical imperative. Which means that if virtue is defined in terms of conformity to the moral law and the categorical imperative, then it follows that, after all, it is obedience to rules that is primary in Kantian ethics, not virtue. Reasoning in this manner, however, divides Kant’s ethical position from within, creating a false antithesis which forces us to choose between duty for duty’s sake or virtue for virtue's sake. My argument is that neither position captures the essence of Kant’s ethical position and that we can refuse such a choice.

I should like now to clarify Kant’s position here. As the basis for all judgments of moral worth, virtue constitutes the heart of the ethical in Kant’s view. However, Kant goes on to define this virtue according to the moral law, the supreme principle of morality. Virtue ethics places the emphasis upon agency and long-term characteristic behaviour rather than discrete acts and decision procedures for moral quandaries. However, what matters most of all for Kant is that moral agency acts consistently out of respect for the moral law, not merely in terms of following specific rules for specific acts, but in the more fundamental terms of the person guiding his or her whole life out of respect for rationally legislated and willed law.

It is now possible to see where the difficulty in interpretation lies. Kant’s ethical position is subtle, profound and genuinely ground breaking. Kant is able to accommodate both rules and virtue and thereby avoid the simplistic either/or positions both his advocates and his critics adopt. Kant advocates obedience to rules not in the empty, thin, duty for duty’s sake manner for which he is criticised, and for which virtue theorists rightly castigate rule ethics. That’s how Kant can be interpreted – and has been interpreted – but this is not Kant’s fully developed position. Kant sets virtue in relation to the moral law in order to define obedience in terms of the broader, richer sense of living a life in accordance with reason. Going beyond the antithesis of rule ethics and virtue ethics, Kant's conception of the good will combines agent and rule so that the virtuous agent is one who consistently 'follows the rules' out of respect for the idea of rationally legislated law. But whilst 'the rules' do indeed serve as guides to action, they are conceived by Kant most fundamentally as guides to life. Kant, that is, is fundamentally concerned with the character of agents and the kinds of lives that agents lead. And this returns us to the centrality of what Aquinas calls the habitus, the social and moral matrix in which virtues are acquired and habits formed and dispositions canalised in the direction of the good.

Maxims as Underlying Intentions

A Thomist reading of Kant as a virtue theorist requires a re-interpretation of what Kant means by a maxim. (O'Neill 1984: Hoffe 1979: pp. 90-2.) Kant’s curt definition of a maxim is as a 'subjective principle of volition'. (Kant, Foundations, 17, Ak. 401, n. 1; 38/420, n. 8). From this it follows that a maxim is a policy of action which a particular agent adopts at a particular time and in a particular place. Since the principle is subjective rather than objective, it fits the agent's own intentions and interests. If we interpret Kant’s maxims as the agent's specific maxims for discrete acts, we proceed inexorably to the rule interpretation of maxims, a maxim as a rule which prescribes or proscribes a specific act. This is what O'Neill is determined to reject, arguing instead that 'it seems most convincing to understand by an agent's maxim the underlying intention by which the agent orchestrates his numerous more specific intentions' (O’Neill 1984: 394).
If, following O’Neill, we interpret Kant’s maxims as underlying intentions rather than as specific intentions, then the path is cleared for a Thomist interpretation of Kant’s ethics as a virtue ethics. For the underlying intentions of an agent are inextricably bound up with the sort of person the agent is and the kind of life the agent lives. And the kind of person an agent is clearly depends upon what virtues and vices an agent possesses.

 In contrast, the specific intentions of an agent are not always an accurate guide to the kind of person that agent is 'deep down inside'. Both O'Neill and Hoffe emphasise this connection between underlying intentions and being a certain sort of person. (O'Neill, 1984: 395; Hoffe 1979: 91).

Kant cautions us against understanding virtue as a 'mere aptitude (Fertigkeif) or ... a long-standing habit (Gewohnheit) of morally good actions'. (Kant 1964: 41-2, Ak. 383, 69/407). Here, Kant is concerned to emphasise that human virtue is a valuable but precarious achievement of pure practical reason. To preserve it, we must be constantly on our guard against heteronomy and empirical inclinations. It has to be regretted here that, in making these points, Kant engages in a criticism of Aristotle which sees little of positive value in Aristotle's own virtue ethics and, frankly, profoundly misunderstands Aristotle. Kant may well be closer to Aristotle on this point than he himself realises. 
Kant conceives virtue to be more than a mechanical habit, something one acquires through repeated practice, but as a state of character determined by a rational principle. Most of all, Kant wants to secure the definition of virtue as a moral disposition 'armed for all situations' and 'insured against changes that new temptations can bring about'. (Kant 1964 42, Ak. 383). Kant can certainly be praised for eschewing a nostalgic attempt to return to or reproduce the philosophical ideals of antiquity in favour of their realisation on the modern terrain. Kant is attempting not to recover the virtue ethics of antiquity, but to define a conception of virtue which is appropriate to the modern age, a virtue which is equipped to deal with the atomisation of modern society and the concomitant breakdown of communities, solidarities and institutions. Kant’s sensitivity to understanding virtue as the cultivation of habits is explained by his awareness of the human capacity for self-deception and rationalisation. This possibly explains why he misunderstood Aristotle so badly, believing that Aristotle himself had argued for virtue as mechanical habit. Emphasising that the good will is the achievement of pure practical reason, Kant has no truck with a view which invites a degeneration into mechanical habits. But that is not Aristotle’s view at all. When Aristotle argues that you are what you repeatedly do, he was concerned with the realisation of human excellence, not training for the dronehood. 
Aquinas, too, understood virtues as the habitual inclinations to act in accordance with the nature of a human being. But Aquinas’ conception is no less rational than Kant. Reason is the distinguishing and highest faculty of human beings. To act in accordance with the nature of a human being is to act rationally, to be in control of one's passions. (Summa Theologica), trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), Part I of the Second Part, question 55, articles 1-4, and question 59, articles 1-5.)

Kant’s view is narrow and overly rational in being detached from natural inclinations and dispositions. Kant’s own view can itself be strengthened by properly reconstructing the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas on virtue.

I would argue that Kant is closer to Aristotle and Aquinas on virtue than he realises. I would argue further that to make good his ethical claims concerning practical reason, Kant requires a foundation grounded in the teleological conception of ontological nature as supplied by Aristotle and Aquinas. 

Kant himself rules this option out. In the Critique of Judgement, Kant notes that once teleological explanation, 'has been adopted and found useful we must at least try to apply this maxim of Judgement in our reflection about nature as a whole .. .' (CJ 398). This leads to the assumption that the universe 'depends on and has its source in an intelligent being . . . which exists outside the world: that teleology thus can find no completion of its inquiries except in a theology'. (CJ 399).

As will be seen, this is the situation with respect to how Aquinas defines the ultimate end for human beings.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas naturally assume that we require teleology and that teleology leads to theology. This is not Kant’s view. For Kant, the notion of purposes in nature is an Idea; the principles governing its employment are not empirical generalizations or synthetic a priori principles, only maxims of reflective Judgement (Korner 1955 ch 9). 
Kant is concerned to emphasise this point. 'What can in the end be proved by even the most complete teleology? Does it perhaps prove that such an intelligent being exists? No, it proves no more than this, that — our cognitive faculties being what they are - we cannot at all form the conception of such a world [that is, a teleologically organized world] unless we regard an intentionally acting being as its supreme cause.' 
By this argument, Kant seeks to show that the doctrines of the older teleological metaphysics are not true of objective reality in the scientific sense but are the product of certain modes of thought adopted by human beings in reflecting on the phenomena of life and personal experience. The problem is that the application of the Categories in Kant’s own critical philosophy most certainly does separate us from objective reality. On Kant’s reasoning we can never know ‘things in themselves’. Kant leaves us walled up in concepts, irrevocably detached from the real world. That is the basis of my claim that Kant, ultimately, is agnostic on the good. The case for the older teleological metaphysics needs to be made.

The metaphysical systems of both Aristotle and Aquinas are based on various notions of natural purpose, final cause, and living organism and assume the existence of God. In Science and the Modern World, A.N. Whitehead notes that Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the introduction of a Prime Mover—God. Whitehead describes this as an ‘important fact’ (Science and the Modern World, Ch. 10). This fact is important not simply because Aristotle is the greatest metaphysician, but because ‘in his consideration of this metaphysical question he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim can be made'. 

It is curious to note how little Kant engages the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, Midgely notes the line connecting Kant to Weber, noting how little the pair of them knew of Catholic sources, particularly Aquinas. (Midgley 1983). This is quite an omission. It means that an the central ideological strand of modernity is vulnerable to the Aristotelian-Thomist counter-attack. 

Perhaps we see her the shaping influence of Pietism on Kant's thought, particularly the principle of "moral" written interpretation. ‘In Pietism, this kind of biblical interpretation had then taken on that specifically Protestant cast in which it affected Kant. Filled with the idea of the unconditional primacy of practical reason, he now sought out the exclusively ethical meaning behind every religious symbol familiar to him… Kant has unqualified subjective confidence that the fundamental and leading idea of his rational religion must be capable of having dominion over this set of dogmas and conforming to its actuality; but for exactly this reason he does not strive beyond it, since he is sure that he can fully demonstrate in it the universal application of his principle. (Cassirer 1981 ch 7). 

The Doctrine of Morally Necessary Ends

The clearest evidence for the centrality of virtue in Kant’s ethical position is provided by his doctrine of morally necessary ends in The Doctrine of Virtue. (Kant 1964, Introduction, Section 3, 'On the Ground for Conceiving an End which is at the Same Time a Duty'.) Here, Kant argues that all acts have ends, since action (by definition) is a goal-directed process. Ends, however, are objects of free choice. Kant recognises that human beings have many desires, wants and inclinations which are biologically and/or culturally imposed, and therefore that nearly all ends adopted are also objects of desires, wants and inclinations. However, since we cannot be forced to make anything an end of action unless we ourselves choose to, it follows that our ends, ultimately, are chosen. Individuals can and do renounce even the biological desire for life in certain circumstances. Since the adoption of ends is a matter of free choice, Kant reasons, they are a matter of pure practical reason rather than of natural inclination. This dualism, I shall argue, blocks the realisation of Kant’s ethical ends and requires that we put reason and nature together again in the manner of Aquinas. I argue that this is possible without either distorting or altering Kant’s moral philosophy in any radical sense.

To see why morally necessary ends are crucial to moral philosophy, we need to see how questions of reason, freedom, the good, and the moral law tie up in Kant’s developed ethical position.

Kant argues in The Doctrine of Virtue that there are two ends which agents have a duty to adopt: their own perfection and the happiness of others. 
Of the two, the duty which agents have to promote their own perfection is most fundamental and the one most directly connected to moral character. Components of the duty of self-perfection include the cultivation of one's 'natural powers', namely powers of 'mind, soul, and body'. 
(This should be compared to Thomas Aquinas’ conception of the soul as a living organism. Aquinas’ end is the substantial union of body and soul. Intellect, appetite and will all play an active role in this union. (Gilson 1961 Pt 2 chs 5 6 7 8)).

The most important component of this duty, however, is the obligation to cultivate one's will 'to the purest attitude of virtue' (Kant 1964 46, Ak. 386). As was seen earlier, Kant conceives the good will as the only unqualified good in the world or beyond it, and as establishing the condition for the goodness of all other things. As finite rational intelligences, the highest practical vocation of human beings is to produce the good will, a will that is good in itself, as an unconditional end, for the reason that such a will is the supreme good and, as such, is the ordering principle for all human activities. It was also argued earlier that, for Kant, virtue is a human approximation to the good will. Human beings, on account of their biological and cultural constitution, are always subject to inclinations which are contrary to the moral law. Reason guides us beyond these inclinations towards the morally necessary ends in conformity to the moral law.

So how does Kant balance free choice with the obligation to obey the moral law? In arguing for freely chosen ends which are morally necessary, Kant is committed to the view that agents therefore have a duty to adopt certain ends. Agents have a moral duty to choose these ends. This is a conception of the good which is more than subjective individual preference. Kant is not neutral on the good, a view which leaves individuals free to define the good as they see fit. Such a view distinguishes various individual conceptions of the good from a singular conception of the good as given by the moral law and as discerned by reason, placing the latter on a much more exalted plain than the former. This runs entirely against the neo-Kantian position defined by the likes of John Rawls, who argues explicitly for the priority of right over the good (Rawls 1971:30/3 446/52). Whereas, for Kant, morality establishes the realm of freedom, for Rawls, morality is merely instrumental in the distribution of primary goods, essentially nonmoral goods. Rawls’ procedural interpretation of Kant is therefore a misinterpretation of Kant. Kant's core principle is not autonomy, but universality. This being the case, individualist liberals could easily denounce Kant’s notion of free choice as illiberal.

Whatever the contemporary deontological liberal attempts to redefine Kant as neutral on the good, Kant's own position is very different, affirming the existence of morally necessary ends. For Kant, the existence of morally necessary ends are crucial to moral philosophy. The good life lies in human agents choosing these ends as a matter of free choice, guided by reason. Kant argues that the abandonment of morally necessary ends 'would do away with all moral philosophy'. (Kant 1964 43, Ak. 384). 

From this perspective, contemporary deontological liberalism asserting a neutrality on the good and the priority of right over the good expresses the demoralisation of the modern world. MacIntyre’s critique of the condition of morality within modernity in After Virtue could have been written by Kant as After Morality. As Roger Trigg argues, ‘morality matters’ (Trigg 2005) and, to Kant, ends are absolutely crucial to morality as such. Kant’s reasoning is that all ends which are necessary are categorical. If all ends are contingent, then all imperatives cease to be categorical and instead become hypothetical. And this would spell the end of moral philosophy. One sees how the reduction of morality to being no more than ‘value judgements’ in the modern world amounts to the eclipse of ethics. ‘Value judgements’ do not constitute a morality, they are a mere congeries of subjective preferences and opinions based on individual desire, want and inclination (Neiman 2009; Oderberg 2000). If individuals are free to accept or reject any end put before them according to their own specific inclinations, then it follows that all commands prescribing maxims for actions are similarly open to rejection. And once morally necessary ends are abandoned, inclinations take the place of reason, the moral law is no longer recognised and morality no longer exists. 

The neo-Kantian position which argues for the priority of the right over the good falls far short of Kant’s own position. For reasons given above, Kant allows us to have both right and the good, rules and virtue. Kant consistently pushed against the boundaries between the moral and the empirical. For Kant, the free will of the moral agent is highly relevant to politics. He argued that 'a true system of politics' must pay 'tribute to morality' (Kant PP 1991:125), a tribute which presses against the boundary which separates the political from the moral so as to overcome the distinction between the politically possible and the morally right (Riley 1982). Kant insisted that right 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (Kant 1991:21). In fine, politics, as a practical doctrine of right, cannot conflict with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).

My argument is that Kant’s morality as duty is comprehensible only when it is placed within a larger framework designed to give meaning to individual existence. I have argued that Kant is keenly concerned with the moral dispositions of agents and the kinds of lives they lead. Such a concern begs a vision of the good life, the very thing which contemporary liberals like Rawls exclude (Rawls 1971). (see Peter Critchley Reason, Freedom and Modernity 2001 vol 2 The Philosophical Origins of Rational Freedom; Reason, Freedom and Modernity 2001 vol 4 The Good Life).

The question is whether, ultimately, Kant himself supplied a vision of the good and the good life. My view is that Kant, ultimately, is agnostic on the good. His detachment of self-legislating reason from ontological nature leaves Kant cut off from ultimate reality or objective reality, things in themselves.

Virtue and the Highest Good

I have shown that virtue plays a much greater role in Kant's ethics than those who read Kant’s ethics as a rule ethics pure and simple realise. This does not mean, however, that Kant’s ethics is just a virtue ethics and nothing else. It is more accurate to argue that Kant combines both rule and virtue ethics to develop an ethical position that is more than the sum of both. Both agent and act perspectives form a significant part of Kant’s ethical theory. That is Kant’s great achievement.

By reading Kant in light of Thomas Aquinas, I have tried to correct the dominant reading of Kant as a deontological rule ethics that is silent on the good. 
Whilst Rawlsian liberalism fits the contemporary demoralised modern world in which right prevails over good, this was not Kant’s position at all on ethics. At the core of Kant’s ethics is the moral requirement to transform society to realise the highest good: 'The moral law .. determines for us . . a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom' (CJ 1951:30). For Kant, human beings 'are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304). Kant’s notion of the good connects directly with virtue, his ethical theory thus assessing not merely discrete acts but most of all agents' characters and ways of life.

Referring to the abstract character of Kant’s universal principle of right, Unger writes: 'it seems impossible to derive from it definite conclusions about what precisely the laws should command, prohibit, or permit' (Unger 1984:85). This is too simple, since Kant's categorical imperative does have content with respect to the ethic and realm of ends. But it is a view that I myself have made. In my PhD thesis Marx and Rational Freedom I made this argument:





This is very much a Kant read in light of the libertarian and communitarian debate and is a view which I have sought to substantially revise in this book with respect to Thomas Aquinas. Kant has a strong concern with the good and emphasises the close connection of virtue and the good. In my viva voce I repeated my claim that Kant, ‘ultimately’, is ‘agnostic’ on the good and therefore cannot achieve his moral aims. I was taken to task by Dr Gary Banham, a Kantian philosopher of great insight and ability, who quoted Kant’s argument that we 'are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself’. 

I can accept this, as far as it goes. Kant is closer to Thomism, with the commitment to the highest good, than he is to Rawlsian liberalism, with its assertion of the right over the good and its ethical neutrality. However, my point concerning Kant’s agnosticism on the good remains to the extent that Kant divorces moral reason from ontological nature, from efficient causality, from first and final cause, from necessary being. The key words from my thesis are that Kant is ‘ultimately agnostic’ with respect to the good. There remains a case for arguing that Kant’s reason and will are detached from nature in any ultimate sense and, that being the case, cannot ground the conception of the good in objective reality. Kant cannot but be agnostic as to the nature of that reality given his epistemological idealism.





The vision that Kant develops in the Critique of Judgement is more expansive than that presented in the first two critiques. Kant now comes to argue that human beings, as Nature’s children, are equipped with natural endowments that enable them to transcend their natural state and create their cultural world, thus realizing Nature’s immanent Ideas. This is Kant's transcendent naturalism, superseding his transcendent idealism. 

Whilst Kant considered Newton to be the master of natural world and Rousseau the master of the moral world, he was aware that neither could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. Kant, in his later work, comes to locate the solution for this, the key problem in his entire philosophy, in Nature. Nature is the original matrix for realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world, even before the birth of humanity; the moral and political development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal providence. Kant’s earlier acceptance of the mechanistic Newtonian conception of nature had prevented him from grasping this cosmic truth fully in his earlier critiques. Acknowledging Nature as the living force resolves Kant’s ultimate philosophical problem in bridging the chasm between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s resolution of the problem of mediation involves a two-way transition: the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law.

(elsewhere in this book I examine Aquinas’ moderate realism which proceeds from sense experience to the mind and then back. I argue that Aquinas had the solution to the problem of mediation all along.)

In contrast to the moderate realism of Aquinas, Kant is an idealist. Where Aristotle is the main influence on Aquinas, Kant is clearly in the line of descent from Plato. (Of course, it should be pointed out that Aquinas incorporated key elements of Plato’s philosophy, especially on participation, rather than opposed Plato and Aristotle to each other.)

For Kant, natural purpose is a supersensible Idea that cannot be found in the blind mechanism of nature (CJ 377). Kant thus proposes a two-way mediation in teleological judgement. Human beings make the upward transition for recognizing the Idea in the supersensible world and the downward transition for realizing the Idea in the natural world. But this mediation is made by both human beings and natural teleology, human beings as parts of a natural teleology. On the highest level, there may be only one Idea of natural purpose. Thus, for Plato, there is only one Idea of Life (Timaeus). However, every species has its own Idea of natural purpose and is governed in accordance with it. On this level, the multiplicity of teleological Ideas corresponds to the multiplicity of aesthetic Ideas. The various particular Ideas of natural purpose are generated by the articulation and specification of the one transcendent Idea of Life. In naming the objects of natural beauty, Kant often refers to living beings such as flowers, birds, and crustaceans. This implies the conclusion that the power of life includes the power of beauty. Thus Nature conjoins the Ideas of Life and Beauty and brings them from the supersensible to the sensible world. This descent of Ideas is engineered by the technique of Nature. This is Nature working like an artist (CJ 390). Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumena proceeds thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings has the intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world – homo sapiens. The moral and aesthetic life of human beings is a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology, which Kant in his Idea of a Universal History conceives as the Providence of Mother Nature.

Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest. 

Kant UH 1996: 41

Despite the ‘apparent wisdom of individual actions here and there’, Kant believes history as a whole reveals mainly ‘folly and childish vanity, and often of childish malice and destructiveness.’ The only way for a philosopher to form a judgement of the human species, is ‘to attempt to discover a purpose in nature behind this senseless course of human events, and decide whether it is after all possible to formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own.’ (UH 1996: 42).

Kant proceeds to develop this natural teleology in a number of propositions.

1.	All the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their end.
2.	In man (as the only rational creature on earth), those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the individual. 
3.	Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason. 
4.	The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order. 
5.	The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which can administer justice universally. 
6.	This problem is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race. The difficulty …. is this: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master.
7.	The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved.
8.	The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also externally—perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.




Kant’s natural teleology brings about, internally and externally, the perfect political constitution which fully realises all natural capacities of humankind. I would read this natural teleology in light of Kant’s two way transition between phenomenal and noumenal worlds. 

Kant reaffirms the Platonic conception of the rational order of Nature in his Ideological conception of natural order. Kant therefore continues Plato's quest for a suitable natural order for the realization of eternal ideals. The descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic world of Being releases Nature from the shackles of humanly imposed moral and natural laws since Nature is able to operate with the power of its own immanent Ideas. In this quest, Kant’s natural teleology revitalises the Platonic conception of Nature as the Mother of all Creation, opening up a conception of Mother Nature as the Eternal Feminine who has the inexhaustible power to procreate and sustain her countless children. (Seung 2007: 190/1).

The problem is that Kant’s rational natural teleology is still idealist. Kant’s Idea is located in the supersensible realm. However, any sense of an ultimate end needs to rely on more than self-legislating reason. Reason needs grounding into ontological knowledge. Here, following Aquinas, I oppose Aristotle’s naturalist essentialism to Plato’s rationalist essentialism. In following Plato, Kant adopts an idealism that is found wanting in both metaphysics and epistemology.

Rational Nature as an End in Itself
The obligation to obey the moral law implies that humanity is charged with the duty to promote the highest good. For Kant, the coherence of rational wills can be achieved only through the obedience of all to one and the same universal law. In seeking to obey universal law as such, virtuous agents are seeking to realize the condition of coherence among rational wills. Once maxims are submitted to the test of universality in this manner, there is a harmony of free and rational wills; the pursuit of private ends ceases to issue in conflict. The moral agent thus comes to respect the categorical imperative through respect for the moral law in abstraction from objects. 
In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents are creating a moral community in which each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222). Kant's harmony of free and rational wills is, therefore, more than a framework for the individual pursuit of private ends, in which any claim to achieving universal happiness can only be realised indirectly. The end of the moral community affirms that individual members directly contribute to the happiness of each other, so long as this meets the test of universality (DV). Not the individual alone but all individuals together make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted.

This universal practical law derives from the objective principle of the will formed out of the conception of 'rational nature’ as an 'end in itself’ (GMM 1991:91). Kant affirms that human beings are ends in themselves, not merely as means for instrumental use by other wills.





Kant’s thinking is teleological. The question concerns the relation of Kant’s practical reason to nature. Kant’s thought introduces hierarchies and dualisms which serve to separate the rational natural end of human beings from non-rational nature. Objects of inclination possess only a conditional value rather than an absolute value. Kant therefore makes a distinction between things and persons.





'Man in the system of nature' 'has an ordinary value' but as the 'subject of a morally practical reason' he is 'exalted above all price'. As homo noumenon 'he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself (Kant 1964:96/7). Beings dependent on nature rather than on will have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called 'things'. Rational beings are 'persons' since their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves. The individual as a rational being 'exists as an end in himself, not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will', but 'must in all his actions .. always be viewed at the same time as an end' (Kant GMM 1991:90).





The concept of rational being, legislating universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective, leads directly to the Formula of the End in Itself: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:91).

Kant's categorical imperative is his supreme moral principle and this is its most politically and historically influential formulation. Kant's reference to 'humanity' as a whole rather than to 'persons' in particular is significant. In addressing the universal humanity in each individual, how humanity can and ought to be, Kant's ethics are social rather than private. The duties that one owes to oneself are duties to all. 'Humanity' is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied to transform the human condition. The duties to oneself are at the same time duties to all: 'To destroy the subject of morality in one's person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person (homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation' (DV 1964:85).





In The History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell recognises ‘Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is generally considered the greatest of modern philosophers.’ Kant’s achievement is immense, to the extent that he brings to fruition all the hopes of ancient philosophy in a way that responds to and resolves the key problems of the modern world. Kant seeks the unity of humankind on the plane of reason, a reason forever denuded of its speculative metaphysical ambition. Herein lies the problem. Kant rejects ancient and medieval philosophy on account of their deficient accounts of nature. Kant is attempting to define an ethical position concerning morally necessary ends in light of the modern scientific revolution and the driving of purpose out of nature. Kant’s achievement is to have demonstrated that this unity of nature emerges from within reason itself. Unity arises from reason’s own legislation; it is reason’s own self-legislation that unifies humankind. Kant points to a reason which grows beyond nature. Such reason no longer seeks to conform to nature, following its "leading-strings", but grows beyond nature.

The examples of mathematics and natural science, which by a single and sudden revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest our considering what may have been the essential features in the changed point of view by which they have so greatly benefited. Their success should incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may permit. Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.

Kant CPR, B xvi.

A new light flashed upon the mind of the first man (be he Thales or some other) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. The true method, so he found, was not to inspect what he discerned either in the figure, or in the bare concept of it, and from this, as it were, to read off its properties; but to bring out what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a priori, and had put into the figure in the construction by which he presented it to himself. If he is to know anything with a priori certainty he must not ascribe to the figure anything save what necessarily follows from what he has himself set into it in accordance with his concept.

Kant CPR, B xiii

By conformity to the object, Kant means conformity to nature. This merely generates the illusions of fundamental heterogeneity, including the apparent heterogeneity of the natures of philosopher and non-philosopher. Kant is clear that reason must be one within the species as a whole. If reason is to legislate unity, it must itself be unified. The reason which is one in the species is "to be found in that reason with which every human being is endowed." (A 839/8 867). There can therefore be no natural differences in kind between human beings, between philosophers and non-philosophers, only differences in the degree to which human beings have approached the end of their rational nature. The philosopher as such undertakes theoretical inquiry out of duty: "Moreover, the resolution of all our transcendent knowledge into its elements... to the philosopher is indeed a matter of duty" (CPR A 703/6 731; A 726/8 754). The duty of the philosopher is to goad human beings to use the reason that is their birthright. In locating the "idea of the legislation" of the philosopher in the reason that is innate to all human beings, Kant democratises philosophy, holding out the prospect that each man and each woman can become a philosopher, thus bringing the species as a whole to its natural rational end. Such a conclusion casts Plato’s statement that virtue is its own reward in new light. All men and women are philosophers and as such come to lead lives of virtue.

In conclusion, Kant’s great achievement is to have delivered on the old Aristotelian promise of human beings not just as social beings but rational beings. Kant gives us the rational society based on the harmony of free and rational wills, a moral community in which each individual member directly contributes to the happiness of all others, so long as this meets the test of universality (DV). Not the individual alone but all individuals together make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted. To this extent, Kant fulfils Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ view of human beings as social and political animals.

But – and this is a big but – Kant realises this vision of the unity of humankind on the basis of a self-legislating reason detached from nature. Kant is clear that the rational end of human beings is to avoid conformity with the object, with nature as either objective necessity or natural imperative that falls short of the moral law. Kant’s reason is therefore transcendent, begging the question as to its grounding and critical purchase with respect to objective reality. What needs to be emphasised is the extent to which Kant makes it clear that the ‘reason with which every human being is endowed" (A 839/8 867) is indeed a natural endowment. For human beings to act rationally and realise the unity of humankind is to realise a natural capacity. Reason is the birthright of human beings. Reason is not abstracted from nature but is innate to all human beings. Human beings are social and rational beings by nature and the rational society, the realm of ends that Kant proposes as bringing the species as a whole to its natural rational end, is a realisation of natural ends.

I argue that the extent to which Kant accepts the modern scientific conception of nature severely vitiates his vision of the realm of ends. There is a dualism in Kant which serves to deprive him of any natural grounds for his conception of the highest good. Reason becomes its own argument, its own foundation. Which merely begs the question – what are the ultimate grounds of Kant’s conception of the good?

I propose to argue that St Thomas Aquinas is able to offer these ultimate grounds. I shall do so by examining, firstly, Aquinas’ epistemological realism, and, secondly, his metaphysics. I shall emphasise the connection between knowing and being throughout. 

In the immediate aftermath of Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy, a number of ambitious attempts were made to reconcile particular and universal, recovering the commonality that had been lost in the modern world. The most ambitious of these attempts came from Hegel and Marx.

6 Hegel, Marx, Immanence and Transcendence
The attempts to reconcile the Individual and the Community

The most ambitious moral theories of modernity have been attempts to reconcile the legitimate claims of the individual and the community – Rousseau, Hegel, Marx in particular. Not only are we no further on from the solutions proposed by these philosophers, we have seen how difficult it is to constitute a social purpose on the atomised, individualistic terrain of modernity. 

Many will agree with the critique of individualist liberalism and the way that this is expressed in a demoralised Weberian modernity. They will, however, question whether Aristotelianism constitutes a viable alternative and will certainly be inclined to think that Aquinas is entirely obsolete and out of fashion. To argue that Aquinas has a viable alternative to liberal modernity is to invite a loss of credibility in circles of moral and political philosophy. 

Which begs the question why, since the central problem is the antagonism between the individualist liberalism of modernity and a communitarian tradition that advances and defends some notion of the common good. 

I should spell out my own view here. Having spent the best part of two decades writing on Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx, I have come to realise the impossibility of deriving communitarian conclusions on the good and on happiness from individualist premises. Those are the premises which lie at the core of liberal modernity. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is the most intellectually satisfying attempt to reconcile individual and community, the particular and the common good. Sittlichkeit is variously translated in English as 'ethical life', 'objective ethics', 'concrete ethics' (Taylor 1979: 83). Sittlichkeit refers to the moral obligations a person has to the ongoing community of which s/he is a part. 

Houlgate has no difficulty in showing how Hegel’s ethical life is compatible with, even entails, the Christian life. 





Hegel proceeds from the most abstract to the most concrete to end with the state as the highest embodiment of Sittlichkeit, the universal which is implicit in the idea that the individual is the vehicle of rational will. (Taylor 1975: 428). Hegel places the forms of the common life in an ascending order: the family, civil society and the state. The state completes this trio in offering ‘a deeper unity, an inward unity, like the family. But it will not be just an immediate one based on feeling. Rather unity here is mediated by reason. The state is a community in which universal subjectivities can be bound together while being recognized as such. (Taylor 1975: 431. 

But Marx was right that the supposed universality of the state was, in capitalist conditions, a rationalisation of particular interests. Bonds of commonality need to be forged within social relations. But Marx replaced Hegel’s state as the universal ethical agency with the proletariat as ‘the universal class’, a principle that, in abstraction from real individuals, easily becomes ‘the party’ and constituted as ‘the state’. Ernesto Laclau claims that:





Leaving aside the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of Laclau’s interpretation of Plato and Marx, it remains the case that the most ambitious attempts to reclaim the common good on the diremptive terrain of modernity have floundered. Dallmayr writes well here, relating Hegel to Marx.





Marx may have been correct to expose the particular interests working to undermine the universalism of Hegel’s state, but his proletarian transformation of politics has proved no more able to constitute real bonds of commonality and universality.

After nearly three centuries of modernity, we are still in search of the common good. The failure to present a coherent view of the liberal individualist position is apparent in the statement of the various modern moralities which, despite the different names by which they are distinguished – intuitionism, situation ethics, emotivism, perspectivism, expressivism - all reduce to forms of relativism and subjectivism. Rousseau, Hegel and Marx were not wrong in seeking an alternative to the individualist liberal view. But they took the high road of modernity, seeking to realise potentialities immanent within modernity for a socially and morally responsible human freedom. Such a view conceives alienation as a progressive force, a necessary dehumanisation that contains the potential for a rehumanisation at a higher level of development. (Dallmayr 1993: xxiv-xxv).

The high road of modernity
Hegel and Marx took the high road of modernity to the moral community of the future. The high road discerns potentialities for the ethical life which are actually inherent in the diremptive terrain of modernity. It is to see alienation as a progressive force, developing and unfolding human capacities and enabling their conscious reappropriation at a higher level. Progress. As Hegel writes in the Philosophy of Right, ‘the rational is the high road where no one stands out from the rest.’ It’s the realisation of the common good on the modern terrain. (PR, §I5A; also §187A). Dallmayr calls ‘the high road of modernity’, a ‘road marked by the vision of a socially responsible human freedom.’ (Dallmayr 1993: xxv)

As Morton Schoolman argues:

Winding, often torturously, toward the reconciliation of the modern world's deepest and most disruptive divisions, the high road leads eventually far beyond the conflict-ridden horizon of the technologically developed world to the reconciliation of its differences with the nations of the industrially developing world, differences over the nature of freedom, the claims on that freedom of public needs and values, over the limits to growth and the socially responsible role of scientific and technological progress, in short, over what is moral, rational, and true.

Schoolman Intro to Dallmayr 1993

What Fred Dallmayr writes of Hegel also applies to Marx and the promise he found immanent in capitalist modernity.






Karl Popper condemned such reasoning as a moral futurism, a historicism, rightly pointing out that something isn’t good simply on account of being inevitable. (Popper 1966). John Gray is currently arguing against the delusions of progress, exposing the teleological thinking behind such delusions. (Gray 2013: 8-12). 

It now seems clear looking back that Hegel and Marx were attempting to realise something like an Aristotelian polis democracy whilst preserving, realising, the individuation of the modern world. 

In retrospect, such thinking stands condemned not on account of being teleological but on account of expressing a bad teleology. In contrast, the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in such a way as to ground ends and purposes in realities that are intelligible, rational and moral.

John Gray, of course, would condemn this too as a myth. ‘For those who live inside a myth, it seems a self-evident fact. Human progress is a fact of this kind. If you accept it you have a place in the grand march of humanity. Humankind is, of course, not marching anywhere. 'Humanity' is a fiction composed from billions of individuals for each of whom life is singular and final.’ (Gray 2013). What isn’t a myth is those billions of individuals composing humanity, and what isn’t a myth is that those individuals are social beings with potentials for growth and development to be realised and exercised in a common life with others. Gray seems only able to see those myths which have become abstracted from real natural essences and invested in various messiahs of religion and economics.

I have written on this in Immanence, Transcendence and Essence (2013) and want to go further than repeating the points I made against Gray there. Suffice to say, the Aristotelian tradition is safe from Gray’s criticisms of delusions. Writing of the restatement of the Aristotelian tradition, I am thinking specifically of Thomas Aquinas, for reasons that will become apparent. The tough minded realism of St Thomas Aquinas is certainly invulnerable to Gray’s accusations of delusion.

Gray’s criticisms are interesting when applied to the way that the old theological assumptions, detached from God, have taken secular form. 

The question is when will we come to the end of the high road? We have been walking, indeed, sprinting, for a long time now, since the first industrial revolution. The end of the journey looks more like Hell than Paradise. In Morality and Modernity, Ross Poole (1991) affirms the high road against MacIntyre’s critical viewpoint. Poole thinks he can extract the rational core of MacIntyre’s critique from the nostalgic mode in which it is presented. 





It’s ‘the high road’ of Hegel and Marx. I wouldn’t rule it out. There are potentialities for an associative freedom that fulfils the goals of individuality and communality in modernity’s lines of development. 

In After Virtue, MacIntyre anticipated precisely this criticism of his views. MacIntyre writes of those ‘critics who will begin by agreeing substantially with what I have to say about liberal individualism, but who will deny not only that the Aristotelian tradition is a viable alternative, but also that it is in terms of an opposition between liberal individualism and that tradition that the problems of modernity ought to be approached. The key intellectual opposition of our age, such critics will declare, is that between liberal individualism and some version of Marxism or neo-Marxism. The most intellectually compelling exponents of this point of view are likely to be those who trace a genealogy of ideas from Kant and Hegel through Marx and claim that by means of Marxism the notion of human autonomy can be rescued from its original individualist formulations and restored within the context of an appeal to a possible form of community in which alienation has been overcome, false consciousness abolished and the values of equality and fraternity realized.’ (MacIntyre 1981: ch 18). MacIntyre makes two points. In the first place, marxism’s claim to a distinctive moral standpoint is undermined by its political history. This could be put down to accident and the identification of Marx with Bolshevism. MacIntyre, however, notes Marx’s commitment to the ‘free individual’ and sees this principle as an integral part of the liberal order Marx was seeking to transcend. Marx writes of the free association of individuals without telling us on what basis, other than economic, this association rests. ‘It is unsurprising that abstract moral principle and utility have in fact been the principles of association which Marxists have appealed to, and that in their practice Marxists have exemplified precisely the kind of moral attitude which they condemn in others as ideological.’ (MacIntyre 1981 ch 18). MacIntyre’s second point, therefore, is that Marxism is unable to make good its claims to transcend capitalist modernity. It lacks that sense of praxis as a moral praxis and so easily becomes entangled in the structural and institutional features of the capital system. MacIntyre notes that as Marxists move towards power, they tend to become Weberians. Much like the liberals. This is the fate of liberalism outlined by Bellamy earlier. We are dealing with an inability to transcend capitalist modernity, to realise the potentials for the immanent society contained within modernity. The high road stretches out further and further before us, the ethical society disappearing beyond the horizon. ‘When Marxism does not become Weberian social democracy or crude tyranny, it tends to become Nietzschean fantasy.’ (MacIntyre 1981 ch 18).

The Humanised World and its Moral Foundations
Marx’s vision is of a thoroughly humanised world, human beings exercising common conscious control of their human powers. (Clarke 1991; Meszaros 1995). But the world is more than human beings and human powers. Marx seems to have abolished alienation only at the price of idolatry, the ‘truly human society’ he sought emerging as a form of self-worship. This is a vision of society of free individuals self-enclosed within their own materialist immanence. As such, it reads as a collective vision of the Nietzschean Ubermensch. And, as such, it isn’t a coherent alternative to the individualist liberalism and moral subjectivism that characterises modernity, but is a collectivist version of it. Implicit in Marx’s view of the community of free individuals is a radical individualism that reads less as an alternative to liberal individualism than as a claim that the liberal principle individual freedom should be generalised so as to apply to all. Marx, that is, is not against the liberal principle of individual freedom as autonomy, but desires a community in which that principle is realised for all. Ian Forbes argues well that Marx proposes a ‘new individual’ which is much more than the social individual of Aristotle, but realises freedom as autonomy for all individuals within community. (Forbes 1990: 58-59). 

Marx believed that by overcoming alienation, human autonomy can be distinguished from the individualist formulations that prevail under atomised bourgeois society and defined as self-determination within community, the truly human society. 





It’s an alluring vision, cogent even. But maybe the reasons for the failure of marxism to achieve such a community are less political, less accidental, and more to do with the survival of the very individualism that Marx was at pains to supersede. Marx, certainly, rejected bourgeois individualism in no uncertain terms. He entertained a view of individuality that would flourish in the community that has abolished alienation and which has appropriated human powers for the society of associated individuals. (see Critchley 2001). 

Such a view is fine in as far as it goes. The problem with Aristotle’s social individual and Marx’s free individual is that they pertain to an incomplete freedom. Ultimately, Marx is let down by the absence of a moral position. The statement ‘workers of all lands unite’ is a moral imperative. If class and material interest were enough, then Marx would not have needed to issue a moral statement enjoining workers to unite. 

We need to ask how secure any unity is when it is based on material interest within the social relations prevailing in a particular time and place. Marx seems to have thought that material integration would do the job of morality. He writes of ‘production by freely associated men’, a conscious and planned common control that would define socialism. ‘Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force.’ (Marx Capital I 1976: 171/3).

But we need to ask on just what moral basis does this free association of individuals with each other rest. There is a moral position buried in Marx. We could very easily set Marx’s case for social solidarity and commonality within the natural law tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas. Philip Kain describes Marx’s view as a synthesis of Aristotle and Kant, a view which is pertinent to the concerns of this essay and its Aristotelian-Thomist reading of Kant’s practical morality. Kain also writes of Marx abolishing and transcending morality (Kain 1988), a view which indicates the extent to which Marx lacks a moral language. The point is much more than that Marx’s well-founded scepticism with respect to moralism led him to downplay his own ethical position.

That leaves Marx vulnerable to the criticism that MacIntyre made, that Marx’s associationalism lacks a moral foundation. If it rests merely on economic ties, then it is part of the very monetised order Marx is attempting to transcend. MacIntyre notes a radical individualism in Marx too, something which is also shared with the bourgeois order to be superseded. What John Hoffman writes about Rousseau is pertinent here. For Hoffman, Rousseau's social contract is something forged by rational individuals who possess no relationship to each another. As a result, Rousseau shares an abstract individualism with liberalism, with the result that force is placed outside freedom, obligations outside rights, and the state outside individuals as autonomous agents (Hoffman 1995: 86). Far from achieving moral unity and common good, this whole construct is merely the ideological expression of market relationships in which individuals appear to live outside of society (Hoffman 1995:86). The problem of how to constitute the common good out of individualistic wills remains 'painfully unresolved' (Hoffman 1995:87).

It is that Marx’s associational and solidaristic vision begs but lacks a moral foundation, with Marx appealing to material interest and class power rather than morality to achieve unity. Marx, that is, is right to appeal to unity in the cause of the common good, but errs in resting that appeal on material interest rather than upon a moral notion of the good. For Robert Nisbet, Marx was right to criticise the antagonism of modern bourgeois society and seek to recover communal bonds. For Nisbet, however, economic interests and class bonds are the most ephemeral of ties and are quite incapable of constituting a moral order. ‘Where Marx was grievously in error was in singling out the ill-defined category of class—the institution in capitalist society with the least possible claim to being regarded as a significant structure of personal allegiance and functions’ (Nisbet 1990: 80/1).

And this absence of a moral position to buttress the associative activity of individuals points to another problem in Marx’s position – the absence of a sense of transcendence, implying a self-enclosed materialism that, sooner or later, reduces itself to the very liberal individualism – the egoism of the isolated, atomistic self - that Marx sought to escape. Marx’s radical individualism thus takes the form not of the healthy exercise of human powers, flourishing within the realised society of realised human beings – which is certainly Marx’s laudable Aristotelian aim - but of idolatry, the self-worshipping society of men as gods.

It is interesting that Epicurus rather than Aristotle was Marx's great hero. In his doctoral dissertation, Marx called Epicurus the outstanding figure of the ancient Greek 'enlightenment'. It is also interesting that Marx showed a greater interest in the Epicurean theory of 'swerving atoms' in the universe than in Epicurean social and moral philosophy. (Meikle 1985: 9-10).

A philosophy of nature and human nature can certainly be discerned in this perspective, as can be seen in Lucretius’ poem, De Rerum Natura. In the Epicurean perspective, human fulfilment and happiness are achieved as a result of the increasing knowledge of nature. There is no spiritual dimension in the Epicurean universe, no transcendent deity, and no personal immortality; there is nothing more than actual existence. (Farrington 1967).





That ‘neutral’ view of nature could easily imply an indifference at the level of human values and morality. Here, one is invited into a world of acceptance of natural finitude as an enjoyment of life in the immediate, defining life as something denuded of higher purposes and ultimate ends. That some such notion savours of the 'hedonism' which prevails in the modern world suggests that naturalist humanism of even the most enlightened or altruistic kind could never give a plausible account of moral experience nor supply an adequate foundation of values such as are required to form a viable civilization. Certainly, individuals within capitalist modernity, pursuing private material satisfactions, are, to a very great extent, practising 'Epicureans'. But this is to pursue the 'good life' in the sense of immediate, private satisfactions. But this engrossment of individuals within materialism is a travesty of the good life. No morality follows from such materialism. Here, Kant was correct to separate morality from such natural inclinations, desires and wants. The simple fact that Kant has to make this argument indicates the extent to which individuals find it difficult to forego tangible and immediate satisfactions for the sake of moral principle (such as respect for others as persons, truthfulness, helping one's neighbour, etc.), and this seems to imply that morality necessarily entails transcendence of some kind, however we may come to define it.

Materialist Immanence
Aristotelian transcendence comes in the form of the process of potentiality being realised as actuality. That may well be an improvement on the Epicurean position, but it still leaves us enclosed within matter. Gilson (1961) writes of the transcendent influence that faith has on reason. Transcendence helps us avoid becoming self-enclosed in matter.

The inadequacy of that purely naturalist view is best exemplified by the fate of Marxism. Marxism has been described as a Judaeo-Christian heresy and a disguised or concealed religion. Yet it is the worldly, secular and thoroughly materialistic perspective which has dominated within Marxism and which, at the level of a repressive political practice, has most shown the need of a principle of transcendence, of an expansive, obligating, inspiring moral goal and vision which are neither derived from nor reducible to the immediacy of individual desires and satisfactions in the world of actual existence. 

This principle of transcendence is successful in evoking a spirit of sacrifice and self-abnegation for a greater, long-term common good. No neutral and indifferent perspective on nature, society, human beings and morality could produce anything like the good life as a civilised life in which human beings realise their essential ends as human beings. I believe Kant offers this transcendental vision. He offers the ideal human community composed of free and equal co-legislators as the 'real object of our willing’ (Kant 1956:121f). The question is how secure the grounding of that ethic really is. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that Kant has a principle of transcendence which is able to inspire and obligate individuals in the pursuit and attainment of the moral society. 

The argument needs to be set within questions of immanence and transcendence. The idea of society as a field of materialist immanence which transcends itself through the realisation of potentials contained within is thoroughly Aristotelian. Aquinas himself adopted the Aristotelian vision of a purpose-filled and driven universe. This perspective also informs Marx’s critique of the capital system of production and the constructive, future-oriented aspects of Marx’s thought – the realised human society of realised individuals. Marx’s notion of capital as dead labour implies a vision of free labour beyond the capital form.

But there are limitations to Aristotelian immanence. For all of the transcendent vision of a purpose-driven universe in which potentials are in the process of becoming actuals, Nature as such has no transcendent dimension. 

As a disciple of Plato, Aristotle incorporated something of the idealistic tradition of transcendence. To be precise, he embedded transcendence in the transition of potentiality into actuality. Unlike Plato, Aristotle saw form within matter, not as apart. 

Marx treats Aristotle critically and coolly in his writings. However, the likes of Scott Meikle and Lawrence Wilde have certainly been correct in emphasising the structural centrality of Aristotelian essentialism to Marx’s philosophy. (Meikle 1985; Meikle 1991; McCarthy 1992). Of course, much of this could have found its way to Marx from Hegel. Rather than pursue these origins at length, it is sufficient here to identify an aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy which appears in Marx’s perspective. This is the idea of the 'good life' which, in contradistinction to transcendent notions of Plato’s world of the ideal forms, is conceived in terms of balanced satisfactions within this world.

Once modern mechanistic science rejected the Aristotelian vision of a purpose-driven universe, nature came to be conceived as neutral, indifferent, lacking any ultimate end which could guarantee the success of human endeavour, indeed, motivate and inspire human effort in the first place. Instead, Nature became a machine that could be known and manipulated instrumentally. Faith in the benevolent universe is rendered obsolete before the advance of knowledge and technique. In its place is the bogus teleology of instrumental ‘progress’, the confidence that the expansion of human knowledge and know-how will lead to human freedom through the conquest of nature. 

Pessimism with respect to modern civilisation has been around since Spengler and Toynbee. Before them, Nietzsche had sounded the alarm that things might not be going according to plan. What is most interesting about recent sceptical writing about progress is that it has come from within the radical camp. One can refer to the cultural pessimism of the Frankfurt School here, and the way that the likes of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse connected the technical exploitation of nature with the social exploitation of human beings. Back in the 1970s, Robert Heilbroner, a writer in the marxist tradition, examined ‘the human prospect’ and concluded that the transformations underway in the modern world were creating a bleak prospect for the long term good. (Heilbroner 1974). For Robert Nisbet, the modern world is 'almost barren of faith in progress'. (Nisbet1980: 353). 'Disbelief, doubt, disillusionment and despair have taken over, or so it would seem from our literature, art, philosophy, theology, even our scholarship and science.' (Nisbet 1980: 318). For the likes of Nisbett, the high road of modernity has turned out to be the road to nowhere. And yet politicians, bereft of political vision and moral certainty, continue to promise ‘jobs, growth and investment’.

The Instrumentalisation of the World
In the absence of the principle of transcendence, relying instead on economic ties of class and material interest, it should have come as no surprise that marxists come, ultimately, to grounded principles of association in some form of utilitarianism. The marxists become part of the very world they had sought to transcend.
Max Weber had seen this from the first, referring to socialism as housing for the new servitude, a dictatorship of the officials taking the place of the promised dictatorship of the proletariat. Weber's critical views of socialism stemmed not just from political hostility but from his awareness that 'the great state and the mass party are the classic soil for bureaucratization' (S 1970: 209). In Weber’s view, socialism elevates both. Similarly in the economic realm, the socialization of the means of production would simply further extend the power of bureaucratized management. For Weber, socialism – and this is the only socialism he thought possible – would simply express the collectivising and bureaucratising tendencies of contemporary capitalism, not constitute an alternative to that capitalism. In Economy and Society he wrote that 'in any rationally organized socialistic economy, the expropriation of all the workers would be retained and merely brought to completion by the expropriation of private owners' (Weber ES 1964: 248). In his 1916 essay on socialism, Weber predicts that ‘it is the dictatorship of the official, not that of the worker, which ... is on the advance'. He poses the question: 'Who would then take control of and direct this new economy? On this point the Communist Manifesto is silent' (1978: 260, 262). In short, far from constituting a genuine common good that unites the various components that make up a society, Weber sees the socialism of his day, a socialism wrapped up in economic concerns, as a rational socialism that would build a 'house of servitude'. This would amount to the completion, not the repudiation, of the alienating dualisms and separations targeted by Marx. Writing in 1918, Weber makes these comments on Bolshevik Russia:

the Soviets have preserved, or rather reintroduced, the highly paid enterpriser, the group wage, the Taylor system, military and workshop discipline, and a search for foreign capital. Hence, in a word, the Soviets have had to accept again absolutely all the things that Bolshevism has been fighting as class institutions. They have had to do so in order to keep the state and the economy going at all.

Weber didn’t like what he saw. For what he saw was the inability to transcend the Weberian modernity of rationalisation and bureaucratisation, the totalitarian encroachment of centralised power over all aspects of life, crushing creativity, autonomy and spontaneity out of the world. Weber saw little, if any, hope for recovering the common good and the good life in such conditions. He considered it to be the 'fundamental fact' of our age that we are 'destined to live in a godless and prophetless time’ (Weber SV 1991:153). Weber nevertheless expected individuals to have recourse to false prophets, surrogates, and artificial communities in a desperate search for a lost meaning. To those searching for the common good in – and beyond – the modern world, Max Weber is the acid test. Weber saw the problem and made it clear just how difficult the solution would be. Weber examined various 'communitarian' solutions to the moral crisis of modernity: 'Ideas such as "state", "church", "community", "party" or "enterprise" are thought of as being realised in a community' whereas in truth 'they provide an ideological halo for the master'. As 'ersatz', totalising and collectivising representations are capable of generating 'fanatical sects but never a genuine community' (Weber SV B 1991:155 199; Turner 1993:17/8; Sayer 1991:143 152).

In the modern world, we are all Weberians. Which is to argue that modernity is incapable of transcending itself, there is no higher good immanent but repressed within capitalist modernity, ‘new-fangled’ forces awaiting liberation by the ‘new fangled men’, the proletariat. Instead, there is a machine world which functions ‘without regard for persons’.

Marx’s Aristotelian vision sees society as a field of materialist immanence bursting with repressed potentialities for a better world. Marx is considered a historicist, one who denies timeless truths and sees the good and the true relative to particular social relations in history. (Strauss 1953; Strauss 1988).

It would be more accurate to characterise Marx as an essentialist who saw the creative unfolding of the human essence through different stages of human development. Human nature has a history. But there is some suggestion that behind Marx’s historicism is a disguised commitment to the good, the true and the beautiful. Bikhu Parekh notes Marx’s commitment to ‘architectonics', suggesting that, ‘like Plato, Marx believed in the harmony between truth and beauty. If he did, his thought would seem to endorse the familiar rationalist belief in the harmony of truth, goodness (which Marx also calls freedom) and beauty.’ (Parekh 1982: 207). If this is the case, then this is all well and good. Why not state that moral position openly? Aquinas does.

The Need for Transcendence
Marx’s critique of the capital system is designed to liberate the potential contained within an alienated modernity. Marx, in other words, sees capital as a progress force creating the material preconditions of the free society of the future. 

But Alasdair MacIntyre has already experienced the optimistic marxist view from the inside and found it wanting. He asks that ‘if the moral impoverishment of advanced capitalism is what so many Marxists agree that it is, whence are these resources for the future to be derived? It is not surprising that at this point Marxism tends to produce its own versions of the Ubermensch: Lukacs's ideal proletarian, Leninism's ideal revolutionary. When Marxism does not become Weberian social democracy or crude tyranny, it tends to become Nietzschean fantasy.’ (MacIntyre 1981 ch 18).

Where, one asks, is the principle of transcendence to be found?

In arguing that Marxism is exhausted as a political tradition, MacIntyre is careful to add ‘that this exhaustion is shared by every other political tradition within our culture.’ Liberal modernity is imploding and lacks the capacity to generate the moral resources to save itself from within. Paradoxically, marxism was modernity’s best and last hope. And it failed or was beaten. 

MacIntyre draws a parallel with the decline of the Roman empire into the Dark Ages. MacIntyre identifies a crucial turning point in this history when men and women of good will ceased to identify civility and moral community with the doomed Roman imperium and, instead of wasting efforts in shoring up that imperium, began to engage in the construction of new forms of community within which moral life and civility could be sustained in the coming ages of barbarism and darkness.

MacIntyre concludes that ‘for some time now we too have reached that turning point. What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope. This time however the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament.’ (MacIntyre 1983: ch18)

Thirty years on, that remains our condition.

If my thesis is correct, that modernity dissipates morality as a collective capital whilst being incapable of generating its own moral resources, then such attempts were doomed to failure from the start. That is to say, there is no morality in the sense of common bonds, shared practices and activities, social identities immanent but suppressed within modernity. Liberal modernity really is a depersonalised and demoralised realm and irrevocably so. Nietzsche’s charge thus stands. But only to the extent that one remains on the terrain of disenchanted modernity. The moral impasse, even implosion, of liberal modernity, with all that that implies with respect to the viability of civilisation and the social order, entitles us to look again at the Aristotelian vision. 

My main purpose in this essay is to revalue Kant’s attempts to resolve the moral failures of modernity in light of the work of Thomas Aquinas. I argue that Kant is on the right lines in overcoming these moral failures of modernity but ultimately falls short on account of the fact that his epistemology and metaphysics conform to the modern scientific devaluation of ontological and teleological nature.

Revaluation is not Nostalgia
Something that needs to be clear from the start is that the revaluation of the work of Aquinas is very far from committing oneself to what Stauth and Turner call a ‘nostalgic paradigm’ in the context of the end of the rationalist project and the collapse of modernity. Nostalgia may well be the pain for home, located in some time and place past. However, the search for more secure foundations for identity is always timely in the absence of those foundations. And that is my point - Aquinas is timely. It is not a case of going back to a lost past. Indeed, although Aquinas is considered the greatest of the schoolmen, the era of his predominance was not long. 

Aquinas’ time is still to come. So I am not talking about the resurrection of a past morality, simply the restoration of a morality that corresponds to and enhances the human ontology. And such a morality is the perennial philosophy. Jacques Maritain refers to the ‘insights and doctrine through which Thomas Aquinas brought perennial philosophy to a peak.’ I see the distillation of a philosophia perennis in the line that connects Aristotle to Aquinas as crucial to providing a coherent moral and intellectual and political response to the problems of modernity. (Dennehy 1992).

When Kant wrote that the rejection of morally necessary ends would spell the end of moral philosophy he could have been predicting the condition of morality in modern times. (Kant 1964 43, Ak. 384). The recovery of morality depends upon how we formulate those morally necessary ends and, most of all, in what we ground them. Self-legislating reason, argues Kant; ontological nature argues Aquinas. If moral philosophy is once more to be able to stake out a position on the key issues of practical life, then it must take the matter of its real grounds seriously. Modern moral philosophers, in both the deontological and utilitarian schools, have sought an external vantage point from which morality is propounded. I am thinking here of the way that John Rawls has developed Kant. Rawls attempts to find an Archimedean point for judging the basic structure of society (Rawls 1971:260/3 584) by means of the device of the 'original position’ in which individual subjects determine principles of justice from behind a "veil of ignorance", unencumbered by accidents and contingencies of real life. Communitarians like Sandel reject the possibility of being able to attain this Archimedean point from which to assess social issues (Sandel 1998:16/7 23/4). Such a point is too remote from social reality for its judgements to have much by way of critical purchase. The consequence has been a vacuity and irrelevance that undermines the conception of the self (Sandel 1998:182 182/3). My view is that morality is an aspect of social life. Only with the creation of a social identity that connects individual good to the ultimate good can morality be brought to bear through social practices.

7 The Impasse of Modern Ethics and Nietzsche’s challenge

The Loss of Moral Truth
Insofar as modern ‘moral science’ has a generic character amidst its myriad confusions and nihilisms, it is united in the distance it has put between itself and the fundamental principles of morality as such. Modern morality is characterised by a search for grounds for morality in the absence of ontological nature – passions (from Hobbes to Hume); the self-legislation of pure practical reason (Kant); emotions and intuitions (Scheler, Hare); existential freedom (Sartre). Summing it all up, perhaps, is G.E. Moore, for whom the good is indefinable. Apart from ontological nature, being, the good is indeed indefinable, on account of being unavailable. The most satisfying modern solution of all was supplied by Hegel, who continued to base morality on the universal and who retained enough Aristotelian essentialism in his philosophy in order to make good his claim. 
Hegel praises Socrates for taking the first step of comprehending ‘the union of the concrete and the universal'. (Hegel 1953: 15). Hegel conceives change to be necessary in the Aristotelian sense of the realisation of potentialities in a whole organism, an organism possesses an essence in which those potentialities inhere. 'A principle, a law is something implicit, which ... is not completely real (actual) ... not yet in reality ... a possibility.’ (Hegel 1953: 27). The events of history make rational sense when set within a whole which possesses an essence and which undergoes transformation of form in working out its telos towards its end. Hegel describes 'that freedom of spirit (which) is the very essence of man's nature' to be the essence of history (Hegel 1953: 24); the telos of world history is 'the actualisation of this freedom', 'the final purpose of the world'. (Hegel 1953: 15). Hegel conceives history as 'the union of freedom and necessity. We consider the inner development of the Spirit ... as necessary, while we refer to freedom the interests contained in men's conscious volitions. (Hegel 1953: 31). Freedom is therefore the revealing of purposes immanent in the necessary line of development. Necessity here refers to a nature coming to attain fulfilment or completion by realising its potential, and hence flourishing.

Here in Hegel we get a glimpse of what this lost promise of the natural law amounts to. Modern morality has departed completely from the towering edifice of rational freedom that Hegel constructed. Hegel’s philosophy has been described as a ‘magnificent ruin’. That still sets it above what passes for moral philosophy in the modern world. For all of their antagonism to each other, controversies between modern moral theory seems like the narcissism of minor differences. Is there really much difference between emotivism, expressivism, situationism, perspectivism? What unites all these modern theories is their rejection of the connection between metaphysics and ethics. Kant made the greatest attempt to give reason its command over ethics back, but Kant’s self-legislating reason is reason grounded in nothing more than itself. The strength of Kant’s ethics – and it is a considerable strength – derives from the religious ethic in which it is cloaked. Without that cloak, Kant is vulnerable to a degeneration from an intersubjective ethics to subjectivism.

As Alasdair MacIntyre argues, the vindication of each moral position within the modern world rests in crucial part upon the failure of the other positions, ‘and the sum total of the effective criticism of each position by the others turned out to be the failure of all.’ MacIntyre is clear: the project of providing a rational vindication of morality has decisively failed.

from henceforward the morality of our predecessor culture - and subsequently of our own — lacked any public, shared rationale or justification. In a world of secular rationality religion could no longer provide such a shared background and foundation for moral discourse and action; and the failure of philosophy to provide what religion could no longer furnish was an important cause of philosophy losing its central cultural role and becoming a marginal, narrowly academic subject. 

MacIntyre 1983 ch 4 

The crisis of ethics is a crisis of rationalism, inextricably connected to the process of rationalisation characterised by the inversion of means and ends. In this Weberian world, means are extended to displace ends. The result is a complete instrumentalisation of the world, at the expense of a natural moral reason located in being. This modern world is characterised by a separation of "is" and "ought" so total that reason is powerless to mediate between them. At this point, reason turns into its opposite, as an ethics separated from the true and the good degenerates into emotivism. This is the self-destruction of reason, not Kantian self-legislation; the role of reason is to suppress reason in ethics. 

If any one person is to be blamed for this destruction of reason and ethics then that person is Nietzsche. In truth, Nietzsche can be commended for his clarity and honesty in exposing the moral hollowness at the heart of modernity. Nietzsche’s abandonment of the nous/intellectus central to Aristotle and Aquinas is less a personal conviction on his part than a factual statement of the condition of morality in the modern world. This is the inevitable state of morality once moral reason is deprived of its foundation in theoretical knowledge of ontological nature. Without this foundation, we lose the necessary connections which Aquinas showed to exist between rational knowledge and truth, intellect, appetite and will, with the result that the intentional opening out of the intellectus to being, getting to God, cannot take place. (Possenti in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

The Search for the Common Good on the ground of modernity
No wonder, then, that the most ambitious attempts to find the common good in a diremptive and atomised world – Rousseau, Hegel, Marx – have been considered to be disguised religions containing a hidden God within. (Tucker 1961; Connolly 1989).

That loss of and search for God sums up the precarious and confused situation of morality in the modern world perfectly. And such searches are doomed to failure insofar as they remain on the modern terrain.

Whilst Kant’s moral system is grounded in self-legislating reason, it is God and the religious frame that render Kant’s ethical position far more cogent than it is on purely rational grounds. 

Kant rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God. Against the ontological argument he argued that existence isn't a necessary part of the idea of God, since ideas do not 'possess' the quality of existence. Against the teleological argument, the view that the world shows evidence of design and hence was therefore designed, Kant agreed with Hume that we cannot argue from effect to cause. Kant rejected the cosmological argument, the view that the world must have a definite origin, since this would be to argue beyond the limits of reason. For Kant, the existence of God rests on the moral law implanted within each and all. God makes sense of morality. 

In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign and contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. Here again, then, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world; and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in which the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is the determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the summum bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by strict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness.
Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not unworthy of it.
A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs to one's state), namely, the participation of happiness. 

Kant Critique of Practical Reason, V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.

But without ontology, teleology and causality, Kant’s highest good or summum bonum risks being no more than an abstract ideal dependent upon a free-floating reason. Kant insists upon morally necessary ends as a condition of moral life, but Kant grounds these ends in reason rather than in ontological nature. One can agree with Kant with respect to morally necessary ends. The problem is that reason which grounds these ends is itself grounded in nothing more than itself.

For Kant, the realm of ends is an idea of reason which is practically necessary if there is to be moral action (Kant 1965 B.372). The moral world is the world as it 'ought to be' as revealed by the necessary laws of morality. This moral is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience, the 'is', is lacking. Which isn’t to argue that Kant lacks an ideal to be achieved, far from it. The realm of ends is

at the same time a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality .. as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment that is, as a corpus mysticism of the rational beings in it, so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other.

Kant Critique of Pure Reason The Canon of Pure Reason, Section 2

This is a significant passage in that it suggests that Kant was searching for a way to overcome the infamous 'Kantian' dualism of Sein and Sollen, the dualism of the 'is' and the 'ought', targeted by Hegel. (Avineri 1972: 137-138; Taylor 1979: 83; Plant 1973: 82). 

Kant pursued this aim by looking to bring moral freedom into the sensible world of experience. In this way, the realm of ends becomes a practical idea. Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and always obeying it, the realm of ends is an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (Kant 1965: B.372), a concept and goal of future society (1965: B.836f). In the sensible realm, its counterpart is progress towards communal autonomy, which Kant puts forward as the 'real object of our willing’ (1956:121f).

The question is how the ideal can be realised through human action. This is a question of the relation of theory to practice, to be discussed shortly. Freedom seems to be an unsituated concept on Kant’s premises, meaning that it cannot even be pursued let alone realised in the empirical world. As a result, freedom is unable to break out of the impotent noumenal sphere and enter the sphere of politics. (Kant 1965 B.334/6 498ff 1956 50ff).

In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem is that Kant doesn’t actually bridge the gap between noumenon and phenomenon and this separation works to prevent the integration of morality and politics. In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. The problem with this is that the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, which can never be empirically realised, but coercion, forcing individuals prudentially to do what they ought to do morally (Kant PP 1991:112/3 117). And this means that Kant’s morality is brittle and fragile, wide open to the subversion of the passions. This is why coercion is required.
The failure to bridge this gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2) results in the autonomy of law, morality and politics within liberal society (Murphy  1970; Arendt 1982), abstracting the forces which govern the world from the human ontology. 

Human Beings as Rational Beings
Aristotle’s ideas played a pivotal role in elevating the human species up the top of the natural order, above non-rational animals and below angels, placed in an intermediary position between the divine and natural worlds. This view is commensurate with Christianity and enabled the church of the Middle Ages to infuse its doctrine with a powerful dose of Aristotelian naturalism. For centuries, human beings as rational beings occupied an elevated, central place in the world. This special position even survived the Copernican revolution Only with Darwin and after has this idea of human distinctness come to be challenged. 
But are human beings really different? In describing human beings as ‘rational animals’, Aristotle still recognises human nature as animal nature. That this is no minor point can be understood in terms of the reaction to Desmond Morris’ The Naked Ape when it was published. ‘The main objection was that I had written about human beings as though they were just another animal species to study… The human animal, I discovered, was still finding it hard to come to terms with its biological nature. … I must confess I was surprised to find myself fighting a rearguard action for Charles Darwin. After a century of scientific progress and the discovery of more and more fossils of human ancestors, I had assumed that most people were ready to face the fact that we are an integral part of primate evolution. I thought they were ready to take a close look at their animal qualities and to learn from them.
There was, in addition, a political misunderstanding. It was assumed, again wrongly, that I was portraying the human species as condemned to some primeval status quo…Tyrannies may come, but they also go. Friendly, co-operative human nature eventually reasserts itself.’





‘With this in mind I am delighted that my Naked Ape trilogy, originally published between 1967 and 1971, is now reappearing. A quarter of a century later, the message remains the same - you are a member of the most extraordinary animal species that has ever lived. Understand your animal nature and accept it.’

A conclusion which also returns us to Aristotle, human beings are animals but ‘extraordinary’ animals in possessing the capacity to reason.

The modern world has seen a reaction against human rationality. Starting with philosophers like Schopenhauer and continued by Nietzsche, the idea that human thought and action are wholly or even mainly controlled by reason has been criticised. Freud demonstrated that reason is not even master in his own home – human behaviour is only very partially motivated by reason. A cursory examination of the history books provides more than enough evidence to substantiate the claim, the same wars, genocides and cruelties in every age, magnified by technological rationality. 

As Mark Twain put it:

'Man is the only animal that deals in that atrocity of atrocities, War. He is the only one that gathers his brethren about him and goes forth in cold blood and calm pulse to exterminate his kind.'

One has to work out whether Twain is denying the human claim to distinctive reason or demanding that human beings live up to their rational capacity. He describes human beings as the only animal that can blush, and has a need to. That sense of shame is surely motivated by an awareness of a higher reason, a reason that makes it possible for human beings to engage in war and genocide for principles, armed with technics, but also to be aware of the immorality of this behaviour and avoid it. 

Twain is worth quoting at length here.

“Man is the Reasoning Animal. Such is the claim. I think it is open to dispute. Indeed, my experiments have proven to me that he is the Unreasoning Animal. Note his history, as sketched above. It seems plain to me that whatever he is he is not a reasoning animal. His record is the fantastic record of a maniac. I consider that the strongest count against his intelligence is the fact that with that record back of him he blandly sets himself up as the head animal of the lot: whereas by his own standards he is the bottom one.
In truth, man is incurably foolish. Simple things which the other animals easily learn, he is incapable of learning. Among my experiments was this. In an hour I taught a cat and a dog to be friends. I put them in a cage. In another hour I taught them to be friends with a rabbit. In the course of two days I was able to add a fox, a goose, a squirrel and some doves. Finally a monkey. They lived together in peace; even affectionately.
Next, in another cage I confined an Irish Catholic from Tipperary, and as soon as he seemed tame I added a Scotch Presbyterian from Aberdeen. Next a Turk from Constantinople; a Greek Christian from Crete; an Armenian; a Methodist from the wilds of Arkansas; a Buddhist from China; a Brahman from Benares. Finally, a Salvation Army Colonel from Wapping. Then I stayed away two whole days. When I came back to note results, the cage of Higher Animals was all right, but in the other there was but a chaos of gory odds and ends of turbans and fezzes and plaids and bones and flesh— not a specimen left alive. These Reasoning Animals had disagreed on a theological detail and carried the matter to a Higher Court.” 

Mark Twain, Letters From the Earth, ed. Bernard Devoto (1938), 227-8.)

Who can deny it? It is for this reason that Jonathan Swift made the peace loving horses the heroes of Gulliver’s Travels. But the historical record does not define the range and limits of human possibilities. The fact that parliamentary democracy based on universal suffrage had never existed in Britain before 1945 is not evidence that it could never be achieved. The same reasoning applies to every other first in history. And the same applies to the promise that, one day, homo sapiens may come to live up to its rational character. That’s precisely what the acquisition of the virtues and the formation of habits is all about in the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition.

Kant's praxis, resting upon the rational hope for progress, affirms that the future is something open, to be created. From this perspective, hope for a batter future is to be grounded not by writing the ideal into the unfolding of the historical process but by inspiring social action through the ideal of a moral community.





The very things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are not given by nature but exist as potentialities for human beings to live up to. (Van Der Linden 1985:102/3). Kant, therefore, affirms history as a process of human self-creation. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society.

Happiness deriving from the moral perfection of humanity does not imply an unmediated existence proceeding through 'inner' conviction but is set within the collective framework of a perfect civil constitution and its laws. If this is still a 'state', then it is a state that has lost its coercive character. This ideal, Kant goes on to argue, cannot be criticised for its alleged impracticality. 'Far the issue depends on freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every specific limit’ (Kant 1965 B.374). Kant's 'concept of freedom' is the essential core of Kant's ethics concerning the possibility of the categorical imperative, the 'keystone of the whole edifice of pure reason' (Kant 1965 B.7 394n; Kant 1956:3).

For these reasons, human beings do seem to be distinct. One can certainly agree, after Darwin, that human beings are animals. The notion of all life on earth as a descent with modification from a common source would seem to imply an ethic which affirms the affinity of all creatures on the planet. Aristotle certainly considered human beings to be animals, describing them as social and rational animals. Perhaps the uniqueness of the human species is in scale rather than kind. Dolphins and apes certainly give evidence of certain linguistic or cognitive skills. Human beings, however, far outstrip them, both in scale of disasters – Twain’s wars, genocides and cruelties – and achievements. If one can question distinctiveness, the existence of a gap is undeniable. If rationality is critical to evolutionary success, then why are there no other animals even remotely close to human beings? Flagging up animal rationality and downgrading human rationality may well be misguided. The price of human beings failing to live up to their rational powers is paid by an escalation of wars, genocides and cruelties.

The philosopher Paul Ricoeur described Nietzsche, Marx and Freud as 'the masters of suspicion', theorists who brought together some two centuries’ worth of critical questions put to the Christian religion. So persuasive were their arguments that their seemed to be nothing behind Christianity at all. But observations that, for all of Marx’s claims that his studies were ‘scientific’, marxism is a disguised religion suggests something interesting. Lurking in the background is the figure of Ludwig Feuerbach, who first voiced the idea that God is all of the best human qualities in abstract form, that, far from God creating human beings, human beings create God. One could go further and examine Hegel’s World Spirit and his notion of the progress of reason to the consciousness of freedom. Then one could refer to the theoretical physicist Frank Tipler, for whom it is not God that creates life, but the purpose of life to create God. And who or what could this God be other than the final realisation of the best qualities of the human species? And what could these be other than the distinctive, rational capacity? 

The Gay Science
Nietzsche, of course, famously pronounced the death of God.

In The Gay Science of 1882 Nietzsche has a madman declare that "God is dead. And we have killed him". Nietzsche refers to the ‘death of God’ as a tragedy. The collapse of an absolute foundation for morality means that we must, in some way, become gods ourselves. Humankind should only have such powers that it can creatively live up to. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche wrote:

'Where has God gone?' he cried. 'I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. We are all his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is more and more night not coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? - gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives - who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed - and whoever shall be born after us, for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher history than all history hitherto.' Here the madman fell silent and again regarded his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern to the ground and it broke and went out. 'I come too early', he said then; 'my time has not yet come. This tremendous event is still on its way, still travelling - it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time after they have been done before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves.' - It has been related further that on that same day the madman entered divers churches and there sang a requiem aeternam deo. Let out and quietened, he is said to have retorted each time: 'What are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchres of God?' (GS, 125)

Ultimate scepticism   What then in the last resort are the truths of mankind? - They are the irrefutable errors of mankind. (GS, 265)

Against this, we need to set at once Nietzsche’s other voice which is heard in these books: the strenuously optimistic voice which refuses to acquiesce in the nihilistic devaluation of the modern world, the joyful voice that insists that the demolition which is underway may be only the essential preparation for future construction. It is here that Nietzsche practices his "cheerful" and transfigurative "philosophy of the morning", conceiving life experimentally as a means to knowledge. Nietzsche suggests replacing churches with botanical gardens in the busy towns and cities, creating places of reflection where the godless can go and give expression to the sublimity of their thoughts, see themselves translated into stones and plants (GS 280).

We aeronauts of the spirit!   All those brave birds which fly out into the distance, into the farthest distance - it is certain! Somewhere or other they will be unable to go on and will perch down on a mast or a bare cliff-face - and they will even be thankful for this miserable accommodation! But who could venture to infer from that, that there was not an immense open space before them, that they had flown as far as one could fly! All our great teachers and predecessors have at last come to a stop ... it will be the same with you and me! But what does that matter to you and me! Other birds will fly farther! This insight and faith of ours vies with them in flying up and away; it rises above our heads and above our impotence into the heights and from there surveys the distance and sees before it the flocks of birds which, far stronger than we, still strive whither we have striven, and where everything is sea, sea, sea! - And whither then would we go? Would we cross the sea? Whither does this mighty longing draw us, this longing that is worth more to us than any pleasure? Why just in this direction, thither where all the suns of humanity have hitherto gone down? Will it perhaps be said of us one day that we too, steering westward hoped to reach an India - but that it was our fate to be wrecked against infinity? Or, my brothers? Or? (Daybreak 575)

For Nietzsche, nihilism is the irrevocable condition of modernity. To reject morality and its universal claims is, for Nietzsche, the only appropriate response to modernity. Nietzsche argued that we should embrace this nihilism with joy and enthusiasm. 

Stauth and Turner conceive this joyous Nietzschean project thus:

It is not enough, therefore, merely to wallow in nihilism; indeed, Nietzsche was one of the most profound critics of such loss of direction. Nietzsche's project was to develop a new morality, but a new morality anchored in the prominence of our physical embodiment in the world. In this study, therefore, we emphasize first the importance of revaluation and Utopian thought against nihilism. Secondly, we argue that for Nietzsche the body and human embodiment were crucial to his whole philosophical and artistic response to the problem of nihilism and the collapse of traditional morality. Thirdly, it is argued via Nietzsche that the everyday world is the habitus for this embodied experience which provides the foundation for a critique of abstract rationalism detached from life. This project provides the basis for a Nietzschean criticism of institutional power over the everyday life, rational knowledge over the body and the artificial world of the state over the reality of everyday interaction and reciprocity. This study is, in short, an attempt to bring sociology back to its origins, namely an exploration of fellowship (socius) through the analysis of reciprocity against the revenge of institutions and rationalism.

Stauth and Turner 1988 Intro

I could rewrite that passage as a demand to go beyond modernity, not morality, as a demand to bring morality back to its origins in the natural law, with human beings acting on the basis of inclinations and dispositions, acquiring the virtues and developing habits within a habitus that realises social and rational human nature. Embodiment? Certainly. That’s precisely what incarnation is about. An exploration of friendship? Aristotle and amity. The problem of morality is, at its core, the problem of modernity and its exaltation of means over ends. The notion of habitus is absolutely crucial to the realisation of true ends in Aquinas. For Aquinas, a virtue is a habitus that informs a reason-governed power in such a way as to perfect the activity of that power. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 229). Aquinas allows us to reinstate true ends, he gives us not false promises of progress through the expansion of material power and technical innovation, but ultimacy in the sense of Being. The practical mechanism of achieving these true ends is supplied by the habitus. The habitus is integral to the acquisition and exercise of the virtues and the formation of good habits; it is an acquired attribute, not the substance of human beings as such but an enduring habit which channels the dispositions in the direction of its true end of fulfilment. The habitus determines how human beings realise their essence and is therefore integral to human flourishing. It requires a socio-institutional structure that embeds and articulates reciprocity and fellowship. The case against Nietzsche is not that his ends of self-realisation are misguided but that they are detached from the habitus they require in order to be achieved.

The point is, when Nietzsche urges ‘become what you are!’, he is demanding the creative self-realisation of the human essence. That, for Aristotle and Aquinas can only make sense in a social context and requires a social and moral matrix which structures forms of the common life in the attainment of the goal of flourishing. 

Back to and Beyond Modernity
Nietzsche's position against modern morality is extreme but can be praised for its clarity and honesty, certainly by way of contrast to those modern moral philosophers who continue to pretend that value judgements amount to a moral system. They don’t. Nietzsche was well aware that we are beyond morality in that such subjectivism was a matter of power rather than of notions of good and evil. I would just argue that morality matters in ensuring human beings are directed towards their natural ends, the attainment of which enables them to flourish well. Without that moral framework drawing individuals out of their own egos, it is difficult to see forms of solipsism inviting madness. Far from becoming the superman of his fantasy, Nietzsche collapsed into insanity. I think that collapse if of more than personal significance and characterises the moral confusion and collapse of modernity.

Nietzsche denied the significance of intersubjectivity and objectivity in morality, and this denial informs most of his key doctrines. However, as Ross Poole writes, Nietzsche was more a representative than a genealogist of modernity in these assertions of individualism. Far from constituting an alternative to modern morality, Nietzsche’s philosophy is more a symptom than a diagnosis of modern nihilism. Nietzsche’s beyond good and evil is a part of the very modern moral wasteland he decries, not a coherent response to it. And, as Poole argues, this comes out especially with regard to Nietzsche’s assertion of the ultimate sovereignty of the self-contained individual. (Poole 1991 ch 6). 

For all of the talk of the superman, Nietzsche’s philosophy expresses clearly the vulnerability of the individual in a modern world which proceeds, in Max Weber’s apposite phrase, ‘without regard for persons’. Nietzsche is not beyond modernity at all, and has certainly not discarded its illusions. On the contrary, Nietzsche asserts the modern faith that the individual must find his own answers to the threats that beset him. This was Weber’s view too, but at least Weber seems to have been under no illusions about how hopeless that position is. The individual in modern bourgeois society is not an achievement, a given, but a challenge and a task. And judging by Weber’s words concerning the iron cage, one could add that the individual in modern society is a hopeless cause.

There is little that suggests joy in Nietzsche’s assertive prose, and much that suggests hysteria. The man protests far too much. 

Nietzsche's account brings out what is required to sustain the individual in a world in which individuality is both created and threatened by the experience of externality: the apparently irreducible otherness of people and of the world. Individuality can only exist by asserting itself, and it can only assert itself through the suppression of otherness. It is driven to undertake the desperate and hopeless task of destroying the necessary conditions for its own existence. Megalomania, disintegration and madness constitute the truth, not just of Nietzsche's life and philosophy, but also of the social world to which they gave exemplary expression. 

Poole 1991: ch 6

This essay makes the case for a tradition that is Aristotelian in origin but which is developed beyond naturalism in Thomas Aquinas’ great work of synthesis. For the Weberian worldview to succeed, for Kant and Nietzsche to be right, Thomism would need to be refuted. Far from being refuted, there has been little engagement with the philosophy, still less the theology, of Thomas Aquinas. 

MacIntyre (1981) makes clear the extent to which Nietzsche did not address let alone answer the Aristotelian and the Thomist position with respect to morality. The impression is that modern moral philosophers have been dealing with the problem of morality entirely within its own terms. This also applies to Kant and Weber. In The Ideology of Max Weber (1983), E.B.F. Midgley makes the point that neither Kant nor Weber show any evidence of ever having read Aquinas and the Thomist position in any depth. When it came to their critiques of religion, both Kant and Weber dealt only with Protestant sources, having little trouble exposing their antinomies. 

My view is that Thomism is required for the Kantian philosophy to deliver on its promises. The views of St Thomas expose the inadequacies of Nietzsche's case against morality, revealing it to be a reaction against the moral hollowness at the heart of modernity. The repudiation of Nietzsche is therefore a rejection of a modernity within which such nihilism is the most plausible moral position.

Max Weber is the key figure here. For all of his Nietzschean influences, Weber effectively argues that rational, bureaucratic modernity is untranscendable. We are eternally doomed to ‘mechanised petrification’ within the steel hard cage of modernity. Weber’s pessimistic conclusions read like Dante’s description of Lucifer, immobilised in the icy wastes of Hell.

Weber demands an answer, and this answer can only be substantial. Weber brings us to the heart of the moral predicament of modernity.

8 Max Weber and the Rationalisation of Modernity

The sociologist Max Weber has long been considered the exemplary figure when it comes to defining the origins, character and direction of modernity. (Lowith 1993; Mommsen 1992). Weber is considered to be the theorist of modernity, so much so that when we discuss modernity, we do so through Weber’s conceptual framework.

This modernization process as rationalization involved:
 (i) the differentiation of social spheres into specialized and quasi-autonomous institutions;
(ii) the growth of abstract conceptualizations of sovereignty and power, which in turn made possible the gradual development of the abstract citizen in the urban city cultures of western Europe;
(iii) the extension of formal, abstract rationality to the creation of law, the formulation of theology as a science, the trans​formation of architecture into a utilitarian practice, and the conversion of medicine from a manual art into an abstract science of disease entities;
(iv) the adoption of bureaucratic standards of procedure in all major public institutions;
(v) the final separation of the private (emotional) and public (rational) world within which separate mentalities or char​acters were to develop; and
(vi) the secularization and disenchantment of culture, produc​ing, not a uniformity of values, but a polytheistic reality of competing perspectives without an integrating or unifying principle. In short, we can define modernity as an effect of modernization and we can define modernization a la Weber as rationalization. 

Turner 1993: ch 1

At the same time, Weber’s words on modernity were hardly celebratory. That reading is possible. No less than Marx, Weber believed that capitalism had swept away the detritus of previous epochs, replacing charismatic and traditional authority with rational systems of authority. Rationalisation entailed reliable, dependable decision-making for the realization of goals in law, politics and production, thus eliminating ad hoc, contingent and unreliable systems of decision-making which characterised traditional societies. For Weber, secularization emancipated individuals from the enchanted pre-modern world, creating a space in which the individual could emerge as a rights-bearing agent.

But this is only half of Weber’s version of the modern revolution. Weber was acutely aware that process of rationalization is as repressive as it is liberatory, threatening to subordinate the human intellect, imagination and inspiration to the imperatives of standardized routines and technical procedures.

It is at this point that commentators can speak of Max Weber as having a philosophy or a philosophical anthropology, a philosophy of life in the manner of Georg Simmel (1968; 1978). It is this philosophical underpinning that lies behind Weber’s concern that rationalised capitalist modernity is producing not the free individual but a new characterology of soulless automata in a bureaucratised world that operates ‘without regard for persons’.

Karl Jaspers describes the way that contemporaries thought of Max Weber as a philosopher.





Human essence, existentialism, being as an act of being, spirit existing in the highest good – I take these to be properly set out in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. For reasons I shall set out, these claims made for Max Weber the philosopher cannot be substantiated. At every crucial point, Weber ruled out the possibility of such a philosophy. Insofar as such a philosophy does exist in Weber, it exists more as a nostalgic undercurrent. 

But this idea of Max Weber as a philosopher is worth giving serious consideration. There is certainly something to it. Willhelm Hennis (and one could add the work of Tenbruck here) has argued at length that Weber's concepts of personality, life orders and life regulation locate his sociology within a tradition of normative philosophical anthropology that may be traced back to Plato and Aristotle (Hennis 1988:26 195 201). That is, Weber’s critical comments on modernity demonstrate a concern with ‘Man’ and the appropriate regimen for the realisation of human potentialities for autonomy, creativity and spontaneity. Hennis's interpretation is firmly based on the identification of Weber's Fragstellung, a set of questions or a problematic, which were concerned to understand the nature of Man and life-orders, that is, how specific socio-cultural contexts and circumstances give rise to personality.

Hennis attempts to revalue fundamental elements of Weber's underlying 'philosophy' as against Parsonian readings of Weber’s sociology as an objective and value neutral scientific discipline. Thus, whilst Weber describes economics as a 'science of man', Hennis makes clear that he is referring to economics in its modern, technical sense. On the contrary, Weber’s description of economics as a science of man entails examining the relationship between social 'conditions of existence' and the quality or 'virtue' of man. In Hennis’ interpretation, Weber emerges as a virtue theorist, his 'universal history' involving a concern with human action. 
Hennis notes that Weber's ethical concerns were organized around Nietzsche’s question as to how spiritual values can survive the assault of modernization in the form of capitalism, bureaucracy and the state. Hennis thus argues that when Weber is writing in an apparently objective and neutral mode about sociological issues, he is in truth addressing his 'central question', the ethical development of Menschentum, involving an 'anthropological' analysis of the relationship between 'personality and life-orders'.

In fine, the philosophical anthropology that undergirds Weber’s sociology gives his writing on rationalisation a fundamentally moral dimension, evincing a critical concern with human personality and social context which converges around the notion of disenchantment. Weber thus emerges as a critic of a modernity which generates the powerlessness of individuals in face of the bureaucratisation of the world. Weber’s sociology demonstrates a concern with achieving the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation (Turner Preface to Lowith 1993:6/7; Lowith 1993:42/4; Turner 1993:212; Mommsen 1988:91/2).

The problem with this reading is that it has to piece together Weber’s critical comments from out of his voluminous ‘neutral’ ‘scientific’ ‘objective’ writing on modernity to form a coherent picture. There may well be a philosophical underpinning to Weber’s critical comments with respect to capitalist modernity, but that hardly amounts to a philosophy. For a concern with human personality, character and the regimen for human fulfilment, try Aquinas and his concern with the acquisition of the virtues, the guiding of the natural dispositions, the formation of habits and the creation of a habitus leading to the ultimate end of the human good. These concerns are not philosophical underpinnings to a sociological critique, they are a structured, reasoned philosophy.

Weber may well be a key figure in addressing the fate of liberal values in a disenchanted world, charting a universal trend toward illiberal forms within capitalist modernity (Bellamy 1992: 158, 165; Mommsen 1974:ch5), but for a robust and reasoned presentation of the normative dimension of human life, we need to look elsewhere. Weber has effectively rationalised a demoralised modernity as an unalterably and irrevocably disenchanted, dis-godded world.

Weber has been presented as a defender of intellectual and scientific objectivity against the onslaught of 'radical scepticism and various forms of anti-intellectualism'. (Bendix and Roth 1971: Intro, chs 3, 5). 

Weber’s scholarship is not in question. What is in question is whether, having rationalised the polytheism of modernity, Weber is in any position to sustain any objective notion of moral and scientific knowledge. In fine, the Weberian view of the world effectively accepts that the world is a multitude of scarcely reasoned relativisms, scepticisms, irrationalisms and nihilisms. Against that, mere philosophical concerns with ‘Man’ and life-orders is impotent and irrelevant. That, in the end, is the case against Weber, that his neutral and scientific sociology provides an effective cover for a world that has been denuded of its philosophical and ethical significance with respect to human personality and regimen. Weber may have expressed a normative concern with upholding the dignity of the human person in the impersonal conditions of modern life, but his sociology lacks any kind of critical philosophical purchase on that disenchanted modernity.

One can even question the extent to which Weber’s normative concerns amount to anything more than remembrances of a past culture, rather than any positive belief on Weber’s part. A closer analysis reveals Weber to stand in direct line of descent from Kant and the systematic rejection of traditional metaphysics. Thus we find Weber rejecting the idea that there could be such a thing as theoretical or practical wisdom, rejecting the idea that there could be a connection between the sciences and wisdom, scientific reason and ethics. Here, Weber is engaged in the modernist project of destruction, dismantling the philosophical and theological wisdom that has accumulated over the centuries. Weber replaces this wisdom not with a genuine philosophy and theology, but a surrogate based on the new idols of modernity – state, capital, bureaucracy, money etc. For all of the comment on Weber as an agonistic liberal in an illiberal age, the fact remains that Weber was an ardent German nationalist in favour of the strong state. That is not a philosophy but a new modernist religion, a bogus religion, an ideology which conceals asymmetries in power relations behind a managerial ideology which holds the permanence and neutrality of bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy is therefore an ideology that conceals and preserves existing structures of power. However, this managerial ideology characterising modernity has implications much more profound than that of rationalising iniquities in power between classes and groups. Bureaucratic rationality is an instrumental rationality in the sense of discerning the most efficient means to ends which are given. The question, though, is given by who or what? If Weber is right, and rationalised, bureaucratised modernity proceeds ‘without regard for persons’, then any ends are supplied externally by the vast impersonal social organisation. These ends pertain to functions and imperatives, not purposes. Questions of ends are questions of values, and Weber makes it clear that reason, narrowed to its scientific definition, is silent on values. Hence Weber’s conception of the world as characterised by an irreducible conflict between rival value positions, with no rational way of deciding between them. Reason cannot settle this conflict between rival values. The result. Inevitably, is the destruction of an objective morality in favour of an irreducible relativism and subjectivism. 

Raymond Aron thus presents Weber’s view of morality as a subjectivism. What else could it have been, once Weber accepted the morally denuded landscape of modernity?

Values are given neither in the tangible nor in the transcendental; they are created by human decisions that differ radically in kind from the procedures by which the mind apprehends reality and elaborates truth. It may be - as certain neo-Kantian philosophers have held - that truth itself is a value, but there remains a fundamental difference between the order of science and the order of value, because the essence of the first is subjection of the mind to facts, reasons, demonstrations, and proofs, while the essence of the second is free choice and free affirmation: no one can be forced by means of a demonstration to accept a value he does not believe in. 

Aron  1967: 206-10

And that view leaves morality without any foundation whatsoever. How can anyone, by way of a moral argument, persuade a committed Nazi that it is wrong to gas six million Jews? Morality matters and the loss of morality endangers us all. Aron spells this out when writing on the ethic of conviction, which is the only morality Weber leaves us with.

Someone who declares: better prison, better death than to kill my fellow man, is acting according to the ethic of conviction. We may condemn him, but we cannot demonstrate that he is mistaken, since he invokes no other judge than his conscience and each man's conscience is irrefutable so long as it does not have the illusion of transforming the world and seeks no other satisfaction than fidelity to itself.

That is to say, the ethic of conviction is refutable not by moral reason but by physical force. The Nazis were beaten by force of arms, not the force of moral reason.

Ultimately, having lost the idea of moral knowledge, it becomes difficult to maintain the idea of scientific knowledge. For if the world really is simply a cacophony of value judgements, then the commitment to pursue scientific truth can itself be no more than a subjective choice. One can refer to objective criteria in methodology, research, evidence, fact, but one can meet the accusation that it is all ‘made up’ only by maintaining that objective standards exist in the first. If that applies in science, then why not in morality? 
Aron shows how relativism and subjectivism in the world not only undermines morality, but also science. Both sides of the fact-value divide succumb to disenchantment.





Weber leaves us not with a moral position at all, just the assertion of irrefutable conscience and subjective choice. 

Alasdair MacIntyre exposes the power interests at play behind Weber’s assertions of the neutrality and impersonality of bureaucracy. He notes that on Weber's view, no type of authority can appeal to rational criteria to vindicate itself except that type of bureaucratic authority which appeals precisely to its own effectiveness. Such an appeal reveals that bureaucratic authority is no more than successful power. MacIntyre considers the way that managerial authority is justified in bureaucracies and concludes:

Thus there is a good deal of evidence that actual managers do embody in their behavior this one key part of the Weberian conception of bureaucratic authority, a conception which presupposes the truth of emotivism.

MacIntyre 1983 ch 3

What is the key to the social content of emotivism? It is the fact that emotivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Consider the contrast between, for example, Kantian ethics and emotivism on this point. For Kant —and a parallel point could be made about many earlier moral philosophers — the difference between a human relationship uninformed by morality and one so informed is precisely the difference between one in which each person treats the other primarily as a means to his or her ends and one in which each treats the other as an end.

If emotivism is true, this distinction is illusory. For evaluative utterance can in the end have no point or use but the expression of my own feelings or attitudes and the transformation of the feelings and attitudes of others. I cannot genuinely appeal to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal criteria.

MacIntyre 1983 ch 3

Weber may well have expressed a normative concern for the fate of human beings and human life in the modern world, but he nevertheless accepted the inevitability of the very structures and institutions that were driving personality out of the world. Weber's intellectual orientation, therefore, is less philosophical and ethical than sociological, his scientific objectivity rationalising the features of emerging social world which contradicted the human ontology rather than promoted it. Lacking that philosophical framework, Weber’s sociology fits the contours of the modern world. To claim that this amounts to a philosophy is to give Weber’s sociology a validity which it cannot rightly claim. 

One can support the attempts of Hennis and Tenbruck to reveal and revalue Weber's underlying philosophical anthropology as against the tendencies to interpret Weber’s sociology as a value free science. Both Tenbruck and Hennis have done sterling work to reveal the normative concerns which inform Weber's sociological work, giving it its particular flavour. The fact that this flavour is pessimistic rather than optimistic, however, suggests that something is amiss in Weber’s philosophy. It is evident that Weber’s anthropological interest is also a normative concern that bears some relation to traditional philosophical and theological problems. However, philosophical underpinnings do not amount to a philosophy at all. Further, Weber’s sociological interest involves claims which work to undermine the philosophical interest, even against Weber’s own normative concerns. 

Weber’s ‘philosophy’ is contradictory, not least because where philosophy and sociology clash, Weber opts for sociology. Philosophy teaches fundamental truth. In contrast, Weber denies that such truth could exist in a world characterised by a polytheism of values. In this respect, Weber falls far short of what is expected of a natural law and virtue theorist. For all of his concern with life-orders and virtue, Weber cannot give us the conditions of the appropriate regimen for human fulfilment on the modern terrain. He believes that such a socio-ethical framework cannot be constituted in conditions of relativism and subjectivism, and he is right. This means that Weber cannot give us a philosophy at all, only a lamentation for lost values, values of autonomy, creativity and spontaneity which are beyond recall.

Eric Voegelin (1952) and Leo Strauss (1953: ch 2) have exposed the limitations of Weber’s position from the perspective of the natural law. Rather than repeat what is argued there, I should like to take engage in a philosophical evaluation of Weber's work that is critical but sympathetic. To repeat, I hold that Hennis’ attempts to identify Weber’s central question as a normative concern with human personality and life-orders is worthy. I would go further and argue that this is the central question of human life, the question of the ultimate end for human beings, the question of the human good. My view is just that we have allowed means to displace ends, functions to displace purposes, and instrumental rationality to displace philosophy, with the result that the fundamental question of human life has been reduced to an underpinning , buried beneath a mass of ‘objective’ sociological data. Aquinas would never have buried his ‘central question’ the way that Weber did, and had to, given his sociological commitments. 

Weber's philosophical anthropology, on closer analysis, is an unfulfilled search for fundamental truth precisely on account of being subordinated to a sociological concern to raise the structures and institutions of capitalist modernity to the status of irrevocable and irremovable entities. It is this that renders Weber’s sociology ideological, in that Weber’s conception of rationalisation and bureaucratisation dehistoricises a particular set of social relations, removes them from political controversy and ethical concern. Set against the permanent philosophical truth of the natural law, Weber’s underlying philosophical anthropology is not strong enough to prevent his sociology from operating as an ideological rationalisation. 

The contradictions at the heart of Weber’s work are not intellectual errors, the product of the human mind. Just as Marx argued that the inversions which characterised Hegel’s philosophy of the state, were the product of inversions of subject and object in the real world, not in the mind (Marx CHDS EW 1975), so Weber’s inversions are not so much intellectual errors as really existing problems which arise from capitalist modernity as an inverted world – a world which has extended instrumental rationality over social life whilst dissolving substantive rationality into mere private subjectivisms. 

Weber's sociology, therefore, confronts us with modernity as a fundamental philosophical problem. The value of Weber's thought, then, is less his philosophical anthropology than his normative concern in an age which denies those values, modernity as an ethical problem whose solution lies beyond the inversions of modernity through the resolution of social contradictions. This is a demand that the world becomes philosophical. That is something which Weber specifically ruled out as an impossibility. 

Nietzsche, in effect, assimilated the nihilism of the modern age, rather than refuting it, proceeding to attempt to 'overcome' it in a thoroughly impossible way. In embracing the ‘gay’ and ‘joyous’ science, Nietzsche seemed to think that he could have the autonomy, creativity and spontaneity that modernity was eclipsing, without engaging in social transformation. Affirming individual, personal, subjective choice, far from transcending modernity’s nihilism, Nietzsche remained on its level.


These observations raise profound questions as to the value and place of philosophy in the world. The modern world continues to identify scientific knowledge with knowledge as such, something which leads to a narrowing of intelligence to the level of pure scientific positivism. It is as though only the physical universe, the world of the tangible, the world accessible to the senses, is knowable. The idea of moral knowledge and moral truth is denigrated and denied in favour of the assertion of value judgements. Those who would deny that this amounts to the end of morality need to answer some fundamental questions. How can we decide, morally, between these value judgements? How can we discern rightness and wrongness in these value judgements? If we cannot find the moral criteria by which we can answer these questions, how can we claim that morality still exists?

However much Kant’s ethical system is intersubjective and universal, the moral relativism and subjectivism of the modern world derives from the Kantian claim of reason to be self-sufficient, recognising nothing above it or beyond it. Allied to an individualism which also holds the self-sufficiency of freedom, it is easy to see how modernity sinks into a scepticism that can see in values no more than the expression of passing times, places and cultures. The idea of permanent truth is thus denied.

My argument is that there is a line of descent from Kant to Weber which charts the path away from objective morality, truth and reality and leads us into relativism and subjectivism, and all its attendant varieties. And this, ultimately, must lead us to question the basic reasonableness of Kant’s philosophical position.

For all of the normative concern with the appropriate regimen for human fulfilment, Weber's politics of responsibility falls far short of politics as a 'science of order', politics in the ancient sense of creative human self-realisation.

In searching for this politics as a 'science of order', Voegelin denounces the exclusion of the scientia prima from the realm of reason. He suggests that 'we may arrive in the course of our endeavours at the theory that the justice of the human order depends on its participation in the Platonic Agathon, or the Aristotelian Nous or the Stoic Logos, or the Thomistic ratio aeterna'. (Voegelin 1952: 23). Whilst, ‘for one reason or another, none of these theories may satisfy us completely’, at least ‘we know that we are in search for an answer of this type.' (Voegelin 1952: 6). Voegelin therefore argues that the sociological reduction of Plato, Aristotle or St Thomas to the status of just some values amongst others to be self-defeating. (Voegelin 1952: 20). For Voegelin, classical philosophy and scholastic theology constituted 'the major and certainly the decisive part of Western intellectual culture'. The idea of the modern world as the triumph of Enlightenment over superstition and ignorance is simply untenable. For Voegelin, mediaeval Christianity expresses 'the belief in a rational science of human social order and especially of natural law'. He affirms that 'this science was not simply a belief but was actually elaborated as a work of reason'. (Voegelin 1952: 20). 

Aquinas, following Aristotle, teaches that the moral virtues are connected and perfected only through the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom. 
We need to give a plausible account of the relation of the order of human activity in the world to the natural and eternal order. Aquinas expounds the natural law in relation to its origin in God, the Author of human nature. 
This is not a move open to those who seek purely naturalist accounts. With mechanicist science stripping the world of purpose, ethics can find no grounding in the temporal sphere, a sphere of power that is radically dis-godded, or de-divinised (Voegelin 1952: 106, 107). Or, if ethics is grounded in such a sphere, through the self-legislation of reason, it will soon wither and die. To this extent, Weber, following Nietzsche, was correct. No morality is possible on this terrain.

Christianity performed the first 'de-divinisation' of the temporal sphere, in that it systematically eliminated the illusions of polytheism and pantheism and drove the pagan gods from the city. At the same time, the transcendence of the one true God does not prevent the presence of God from the world He has created. God is in the world but not of it.
Those who prefer their history with a tinge of irony would no doubt smile at the way in which modernity’s disenchantment of the world has continued this process of de-divinisation, overthrowing the Judaeo-Christian God, only to restore the ancient polytheism in the modern veneration of impersonal powers, the new idols of money and power, bureaucracy and the state, war and disorder. And the loss of supernatural ends has also brought the return of the old pantheism, human beings enclosed in a material world that is in large part of their own making, reduced to mere automata serving the machine they have built.

Natural Law and The Ultimate Origin of Political Authority
For Aquinas, God is the ultimate origin of political authority. God is the Author of human nature and hence the natural law. (Bowe 1955).

Aquinas affirms the true harmony of a political morality which is in accord with the natural law which is, in turn, in harmony with the eternal law. To the extent that Kant fails to recognise this synthesis, he cannot avoid a split into an "other worldly" morality' which lacks social relevance, and a worldly Weberianism, indeed a Machiavellianism, in which 'morality' is simply a technology of power. This is Thrasymachus and justice as the interests of the strongest over against Plato’s justice as a social virtue. 
Kant clearly chooses the former over the latter, but the world chooses otherwise. Not good and bad, right and wrong, but what works is all that matters once morality loses its critical purchase on the real social world. Kant would reject that conclusion, and would instead affirm the morality of the summum bonum. But that ethical commitment is groundless in the modern world. 

Weber's secularistic typology of the 'ethics of intention or ultimate ends' and the 'ethics of responsibility' is not the Aristotelian or Thomist ethics of ultimate ends but an ethic of personal conviction based on subjective choice. 

Although Kant clearly opposes the Machiavellian and Hobbesian doctrine of the authority of the State to determine the content of faith and morals, he is aware of the need for government to impose law and order. Since the individual, is ‘misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law' and thus 'abuses his freedom in relation to others', he therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. Kant is aware that this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (UH 1991:46), the realisation of the end of perfect constitution based upon citizen wills 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved' (UH 1991:46). In the meantime, government has a duty to preserve order. 
Kant's division between the phenomenal world of natural determination and the noumenal world of moral freedom divides human experience within and subjects the individual to an endless struggle between the command of duty and natural inclinations. (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2). To preserve order, legal force must intervene, compelling individuals to subordinate their real nature to the necessity of law, identifying this as happiness. Kant's self-legislated, self-sufficient reason defined apart from ontological nature thus invites a dualism between the individual as a independent rational subject and the individual as an empirical being subordinated to external authority (Norman 1983:96 98).

The natural order needs to be open to the divine and transcendent
Max Weber's rejection of Christianity stems less from philosophical grounds than from an ideological presupposition on his part, the idea that the acceptance of divine revelation necessarily entails the 'intellectual sacrifice' of reason. Closer analysis reveals Aquinas to be impeccably rationalist, supporting every argument he makes by reason, insofar as it can be supported by reason. Aquinas moves into the realm of faith and revelation when he has reached the limits of reason. Showing that there are such limits is one of the principal achievements of Kant’s philosophy. The same ideological assumption crops up in Shadia Drury’s assault on Aquinas, the repeated accusation that Aquinas subordinated reason to faith. This is caricature, in that in those instances where faith and reason are said to clash will be found where and when reason has reached its limits. Weber merely states the modernist assumption that faith involves the sacrifice of reason. It is a mere Enlightenment prejudice that shows no depth of understanding of the position that Aquinas set out at length. The claim is repeated, but becomes no more true for that.

Aquinas does not deny reason and the natural order at all. He just argues that this order is incomplete and that the realisation of human ends within this order will lead to an incomplete human fulfilment. The natural order therefore needs to open out into that which is divine, transcendent and eternal. Certainly, revelation is a mystery and its truth cannot be fully understood by human beings in this life. 

The modern Gnosticism
Voegelin identifies Nietzsche and Marx as key figures among the 'modern gnostics' who reject the truth of a transcendent divine principle so as to promote a false ideological 'certitude'. (Voegelin 1968). Voegelin is drawing a direct analogy between the modern assumption that knowledge of the self-made social world is a self-knowledge which makes men as gods. This is the old Gnostic heresy, the idea that knowledge alone is sufficient for liberation and freedom. The modern Gnostics have no sense of the transcendent, no idea of a world that is bigger than human beings. The world is a human creation and men have become creators in the same sense as God the Creator. Voegelin is correct to reject the false 'certainties' which the modern Gnostics hurl against divine truth; he departs from Aquinas when he appears to reject the certainty which may be claimed for the divine truth as such.

Voegelin criticises Nietzsche and Marx for the way that they envisage the ontological transformation of man to attain a new kind of being as an act of pure self-invention. Here we see self-knowledge based on self-creation as the Gnostic heresy, the false 'certitudes' of Nietzsche and Marx being the mistaken substitutes which atheism puts in the place of God, morality and Christianity itself. (Voegelin 1968; Voegelin 1950: 275-302). One is reminded of G.K. Chesterton’s remark that when one stops believing in God, one does not believe in nothing, one believes in anything. This idea of false certitudes, however, exposes the hidden God at work in those materialist philosophies claiming to go beyond the illusions of religion and morality. The inability of Marx and Nietzsche to overcome that tension between truth and illusion, ideal and reality, leads us to ask whether or not there is an inherent paradox in human nature itself, one that has us constantly at extremes between immanence and transcendence. Attaining harmony between those contrary pulls emerges as the key to the resolution of the problems of the human condition.

Machiavellianism and the Individualist Premises of Modernity
Leo Strauss has no difficult in identifying Machiavellianism is an intellectual and moral evil which opposes and undermines the natural law and lies at the black heart of the immoral politics of modernity. 

One can sum up modernity as Machiavelli and Hobbes in political authority, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel in the search for the lost morality and common good, Weber and Nietzsche as accepting that this loss is irrevocable, thereby embracing value judgements, perspectives, and nihilism in its place.

Strauss therefore rejects the project of modernity as doomed from the start. Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke have set up a problematic that is essentially without resolution. Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx were effectively trying to find a common good and a common ethic that simply does not and cannot exist on the modern terrain. The doomed project reaches its culmination in Nietzsche, whose errors have the merit of exposing the moral hollowness of modernity. (Strauss 1975: 81-98.) In effect, modernity could only have ended in the insanity of Nietzsche, its subjectivism taken to extremes of the madman as superman.

There is a line here, leading from Machiavelli, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber, which marks the distance that modernity has travelled further and further away from the natural law. That journey culminates in the disenchanted sphere which has lost morality as an overarching objective foundation, and which has lost politics as creative human fulfilment. The human end has been lost in an inverted world that has extended the instrumental rationality of means over all spheres of life.

Strauss criticises the individualism that lies behind the social contract advanced by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others. Social contract theory merely expresses the split of the common life of human beings between a social atomism below and a political centralisation above. The social contract does nothing to restore that lost unity, merely rationalises that bifurcation, reinforcing individualism and centralisation as two sides of the same coin.
An understanding of Aquinas allows us to reject modernity’s twin poles of individualism and centralisation through a genuine conception of a political society founded on the common good.

The problem with the modern political and moral philosophers is that they are unable to correct modernity on the question of individualism and the common good, for the very reason that they still work within the framework of liberal modernity. Even Marx and his idea of free individuality reads less like a critic of the liberal order and more like someone devoted to realising liberalism’s most cherished values. It can’t be done, for all of the reasons that Marx gave – the intransigence of central liberal institutions such as private property in the means of production. So that leaves us with the fantasy of the liberal ideal detached from the conditions of its realisation – a totalitarian political centralisation as a counterpart to the atomisation of civil society.

The modern problem is to reconcile individualism and the common good by overcoming a division between political 'realism' and ethical 'idealism', neither of which is a sustainable position. The one generates the other and both confirm each other in their falseness.

Jacques Maritain argues well here. The evils of Machiavellianism can be avoided not simply by rejecting Machiavelli's political 'realism' but also by refusing an ineffectual notion of ethical 'idealism' as the only alternative. (Maritain 1956: 323). Utopianism is not the only alternative to a visionless pragmatism concerned only with power, its acquisition and its retention.

Facts and Values
Weber expresses the fundamental inversion that lies at the heart of modernity in the form of the distinction between means and ends. In an important sense, this goes back further to David Hume’s distinction between facts and values, stating the philosophical convention that it is impossible to derive an ‘ought-to-be’ from an ‘is’. Ironically, Hume identified that ‘is’ with God and was seeking to undermine the divine foundations of morality. In time, in the hands of G.E. Moore, that convention became the impossibility of deriving values from nature. Kant’s self-legislated reason is itself detached from nature in this sense. Which begs the question as to from where an ought-to-be can be drawn, if indeed morality still matters and an ought-to-be still needs to be drawn. Aquinas’ position allows us to uphold both nature and morality against the modernist agnosticism, rejecting the rationalist detachment of values from nature. Aquinas allows us to establish the proper relation between facts and values, by the light of natural reason, giving us a sound philosophical understanding of the relation between being and goodness. (Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q.5, art.l.) 

Leo Strauss acknowledges the intellectual strengths of Thomism. 





Strauss values the way that Aquinas resolved certain tensions in the Aristotelian teaching, particularly concerning the relation between the temporal and eternal good of man, and the relation between the practical and the contemplative life. 

The Thomist synthesis depends on the synthesis of reason and revelation. Many critics simply presume that such a synthesis is impossible and that, therefore, Aquinas must necessarily sacrifice reason to faith. This is based on a complete failure to understand Aquinas’ developed position. It is self-evidently true that revelation concerning mysteries that are inaccessible to unaided human reason cannot be subject to reason. This is not to deny reason but to point to its limits, beyond which reason cannot go. Unless one wishes to commit oneself to the untenable thesis that the whole world and everything in it is at all times knowable, and hence subject to reason, Aquinas’ position is entirely reasonable. 
The real controversy concerns the relation of philosophy to theology, reason to faith. If Aquinas holds that the supernatural end is superior to the natural end of human beings, does this imply the subordination of the latter to the former? Does it imply the sacrifice of reason to faith? If so, then the Thomist synthesis of reason and revelation must necessarily involve the absorption of philosophy into theology in such a way as to deny the autonomy of philosophy. This most certainly is not Aquinas’ view. He states quite clearly that for philosophy to be the handmaid of theology, it must be genuine philosophy in the sense of respecting the autonomy of human reasoning. Indeed, the natural law simply could not function as it ought without the use of human reason seeking understanding of nature and the human moral condition. 

Certainly, for Aquinas, the truths of both philosophy and theology have their ultimate origin in God Himself. The eternal law is the ultimate source of all law and all human knowledge, which implies that  divine revelation is superior to philosophy. (Aquinas, Summa theologiae, la, Ilae, q.90—q.97.) This most certainly does not mean that revealed truth can suppress naturally known truth. On the contrary, for Aquinas every truth is in harmony with every other truth and reveals something of the whole truth. All it means is that revelation brings a certitude that human reasoning can lack.

Leo Strauss rejects modern moral and political philosophy of modernity since he is aware of the extent to which they lead in the direction of (and sometimes actually reach) nihilism. (Midgley 1979: 168-190; Midgley 1981: 235-247).

These criticisms indicate that there is a doctrine implicit in Kant’s notion of self-legislated reason, which comes out more and more as the Weberian rationalisation of the world unfolds, that is neither true nor harmless. This implies that, whilst advocating an ethical intersubjectivism and universalism, Kant’s thought is eventually susceptible to subjectivism, relativism and nihilism.

Weber's modernist rejection of the classical philosophical and Judaeo-Christian theological traditions originates not in some ideological error in Weber’s thought, but in the modernist revolution of reason against originary and ontological nature. Notions of a self-legislating rationality involve human self-genesis, leading to gnosis as human self-knowledge in a self-made world. It makes sense only if men really have become as gods and there is no reality greater than the one human beings have made. Kant himself remains within the mental prison of his concepts. With Vico, Hegel and Marx we are at least out in this world made by human praxis. Hegel and Marx have the merit of understanding this auto-genesis as a process of loss and redemption, abolishing alienation to realise a world in which human beings can be at home. A New Eden. That may not be so different from what the Bible recommends, the New Jerusalem as a co-operative endeavour between human beings and God. But, at the level of human power and knowledge alone, there is the danger of an idolatry that once more makes the world alien to human beings.
One should draw attention here to the achievement of Aquinas’ philosophical/theological synthesis, putting knowledge and power in its place within a greater whole. The fundamental guidelines of that synthesis ensure that we can develop a more definitive critique of modernity, one that avoids its snares, delusions and temptations and sees its promises for what they are – seductions based on Faustian bargains. 

Science and Scientism 
Rationalisation as ideology
In modern times, a growing inattentiveness to moral and philosophical truth has been accompanied by a rush to embrace a variety of ideological surrogates. Although characterised as a sceptical and secular age, nothing so much characterises modernity as its credulous grasping after meaning as evinced by mass support for nationalism, technology, and by the veneration of wealth and power in any number of forms, from ‘strong’ leaders to pop stars and football teams. The collective amnesia at the heart of modernity’s intellectual enterprise – the false antithesis between modern enlightenment and medieval ignorance and superstition – has given rise to the whole range of errors.

Thomism and the intelligibility of the universe
If Aristotle is right, and you are what you repeatedly do, then we forget what we fail regularly to do. Dazzled by scientific advance and technological innovation, plenty of the pre-modern wisdom has been forgotten. Vico held that the condition of knowing the truth of something is to have made it. Nature is God’s realm, he argued, therefore we lack knowledge of it. We know only the world we have made. For Kant, we know only the phenomenal world which is accessible by our cognitive apparatus. We do not know the world of things in themselves. Slowly but surely, we distanced ourselves from the truth that the entire universe is, in a profound sense, intelligible on account of the fact that its contingent existence derives from the necessary existence of the prime intellect which is God. Further and further, the modernist project has distanced human reason from Nature and God. The result is that the greatest assertion of the creativity of human reason is combined with an acceptance of its complete ignorance and impotence with respect to the real world, the ultimate world of which human praxis is but a part.

One could refer here to the way that John Polkinghorne has no trouble connecting quantum physics with the notion of intelligibility as developed by Aquinas. This is the idea that there is no dualism of subject and object but an intelligible connection between knower and known.

These truths point to the intelligibility of the universe through the prime intellect, but still leave it to human beings to use their reason to apprehend the ultimate meaning. Misconception through human error is possible, bringing about not order and harmony, but disorder and disharmony, with all manner of contradictions between the propositions held to be true in increasingly specialised fields of knowledge. Weber holds such specialisation and differentiation to be one of the most salient characteristics defining modernity. (Turner 1993: ch 5). Such parcelling out of human knowledge makes it less and less likely that we may perceive the whole. Paradoxically, advances in knowledge serve to cloud intelligibility by splitting up our reason. Alvin Gouldner opines that Weber produces a Protestant version of the Thomist effort at harmonising the relations between science and values. (Gouldner 1964: 212). Such a notion is just so wrong on so many levels it is hard to know where to begin. Safe to say, no such version is possible and, since Aquinas has already harmonised reason and faith, fact and value, philosophy and theology, any version other than the Thomist one isn’t in any case required. 

The modern distinction between science and morality
To those who would argue that science and religion are involved in a clash between the forces of reason one the one hand and superstition and ignorance on the other, we may quote W.J. Ong:

Alfred North Whitehead and others long ago made the suggestion that the patience to attack a problem scientifically implies an act of faith in the intelligibility of the universe, and that historically the great impetus to this act of faith has been Christianity, with its unequivocal belief in a personal God and in a universe created by Him in time and with a determined purpose ... . This explanation is undoubtedly true in the large ....

Ong  1958: 165

I would just add that this idea of the intelligibility of the universe pre-dates Christianity and is an honour that rightly belongs to Judaism. Max Weber himself wrote very well on this point. (Weber 1952; Berger 1967; Zeitlin 1984, 1-35).





Chief Rabbi Sacks’ final lines bear repetition: ‘If God created the world, then it is, in principle, intelligible. The mists of irrationality have been dispelled.’ Intelligibility is the key, and it is the idea that there is a God who created the world that sustains the faith that the truth is out there, is attainable and can be sought.

One ought to clarify this idea further, left there be any misunderstanding. (Unfortunately, there are rationalists out there who deliberately grasp the wrong end of the stick in order to prove the truth of what they already believe to be true). Whilst faith – Jewish, Christian, any – encourages a search for truth through inculcating a belief in the intelligibility of the universe, neither this belief nor the search for truth relies upon supernatural faith. The intelligibility of the universe is something which can be known through the reason of the philosopher and the scientist. As an example here, we may refer to the scientist Michael Faraday. Despite his immense scientific achievements, Faraday turned down a knighthood. Faraday's humility stemmed from his belief that all his inspiration and discovery came from his faith in God. ‘I am of a very small and despised sect of Christians, known, if known at all, as Sandemanians.' That was how Faraday introduced himself on one occasion. The Sandemanians based themselves firmly on the New Testament. Far from treating science with suspicion, the Sandemanians saw that the New Testament gave a clear mandate for science. In his Epistle to the Romans, St Paul observes that, 'since the creation of the world God's invisible qualities - his eternal power and divine nature - have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse'.

Faraday quoted this passage on two occasions in the course of giving public lectures. In Faraday’s view Nature was 'written by the finger of God'. It was his calling to study nature so as to make clear the eternal power and divine nature of the Creator. That is science and that is enlightenment. To Faraday, this entailed 'unravelling the mysteries of nature was to discover the manifestations of God'. A scientist seeks to explain the laws of nature, a theologian seeks to define the nature of God. To Faraday, these were necessarily part of the same calling.

Seeking to understand the nature of electricity, Faraday read every paper published on the subject and recreated every experiment. But he was driven on by his faith. If it is true that God has made Himself known through nature, then nature's laws must be intelligible. 'I believe that the invisible things of HIM from the creation of the world are clearly seen,' Faraday declared. 





Where French scientist Andre-Marie Ampere had expertise in mathematics, Faraday had his understanding of the nature of God. Faraday could not follow Ampere’s arguments. 'With regard to your theory,' Faraday wrote to Ampere, 'it so soon becomes mathematical that it quickly gets beyond my reach.' So Faraday sought another way forward – his intuitions concerning how the physical world would be influenced by its Creator. In 1844, for example, he wrote a note on the nature of matter, speculating about atoms: 'by his word' God could have spoken 'power into existence' round points in space, he wrote.
Faraday was almost entirely alone in the scientific world in considering the role of empty space.

To Faraday, intent on discovering the nature of God through His influence on the physical world, this seemingly empty space had to be of interest. It also made sense to Faraday that such divine influence could be discerned. The properties of matter 'depend upon the power with which the Creator has gifted such matter', he said.
According to science historian Geoffrey Cantor, Faraday saw himself as investigating a 'perfectly designed system' in which all events are tightly ordered by divine providence and held in a self-sustaining system with matter and force both conserved. Forces can be transformed into one another, but neither created nor destroyed by any human power.
Added to this was Faraday's concept of symmetry: cause and effect, action and reaction, north and south. For him, everything in nature was somehow correlated with something else. And it was all subject to the law of 'unity in diversity'. In his First Epis​tle to the Corinthians, St Paul said that "There are different kinds of service, but the same Lord.' The lesson, to Faraday, was clear. 'Like the members of the Sandemanian community who work in harmony for the common spiritual good,' Cantor wrote, 'so the different material bodies and the laws of nature cooperate with one another within the system of nature.'
All of this led Faraday to a particular view - a preconception - of what he would discover in his experiments. First he discovered the magnetic field that inhabited 'empty' space around a magnet. His view of the integrity of all things led him to conceive this field as being composed of closed loops: for him, circular forms were more reflective of the Creator than were lines that stretched merely from one point to another.




Copernicus, Galileo, Pascal, Mendel .. the list of those who combined science and religion, reason and faith is endless. 

It is not science but scientism which sees a necessary opposition here. It isn’t difficult to show that those guilty of scientism are really advancing a religion under the cover of reason, and not a very pleasant religion at that, repeating all the worst excesses of the religion they claim to oppose – bigotry, slander, intolerance, misrepresentation, extremism in comment.

In The Nature and Origins of Scientism J. Wellmuth's argues:





Aquinas is a realist, as are Aristotle and Plato and all those who hold that there is a real world, an ultimate reality, beyond human concepts and conventions. In the Middle Ages, the realists came to be opposed by the nominalists, those for whom there is no truth and knowledge beyond what the human mind can name and define and conceive. One can see immediately what really divides Aquinas and Kant. Aquinas affirms the existence of a real world independent of the human mind; Kant proceeds from the cognitive apparatus of the human mind and argues the impossibility of knowing anything beyond those concepts. (To be precise, Kant is most correctly defined as a critical idealist rather than a nominalist. A philosopher like Quine is more of a nominalist).

Modern scientism has its roots in nominalism, a philosophical error which one can find presented in its most sophisticated form in the work of William of Ockham.  

It goes without saying that scientism is crude and misrepresents science as much as it misunderstands the true nature of philosophy. Scientism is concerned not with the search for principles, first or otherwise, but with pragmatism, in the sense of some practical endeavour to get things done, show tangible results. It involves a mentality which is congenial to state power and hence ideological thought. Scientism’s god is progress.

Aquinas set out the intellectual basis for the proper distinctions between philosophy and the special sciences in his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius. (Maritain 1959; Gilson 1950; Martin 1957). 

The increasing specialisation of and differentiation between disciplines resulted in the loss of a coherent, holistic intellectual synthesis, something which permitted errors to go unchecked. Not the least of Aquinas’ achievements was the synthesis of philosophy and theology. Their separation involved the loss of an architectonic function for theology. One can note the growing tendency, in Althusius, Grotius and others leading up to Kant to treat the philosophical disciplines separately, losing sight of their interconnections, something which reflected Protestant, rationalist and voluntarist tendencies in natural law theory in the context of a retreat from the idea of metaphysics as the Queen of the sciences, the science of being. (Midgley 1975).

Intellectual specialisation and differentiation entailed the loss of the architectonic conception and brought about intellectual disintegration. The origins are mediaeval in the shape of nominalism and philosophies which taught the primacy of the will over intellect, which took over from Aquinas’ moderate realism and his teaching of the intellect over the will. From the Renaissance and then the Reformation, rationalism and voluntarism were expressed in various, and frequently unusual, combinations. 
In light of this distintegration of the old intellectual synthesis, one can appreciate the immense task that Kant took upon himself, and Kant’s brilliance in nearly achieving the impossible. The problem is not the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, plenty of which can be salvaged. The problem is the modern world and its alienating, disabling separations – nature and reason, fact and value, real and ideal, means and ends.

Nevertheless, Kant’s failure was modernity’s last chance. Kant’s antinomies prepared the way for modern rationalisation and the disintegration of morality into myriad subjectivisms. 

To understand Kant’s task we need to address the sceptical arguments of David Hume. Hume's distinction between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought-to-be’ has reigned for so long as a philosophical convention that it is simply taken for granted, quoted so casually as to end rather than encourage philosophising. The context of Hume’s scepticism is the continued spread of Protestant, rationalist and voluntarist modes of thought throughout the contemporary world of religion and science and politics. These modes were so pervasive as to be taken for granted, and hardly reasoned from a philosophical perspective. Hume is a rightly celebrated philosopher. But it is interesting to note that, as is the case with other heavyweight modern philosophers, Hume does not engage in any deep or sustained sense with the key theories of metaphysics and natural law. Yet again, a major philosopher fails to enter into a dialogue with Aquinas. Clearly, if Hume's scepticism could be sustained, then Aquinas’ thought would be shown to be false (along with philosophy and science as such, I would add.) Far from refuting Aquinas, however, Hume just avoids him. Instead, he concentrates his fire on inadequacies of the natural law theories of the likes of John Locke. This says nothing about natural law theory as such, and nothing about Aquinas’ natural law theory in particular. It merely tells us that the rationalist, voluntarist and empiricist philosophers of the modern world were not up to the task of providing an adequate philosophical basis for rational norms of human action. Plato and Aristotle had little trouble in exposing the inadequacies of the myriad relativisms and scepticisms of their day. John Locke is no Plato and no Aristotle. That Hume came to be so celebrated for little more than a retread of an ancient philosophical self-indulgence underlines how much is lost once metaphysics, the science of being, and natural law, guiding human beings to the final good, is lost. Without that anchoring in ontological nature, of course human beings find themselves being swept along down the road leading to scepticism. 

Hume succeeded in exposing the inadequacies of modern attempts to define metaphysics and state the natural law; he did not knock down metaphysics and natural law as such, let alone Aquinas’ thought in particular. But let us presume, as a little thought experiment helping us understand where scepticism leads us, that Hume is right with respect to metaphysics and natural law as such. Kant thought he had given the reply to Hume, reinstating reason, but Kant’s philosophy no less than Hume’s is conceived apart from nature and being. 

Questioned about the basis of morality in nature, those who reject metaphysics and the natural law can say nothing. But the social life of human beings cannot proceed in such a condition, but will seek meaning concerning those things of fundamental concern to human life. One sees how easily a moral silence will soon be followed by resort to moral surrogates, of who knows what provenance and with who knows what consequences. Such scepticism is a morally precarious and ultimately unsustainable situation.

With the rejection of metaphysical truths, reason is neither able nor competent to establish the norms upon which a viable human life is based. One sees how Kant’s ultimate agnosticism with respect to the good invites the return of the Humean scepticism he had thought he had answered, leading eventually to a Weberian subjectivism and relativism and culminating in a scarcely reasoned nihilism. Kant came so near to pulling of the impossible, supplying modernity with a viable morality, but his failure has left us so far from the world of moral truth.

Which is why Max Weber is such an important figure. Weber is what we get as a result of Kant’s ultimate failure. Kant at least sought to address metaphysics to determine what could legitimately be claimed. Weber rejects the very idea of metaphysical truth as such, holding, against Kant, that human reason is unable to establish such universal norms as can be accepted as valid by each and every reasonable human being. Kant believed that such universal morality is possible, rooted in the reason shared by all reasonable men. (I write men deliberately, since Kant had some odd things to say about the reasoning capacities of women, which would seem to undermine his claims to have defined a universal morality.)
Kant thought he had answered the scepticism of Hume and had succeeded in reinstating the claims of reason to determine morality. Kant’s failure allows Weber to reinstate scepticism. And we have been living in Weber’s world ever since. 

Weber is such a sceptic that he holds not only that the reason of an individual person cannot supply a rational norm for another person, but that it doesn’t even afford a viable prescription for the person himself or herself. Kant, famously, separated duty and inclination. Aquinas held that morality and natural inclination worked together through the appetites. Weber just flat denies that human nature contains any such norms based on right appetite. Kant sought to define moral duty against Hume’s notion that reason is the slave of the passions. Aquinas could avoid having to choose one or the other through his valuing the moral significance of the inclinations, dispositions and appetites. Weber’s view, however, reads more like the moral tradition in the process of disintegration, with the individual acting not out of morality or duty or virtue, but in response to feelings, passions, inclinations and so on, none of which is related through any valid moral principle. As a result, individuals are enchained to empirical necessity, the very thing which Kant sought to avoid when defining duty in opposition to inclination. Accordingly, the choices made by the Weberian individual man, (insofar as acting as a slave to the passions can be said to involve choice), are not moral choices and reflect no viable moral position, but express ideological positions which reflect the functions and demands of the existing social order. G.E. Moore in the naturalist fallacy argued that it is impossible to read off moral values from nature. We see that, as a result of the ensuing moral silence, values take the form of the imperatives of the prevailing social system. The need for morality does not disappear in the absence of morality, the moral imperative just gets projected elsewhere.

In arguing the impossibility of prescribing a moral code, Weber presents us with a choice between 'an ethic of ultimate ends' and 'an ethic of responsibility'. But that presumes that the Weberian individual is already in a position to choose before even making a choice. That is, the posing of these two ethics as alternatives presumes that the Weberian individual already 'knows' that 'ultimate ends' possess merely a subjective meaning since they lack any ontological status or validity; and already 'knows' that responsible action is responsible only in relation to objectives which are worthy of choice only as subjective preferences, not as objective goods. (Midgley 1983 ch 2). 

Which is not to say that Weber reinstated Hume’s scepticism in any direct sense. Rather, scepticism returned via the agnosticism of the neo-Kantianism of the late nineteenth century. This turn was always a possible development. Kant followed Hume in denying the natural ends of human nature were discernable. For this reason, the foundations of a Thomist natural law is lacking in Kant, something ultimately undermines his ethical teaching. Kant needs the natural law to make good his claims. This is precisely what he lacks.

For all of Kant’s similarities to the nominalism and voluntarism of the late Middle Ages, he lacks what even this late scholasticism had, the divine will which is able to fill in where moral philosophy is deficient. Kant rejected dogmatic theology and traditional metaphysics but could not supply any plausible basis for moral obligation in their place. (Midgley 1975; Grisez 1958.)

In fine, Kant can find no basis in the human intellect, in the divine intellect or in the divine will for a lex obligans. He cannot find any basis in human nature even for a lex indicans. Given his rather meagre premises, Kant is only able to found – if found is the right word - a lex obligans through recourse to a - purportedly - autonomous human will. 

It doesn’t wash. Kant’s philosophy is an unstable admixture of rationalistic and voluntaristic, with reason ultimately proving unable to make good its claims to constitute morality. The antinomies in Kant’s philosophy leave us with the modern moral predicament unresolved. Kant’s fate was sealed the moment he rejected traditional metaphysics and the doctrine of the natural law. With that rejection, Kant lost the architectonic conception he so desperately sought in his philosophy. He lost that the integrative function performed by the natural law and spent the rest of his philosophical career attempting to put together what he had rent apart. Kant wasn’t alone. The fate of Kant and his antinomies expresses the predicament of the modern world as such. And Kant understood the modern moral condition to be a predicament, a problem that demanded resolution. Kant rightly argued that the human mind tends towards unity, the unity in which it finds peace and satisfaction. (Krieger 1972: 102; Krieger 1965: 191-201). If that sounds familiar then it should, it is Aquinas and the reunion with God. It’s called beatitude, the ultimate end for human beings.

[the rejection of metaphysical truths – reason not able or competent to establish norms = agnosticism and scepticism and nihilism – the consequences of Kant’s abandonment of natural moral law ] Midgely
Whilst Kant holds that the moral law is universal, its universality rested upon the self-legislation of practical reason; Kant’s moral law rests upon a certain notion of ‘possibility’, since it is not based upon a real natural moral law.

We shall thus have to investigate the possibility of a categorical imperative entirely a priori, since here we do not enjoy the advantage of having its reality given in experience and so of being obliged merely to explain, and not to establish, its possibility.

Kant GMM 1991: 84-85

Kant demands that a principle be ‘objectively necessary as a universal law’ (Kant GMM 1991: 87), but he grounds this not in natural law but in ‘the general concept of a rational being as such’ (Kant GMM 1991: 79). 

Here, however, we are discussing objective practical laws, and consequently the relation of a will to itself as determined solely by reason. Everything related to the empirical then falls away of itself; for if reason entirely by itself determines conduct (and it is the possibility of this which we now wish to investigate), it must necessarily do so a priori.

Kant GMM 1991: 90

Reason as the distinguishing feature of human beings is, of course, central to the natural law tradition. Human beings are charged with a duty to use that reason in bringing about the good. Kant’s self-legislation pertains to reason in the universal sense, not the subjective:

The practically good is that which determines the will by concepts of reason, and therefore not by subjective causes, but objectively—that is, on grounds valid for every rational being as such.

Kant GMM 1991: 77

So the case against Kant is not that his ethics are subjective, leading to relativism. The problem is that Kant separates reason from nature and so lacks the supporting framework that ensures the universality of reason. Basing his universal moral law upon mere 'possibility', rather than natural moral law, is not a stable intellectual position and, eventually, proved vulnerable to an encroaching subjectivism. Accordingly, Kant commentator L.W. Beck concedes that Kant’s ethics are fundamentally contradictory. In attempting to defend Kant against his critics, Beck identifies Kantian antinomies so clearly as to expose just how unstable Kant’s position really is. It becomes clear why Kant’s rationalism and universalism could slide into irrationalism and subjectivism. Lacking a grounding in natural law, Kant’s reason is not strong enough to resist the strong tendencies to irrationalism and subjectivism in the modern order.

Kant’s sharp distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world renders his doctrine vulnerable. Whilst we can know the phenomenal world, shaped by the activity of the conceptual apparatus of the mind, we can never know things-in-themselves. This means that the noumenal order has no proper foundation; inaccessible to reason, it is bound to disintegrate into a general scepticism. We see in this distinction between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world the basis of the split between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’, generating in time the split between positivism and moralism which characterised neo-Kantianism. Whilst the phenomenal order becomes the realm of facts, the noumenal realm undergoes a progressive conversion in which Kant’s intersubjective ethic dissolves in a realm of subjective values subject to nothing but the arbitrary choice of the autonomous will. Thus, when the influence of Nietzsche is noted, we should be aware that Kant’s own doctrine is capable of degenerating into the Nietzschean doctrine.

Agnosticism, scepticism and nihilism – Weber in the aftermath of Kant
It is against the background of neo-Kantianism and the work of Rickert, Windelband and Dilthey that Weber comes to distinguish sharply between facts and values, with science and intellect belonging to the one realm, and morality to another. Whilst Weber is here a clear disciple of Nietzsche, this distinction can certainly be traced to Kant’s dualism of Sein and Sollen. Kant and neo-Kantian positions are closer to Nietzsche’s position than many Kantians have been prepared to acknowledge. (Kantian Gary Banham recognises the connection).

Weber’s distinction between fact and value has practical implications with respect to the concomitant distinction between knowledge and will. The 'ethical neutrality' of scientific sociology purportedly immunises science from value-judgements and lets the vocation of politics be stated with greater clarity. Freund praises the separations between value and fact, and between will and knowledge, as enabling science and politics to 'collaborate more successfully because their very separateness will have eliminated confusions that would only have hampered both'. (Freund 1968: 6).

This comment begs some deep questions, though. Is science without moral implication? Can values never play a role in guiding the scientific endeavour? On what grounds is the scientific pursuit of the truth justified? With regard to politics, does knowledge, fact, information have no role to play in decision making? It is hard to see how a distinction so sharply drawn could avoid value-free knowledge degenerating into a pointless accumulation of facts without end, and politics degenerating into random acts of arbitrary will. It makes more sense to envisage a collaboration between the realms of fact and value, science and ethics, which cannot be simultaneously achieved. That is possible only if reason and nature are put back together, the various disciplines ordered accordingly.

The natural law tradition is firmly grounded in Aristotle’s argument that the human being is a politikon zoon, which Aquinas rendered as ‘social and political animal’. For Aristotle, the state is the supreme community of all the other communities, each arranged according to their appropriate ends and purposes. Aquinas’ political order, too, is based on a principle of subsidiarity, creating a whole based on the theme of ascending purposes and competencies.

In contrast, modern political thought and practice continually flounders on the twin reefs of individualism and collectivism. Atomisation at the social level proceeds hand in hand with centralisation at the political level. Individualism engenders totalitarianism in the history of modern political thought and practice. The tradition which connects Aristotle to Aquinas sees individuality and sociality as two sides of the same human coin. In the modern world, these two essential aspects of human being have been rent asunder and pushed to extremes. The individual being is fundamental separated within.

We can see this at work in the social contract tradition. On reflection, there is no paradox at all that the radical individualism of Hobbes, for instance, should issue in the rule of the strong state. Things become more interesting with Rousseau and Marx, both of whom sought to defend and promote individual freedom within an overarching communal framework that recognised the social nature of human beings. Condemned as ‘totalitarian’ thinkers (Talmon 1986; Talmon 1960; Femia 1993; Popper 1966), the problem with Rousseau and Marx is less to do with their alleged collectivism than with their attempt to realise fundamental liberal principles with respect to individual autonomy. A radical individualism engenders collectivism.

The split between individualism and collectivism so misconceives the nature of the human being. Rather than proceed from the conception of politikon zoon and politikon bion to develop the principles and practices of socio-political cohesion, the individualism of the modern world is taken as a given, an absolute and sacrosanct principle. J.G. Merquior accuses Marx of despising bourgeois rights and liberties, claiming that Marx had little positive to say about the individual. (Merquior 1986:56).
On reflection, it seems that Marx can be criticised for radicalising the liberal conception of the individual. His aim was the free society of free individuals, recognising that the one is the condition of the other. Merquior, however, presses his charge, claiming that Marx was not prepared to think of communism as 'a moral supersession of capitalism’, as a 'social individualism' which would lose none of the liberal conquests. Marx’s ethics are a combination of Aristotle and Kant, precisely a social individualism that not just values the principle of free individual but realises it (Kain 1988; Meikle 1985; Forbes 1990). 

Rather than mount a defence of Marx against these charges, I am more interested in the way that Merquior identifies a connection between individualism and collectivism, Merquior claims that Marx’s idea of freedom 'did not help him to see the point of individual rights: its accent fell on freedom conceived of as a power of self-realisation, the self-actualisation of human essence, not as a set of franchises or the pursuit of individual desires within a broad sphere of permissible behaviour'. Merquior claims that Marx didn't share Kant's respect for the person as an end in itself. Marx's free individual is thus 'more of a species being than a singular personality'. For Marx, 'the ultimate legitimation of a social and political order came from the logic of history, not from the will of the people'. As a result, 'Marx's suggestions on rule, freedom and control under communism . . . comprehended much that might be easily used by those who have built tyrannies in his name' (Merquior 1986:36).

Merquior thus contrasts Marx unfavourably with Kant. In truth, if Marx’s free individual does engender collectivism, it is precisely because it too closely resembles individualist notions of the person as an end in himself/herself, too closely resembles assertions of the will, insofar as these proceed outside of a socio-moral matrix. The charges that Merquior directs against Marx could more readily be directed against Kant. The problem, mind, is not philosophical but has its roots in an atomised social context. Marx made the point umpteen times that the commonality that human beings as social beings require is denied in an atomised bourgeois civil society and is therefore projected upwards to the illusory community of the state. (Thomas 1994). The theme is so pervasive in Marx that any number of references could be given. Marx proposes no abstract collectivism at all, criticising the state as an ‘illusory community' and as the ‘illusory communal life’ (Marx 1999:53/4 83/84 87/8), functioning as a surrogate for the absence of the real community in society. Marx’s critique of alien politics – the way that the commonality denied by bourgeois individualism is projected upwards towards the abstract realm of the state – identifies the extent to which individualism and collectivism presuppose each other on the terrain of capitalist modernity. 

It is apparent that radical individualism cannot provide a truly rational solution for the problem of political order. The politics of Rousseau and Kant floundered on this radical individualism, and some critics say the same of Marx too. Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is the closest we can ever come to a solution, short of a full reinstatement of the natural law in politics and ethics. 
With Kant, reason came to be reduced to being an instrument attempting to regulate the disordered passions from the outside. (Critchley 2001: 115-119; Critchley 2007: 153-163)

Radical Individualism and Totalitarianism

E.J. Roesch shows how Rousseau begins with the premise of radical individualism and proceeds to a totalitarian solution to the problem of socio-political order. (Roesch 1963). The extent to which individualism and totalitarianism or collectivism are joined may seem paradoxical but closer analysis reveals the extent to which the one engenders the other. An overly assertive individualism denies the social character of human being in real life and leads it to being invested at a more abstract overarching level. Rousseau thus ends with a totalitarian solution precisely because he begins with a doctrine of radical amoral individualism. Or so Roesch argues. It is the familiar thesis of totalitarian democracy. A defence of Rousseau against these charges is easily mounted. To repeat, these errors of individualism and collectivism lie not in philosophy – not in Hobbes or Rousseau or Hegel or Marx – but in a social reality that has fractured social bonds and ties and thereby sent the needs for commonality, universality and solidarity to abstraction. Rousseau was making a serious attempt to resolve this bifurcation into individual and social, seeking to reconcile the two. (Critchley 2003).

The fundamental problem of political philosophy, for which the social contract provides the solution, is “to find a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate and by means of which each one while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before”.

Rousseau The Social Contract 1973: 176

That remains the problem of political philosophy in the modern world. If Rousseau failed, then he failed less on account of his radical individualism than because his principles of social unity were insufficient to overcome the individualism at the heart of modern society. The problem as Rousseau defined it remains the one with which natural law theorists will have to deal. Accusations of ‘totalitarianism’ are absolutely no help whatsoever, not least because they have been thrown at Plato and Aristotle as well as the usual suspects of Rousseau, Hegel and Marx. It soon becomes clear that those who are the quickest to allege totalitarian intent  and potential are themselves firmly committed to the very individualism that fosters collectivism at the other extreme.

Which is to argue that Roesch’s proper target should be the atomised and amoral modern world around him, not Rousseau.

Coming back to Weber, it is apparent that both knowledge and morality are curiously unanchored, leaving us with a world characterised by the totally 'free' attribution of subjective 'meanings' with no way of deciding between them; they are all equally meaningless. In an intrinsically meaningless universe, meaning can neither be discerned nor conferred, which means that these 'free' human value attributions of meaning lack meaning. 

Meaning is possible if we appreciate that we live in a universe subject to a natural (and divine) order. The meaningless Weberian universe cannot but degenerate into subjectivism. This may be defended in terms of freedom and the assertion of the will, but from Aquinas’ natural law perspective this is a misuse of human reason. We thus see the extent to which Kant’s self-legislating reason falls short in being detached from the natural moral law. Reason is not merely a matter of the will but is ontological in character, being ordered to the truth. The Kantian individual, like the Weberian individual, possesses the same rational human nature as other individuals. Kant knew this, hence his commitment to universality. But he did properly recognise this universality as proceeding in accordance with the rational norms of natural law. The result is that Kant’s universalism collapsed into the fundamental individualism of modern society. 

Science and Ultimate Meaning
Weber is certainly aware of the extent to which his separations undermine both science and morality:





But the problem is more fundamental than Weber realises. Weber’s normative concerns do not amount to a philosophy, but they do introduce values on Weber’s part which contradict his much vaunted methodological individualism and value-neutrality. Weber is drawing upon a philosophical anthropology which derives from a tradition directly opposed to his ‘scientific’ sociology.

Hennis writes of Weber’s concern with ‘Man’ and life-orders, the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation. Yet Weber presented his position in terms of a value-neutrality and pragmatism. There would, therefore, appear to be contrary themes within the structure of Weber’s sociological thought. Certainly, Parson’s presentation of Weber in terms of a value-neutral objectivity in social science is one sided, but it remains one side of Weber. For all of the comparisons of Weber’s rationalisation to Marx’s alienation thesis (Lowith 1993), and for all of the attempts to root Weber in a philosophical concern with Menschentum, it remains difficult to see how these contrary aspects in Weber’s thought can be reconciled. In this respect, it is significant that Weber’s normative concern with human personality is overwhelmingly expressed in a nostalgic frame, highlighting what is in the process of being lost as a result of an inexorable rationalisation. The sense of despair in Weber’s sociology is pervasive. (Stauth and Turner 1988: ch 1).

Aristotle makes a key distinction between human beings as they are and human beings as they could be. Aristotelian philosophy is fundamentally optimistic, emphasising potentials becomes actuals, as well as creative human agency. Aquinas, too, emphasises habitus as the social and moral context in which the dispositions and inclinations are channelled to the good. Weber’s concern with life-orders seems more sociological, observed from the outside in the past tense. There is no commitment to creating the appropriate regimen for human self-realisation in Weber. And even if there was, it could only be a subjective commitment on his part. On his own premises, Weber could not give good reasons to others as to why they should support his commitment.
Hence Weber’s social prognosis is fundamentally depressing and dispiriting. 'Not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now. Where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but the proletarian has lost his rights' (1970: 128).

So what’s the point? There isn’t one in Weber’s meaningless universe. He admits that 'how to measure up to workaday existence' in this disenchanted world is so 'hard for modern man' (Weber 1970: 149). His ‘solution’ is personal, the ethic of responsibility, which he sets out at length in 'Politics as a vocation'. In essence, the ethic of responsibility maintains that 'one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action' (1970: 120). And that, in face of the polar night of icy darkness and hardness, is hopeless.

The Need for a Rational Metaphysics
Etienne Gilson explains why many intellectuals in a liberal culture could come to adopt positions which serve to undermine the rationality of science. He notes that 'for want of a rational metaphysics by which the use of science could be regulated, the liberal philosophers had no other choice than to attack science itself and to weaken its absolute rationality'. Criticising this assault on rationality in science, Gilson comments: 

Losing science will not give us philosophy. But if we lost philosophy itself we must be prepared to lose science, reason and liberty; in short, we are bound to lose Western culture itself together with its feeling for the eminent dignity of man. 

Gilson 1950: 292-293 

The loss of science and scientific rationality, therefore, originates in the loss of a sound philosophical foundation in the first place. The loss of a rational metaphysics leads to Weberian separations and differentiations, confining will, intellect, reason, knowledge in their own spheres, cut off from each other and ultimately coming to suffocate for want of connection and relation to each other. Ethics and politics, the world of practical reason, follows suit. In fine, to sustain intellectual integrity, in sociology as well as science, a solid philosophical foundation is practically necessary. 

[the denial of right reason leads to the instrumentalisation of reason] Midgely
As a result of his normative concerns, Weber retains an understanding of ‘man’, so that his sociological perspective is not wholly erroneous. 

The problem is that the implicit and even the explicit rejection of the natural law entails the loss of that objective foundation to which social life and culture ought to conform, and against which we check behaviour and actions which diverge. Lacking an objective standard of natural morality, it is easy to misunderstand the character and significance of those human actions which are morally bad and wrong. By what standard can we judge, if everything is relative to custom and habit?

The law of reason and the assault of sensuality
Reason transcends the ego, the triumph of the person over the self

Aquinas commented that the wise who follow the law of reason are few whilst those who yield to sensuality are many. He is pointing to the pursuit of inordinate desires (involving the usual suspects, sex, money and power subject to the lex fomitis as a common practice. This tendency to follow sensual immediacy no doubt goes some way to explaining the general mediocrity of a world given to excess. Enough is never enough in such a world, since it recognises no end point, no limit and hence cannot entertain the notion of satisfaction or fulfilment. Drawing parallels between Marx and Aquinas, A.M. Parent observes that both understood how the rich commonly tend to be inordinately concerned with increasing their riches in a kind of constant lex fomitis) (Parent 1956: 149-58). The truly rich man knows when he has enough, the poor man never does.

Value judgements as lacking objective foundation
Value-judgements do not constitute a morality at all, in that they lack an objective foundation. The sociological origin of those values do not and cannot supply a rational basis for morality, since it cannot supply a framework within which individuals make their choices and impose their values. 

As noted elsewhere, Raymond Aron located Weber’s 'philosophy of values' in the Kantian philosophy. (Aron vol II 1967: 206)

Like Kant, Weber abandons rationalist metaphysics, the natural law and also natural theology. Kant was profoundly influenced by the pietist tradition. Weber comments that, 'All pietist theology of the time, above all Spener, knew that God was not to be found along the road by which the Middle Ages had sought Him'. (Weber 1948: 142). That is the view of pietist theology, it doesn’t make that view correct.
The abandonment of natural theology and natural law leaves Kantian and Weberian secular ethics without a foundation. Hegel criticises Kant’s ethics as an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R). Kant's pure motive of duty is thus merely a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake’, offering no content or direction of action (PR para 135R). For Schopenhauer, Kant’s duty for duty’s sake is merely a substitute theology in the absence of a genuine theology. Nietzsche considers Kant's ethics to be merely a disguised Christianity. Nietzsche may be correct, but it is a Christianity shorn of its objective foundations. The result is that both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche take their departure from Kant and show greater courage and honesty in basis their philosophy on the fundamental irrationality of the human will. 

Weber's views on ethics and politics expose a connection between Kant and Machiavelli. Leo Strauss is to be commended in identifying the fact that 'in the decisive respects, Kant too was a Machiavellian'. (Jaffa 1975: 4).

Weber certainly favours Machiavellianism over Kantianism, particularly with respect to the hard realities of politics. But Weber cannot and does not justify this preference philosophically, just pragmatically, in relation to political power. Nevertheless Kantian ethics does find a place as an element within Weber’s overall system. 

Rousseau is attempting to find a solution to the fundamental problem of ethics and politics. Rousseau’s approach would profoundly influence German philosophy and forms the basis of the work of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Marx. (Kelly 1969). The great lesson which Rousseau taught the German philosophers of the next century was that resolution of the problems of moral philosophy is the key to resolving the problems of political philosophy.

Modernity unable to uphold a philosophical morality
Weber follows Kant in rejecting rationalist metaphysics and the natural moral law, thereby implicitly rejecting Aquinas’ doctrine of the natural law. In the absence of a direct critique, however, we may doubt that Kant understood precisely what it was that he was rejecting.

[modernity rejects the common good] Midgely
The rejection of rationalist metaphysics and natural law also entailed the rejection of the common good, whether this was expressed through philosophy or theology. Raymond Aron draws out the implications with respect to Weber’s thought:

political decisions will... always be dictated by a commitment to values which cannot be demonstrated. No-one can decree with assurance to what extent a given individual or group must be sacrificed ... in Weber's mind it is as if the Catholic notion of the common good of the polity were not valid, or in any case could not be rigorously defined.

Aron vol.2 1967: 209

Certainly, Weber is sceptical with respect to the practical difficulties in identifying what is entailed by the common good in particular cases. Weber is aware of the impossibility of deciding between conflicting ethical standpoints. But his fundamental position, independent of his own value-judgement, is that there is something illogical about the notion of the common good as such. 

Weber’s position amounts to this, that whatever values compete for our allegiance, they are gods or devils of our own choice, neither good nor bad or maybe both, no-one really can tell. Weber, that is, rules out an ordered allegiance. That is, notions which could provide a consistent basis for rational human action, such as the common good and the hierarchy of goods, are ruled out by Weber on account of lacking in internal consistency. 

In fine, Weber envisages a range of logically legitimate choices among various value-judgements, yet rejects the common good on grounds pertaining to the logic of the realm of value. Since such logic does not belong to Weber’s conception of an ‘objective’ social science, nor to Weber's own value system, Weber’s rejection of the common good is based on no more than a prejudice. One wonders the extent to which such prejudice colours Weber’s analysis as a whole. Hennis detects an underlying philosophical anthropology with respect to human personality and character. One could be generous and read Weber in the context of Aristotelian philosophy. The problem is that at key points he rules out anything resembling an Hellenic-Thomist Sittlichkeit, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, Marx, the lot. So how is this supposed normative concern of Weber’s expressed? In terms of a cultural pessimism with respect to the future. Yet it is Weber’s sociology above all which elevates the specific institutions and relations and structures of modernity to some kind of permanent and necessary truth. 

In rejecting rationalist metaphysics and the natural law, Weber has rejected the only viable principles upon which a resolution of the problem of politics and ethics in the modern world could have been achieved. And having ruled out the solution, Weber declares the problem of supplying moral and political norms for rational human action to be incapable of solution. At which point he promises us the gloomy future of the polar night of icy darkness and hardness. That pessimism reveals more about Weber’s ‘philosophy’ than our predicament. Weber leads us into a cul-de-sac and then says, in effect, I told you so.

On this point, Kant was right when it came to offering the future ideal as a regulative ideal, something that we can make the object of our willing, an ideal to inspire us and obligate us and get us moving in the right direction. Self-fulfilling prophecies can be both optimistic and pessimistic. 

It is therefore necessary to insist, against Weber, that the only value system which is able to claim perfect internal consistency in being applied to the real world is a system which is grounded ontologically in ultimate truth. This determination of the truth enables the proper ordering of all subordinate goods with respect to an objective moral order which is grounded in human nature, in the relation of human beings to the rest of nature and to God as the Author of nature. This is to ensure that natural and supernatural order enmesh in terms of the determination of the ultimate human end.

The claim that Weber’s sociology contains an implicit philosophy of life, then, has to be sharply qualified. A normative concern with Menschentum is certainly present in Weber. The problem is that it isn’t properly integrated into a philosophy as such. Having rejected the core elements of the ordered realm of human morality, Weber’s system of value is incapable of being truly consistent with human nature. 

The separation of politics and morality – the state as coercion
Weber's rejection of natural law involves a very skewed understanding of Christian ethics, something which impacts on his conception of politics. Losing sight of the good, Weber shares Machiavelli’s view of politics as a technology of power, a technology based upon power rather than morality. In this conception. the ruler must feign morality in his motives but ignore it in the political arena. Where the German philosophers responding to Rousseau would retain the sense of the state as an ethical agency concerned with the universal good, Weber's sociological analysis leads to him repeating Machiavelli’s, Hobbes’ view of the state as based on coercive force. (1948: 77—8). True, Weber cites Trotsky’s definition, which only goes to show the extent to which Bolshevism, far from constituting an alternative to capitalist modernity, brought its tyranny of abstraction to its culmination.

Plenty has been written of Max Weber as an agonistic liberal writing in an increasingly illiberal age. (Bellamy 1992). The only problem with this view is that Weber’s own political writings exhibit a distinctly illiberal concern with the power of the state, the German state in particular. And not the state as the pooled sovereignty of the people, but the state as force, capable of effective action. Weber is largely silent on such things the fine moral and legal distinctions with respect to justice. Weber, it is clear, is primarily concerned not with the concepts of just and unjust force but with force as such, distanced from its moral and legal character and justification. 

The extent to which Weber openly embraced the doctrine of Realpolitik undermines claims that he is a liberal defender of freedom against socialist ‘serfdom’ and marxist totalitarianism. Weber rejects socialism as the dictatorship of the officials, only to make some very strong statements in favour of the strong nation state based on force. Weber’s spells out his political views in his inaugural lecture of 1895, and these remained his fundamental views for the rest of his life. In the lecture, Weber stated that the ultimate goal of scientific sociology is the political education which is directed to the strengthening of the nation state so as to meet 'the difficult struggles of the future'. (Weber 1971: 23-24). Weber, it has to be remembered, was committed to the objectivity of a value-neutral social science. He also ruled out the notion of the ultimate end and common good with respect to morality. Yet he has no trouble in identifying the goal of scientific sociology as service to the strong state. 

It is clear that these 'difficult struggles' anticipated by Weber were envisaged in relation to the strength of the German state in world power politics. This forms the political context of Weber’s sociological analysis of force. Weber’s simplistic conception of the state as force effectively makes the successful use of force its own justification. 

In considering Weber's apparent ignorance of the questions of justice and justification, it has to be significant that Weber’s knowledge of the various schools of natural law seems limited to Protestant and Rationalist writers dating from the Reformation. There is no indication that Weber knew Aquinas’ works in any direct sense. He writes in the most general terms about Christianity’s adoption of natural law, but his image of Christianity is evidently shaped by Protestant sources. 

In his work On Law in Economy and Society, Weber suggests that the lex naturae is 'an essentially Stoic creation which was taken over by Christianity for the purpose of constructing a bridge between its own ethics and the norms of the world'. (Weber 287)

This means that Weber’s attempts to delineate a 'genuine religious ethic'  and an 'ethics of ultimate ends' can be somewhat arbitrary, not reflecting a deep philosophical and theological understanding. Instead, Weber gives us not a coherent philosophy and theology but a pastiche of elements which are mutually incompatible, selected to elaborate a particular point but not forming a consistent whole.

This inconsistency certainly makes sense in light of Weber's view that all ethically orientated conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims' corresponding with the two types of ethics. (1948: 120). Weber thus goes on to claim that 'the ultimately possible attitudes towards life are irreconcilable and hence their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion'. (1948: 152; Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, pp.17—18.) Well, they couldn’t be on Weber’s premises.

Aron expresses Weber’s predicament – and our predicament insofar as we live in an amoral Weberian world - when he states:

'the heterogeneity of ethics ... makes our whole existence "a series of ultimate choices by which the soul chooses its destiny". The multiplicity of gods expresses an ineluctable struggle ... Existence consists in choosing between different gods'.

Aron, German Sociology, p.84.

Although this heterogeneity of ethics requires that 'Each of us must impose our own meaning upon an otherwise meaningless world.' (Dawe 1971: 42), Weber evidently feels the need to resolve his antinomies. For instance, writing of the uses of scientific sociology, Weber emphasises its value in helping a man 'to give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct'. (1948: 152).

The problem is not only that Weber cannot achieve the adequate moral synthesis he seeks between two incompatible ethics, but that his ethics does not and cannot constitute a moral theory at all. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that, for all of the attempts to excavate the underlying philosophy buried within claims to objective scientific sociology, ultimately, we can find no coherent doctrine which expounds what it is to be authentically human in any philosophically adequate sense. Even worse, Weber’s systematically developed arguments advance a view which denies that the authentically human being could ever exist.


This is to argue that Weberian morality and modernity has grave ontological implications with respect to human authenticity and fulfilment. For, if 'human nature' is irrevocably subject to the incompatible commands which Weber imposes arbitrarily, then there could be no such thing as a real and authentic human being. This absurd conclusion is the logical culmination of the rejection of ontological nature in the first place. This arbitrariness is the only way that that rejection could end. The problem can be resolved by citing Aquinas’ observation that it is impossible for a man to have fundamental inherent natural inclinations towards logically incompatible ends; an individual cannot naturally desire evil as such and cannot naturally desire to be another kind of being. (Summa theologiae, I, q.76, art. l and I,q.63, art.3; Quaest. Disp. De Anima, Art.XI; Summa contra Gentiles,II, c.58(5). Not even an Omnipotent being, God Himself, could create a being embodying such contradictions. (Summa theologiae, I, q.25, art.3). At this point, we see how Weber's departure from the true philosophy of man so as to entertain some fantastical, impossible being is under the shadow of the Nietzschean superman, a being who not only claims the prerogatives of God but purports to be able to accomplish those things which not even God has done, because they cannot be done! Of course, it doesn’t make sense. That’s the critical point.

Protestantism, liberalism, secularism and nihilism
An acute awareness of the contradictions within the modern nihilistic world is creating a sympathetic audience for Aristotle’s teleological philosophy but also for the Thomist alternative to a world shorn of ultimate ends.

[inhumanity of religious individualism] Midgely
It should be stated clearly that Weber's critical comments directed against the Protestant ethic have no implications with respect to Catholicism. In The Failure of Individualism, R.S. Devane, cites approvingly Weber’s argument in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism which exposes the sheer inhumanity of that Protestant individualism which inflicts an unbearable feeling of inner loneliness upon the isolated individual. (Devane 1948: 32-33).

The old phrase that all roads lead to Rome doesn’t apply when the only version of Christianity on view is Protestantism. Weber’s presentation of the religious ethic leads not to Rome but to Nietzschean nihilism and atheism. At best. To describe Weber as a Protestant atheist is to draw attention to how the individualist Protestant ethic proceeds inexorably to liberalism and secularism.
And that individualism also leads to political centralisation and authoritarianism. Protestants, as a matter of historical fact, have come to accept the leadership and even the dominance of the secular power of the State over theology. The head of the State in the UK is the head of the Church of England. Similar state involvement can be found in Germany. And with none of the intricate and prolonged debates concerning the two swords as could be found in Catholic history. This acceptance of the involvement of the state power in religious matters no doubt explains the ease with which Weber could advance a supposed 'heterogeneity of values', so long as German national power was served.

The source of the difficulty lies in the loss of natural reason, with the result that the Protestant reformers failed to uphold the harmony between faith and reason that Aquinas had established. We have been searching for that harmony ever since, and not even the combined efforts of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx have proved successful in setting modernity on the true path. 

Aquinas’ supernatural faith is above reason but in harmony with it, not against it. The accusation that Aquinas sacrificed reason to faith is just plain wrong and betrays a complete ignorance of Aquinas’ position. That ignorance has serious consequences in that it denies us the solution to the moral impasse in which modernity is submerged. The rejection of supernatural faith as envisaged by Aquinas invites false solutions in the form of an 'ultra-supernatural' faith which really is contrary to reason or secularised faith which inflates reason into performing as a substitute religion. The militant atheism and humanism that currently stalks the modern world is not an alternative to the religion it despises at all, it simply transposes the features it feigns to dislike about religion into its own terms. It is a secularised faith. To repeat, the solution lies in the harmony between reason and faith that Aquinas established. Once reason and faith are torn asunder, the debate flies to extremes and people become trapped in narratives of their own making. In the example of Max Weber, we see faith secularised and presented as an arbitrary choice based upon the assertion of the will over the intellect. 'We are free to believe a prophet or not to believe him' (Jaspers 1965: 253). That inverts the proper relation between intellect and will as established by Aquinas.

Weber’s ethic is clearly influenced by the Protestant view of the centrality of private judgement in divine revelation. The problem is that this view contradicts the key idea of public divine revelation. St Gregory the Great compared Sacred Scripture to a river that is so deep that the elephant may float and so shallow that the lamb may find its feet. The Protestant appeal to the 'clarity' of Scripture takes insufficient notice of the combination of simplicity and profundity in the text. Recognition that the true meaning of the Scripture is not immediately available forced Protestantism back to 'private judgement' with respect to divine revelation. The position is wholly untenable in that there is a clear contradiction between a public divine revelation and a private judgement with respect to its meaning. The result is impeccably Weberian, an endless multiplication of mutually incompatible private judgements, no one of which can claim priority over others given the absence of objective criteria, no overarching morality just a multiplicity of competing values out of which the individual may pick and choose according to whim. What is missing here is the objective revelation promulgated by God to which the individual submits accordingly.

Protestantism as pure rationalism – the individual as god
Long before Max Weber, Taparelli d'Azeglio had seen how a Weberian world was in the process of emergence as a consequence of the subversive effects of the principle of private judgement. For him, the central principle established by the Protestant Reformation was the principle of pure rationalism. (d’Azeglio 1857).

A good thing too, some might say. It depends on whether one things reason is sufficient to cover the whole nature of human experience. The French Revolutionaries set up Reason as the new God, with predictable consequences.

Jacques Maritain (and J.A. Moehler) observe that, in locating the criterion of doctrine in himself, Luther was putting himself in the place of God. (Maritain 1928: 15).

In truth, Luther’s subjectivism is the most salient characteristic of Protestantism. The Protestant principle of private judgement played the crucial role of psychic preparation bringing about what Charles Taylor calls a ‘secular age’. The idea of private judgement fits perfectly the modern idea that morality is no more than a value judgment. Protestant subjectivism thus prepared the ground in which morality came to be regarded as no more than a matter of private choice, with individuals being allowed to believe and do what they like, so long as it harmed no-one. Such a morality is policed by the law, not by principle. Rightness or wrongness depends merely upon the particular individuals concerned. The social aspect of morality is completely lost. In the public realm there is law as a neutral regulatory force, not morality.

Leo Strauss rightly traces Weber's scepticism to his view that, whilst it is necessary to choose between human reason and divine revelation when it comes to discerning the guiding principles of our lives, the real grounds by which we could justify choosing one over the other do not exist. (Strauss 1953: 74—6).

Troeltsch praises Thomism with this paradoxical formulae: 'So far as one can see, Thomism will invariably conquer until it dies in the act of victory'. (Troeltsch 1931: 280).

By this, Troeltsch seems to mean that the Catholic ideal of the harmony of reason and revelation or faith is unattainable, yet remains the standard by which philosophy and theology is to be checked and evaluated. In this way, harmony functions as a kind of Kantian regulative ideal. The Catholic ideal of the harmony of reason and revelation thus functions as a spur to elevate judgement beyond the realm of mere particular or private beliefs.

Weber and Modernism
For all of Weber's importance as a – and maybe the – thinker of rationalist modernity, it is worth noting that he did not have – or did  not display in his writings - a substantial understanding of Catholic thought in general and displayed little knowledge of Aquinas’ thought in particular. There are general references, made in passing, but no sustained analysis. Weber may have established his thesis that the Protestant ethic is connected with the spirit of capitalism, but Protestantism isn’t Christianity. The Protestant road leads to subjectivism, liberalism, atheism, not to Rome. In travelling that road, we have moved further and further away from the common good and from the idea that justice is a social virtue.

Natural Law as a Work of Reason




One can hardly engage in a serious study of mediaeval Christianity without discovering among its "values" the belief in a rational science of human and social order and especially of natural law. 

Voegelin rightly points out that 'this science was not simply a belief, but it was actually elaborated as a work of reason'. For all of his weighty scholarship and voluminous writing, at no point to the best of my knowledge does Weber properly evaluate the claims of this rational science. The same applies to other modernist philosophers. It seems that they swallowed the modernist prejudice that the pre-modern age was an age of ignorance and superstition. Modern scholarship is now making it clear that the advances of the Renaissance and the scientific and industrial revolutions were prepared and prefigures in the Middle Ages. And not least in this achievement is the rational science connected with natural law and metaphysics.

Voegelin comments that 'In order to degrade the politics of Plato, Aristotle or St Thomas to the rank of "values" among others, a conscientious scholar would have to show that their claim to be a science was unfounded'. Weber makes no attempt to give such a demonstration. In line with other modernist thinkers, from Kant to Nietzsche, there is a refusal to engage with realist philosophy as philosophy. There may be sociological and historical references, but there is little by way of sustained philosophical critique. So much so that it is impossible to mount a point by point rebuttal of charges raised against Aquinas. Those specific charges are not mounted in the first place.

Polytheism as a secularised ideology of mutual incompatible gods
Individualism brings about collectivism in politics and conformism in society. 
Hennis attempts to locate Weber in an older philosophical tradition concerned with the appropriate regimen for human fulfilment. This view would seem to identify Weber, on account of his normative concern with human authenticity, with a tradition that embraces Aristotle and Aquinas. Instead, it is the figure of Nietzsche which looms largest in Weber’s writing.

Aron notes the descriptions of Weber as ‘a new Machiavelli’, going on to point out that Marx and Nietzsche were the ‘two major’ influences on Weber, forming the basis of the view that Weber was the 'Marx of the bourgeoisie', being ‘far more Nietzschean than democratic.’ (Aron 1967; also Hennis 1988: ch 1). 

In February 1920, a few weeks before his death, returning home from a discussion with Oswald Spengler, Weber, as reported by Eduard Baumgarten, made these remarks to his students: 

The honesty of a present-day scholar, and above all a present-day philosopher, can be measured by his attitude to Nietzsche and Marx. Whoever does not admit that considerable parts of his own work could not have been carried out in the absence of the work of these two, only fools himself and others. The world in which we spiritually and intellectually live today is a world substantially shaped by Marx and Nietzsche.

Quoted in Hennis 1988: ch 4; Baumgarten 1964: 554-5

Weber accepted completely Nietzsche's diagnosis of modern times: God is dead. For Weber, it is a 'basic fact' that we are fated to live in a 'godless time, without prophets'. What he means by this, and what Nietzsche meant, is that the objective order of values deriving from the Judaeo-Christian conception of God has broken down, leaving us on our own when it comes to determining the values by which we live. 

It is the fate of our epoch to have eaten of the tree of knowledge and thereby to have entered the disenchanted world. In "Objectivity" in social science and social policy', Weber identified the ultimate achievement of scientific reflection as being

to make conscious the ultimate yardsticks manifest in the concrete value judgement, thereby rendering these standards accessible to a process of discussion and argument which is clear about its own premisses. Scientific self-reflection, which transcends the naive positivity of specialised science, does not indicate what 'should' be done; but it does show what can consistently be done with available means to attain a pre-given purpose. Above all, such self-reflection enables us to know what we really want. The here presupposed 'objective' invalidity of our ultimate value standards and the absence of obligatory general 'norms' does not inhere in the general nature of science as such; rather, this lack stems from the characteristics of that particular cultural epoch which is fated to have eaten from 'the tree of knowledge', to have recognised that we 'must ourselves be able to create' the 'meaning' of history. 'Only an optimistic syncretism . . . can deceive itself theoretically as to the tremendous seriousness of this circumstance or evade its consequences in practice.

Weber in Shils and Finch 1949: 57

Which means that whilst science advances, and we may come to be able to quantify and calculate everything in the world, we do not gain one iota of a dependable meaningful orientation to the world. We are on our own. All the meaning in the world now has to come from ourselves. That’s Kant’s view, hence his emphasis on the self-legislation of practical reason. But is it tenable? Is it viable? Is it true? Throughout the Protestant Ethic, Weber returns to the extreme isolation to which modernity consigns the individual. Indeed, in which modernity confines the individual, an iron cage that is as much a psychic as a physical prison in that it embraces our very subjectivities. If everything now does indeed come from us, we have become our own jailors, not our liberators. If God is dead, Nietzsche challenged us to become as gods. How, on earth, can that old delusion be expected to work in modern conditions of atomism and isolation, when it has failed so many times in the past?

Weber is certainly Nietzschean to the extent that he rejects the search for an objective overarching moral framework, and the life free from contradictions which comes with it, embraces the life of contradictions in the Nietzsche’s joyful and gay sense. Except there is nothing joyful and gay about Weber’s diagnosis of our condition and prognosis for the future. 

Marx at least saw alienation as a revocable process, human beings reclaiming their alienated powers and reorganising them as social powers. Weber, for all of his pessimism, seems to acquiesce in the veneration of these alienated powers as new gods. Like Machiavelli and Nietzsche, Weber regards pagan polytheism as more serviceable in the cause of state power and effective power politics than the monotheism of traditional religion. But Weber also makes reference to a new polytheism constituted by the vast impersonal forces of capitalist modernity, the new idols of state, bureaucracy, money, capital, commodities etc, all of which are the secularised equivalents and theological surrogates for the old Christian ethics. The impossibility of embracing a multitude of incompatible 'gods' is of no consequence if we just learn to acquiesce in a life of contradictory subject to contrary pulls, with no need to differentiate between good and bad. 

The heterogeneity of ethics which Weber opposes to traditional morality is no mere celebration of pagan polytheism. Asserting that 'different gods struggle with one another, now and for all time to come', Weber proceeds to argue that 'every religious prophecy has dethroned polytheism in favour of the "one thing that is needful"'. (1948: 147-149).

Weber conceives monotheism primarily in terms of his ideal type of the 'ethic of ultimate ends' rather than in the Thomist terms of an ordered hierarchy of goods which leads to — and is consistent with — the highest good. The fact that Weber tends to describe this hierarchy as a 'compromise' indicates that he doesn’t actually understand what it means in Aquinas’ argument. In this respect, Weber’s new polytheism of impersonal forces is a far more serious contradiction of the truth about the divine unity than is pagan polytheism, old and new. Such pagans recognise the one ultimate reality, with other deities derived from that one reality. Aquinas himself acknowledged that there were pagans who affirmed the existence of the one supreme god, which caused the existence of the other gods. Aquinas drew the conclusion the Manichees were more opposed to the truth concerning the divine unity than the pagans in that they asserted two first principles, neither of which is the cause of the other. (Summa contra Gentiles, book I, chap. 42.) Weber’s error is not simply his polytheism, it is his irreducible polytheism associated with the fundamental heterogeneity of first principles or values. 

Private Conscience and Moral Knowledge
Conscience lacks objective moral, philosophical or theological knowledge
The Protestant doctrine of private conscience eases seamlessly into the liberal doctrine of the right of the individual to do and think anything s/he likes, so long as it harms no-one. It is against this background that Weber’s denial of the possibility of objective moral, philosophical or theological knowledge. Weber thus denies that the expressions 'the proper formation of conscience' and 'the true dignity of the human person' have any meaning which is objectively valid. Whilst Weber’s view is consonant with the conception of the individual that prevails within liberal modernity, it follows that the nature of the dignity of the human person, and what is required by way of a habitus or regimen for its flourishing, is inherently indeterminable on this Weberian account. The attempt to read Weber in the context of a philosophical anthropology concerned with human fulfilment therefore fails at the point where it matters most – what is to be done to create the conditions of human flourishing. Weber lacks this awareness of human potential becoming actual.

It is interesting to note that although Weber ruled out ultimate ends, the common good and any ethic based upon an objective moral framework, holding the heterogeneity of values, his strong nationalism implied some form of such an ethic. Weber's support for the struggle of the German state against Catholicism could have no justification in Weber's own theory of values. Weber’s attitude can be described as an inordinate nationalism comprising elements of a rationalised and secularised Protestantism and a Machiavellian awareness of power. (Mayer 1956: 26, 117).


The Ontological Instability of Modernity
The separation of reason and revelation, natural order and supernatural order 
Weber's refusal to address the crucial questions of the traditional metaphysics derives from his assumption that reason and faith or revelation are necessarily antithetical. Where Aquinas held reason and faith in balance, Weber expressed the common modern prejudice that identifies anything which is above reason with the irrational. This mode of thinking splits the totality of human experience in the crudest of senses, and fits the simplistic division, deriving from Enlightenment materialism, that distinguishes between reason and knowledge on the one hand and ignorance and superstition on the other. Since some things are not accessible by reason and appropriate for wholly rational treatment, there is a category of arational or non-rational in addition to the rational and the irrational (Stenmark 2004).

It is worth spending some time exposing modernity’s self-identity as an ideological claim to individual freedom that is contradicted in practice. It is interesting to note how, in denying supernatural ends, modernity evinces a tendency to inflate its naturalist claims to fantastic proportions. Elaborating this point entails comparing and contrasting the Thomist teaching on the relation between the natural order and the supernatural order and Nietzschean aspirations of the free individual as the superman.

Nietzsche’s conception of the superman is, on reflection, modernity’s image of the free individual taken to its logical conclusion. Over-impressed by the extent to which human technical power has re-made the world, it is a short step to believing that human nature itself can undergo such a self-transformation. Certainly, Aristotle argued in favour of the realisation of potentiality so that human beings as they become human beings as they could be. But Aristotle’s view was based upon an essentialist conception of human beings as being something essentially and essentially something. In other words, human self-transformation is the progressive unfolding of the human essence. Modern notions of self-transformation, in contrast, lack this stable basis in the human essence, holding that human nature is ontologically unstable, variable, contingent, something that is created and re-created by human endeavour. Indeed, something that can be transposed into another nature entirely, the nature of the superman. One can easily explain Nietzsche’s command ‘become what you are’ into an Aristotelian demand for the realisation of the human essence, human beings becoming what is given in their potential to be, the final form being what human beings are. Read as ‘become what you want to be’, however, and the command veers into the realm of fantasy. It is in this sense that the Nietzschean superman can be said to rest upon ontological instability.

Further, this ongoing ontological transformation implies the denial, displacement and even the destruction of original human nature, certainly in the sense of human nature as a given essence containing the potential for growth and development of a particular kind. Indeed, to the extent that reason and culture are considered the main drivers of history, with nature falling further and further into the background, it becomes possible to think of human nature as possessing no ontologically determinate nature at all. All that there is is the endless transformation of persons, with human nature having no content outside of the historical. The process is endless because it lacks a sense of human beings as essentially something and something essential, with potentials becomes actuals of some determinate sort. Instead, all there is, is a continuous transformation that lacks a determinate end point, human fulfilment. The process is endless because no condition can be said to contain human nature as such. The concept of human nature as distinguishable in the various states of the unfolding of the human essence becomes meaningless and is therefore abandoned. 

Both the Aristotelian and Thomist viewpoints envisage many potential and actual conditions in the expression of human nature in history, they deny that human nature as such can be extinguished or overridden in some process of self-transformation. Any human endeavour can only proceed in accordance with human nature in some form. (Midgley 1975).

Thus, when Aquinas identifies natural tendencies in human beings which are shared with the lower beings alongside a natural tendency towards God, (Summa theologiae, la Ilae, q.94, art.2.), this does not mean that human beings are inherently contradictory beings, the natural inclinations dividing between lower and higher natures, between the natural and the rational aspects of human beings. Rather, natural functions which are not rational acts, in that they are not subject to the control of reason, are not involved in any internal conflict with human reason. Likewise from the other direction, the supernatural gifts which God imprints into the human mind do not entail the complete alteration of the natural being of human beings into another grade of being entirely. In the Thomist conception, nature and culture/reason work together, with all historical development being the development of something, some substance or essence, not a creation ex nihilo. Regardless of whether or not human beings achieve the final end of beatitude, human nature will remain and cannot be destroyed. A culture and reason indulging superhuman fantasies through abstraction from nature may engage in destructive ontological transformations, with any number of damaging consequences, but the complete transformation of human nature is simply impossible. (Midgley 1975: 33).

It is interesting to note that Weber characterised modernity in terms of a ‘convulsive self-importance’. That should make it clear that the Nietzschean superman is quite distinct from the common mediocrity of modern society, or at least Nietzsche and Weber thought so. But there is a clear sense in which the superman is not aimed against modernity at all, but is in fact modernity’s own self-image. Modernist fantasies with respect to the superman are revealed when one understands the extent to which they depart from the Thomist teaching on the eternal law as the ultimate standard and source of every valid law, the natural law, the positive and human law. (Midgley 1975: 459 n., 100, 479-480 nn.42 and 43)

This abandonment entails the loss of the Thomist doctrine of the relation of the natural and the supernatural, splitting up what Aquinas had joined together in a seamless web working towards the ultimate end. 
As a result of the split between nature and reason/culture, the tendency has grown to confuse human nature as such with any of the various social and historical states through which human nature has been expressed, thus misidentifying the natural law. (Midgley 1975: 80-2 and 143-6). 

Such views express the complete inability to understand the 'openness' of the natural law to completion by divine law, and the fruitfulness of the natural law in spurring human beings to establish positive laws in accord with natural law, leading to the ultimate end. (Fuchs 1965.)

The divine treasure is borne in earthly vessels, and it may be worth commenting on the Church. The Church is an earthly institutions and like all earthly things is prone to human failings. There is a need for caution here, keeping in mind that 'the union between the human and the divine is a subtle one; so delicate that if we push ahead without critique without due caution, we very often run the grave risk of behaving like the son who insults his mother'. (Lubac 1966: 67-9.)

Rationalism, voluntarism and empiricism

The teaching on the ultimate source of every kind of valid law and the proper relation of natural law, positive law and eternal law has been undermined progressively by a wave of successive onslaughts - Protestantism, rationalism, empiricism, voluntarism, secularism and scientific materialism. The English philosopher John Locke wrote at the beginning of this process which led to the general rejection of the natural law and the eternal law, issuing eventually in modern secularism and atheism. Indeed, Locke's simplified, rationalistic 'Christianity' reveals clearly the extent to which all Protestant roads lead not just to atheism but to a the secularised pseudo-mysticism in which theological presuppositions, detached from God, come to be re-attached to modernity’s new idols, hence Weber’s polytheism of uncontrollable impersonal forces. (Devane 1948: 113-120).

Despite attempts to claim Locke as a great proponent of liberal freedom of the individual as against collectivist doctrines of the state (Thomas 1991), Locke himself does not spring the trap in which individualism entails collectivism. Whereas the likes of Rousseau and Hegel and Marx have been condemned as statists in their attempts to overcome the diremption of modern bourgeois society, Locke’s ‘collectivism’ is more insidious, his free individual being governed by supra-individual collective forces as an external constraint. It is in this sense that modernist principles of individualism and collectivism are to be found joined together in Locke's work.

(And this leaves aside the supposedly liberal and tolerant Locke’s manifest absolutism at the level of the state, particularly his insistence that Catholics be excluded from citizenship. Craig Thomas expatiates at length on the supposedly totalitarian aspects of the doctrines of Rousseau and Hegel, the continental tradition in political philosophy, lauding John Locke’s liberalism to the heights. Marx openly called for universal suffrage, for votes for all men and women, long before the Suffragette movement, and yet is denounced as being anti-democratic. Locke argues in favour of the exclusion of Catholics, and Thomas praises him as the custodian of liberty. Curious.)

The connection between individualism and collectivism not only defines the modern world but constitutes the essential question of modern political philosophy. It seems that, whether in the liberal forms of Hobbes and Locke, or the continental forms of Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, there seems to be no purely rational means of achieving harmony between the individual and society so long as the fundamentally alienative social relations of capitalist modernity remain in place. That is the key condition which is always missed in denunciations of Marx as a totalitarian. There is no solution to the problems of modern diremption on modernity’s own terrain. Hence the failure of purely rational solutions, rational in modernity’s own Enlightenment sense and instrumental sense of technical power.

In these conditions it becomes understandable that reason comes to be expressed in the arbitrary will to power of the modern state. Beginning with the view that the state is the product of reason, we end with what Norberto Bobbio calls the 'statization' of reasons (Bobbio in Keane ed 1988:73). It is the distance we have travelled from Aristotle and Aquinas to Machiavelli, from reason as a gift implanted in the human mind for purposes of human good to rationality as a technology for the aggrandisement of state power. In this context, the social contract exists as a rationalisation of collectivism in politics and individualism.

The modernist tradition originates in Machiavelli and leads inexorably to Nietzsche and Weber. The work of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx read in retrospect like failed attempts to divert modernity away from its destructive tendencies, by identifying the high road within modernity’s own lines of development, a road leading to the summum bonum. How else would one describe Rousseau’s Social Contract, Kant’s realm of ends, Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, and Marx’s communism? The question is this, is modernity’s potential for the human good redeemable? Hegel and Marx say yes, Weber says no, Nietzsche tried to change the question entirely, and paid the price for his evasion and flight.

In contrast to Rousseau, Hegel and Marx, Weber did not attempt invest the state or the political community with a universal significance. He didn’t think such universalism possible in modern conditions. So Weber didn’t engage in any false 'rationalisation' of the state by any appeal to a social contract theory. Weber simply and crudely identified the state with coercive force and power. The state is not an ethical agency concerned with the common good and Weber did not pretend that it was. Neither did he attempt to pose the state as an ethical agency as an alternative to his conception of the power state. And this, in the end, means that Weber engages in that Machiavellian 'statization' of reasons which Bobbio wrote about. And that is itself a rationalisation of the state power. It comes as no surprise, then, to see the extent to which the arbitrary value-choice of the individual and the arbitrary will to power of the nation State go hand in hand in Weber. Mommsen encapsulates Weber's outlook in this paradoxical formula: 'The utmost possible freedom through the utmost possible dominance'. (Mommsen 1965: 41).

The statization of reason and the rationalisation of the state is a denial of the Aristotelian sense of politikon bion, the public life which expresses human sociality and establishes the conditions of human flourishing.

Weber is committed to the task of ensuring the strength of the German state in the midst of unprecedented historical change. The problem, however, is not merely that this concern with state power departs from the concern of Aristotelian public life with the person, it is that Weber conflates the primacy of the will with the power of the nation State so that politics loses the connection with creative human fulfilment that it had in its original definition. The concern is now with state power and not the human good. Such a conception fails to respect the essential sociality of human beings, and abstracts politics from the natural socio-political inclination inherent in human beings. 
Further, Weber's power politics denies the common good in the political community at home, denigrating the legitimate role played by intermediary bodies and groups within the state, whenever these conflict with the overriding objective of state power. Weber also denies the common good abroad in the international political society. (we can take it as read that Weber denies the idea of the universal Church). We are left not with Weber the agonised liberal in an increasingly illiberal age, but with Weber as the proponent of an inordinate but nevertheless insistent nationalism. 

One sees again how the principle of individualism engenders and buttresses the totalitarian principle in politics. Not that Weber manages to integrate the two norms in any coherent sense. Whenever individualism and nationalism clash, Weber opts in practice for nationalistic norm. The individualistic norm tends to be expressed as a cultural pessimism, a nostalgic lament for the autonomy and spontaneity and creativity that has been lost and can never come again. In the main, however, Weber merely alternates between the two. As J.P. Mayer argues, Weber sought to combine Realpolitik and moral individualism in such a way that 'both phenomena have been falsified'. (Mayer 1956: 28).

From an Aristotelian and Thomist perspective, there is nothing to be gained from the reconciliation of Realpolitik and moral individualism. Individualism and totalitarian collectivism are two sides of the same coin and bifurcate the social being of individuals within, sending human beings to extremes in the process. Individualism and collectivism are not only incompatible with each other, most of all they are incompatible with the common good and the highest good. 

The Dissolution of Liberal Society and Liberal Ideology
In Corporate Society: Class, Property and Contemporary Capitalism, political economist John McDermott (1991) argues that liberal principles and values are becoming increasingly unsustainable as we move to the post-liberal society. We are moving into an age characterised by the corporate form, a form which is eclipsing the social roots of liberalism in private property. McDermott writes of the ‘erasure’ of liberal society. 

It is becoming increasingly clear that liberalism is not only unable to realise its basic principles by bringing about the liberal society, but is proving incapable of upholding established human rights and liberties against corporate capitalist pressures. Lindley argues that when liberal principles clash with liberal institutions, particularly private property, liberals are forced to choose one over the other. The two no longer go together as they once did To defend and realise the core liberal value of autonomy requires that liberals confront capitalism as an autonomy impairing and denying order (Lindley 1986:165/6; Forbes 1990:137). There was a brief spell of social liberalism which sought to assert the primacy of the political over the economic. Predictably, it floundered on the twin reefs of individualism and collectivism, coming to extend the claims of the state over civil society.

Liberalism is also proving incapable of defending crucial human rights against the rising tide of materialistic attitudes. It is difficult to know which is the greater threat to notions of the common good, atheism or consumerism. Either way, there is a pervasive secularism which is winnowing away the ties with which human beings make common cause. This kind of impersonal collective restraint exercised through impersonal forces embodies a more subtle, more pervasive totalitarian principle than that embodied in the state. 

The only secure foundation for the defence and promotion of fundamental human rights is objective natural law. (Midgley 1976: 144-155).

Liberalism is not fit for this purpose. The impressive efforts of Raz and Galston are attempts to supply liberalism with a solid universal foundation. Such a solution would always be vulnerable to be eroded by its own individualist premises. Why not simply go direct to the natural law? Natural law supplies the missing element in liberalism.

Karl Lowith draws a parallel between Marx’s alienation thesis and Weber’s rationalisation thesis. Lowith argues that was at issue in both cases was a 'totality.' ‘For Weber this was the rescuing of an ultimate human 'dignity'; for Marx it was the cause of the proletariat. For both it was therefore something akin to human emancipation.’ (Lowith 1993: Intro).

Weber finds himself agreeing with Marx that modern humanity is in some way alienated. Indeed, to Marx’s separation of the worker from the means of production, Weber added a series of further separations to postulate a general separation. For Weber, this separation characterises modern social organisation as such and extends across all areas of social life.





Weber is in fundamental agreement with Marx, arguing that the formal freedom of labour in the market has resulted in a factory discipline, managerial surveillance and social regulation that denied human dignity and creativity. For Weber, however, this expropriation went beyond simple economic expropriation but embraced all aspects of life, extending discipline, surveillance and calculation over the whole of social life (Turner 1993:201/2).





Weber’s rationalisation thesis therefore entails a general alienation. The separation of the material means of human action from the human agents using these means constitutes the generic foundation for the institutional rationalisation and differentiation which defines modernity for Weber. It is precisely this generalisation which leads Weber to assert that bureaucratisation is an irreversible process that is destined to embrace most areas of social life. Weber describes bureaucracy as discipline's 'most rational offspring' (1968:29).
(Critchley 1997).

Marx and Weber are therefore aware of the struggle for humanity within alienated modern conditions. But the similarities between Marx and Weber end when it comes to diagnosis and prognosis. Weber’s rationalisation is a general, all-pervasive process rooted in the nature of reason as such. Marx locates the problem in specific social relations which give us an alienated system of production.

Weber’s Protestant Ethic contains a vague awareness that the source of the difficulty is the denial of rationalist metaphysics and natural moral law. The extreme inhumane isolation of the individual that Weber describes at the conclusion of the book emerges as a consequence of the rejection of God and religious values. Not that Weber argues for their recovery. Quite the contrary, Weber thinks that the traditional morality is beyond recall. Since Weber cannot supply a definite diagnosis of the alienation of modern humanity, we should not be surprised that he cannot offer anything by way of an optimistic prognosis concerning redemption. 

Marx understands that atheism, to succeed, has to take a positive form rather than a negative form. It is easy to reject God and deny the divine order of the world. The difficult part is taking the place of God and living up to one’s creative powers in a self-made social world. Marx affirmed this possibility. It amounts to the claim that human beings can impose human form upon the world. The notion of men as gods is quite different from the idea of cooperation between God and human agency in bringing about the good. Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks writes of a ‘great partnership’ here between God and human beings. (Sacks 2011). 

Marx is not writing of a partnership. He is writing of human beings going it alone. Marx is not an atheist in a crude, negative sense. He knows that such atheism is cheap. Marx’s case is nothing so obvious as religion amounts to ignorance and superstition. On the contrary, Marx argues that religion expresses a real human yearning and need in abstract, fantastical form. Marx is criticising not the illusion as such, but the alienated social conditions which require illusion.

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975

Real human happiness, then, requires social transformation so that human beings no longer have need of recourse to illusions in order to nourish their heart and soul. This is a positive statement of the possibility of the human good. But the implications are profound. A social transformation of this kind implies the abolition of religion. This would be abolition in the sense of positive transcendence, so that religion is abolished as it comes to realise its ideals. That, surely, is what every religion aims at? Maybe, but only as natural ends pass over in the supernatural end. With Marx, this self-abolition of religion implies something different: it implies that human beings become the centres of their own Earthly Heaven.

The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself. 

Marx EW CHPR:I 1975

What is remarkable about Marx’s argument is the extent to which it is a variant of Aristotle and Aquinas. That is, it seeks to realise the transcendental end within naturalist terms. Marx proceeds from the notion of the human essence, examining how this essence unfolds progressively in history. Human beings are historical beings developing their essence in successive social relations. Marx thus examines the unfolding of the human essence, overcoming the contradictions inherent in various social relations until, finally, socialised humanity is attained. (Critchley 2013).





Scott Meikle argues that ‘with Marx, human self-understanding reached a point of attainment yet to be surpassed.’ (Meikle 1985: 11-12). For Meikle, this is praiseworthy, akin to the ancient wisdom which emphasised self-knowledge. Others suggest that this ambition identifies Marxism as a Judaeo-Christian heresy, a modern day atheistic gnosticism which claims to deliver human beings from alienation through the unfolding of human knowledge in a historical process effected by purely human means. 

A Neutral Ethics is Not Practicable
Dorothy Emmet comments pertinently that 'a completely neutral and morally aseptic meta-ethics is not practicable'. (Emmet 1966: 84).

This means that there is no fundamental distinction to be drawn between Weber's particular value-judgements and his general value-judgement concerning the scope and status of logically possible values. Both these value-judgements lack foundation, being the products of ideology , not philosophy.

Weber's rationalistic 'disenchantment' of the world
Weber is not a philosopher but a profound social theorist who, though despairing of philosophy, nevertheless embarked on a moral endeavour which, at fundamental points, required a philosophy of ‘Man’ and life for its completion. Identifying Weber’s normative concerns, one can claim that there is an underlying philosophical anthropology at work in Weber. But one should not make the mistake of taking these scattered themes to constitute a philosophy. They do not. Instead, denying philosophy but requiring a philosophy to make good his normative claims, Weber has recourse to an ideological surrogate which takes the place of philosophy.

Weber denies the possibility of holding any objective philosophy or morality. And Weber saw clearly that the denial that God or the gods exist entails the removal of the foundation for human values. It is at this point that Weber draws specific conclusions concerning the extent to which 'rationalisation' involves the 'disenchantment' and 'de-divinisation' of the world. Weber’s denial of the notion of religious truth involves not just the denial of the existence of God or the gods, but, most importantly of all, the logical conclusion that there are no true or valid human values. Weber thus concludes that there are no such things as objective human values.
The process of 'rationalisation' is therefore a de-divination or dis-godding that leads to atheism and emerges as nihilism. Which begs the question as to just how Weber can affirm his values of autonomy, creativity and spontaneity. The answer is that he doesn’t. Whenever Weber expresses these values, it is always in a context of their loss. There is no foundation for these values in Weber’s thought. Like Nietzsche, Weber is reduced to 'choosing' or 'imposing' human 'values' in a personal sense, something which goes nowhere near to filling the void that the collapse of objective foundations has opened up. Where once there was an objective moral framework, Weber can do no more than to choose his values in a subjective sense, as though they could possess validity, he can do no more than choose which of the substitute 'gods' to serve. Neither values nor gods possess anything by way of objective validity. 

Rationalisation and Subjective Values
Henrich attempts to make general sense of the incompatible perspectives which characterise Weber’s view:





Since Weber never believed that God or the gods ever existed in the first place, the 'disenchantment' or 'de-divinisation' he describes involves a subjective transformation in the world, not an objective one. That is, Weber is describing a change which has taken place in the human consciousness. 
For Weber, the whole process amounts to the tragedy of knowledge revealing the fundamental meaningless of the world. It is not that we have come to kill God but to realise that God never existed in the first place. Human beings are therefore subject to a tragic fate: 'We are irreligious because fate forces us to be irreligious and for no other reason'. (Strauss 1953: 73). Strauss thus concludes that Weber 'despaired of the modern this-worldly irreligious experiment, and yet he remained attached to it because he was fated to believe in science as he understood it'. (Strauss 1953: 74).

Polytheism – heterogeneity of values
Weber understands that Christianity put an end to the pagan polytheism of antiquity. When Weber writes of the new polytheism, he is not claiming that this amounts to a return to religious polytheism. What Weber is doing is revaluing what he considers to be of value in polytheism, the heterogeneous multiplicity of values, and stripping them of the last vestiges of religious belief. Or so he thinks. It is easy enough to claim God and the gods are dead, it is much more difficult to get rid of the theological assumptions that underpinned them. In Weber’s heterogeneity of values, these theological suppositions come to be attached to the new idols that run the world, the vast impersonal forces of modernity. We have a reinstatement of the old chaos. Weber appeals to the necessity of subjective value choice, but he assuredly knows that his new 'gods' are false and that his ‘magic’ is an illusion.

The Need for Essentialism




To conclude, it is worth evaluating what has been said of Max Weber's ‘philosophy’ in light of Thomist metaphysics and natural law.

The philosophical/theological synthesis of Thomas Aquinas entails a basic harmony organised around the immutability of natural moral law and the fundamental homogeneity of its applications throughout the many and varied states or conditions of humanity in history. Against this, Weber denies the objective foundation of values and instead asserts the heterogeneity of values.

Aquinas affirms the capacity of human beings to know the natural moral law. This is the only true foundation of any notion of human ‘progress’. The ultimate end for human beings is attained through coming to know and live in accordance with the natural law. Against the, the modern world elevates means over ends, with a technological and economic determinism presented as the path to progress.

Recognising the intellectual failure of the atheistic ideologies inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault, no friend of the traditional morality, exposes the failure of the modernist enterprise. Modernity has proved incapable of supplying a viable and enduring moral theory. Indeed, as Foucault’s work makes clear, it is no step at all from abandoning God to abandoning the human subject. With the decentering of the subject, modernity has proved incapable of even sustaining a doctrine of human existence. So much for Weber’s supposed philosophy of life. As Foucault makes clear in The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, the inevitable result of modern atheism, in denying the existence of God, is to have brought about the disappearance of man. 

Voegelin refuses to indulge Nietzsche and his fantasy that irrational values were sufficient to 'overcome' nihilism, either his own or that of the modern age:





Weber himself fell under Nietzsche’s spell but his ingrained realism leads him to express the ‘gay’ and ‘joyful’ science in pessimistic form. Weber knew it was a fantasy. Nietzsche, however, sustained his irrationalism and drove beyond good and evil. Nietzsche went mad, modernity carried on its normal path, the path of rational madness.

At this point we need to emphasise the conclusion that the irrational mentality derives not merely from philosophical error but from an inverted world in which means have displaced ends with the result that human aspirations and passions are no longer rightly ordered. Which brings us to St Thomas Aquinas and the right ordering of the world.

I shall, in what follows, set out Aquinas’ position, and then re-engage with Kant, showing points of agreement and points of disagreement.

9 AQUINAS' EPISTEMOLOGY 
THE FOUR-CAUSAL EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK

The Four Causes
Aquinas explanatory framework is defined and developed in causal terms. Whilst the four causes can be stated fairly simply, it is how they are applied that shows Aquinas’ true sophistication. Aquinas employs causation in a comprehensive way, both in terms of aims and commitments. This is clear even in Aquinas’ earliest surviving work, On the Principles of Nature (De principiis naturae), written when he was aged in his mid-twenties. In this work, Aquinas provides a clear explanation of the doctrine of the four causes. Aquinas defines a broadly Aristotelian explanatory framework, setting out conditions for adequacy in explanation, and establishing terms and positions, to which he consistently adhered for the rest of his long writing career. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 17).

Aquinas’s realism
Aquinas argues that the real existence of form and matter follows from the real existence of change, whether substantial or accidental. His reasoning proceeds from the fact of change. Since the necessary condition of change is the prior existence of form and matter, form and matter must therefore exist. This argument and its conclusion concerning the existence of change defines Aquinas's realism concerning form and matter. In other words, explanations concerning form and matter are not merely useful or pragmatically justified but are true in that they capture how objects in the world really are. Aquinas, that is, affirms the reality of these objects prior to our interaction with them. They exist independently of human explanation and categorisation. Form and matter would exist in a world without the existence of rational beings offering explanations of them. 

This is Aquinas's realism, that form and matter exist prior to human apprehension and are required for change. The reasoning from premise to conclusion is simple. The premise is that there is change. Aquinas argues that those who deny that there is motion imply that those of who believe that there is motion have false beliefs about the world and should therefore change them (InPh VIII.6.1018). As Aquinas states, "if there is false opinion, there is motion." In other words, the deniers of change are enjoining those who believe that there is change to change their beliefs – in which case there is change. 
Aquinas proceeds from this premise to argue that change involves a complex of form and matter — that is, of things that are potentially something (the colour green or a human being or a boat), and of things that make them actually this thing (being green, being human, being a boat). Aquinas can only offer this causal explanation if he affirms the reality of matter and form. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 29).

Aquinas’ insistence on the reality of form and matter is premised on the distinction between potentiality and actuality, that is, between potential existence and actual existence. These terms are correlative, in that a thing which exists as a potentiality is potentially some range of determinate actual things. The bricks and mortar are potentially a house, and are not potentially a boat. A thing which has achieved actual existence has actualized the potentiality of something which existed as potential. A house is therefore an actualized pile of bricks and mortar, has been made a house by efficient causality.

The Efficient Cause
Potentiality and actuality are correlative, but change does not proceed in any direct, inevitable sense. A potentiality does not become actuality in some automatic sense. In other words, potential does not become actual by its own agency. As Aquinas states emphatically, "what exists in potentiality cannot bring itself into actuality" (DPN 3.3-5). Change from potential to actual requires a factor that is beyond matter and form. This factor is what Aquinas calls the efficient cause, the agent of change.

This is an area which has given rise to some of the greatest controversy and misunderstanding. There has been a strong tendency amongst critics of essentialism to argue that the emphasis on necessary lines of development, in which something becomes in actual what it is in potential, implies an inevitabilism and a determinism. This is a complete misunderstanding. Martha Nussbaum has done sterling work here, making it abundantly clear that there is nothing inevitable about change. Essentialism is not a determinism. (Nussbaum 1986; Nussbaum 1992). Necessary lines of development are frustratable. It all depends upon the agent coming to act in accordance with necessary lines of development, turning potential into actual. Certainly, the agent lacks choice, in the sense in which critics of essentialism wish to identify choice with freedom. The agent embraces ends given by potentiality rather than chooses ends. Determinist? Critics of essentialism are entirely free to choose to turn bricks and mortar into a boat if they like. It’s just that to essentialists like Aristotle and Aquinas that is not so much an assertion of freedom as a delusion.

It is evident that bricks and mortar are not self-organising, and do not arrange themselves into a house of their own volition. Nor does the house, once built, paint itself and give itself a garden with a nice picket fence. This implies that both the bricks and the form of the house exist as ingredients waiting to be combined by the agent —that is, the builder who puts the form into the bricks in coming to build the house.

Strictly speaking, though, this is not exactly what Aquinas argues. The agent does indeed turn potential into actual, but the form of the house does not exist until the house is built. As Aquinas makes the point, "the form does not exist until the thing is made" (DPN 3.10-11). Aquinas does not, therefore, consider form to be an ingredient or a constituent like matter.

The matter supports the form. Only by its presence does the form make matter what it is in actuality. In other words, the form exists only when the matter is actually informed. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 31).

The matter acquires actual form not through the spontaneous generation or organisation of the form itself but through the agent cause. It is the agent which changes a potentiality into an actuality. This is the efficient cause.

There are therefore three factors involved in change and generation: 
(1)	matter, from which change proceeds;
(2)	form, into which a thing changes;
(3)	an agent, acting to bring about the form that the matter has.

Aquinas’ point is that the form is actual only when it is actualised, it does not exist as potential, either as component or ingredient. In being demolished, a house loses its form. The form no longer exists; it ceases to be. In like manner, in building a house, a builder does not pick up a form along with the bricks. There is no pile of forms alongside the pile of bricks. The form does not exist in actuality outside of the mind of the builder. It is through the agency of the builder, through the act of building, that what is potentially a house (the bricks and mortar) becomes a house in actuality (the bricks and mortar so arranged to actualize the form of the house).

The Final Cause
From the existence of change, Aquinas demonstrates the existence of material, formal, and efficient causation. Aquinas now adds a fourth cause, the final cause.

A shape is only a weak first approximation of form. However, in acting to realise potential, an agent refers to the suitability of a shape. A builder has to make an implicit judgment as to what a house is for. To qualify as a house, a thing must have the function of a house, it must be fit for habitation. Without meeting this condition of suitability, no matter, however informed, can qualify as a house. Thus, for Aquinas, a house has an end or function that defines it as a house. This end or function is the final cause qualifying the house as a house.

This may seem simple enough, but remember the earlier criticism of essentialism as a determinism. A house is not a boat, and it would be ridiculous, in the name of asserting freedom as free choice, to ignore final cause and try to turn a pile of bricks and mortar into a catamaran. To argue final cause this way is not a determinism, but a true freedom that corresponds to real potentialities.

The bigger problem is elsewhere. For Aquinas, it is not only artefacts that have final causes. He argues that "every agent, whether it acts by nature or by will, tends toward a goal." However, he continues, "not every agent is aware of the goal or deliberates about it" (DPN 3.20-23). Aquinas is here employing a broad definition of "agent", referring not only to rational agents acting by habit, without deliberation or awareness, but extending it to non-rational animals, plants, and all the way to nonliving elements and the like. 

Human beings may pursue ends without having deliberated about them. Aquinas gives the example of a musician who plays a polished piece without stopping to think about how best to proceed (DPN 3.31). Much human action is in this manner.

For Aquinas, this example is relevant to the range of entities that can have final causes. Since human beings have wills, they can deliberate about how best to set and achieve their goals. Plants, however, lack wills, and so are unable to reflect upon goals. This lack of wills and deliberative faculties, however, does not preclude plants from having an end. The end of a plant is its flourishing as a plant, an end which explains its activities as a plant. 

Reasoning in this manner, Aquinas’ thought is attuned to a purpose-driven universe. For Aquinas, the universe is shot through with final causation. Further, Aquinas integrates the myriad local final causes discussed above within a comprehensive, all-encompassing global final causation. For Aquinas, the universe is ordered around and explained by the ultimate final cause, which is God.

The Four Causes Developed and Articulated

Aquinas draws attention to the five important features of causes, all of which will need to understood before coming to evaluate the explanatory role they perform for Aquinas.

1.	"It is possible for one thing to be both cause and effect of another, though in different respects" (DPN 4.9-11). In other words, whilst a cause is always "prior in nature" to what it causes, something can nevertheless be both prior and posterior to the same thing.
2.	The four causes are ranked internally: the final cause is "the cause of causes, because it causes the causality of all the other causes" (DPN 4.34-36).
3.	Causes can be more or less proximate.
4.	Causes can coincide — one and the same item can be identified as the formal, final, and efficient cause of some effect.
5.	Causes can be inherent or coincidental, a fact of which Aquinas makes heavy use when resolving disputed questions in rational theology and ethical theory.

Pasnau and Shields 2004: 37

A cause is prior to its effect. But things are not so simple. For example, x can be the final cause of y even though y is the efficient cause of x. Thus, good health is the final cause of regular exercise. At the same time, regular exercise produces good health. A person engages in regular exercise in order to be attain good health and by exercising achieves the desired result. In like manner, plants have a tropism for light because they seek light for photosynthesis. By turning toward the sun, however, plants expose themselves to light and so engage in photosynthesis. ‘In these sorts of cases, final and efficient causes are prior to one another. In no case, however, is it right to think that x can be the efficient cause of y if y is already the efficient cause of x. The same holds true of instances of final causation. Any such case in either causal domain would violate the requirement that causes be prior in nature to their effects.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 38-39).

Aquinas now examines material and formal causes, once more highlighting the interdependence between form and matter. Aquinas holds that "matter causes form in those cases where forms exist only in matter; and similarly form causes matter inasmuch as matter can actually exist only through that form" (DPN 4.37-40). The crucial idea is that "matter and form are correlative" (DPN 4.40-41). Aquinas’ point is a corollary of his initial definitions of form and matter. Form is that which makes the matter that exists in potentiality, exist in actuality. That is, form causes the matter to be what it is in actual existence. The form of a house makes the potential for a house contained in the bricks and mortar, a house in actuality. To state that the builder, the agent, has turned bricks and mortar into a house, is to state that the builder has arranged the materials so as to actualize the appropriate form, that which qualifies the house as a house. Conversely, when the house is knocked down, the bricks and mortar lose the form of the house, the form ceases to exist. Thus, the form causes the bricks and mortar to be a house, when they are a house in actual existence. The bricks and mortar are potentially the matter of a house, but this potential is actualized in being informed, becoming actually the matter of an actual house.

Priority Among the Causes
For Aquinas, the final cause is always prior in nature. He argues that the final cause "causes the causality of all the causes" (DPN 4.35). This priority of the final cause occupies a central role in Aquinas's explanatory framework. A thing can only be understood completely and systematically by apprehending its final cause. It follows from this that it is only possible to understand the nature of a human being by comprehending the final cause of humanity. To know what a human being ultimately is to know that the goal of human life is supreme happiness (IV Sent 49.1.1 ad 3). This is the goal that human beings seek naturally, as part of their nature, without choosing to do so as a matter of rational deliberation. From this perspective, vast chunks of modern moral philosophy are just so much noise, an irrelevant attempt to produce, define, adduce and qualify reasons that cannot be given, and what is more do not need to be given. Apparently, we cannot adequately define happiness. That doesn’t stop human beings, without an ounce of philosophy, from pursuing it. 

Aquinas starts with the end and then reads backwards from it. To understand what human beings are requires that we understand what the good for human beings is. Thus, human beings achieve self-knowledge only by coming to understand something objective about our natures. Hence the priority that Aquinas assigns to final causation. Since it is the final cause that makes a thing what it is, knowledge of the nature of a thing requires a full understanding of its final cause. This final cause specifies, in turn, its ultimate good. And the ultimate good for human beings is supreme happiness.

The method and practice of the four-causal explanatory framework
Aquinas’ explanatory framework is based on the Aristotelian four causes. This schema pervades Aquinas's thought. The four-causal explanatory framework is deceptively simple. The outlines are easy enough to grasp. It is how Aquinas employs the schema, however, that it comes to reveal its subtlety and complexity, structuring complex explanations and clarifying doctrines pertaining to creation and soul-body relations, straightening out a whole array of thorny and obscure philosophical problems, such as coincidental and incidental causes. In the end, the intellectual power of the four-causal schema can only be appreciated by seeing how Aquinas uses it when engaging with substantial philosophical problems. I have only given an outline and, as an outline, it will be open to objections. In the end, a methodology is a tool-kit. The real test of those tools is their use in action. Here, the four-causal explanatory framework, as used by Aristotle and Aquinas, has substantial achievements to its name.






In the Categories, Aristotle had distinguished ten categories of being: substance, quality, quantity, relation, where, when, position, having, doing, and being acted on. Aquinas makes use of these categories, but doesn’t make them integral to the analysis of being.

Aristotle’s fine distinctions are of limited value when coming to analyse being. It is difficult to see a fundamental difference between, for instance, being green (quality) and having a hat on (having) and having ten green bottles on the wall (quantity) and knocking them off (doing). Likewise, it is difficult to see the fundamental similarity between being green and being a philosopher, even though they are both qualities. Certainly, there differences and similarities in all these cases, but these are secondary to the question as to what being as such is. 

What Aquinas does retain from Aristotle’s conception is the basic distinction between the being of substances and the accidental being pertaining to the other nine categories. No matter how many categories of being there may be, Aquinas holds that there is a clear distinction to be made between those beings that are substances and all the other ways of being. The other nine categories of Aristotle are no more than ways in which substances are.

Aquinas gives living things as the clearest example of substance. Living things possess the unity and coherence that identifies them as a single thing, enduring through change, over time. An oak tree endures through change, over the course of its life. It can therefore be said to form a single substance, with a single substantial form, and that this substance takes on a series of accidental forms over time. The tree starts life as a seedling, and goes through a series of accidental forms as it grows, from one inch tall to one hundred feet tall.

This is accidental change, no more than ways in which the substance is. These changes do not amount to substantial change, which Aquinas calls corruption.

Finer sorts of distinctions can be made on the basis of this fundamental distinction between substances and accidents – between living and nonliving substances, between plants and animals, and so forth. In terms of accidents, we can write about colours, for instance, going on to distinguish between green, red, black, purple etc. This is to distinguish between kinds or species in terms of their essences. 

Aquinas is both essentialist and existentialist in that his thought is founded on the etymological link between 'essence' (essentia) and 'exist' (esse). Existence is formed out of essence. To be is to exist as a thing of a certain kind, as given by the essence it has. It is the essence of a thing that makes it exist as a thing of a certain kind. The essence of a thing defines it as a member of a certain species of thing, the essence being held in common by all members of that species. The essence of a thing defines what (quid) that thing is, quiddity being the whatness of a thing. We can also refer to the nature or the form of the thing here, pointing out, however, that the essence of a material thing amounts to more than just its substantial form.

Aquinas’ thought is falls under the category of essentialism, and has been subjected to relentless assault, first by the mechanical materialism of the scientific revolution but more recently by postmodernism, by feminism and by philosophy of a more cultural and literary persuasion. To these critics, essentialism implies a biological determinism, using nature to set up norms for human society which differentiate between natural and unnatural. ‘Biology is not destiny’ assert the feminists. Biology most certainly is not destiny in essentialist philosophy. As Martha Nussbaum has emphatically shown, essentialism is not only insulated from these charges of determinism and fatalism, it has plenty to offer those who wish to employ reason and culture in shaping our futures out of our biological natures. That is most certainly what Thomas Aquinas offers (and Aristotle before him, and Hegel and Marx after him). Somewhere along the line, critics seem to have conflated essentialism with Social Darwinism and socio-biology. Aristotle was a biologist and he did seek derive laws and lessons for ethics and politics from biology. But he did not simply read off politics and ethics from biology, he knew fine well that the field of practical reason was based on more than scientific knowledge.

Essentialism has been under assault since the scientific and industrial revolutions and the way that they demonstrated a technical and instrumental power detached from nature. This led philosophers to question Aristotelian notions of the reality of natural kinds. Thus John Locke came to argue that the divisions of things into species and genera do not reflect the true natures of things but are the product of human convention.

"The Species of Things to us, are nothing but the ranking them under distinct Names, according to the complex Ideas in us; and not according to precise, distinct, real Essences in them." 

Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding III.vi.8

That conclusion seems to run contrary to Locke’s empiricism and his rejection of innate ideas. Locke does, however, recognise that things can be grouped into kinds, he just wonders whether we can yet identify those kinds. That identification would seem possible only by recognising that things possess a real essence in them, a nature which defines them – allows us to define them – as a thing of a certain kind.

Contemporary philosophers of science questioned whether and where objective lines can be drawn between species. How many species of an animal or a bird or an insect are there? Is there is an objective answer to the question? If these is, then an essentialism of some kind is involved. For all of the questioning of where the boundaries of species membership lie, it is hard to see scientists coming to deny that two things – sheep, cows, gorillas etc - could be categorised, in an objective sense, as members of the same species. One need only examine the human species to see the importance of essentialist modes of thought and analysis. Whilst there are clear differences between individual members of the species, only racists, sexists and homophobes would divide the one human species into several species, as though black people, women and gays are not true and full members of the human species. The criticism of essentialism as setting up norms which exclude and oppress some groups as abnormal can be turned against the anti-essentialists themselves. Human beings in all their individual forms are members of the one human species, and that is how they are to be treated according to a properly understood essentialism. The dignity of each and every individual rests upon that innate and common humanity. Essentialism holds that human beings constitute a distinct species according to a common nature. In this fundamental respect, essentialism serves as an antidote to the pernicious influence of sexism, racism and homophobia, however much has been articulated via historical institutions that have turned essentialism into a repressive dogma instead of a tool for the humanisation of the world. That is a case against how essentialism has been expressed through institutions created in certain times and places, underlining the tendency of human beings to hold on to the familiar, rather than a case against essentialism as such.

Essentialism conceives all individual persons to be members of the species by virtue of having the same essence. The case for the objective grounds of determining the definition of a species  and the membership of a species would seem clear. The fact that there are real species divisions in the world seems clear. The arguments are always around the boundaries. Since this is the case, the divisions that pertain must be founded on the basis of some kind of commonality shared by the individual members composing the species. Species membership is determined by objective criteria, with individual members meet this criteria and therefore sharing a kind of commonality. Aquinas's realism is based upon this kind of essentialism, acknowledging that there are objective criteria denoted by the essence, something which is shared by all individual members of the species.

The point is worth labouring since essentialism is fundamental to Aquinas’ system. The search for essences is the principal tasks of Aquinas’ philosophy, from which all else follows. Whether Aquinas is investigating God or human beings, he is seeking to describe and explain their nature in terms of their essence. Aquinas understands that we can never acquire a complete understanding of God's essence. He even admits that we can only ever achieve an approximate account of human nature. However, to present the fullest possible account of being, inquiry has no option but to proceed as far as it can in this direction. Indeed, Aquinas argues that it is a definitive part of the human essence to seek to understand the natures of other things. Human beings, that is, are rational beings who require the intellectual satisfaction that comes from understanding not just that a thing is, but above all understanding what a thing is—that is, its quiddity or essence.







Aquinas distinguishes between simple substances and composite substances. Simple substances are entirely immaterial — minds without bodies. The first and most simple substance is God. Composite substances are a composite of form and matter. With respect to living composites, their form is their soul, so that such living things are a composite of soul and body. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 57).

Since the essence of a thing is what makes it a certain kind of thing, by definition the essence cannot be identified with matter. However, matter is the potentiality of being a thing of a certain kind. That is, although it is not the matter that makes a thing be human, or be anything, the presence of form makes matter become something. It is the form that makes a thing actually be a thing of a certain kind. Yet this does not mean that the form is the essence of a material substance. For Aquinas, the essence comprises both form and matter. Thus the essence of a human being is both body and soul.

Matter is part of the conception of essence since to become a thing of a certain kind requires the right sort of matter. To become a house requires bricks and mortar. To state the same point negatively, bricks and mortar are not even potentially a high-speed motor boat. We may be free to choose to turn bricks into a boat in pursuit of a final end we have chosen by our reason, but I would suggest that this is not so much freedom as delusion. Thus, both matter and form enter into the essence of a thing.

Immaterial Substances
With respect to simple, immaterial substances, no two separate substances can belong to the same species. Things which belong to the same species do so by virtue of sharing the same essence. Aquinas explains the way in which composite beings are individuated, going on to argue:





From his metaphysical premises and his insistence that simple substances are pure forms, Aquinas concludes that no two simple substances can be of the same kind. 

For Aquinas, we cannot see God and must therefore seek understanding by reference to His effects, making some sort of inference from creatures back to their creator. 

Although Aquinas tends to include God among the simple substances, God is not strictly a substance. Since God's simplicity precludes the possession of accidents, God does not satisfy the second part of the definition of substance. This would seem to imply the redundancy of the philosophical study of God's nature. However, Aquinas argues that plenty can be said about God's nature, so long as proceed by way of analogy. Aquinas thus affirms that it is God's nature to be perfectly good, wise, and powerful. However, these attributes mean different things when applied to God and to human beings. Aquinas is arguing analogously. Further, we cannot say what God is in any positive way, we can only argue negatively and say what God is not.

Aquinas’ God is therefore so alien we can only proceed analogously and negatively. This alien character becomes clear when we recognise that God's simplicity goes further than even that of the simple created substances. Both God and separate substances count as simple in being immaterial. They are not composite in that way. However, separate substances are composite in that there is a distinction between their essence and their existence. This is how Aquinas makes the distinction between essence and existence:





In other words, to understand a thing's essence requires that every part of that essence is understood. Anything not required by that understanding is therefore not part of that thing’s essence but is instead distinct from it. Since a thing's essence can be understood without understanding whether that thing exists, a thing's existence is distinct from its essence.

The word 'understand' used throughout the argument has to be taken as meaning to completely understand. In which the claim that you cannot completely understand a thing's essence without understanding every part of that essence is straightforward. In which it follows that you can completely understand a thing’s essence – what a thing is — without knowing whether or not that thing exists. 

Substance and Accidents
To compare God to creatures is to have a picture of how being is organized. The Porphyrian Tree divides all being into a hierarchy of higher and lower kinds, running from the most general down to the most specific. At the bottom of the Tree are species, what Porphyry describes as the most specific species, such as human being. The definition of human being as 'rational animal' comes from taking the most immediate genus, sensory living thing (= animal), along with the differentia that separates human being from every other species of sensory beings (= reason). Following the view that the definition of a substance identifies its essence, the conclusion is that the essence of human being can be defined as rational animal. This conforms to Aquinas's doctrine that the essence of a composite substance covers both form and matter in common. Whilst animal encapsulates the essential sensory contribution of the human body, rational encapsulates what is distinctive about the human soul.

The problem is that Aquinas doesn’t believe that we know the essence of any substances, not even material ones.





Clearly, few would think that the definition 'featherless biped' encapsulates the essence of human being. The definition 'rational animal' makes sense to the extent that it does signify the essence of human being as rational. It signifies, but it does not show what that essence is, in the same way that 'God' signifies God without showing us God's nature. The definition 'rational animal' does not describe the essence of human being because it is taken from accidental features of human nature.

Putting the causal and metaphysical aspects of Aquinas's theory together, it becomes clear why he makes a firm distinction between substances and all other types of being as accidental, and why he understands substances to exist in the truest and most complete sense. Substances have a strong and distinctive unity on account of their tight causal coherence as well as the metaphysical dependence of each part on the whole.





‘One would not expect an aggregate of substances — a grove of trees, for example — to be causally unified in this way. Even if it somehow were, any one of the individual substances could surely exist apart from that aggregate. An aggregate of substances has only a very loose sort of unity: we can speak of it as one grove, but it is not one thing in the truest sense. Something similar is true from the other direction. Accidental properties make up one thing with their substance, but they have no existence on their own apart from that substance. The shape and color of a tree depend on that tree, whereas the tree depends on no particular shape or color. Even whole bodily parts of a substance are dependent in this same way. The branch of a tree is produced by the tree, and if severed from the tree it ceases to exist as a tree branch (even if we might, for lack of a better word, still refer to the dried-up wood as the branch of a tree).
In this way, our picture of the world as built up out of discrete substances is based on facts about how things are organized in the world. Central to this scheme is the theory of essences as what unites and individuates substances. Decisions about how to characterize the essence of a certain thing do not rest on convention or arbitrary choice, but instead reflect the causal structure of the universe. That, at any rate, is our goal.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 69).

Universals
For Aquinas, the classification of substances according to the hierarchy of species and general given by the Porphyrian Tree yields a true description of the world. Aquinas is a realist and not a conventionalist in that he believes that the truth about reality is independent of human conventions. Aquinas does not locate the grounds for such truths in any ideal realm of Platonic Forms, nor even in the mind of God (the remote ground for all truth). Rather, natural-kind concepts apply to the world in virtue of the facts about the world itself. Concepts such as human being, animal, and substance apply to a person in virtue of their natures. These arc not truths that we invent and are therefore conventional; they are truths which we discover about the world. Aquinas is a realist, not a conventionalist.

Qualitative Sameness
Aquinas faces the problem of how to ground his natural kinds on the things themselves. Consider human beings. If a human being is an animal, then it must share this animality in common with other human beings. However, Aquinas denies that human beings share some form, animality, which makes them members of the same genus. Rather, genus terms signify a range of different forms in an indeterminate way. (in the way that the colour ‘grey’ refers indeterminately to a whole spectrum of hues.
Aquinas makes this point as follows:





The passage explicitly rules out the possibility of literal, numerical sameness, but by implication it also rules out the possibility that all members of a genus share a form that is qualitatively the same.

So why are two persons members of the same species if they different in form? And why is a human being and a chimpanzee members of the same order? Since substances are arranged along a continuum, where do we draw the lines and by what criteria?

In answering these questions, Aquinas proceeds by way of the intellectual activity of abstraction. Whilst members of a species are entirely individuated by their various distinctive features, meaning that they are not exactly alike, the intellect distinguish the essential from the accidental, giving us a conception of a thing's species (or genus) by focusing on what all members of that species (or genus) share in common:





By abstracting in this way, the intellect separates off the accidents to leave only the shared essence remaining, something shared by all members of a species or genus). 

This intellectual abstraction may seem unnecessarily abstruse. In everyday life we simply rely on observable properties and this seems to work OK. Aquinas would agree. But we proceed in this manner because we have a poor grasp of the real essences of things. Aquinas therefore can say nothing of value concerning the deeper essential structure of material substances. But Aquinas does not go so far as complete scepticism or agnosticism with respect to things-in-themselves. On the contrary, Aquinas’ conception of essence holds that a substance is a member of a genus or species on account of its essence, not any observable capacity or function. A true and complete understanding of the world would have that level of explanation. 

Numerical Sameness
When it comes to universals, Aquinas is a conceptualist rather than a realist. The problem of universals can be stated simply: how can two things be described as having the same properties if they do not truly have the same properties—that is, numerically the same properties, in which case the properties they have would be universals, capable of existing in more than one place and time? (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 74). Aquinas holds that universals are made by intellect and are therefore mind-dependent in the strongest sense. In On Being and Essence, Aquinas cites with approval both Averroes and Avicenna, for whom "it is the intellect that makes universality in things" (3.100-101). Outside of intellect, then, there is nothing suited to exist in many things or to be predicated of many things. The operation of intellect is required to abstract away the accidental features of a thing, leaving behind only those essential features that hold true for all members of the species (or genus). This may seem like Kant, but Aquinas’ activity of the intellect isn’t quite the same thing as Kant’s cognitive apparatus of the mind shaping the world. Aquinas’ intellect starts with the real world and then becomes active by way of abstraction. Kant proceeds from the mind to the world. Aquinas, to employ a later terminology, is both an empiricist and a rationalist, his active intellect goes to work on a real world presented to the senses. Thus, universals exist only within intellect: "Whatever is in Socrates has been individuated" (On Being and Essence 3.81-82); "universals, inasmuch as they are universal, exist only in the soul" (InDA 11.12.144). Aquinas is therefore a conceptualist and not a realist when it comes to universals.

Abstraction, for Aquinas, is a mode of representation rather than a mode of existence. That is, an object is abstract because it represents the world abstractly, not because it exists abstractly. The only abstract entities are entities which have representational content — mental and linguistic entities. For Aquinas, a universal is suited to be fully present in many particulars at the same time, but cannot be actually present in those particulars. The idea is incoherent for material substances since they are individuated by the differences between their natures. For example, if the universal nature of humanity were to be actually present in all individual human beings, there wouldn’t be any difference between them. 





Aquinas therefore argues that universal natures are suited to be present in many things, and no more. This means that there is stripped-down abstracted nature that applies to every individual of that kind.

This returns us to the key question: are universal concepts true of the world or are they just a product of the intellect? Aquinas is a realist with respect to the species and genera of the Porphyrian Tree. Yet he is a conceptualist with respect to universals. Aquinas argues that the intellect makes universals by way of abstraction from reality, since these universals do not exist outside the mind. At the same time, Aquinas holds that abstraction is truth-preserving to the extent that the resulting concepts correspond to what is in the world. The problem is how is this correspondence possible if, as Aquinas argues, there are no universals in the world.

In resolving this problem of correspondence, Aquinas distinguishes between three ways in which we can characterize the nature of a thing: 

The first way refers to nature as it exists in a particular individual. If nature is individuated, then it exists in this particular individual and not in any other individual.
The second way refers to nature as it exists in intellect. If nature is abstract and universal in this way, then it is apt to exist in and be predicated of many individuals. However, this commonality is the very thing which seems to make intellectual judgments false.
Aquinas’ solution is the third way, that is, nature considered absolutely. The content of the intellect’s judgement as it grasps the nature of a thing is this nature considered absolutely. So considered, this nature is neither individual nor common.





The paradox of correspondence that Aquinas is addressing is this: if nature had individuality built into it, then it wouldn't apply to all individuals; if nature had commonality built into it, then it wouldn't apply to any individual. Aquinas’ solution is to argue that when, for instance, we conceive of humanity, the content of that thought is abstracted out, so as to make the concept true of each and every individual human being. It is neither individual nor common but both.
Which brings us back to universality. Concepts are universal within intellect. However, this universality doesn’t form part of the content of the concept but is an addition or an attachment. 

For humanity is something in a thing, but it does not there have the ratio of the universal, since there is no humanity outside the soul that is common to many. But in virtue of its being taken up in intellect, it has adjoined to it, through the operation of intellect, an intention, in virtue of which it is said to be a species.

I Sent 19.5.1c); cf. ST la 85.2 ad 2, InDA 11.12.96-151, and note 21.

The intellect therefore appends an intention (intentio) or account (ratio) of universality to the concept. This is a mental label adjoined to the concept, marking that concept as one that applies to any individual of that kind. Nature considered absolutely is not a Platonic reality of Ideal Forms, simply nature stripped of any further attachment. Considered absolutely, the nature is neither individual nor common since "each is outside the understanding of humanity." However, "each can accrue to it." In other words, what universal concepts and particular material individuals both have in common is nature considered absolutely. And is this that permits connection between intellect and reality, thus resolving the paradox of correspondence between concept and world

Realism and abstraction
Metaphysics is the study of the nature of being as such, not particular kinds of beings. For Aquinas, this study of being as being entails drawing a number of fundamental distinctions: substance and accidents; substance and aggregates; simple substances and composite substances; created and uncreated substances; essence and existence. What there is, Aquinas argues, is always particular. This requires abstraction and classification. If we attempted to grasp the world in terms of each thing as a particular, then we would understand nothing. We have therefore to pay attention to what each particular thing has in common, and thus we proceed to understanding by way of abstraction and classification. 

Aquinas is here a rationalist following in the footsteps of Plato, for whom the innate concepts of the mind impose order and unity on the particular things of the universe. Plato argues that our concepts are derived from the Forms. In thinking, we apply concepts to what we experience, but these concepts do not derive from experience. The fact that individuals have different experiences implies that we would have different concepts. Concepts cannot, therefore, be formed by classifying experiences, since this would make communication impossible. Rather, we classify experiences by already having concepts. Plato concludes, therefore, that we have innate knowledge of concepts. 

Aquinas isn’t arguing that nature taken abstractly is Plato’s world of the Ideal Forms. But he is arguing that our minds introduce commonality into a world of particulars, through the process of abstraction. What Aquinas proposes is a correspondence between thought and reality. If abstraction is to yield a genuine understanding of the world, then there has to be real patterns in the world, natural similarities among kinds that enable the mind to establish commonalities and assign individuals to species and genera. Aquinas is both empiricist and rationalist, a realist affirming the active role of mind in understanding the world.

Having established the foundations in terms of epistemology and metaphysics, we may now press on to God, Nature, human beings and human society. Before that, however, it is worth comparing and contrasting Aquinas and Kant in terms of their epistemology and metaphysics.

11 Aquinas and Kant Contrasted

Necessary presuppositions, reason as its own end
Since Descartes’ cogito, and as exemplified by Kant’s idealism, modern philosophy has moved further and further away from the epistemological realism of Aquinas. The assumption is that there is no reality underlying appearance and that we know things as we know them. We cannot go beyond our consciousness and know things as they actually are.

Descartes questioned whether his concepts had any counterpart in the real world outside his mind. The crucial point to grasp is that for Descartes the primary objects of thinking are things as they are known in our mind. Descartes, of course, found the idea of God to be necessary.

In the work of Kant, God had been reduced to a ‘necessary presupposition’ of moral life. Here, Kant distinguishes himself sharply from Thomist metaphysics. 

The critical theory of the Critique holds that we can use the pure concepts of the understanding to conceive of objects that lie beyond the limits of our sensible intuition through our power of inferential reason. We can, for instance, imagine a spatio-temporal universe that has a kind of completeness that our indefinitely extendable actual intuitions can never have; we can imagine objects that cannot be represented in sensory experience at all, such as freedom, God or an immaterial soul. However, such conceptions do not amount to knowledge, in the strict scientific sense, and the errors of traditional metaphysics can be attributed to claims that they do. But Kant goes further than this denial of claims to knowledge to affirm a view of human powers which holds that none of these pure concepts fails to have a proper use if only we understand it correctly (G, 4:395). Kant proceeds to argue that the field of moral experience yields evidence for a reality that underlies and yet is beyond the phenomenal world. This is the world of 'noumena', the world of things-in-themselves. Kant’s point is that whilst knowledge of the existence of our own freedom, as well as God and the immortal soul cannot be theoretically demonstrated, neither can they be disproven. These ideas are necessary presuppositions of moral conduct — objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge. Kant thus brought the controversy between science and religion to a conclusion which both sides could live with.
The nature of Kant’s solution, centred on ‘practical ideas’, merits extensive treatment. 
For Kant, all metaphysics issues in the practical "ideas" of ‘freedom’, ‘God’, and ‘immortality’. These ‘ideas’ are the necessary supports of morality, the conditions that are required for the objectivity of moral experience. These 'ideas', by which reference to the noumenal world beyond possible experience can be made, possess a special character. 





Unlike the categories of the understanding, the ideas of 'God', 'freedom' and 'immortality' are neither abstracted or derived from experience nor applicable within it. Kant defines the ‘ideas’ of God, freedom and immortality as 'ideas of pure reason' in order to distinguish them from the 'forms' of perception (space, time) and the categories of the understanding (cause, substance and attribute, etc.) Since these ‘ideas’ are neither abstracted or derived from experience nor applicable to experience, their use is subject to severe limitations. Whenever these ‘ideas’ are misused, Kant argues, our thinking strays into an 'absolute' or 'speculative' metaphysics. As a result of spuriously applying the ideas of pure reason to objects of experience, our thinking falls into hopeless confusion and contradiction. The same deficiencies occur from the other direction, when the categories of the understanding are applied to the noumenal realm.

Kant is firmly working in the tradition of Plato (CPuR, A312-20/B369-77), arguing that the ideas of pure reason have a legitimate use, or yield a "canon" (A 795—831 /B 823—59), but in morality rather than science. Knowledge of the existence of God, of immortality and of the immaterial soul is impossible; these are incapable of rational theoretical demonstration. That, for both rationalists and empiricists, would seem to bring the matter to a negative conclusion. Not so, Kant argues. Knowledge of human freedom is also incapable of theoretical demonstration, but this is not the end of freedom as a value. Human beings continue to think and act as though human freedom is real, an integral part of Being, implying that there is an underlying moral truth which is beyond rational scientific demonstration but which, in its practical effect, is no less real for that. Kant’s solution is to argue that whilst God, immortality and freedom cannot be theoretically proven, neither can they be disproven. They are objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge, necessary presuppositions of moral conduct. Hence Kant’s statement that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (CPuR B xx). 

Knowing and being
This is a far cry from Aquinas, for whom God is the supreme object of metaphysics, the supreme principle of intelligibility. Aquinas conceives God as act-of-being, examining necessary being and the ways of knowing God as a condition of our own knowing and being.

For Kant, our way of knowing, through the categories of understanding, generate phenomena. These are things as they are known and are quite distinct from noumena, the things in themselves which are unknowable. The way that we understand things is not the way in which these things exist. Against this view we may quote Aquinas:





Aquinas wrote this passage with no idea of the difficulties future philosophers would find themselves in as a result of departing from the realist view that what we know is things as they are. The distinction between our mode of knowing them and their mode of existing confirms rather than denies that our knowledge is of the things themselves. Rather than open out to explore the world, philosophy has retreated into itself, obsessing over the question of how we know our knowing, becoming ever more sceptical with respect to the possibility of knowing things. It is in this sense that philosophy has come to seem meaningless, a mere intellectual game, forever polishing its lenses but unable to ever actually see anything in the world. The incoherence to which this denial of the possibility of knowledge of the real world has led not only has deleterious intellectual consequences, but has a damaging effect upon practical philosophy. Hence my concern to connect epistemology and metaphysics to politics and ethics in relation to the good and the virtues.

The epistemological impasse of modern philosophy
The Cartesian and Kantian foundations of modern philosophy no longer carry the weight they once did. The denial of metaphysics has left philosophy with uncertain grounds. The thinking mind in abstraction from ontological nature has been exposed as an illusion, a self-invention. In the altered philosophical climate, the rationalists are no longer as strong as they once were and have proven vulnerable to a range of scepticisms and nihilisms. In these circumstances, there is more to be gained by exploring the common ground with the likes of Descartes and Kant against post-foundational relativisms than by continuing the antagonism with the rationalists. Rationalism as a disembodied abstraction from ontology is in retreat. It is time to salvage what is of merit in the rationalist tradition and put it back on a sound metaphysical footing.

There are various approaches that could be taken here. In the introduction I referred to transcendental Thomism, existential Thomism and Aristotelian Thomism. One can take a transcendental approach in the manner of Plato and Kant. This would commit us to an epistemological idealism. Or one can adopt a moderate realism in the manner of Aristotle and Aquinas. For all of the suggestions that Aquinas could be modernized in the manner of the transcendental idealism of Kant, it seems that it is Kant who would benefit most from Thomist direct realism. There is no need to work from consciousness to being by way of the transcendental method. Aquinas’ direct realism emphasises the dynamic contribution that mind makes to knowledge of being without need of the transcendental method. 

Further, Aquinas is a realist who shows how it is possible for individuals to encounter being in the activity of interpersonal community. Aquinas’ realism, that is, achieves everything that Kant’s realm of co-legislators sets out to achieve, and more. Aquinas’ concerns are not epistemological in the modern sense. Aquinas gives us personal knowledge, he relates knowing and being. Knowledge is not just cognitive but affective. It reveals and realises something of the human ontology.

Jacques Maritain appreciated this more than anyone, as his The Person and the Common Good (1966) reveals. Maritain points out that in St. Thomas's practical science of ethics, moral universals are reached by generalization from the prudential judgments of good men connatural to the values at stake. 





For St. Thomas, the knowledge of being is both personal and interpersonal knowledge. Earlier in the twentieth century Pierre Rousselot had argued that the wisdom of St. Thomas was an intellectualism linked to a philosophy of the person. This means that since Thomas's pure act of existence was personal, our knowledge of being in its most perfect form meant sharing in the life of another person. 

This personal philosophy is full of possibilities with respect to psychology, communicative ethics and discursive pragmatics. (Schluter and Lee 1993; Rogers 1995; Rogers 1979; Mitchell 1988; Goleman 2007; Brooks 2011; Habermas 1991; Habermas 1992; Habermas 1989). McCool thus refers to the personal and interpersonal knowledge of a free agent living with other free agents in a community. ‘Inside that framework abstract impersonal knowledge is illumined, fed, and supported by personal knowledge.’ (McCool in Hudson and Moran ed 1992). This brings us close to Kant’s highest good of the moral co-legislative community in which individuals treat each other as ends (Van Der Linden 1988:4/5). The obligation to obey the moral law implies that humanity is charged with the duty to promote the highest good. In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents are creating a moral community in which each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222). Not only the individual alone but all make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted.

Thomism and Kantianism
The towering figure of Immanuel Kant is impossible to ignore. In many respects, Kant’s resolution of the problems of knowledge and faith, science and morals remains the most intellectually satisfying philosophy we have. But, it seems, that the problems he solved were in large parts problems of a modern world whose outlines Kant to easily accepted. Kant’s achievement seems less secure the more that one investigates the modernist premises of his philosophy. Kant’s achievements are many, and I have argued at length in favour of Kant’s ethics. But it is out of concern to ground those ethics in a defensible conception of the good that leads me to challenge Kant’s work in epistemology and metaphysics. On such fundamental questions as the realism of knowledge and efficient causality, Kant’s arguments are flawed, with the result that his ethics concerning ends and the highest good are not as compelling as they should be. At the heart of Kant’s ethics is the moral requirement to transform society to realise the highest good: 'The moral law .. determines for us . . a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom' (CJ 1951:30). Kant argues that human beings 'are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304). I wholeheartedly concur with this commitment to the highest good. For Kant, the good connects directly with virtue so that his ethical theory concerns not merely discrete acts but most of all agents' characters and ways of life. That is my Thomist reading of Kant as a virtue theorist and just as a deontologist. But, a Thomist would ask, on what is the moral law based? Reason alone cannot be its own ground. On what is reason based? How does reason relate to the good and where is the good located? Here, Kant’s rejection of metaphysics and his separation of morality and freedom from ontological nature hobbles his ethical commitment. It is because I agree with Kant’s ethics that I seek to secure its foundations. This is why I affirm Aquinas’ epistemological realism to Kant’s epistemological idealism. Aquinas’ direct realism is able to illuminate our self-understanding as human knowers much more than a transcendental idealism cut off from ontological nature. 

Whilst Kant’s explanation of efficient causality and the principle of causal explanation is designed to rebut Hume, and as a result is little more than a halfway house between Humean temporal sequence and the traditional notion of the efficient cause as the active producer of its effect and therefore the explanatory ground or sufficient reason for it. Kant’s position falls far sort of Aquinas’ work on first cause, the efficacy of secondary causes and final cause. The division is one of idealism and realism. Whereas Aquinas can point to the actively productive role of the cause in relation to effect, Kant has the mind introduce a necessary link between cause and effect. That simply begs the question in the absence of the ontological dependence that Aquinas establishes. Aquinas, that is, is able to ground efficient causality in a way that Kant cannot. And the reason is that Aquinas adheres to Aristotle’s single event model in which the causing and the being caused are the one identical event, with different relations, one in the effect, the other from the cause: for example, the chopping of the wood and its being chopped are identical ontologically, located in the wood as from or by the axe (actio est in passo), which Aristotle analyzed in the categories of action and passion. 

A fundamental area where the Thomist case must be made concerns Kant’s denial that the human mind can have knowledge of the real world as it is. For Kant, we can know the world only as it appears to us phenomenally, making it intelligible through the imposition of our own a priori forms of sense and understanding.
This epistemological idealism involves Kant in a split between the real and the human mind. Kant is unable to see the consequences of action as the self-manifestation of being, he is unable to mediate between the real and the human mind. The cognitive apparatus of the human mind does not in itself create the objects we know; these present themselves to our cognitive apparatus by action. However, denying that we can know about the thing in itself, Kant cannot allow that action can reveal anything by way of real existence. Here, there is a separation between ‘being’ and ‘knowing’ that makes no sense to Aquinas. For Aquinas, what matters is not being as a passive or static entity, but is act-of-being; Aquinas asserts the primacy of existence over essence. 

For Aquinas, to be is to live. The conception of the real, cognition, is bound up with actual be-ing as existence. In contrast, for Kant, being is merely the result of our a priori forms making sense of experience; we can never go beyond our consciousness to access the real as such. Whilst, through the conceptual apparatus of our minds we recognize the existence of the object we know, its action indicating that we are not making things up, we cannot affirm the object’s existence in itself, since this would amount to a claim to have knowledge of things in themselves. This, Kant’s epistemology rules out. 

Where Aquinas makes intelligibility the key to the relation between subject and object, knower and known, Kant’s view is unintelligible in that action reveals nothing about its source. 

There is a clear distinction here between Aquinas’ epistemological realism and Kant’s idealist approach to knowledge. Kant’s idealism requires that we know what a thing is like in itself apart from any action on others. That is an unrealisable ideal to the extent that we are not creative of what we know. Aquinas’ direct realism yields objective knowledge of the real through the objective relations of the world, that is, the way that things in action reveal the natures they have in themselves to us and other beings. One may call this a "moderate realism" in that it reveals all that we really need to know about the world, the kind of difference things make to us.

The problem is that Kant too closely followed the view of physical nature presented by Newtonian scientific explanation. Kant came to modify his view later, presenting a transcendental naturalism to supplement his earlier transcendental idealism. And this offers a route to putting Kant closer to St. Thomas. 

That aim of bringing of reason and ontological nature in connection is implicit in the starting point of Kant’s philosophy. Kant considered Newton to be the master of natural world and Rousseau to be the master of the moral world. He realised, however, that neither could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. There was a gap between science and ethics, fact and value, that Kant sought to close. In his first two critiques, Kant maintained a strict separation of reason from the empirical world of natural inclinations. In his later work, however, Kant came to locate the solution for the separation of the phenomenal and the noumenal, the key problem in his entire philosophy, in Nature. In the Critique of Judgement, Nature is conceived to be the original matrix for realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world, even before the birth of humanity. Kant argues that the moral and political development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal providence. His earlier acceptance of the mechanistic Newtonian conception of nature – driving telos, purpose out of nature - had prevented Kant from grasping this cosmic truth in any developed sense his earlier work. Acknowledging Nature as the living force resolves Kant’s ultimate philosophical problem in bridging the chasm between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s resolution of the problem of mediation involves a two-way transition: the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law.

No longer walled up in the concepts of the mind, we can come to experience the real world shared by others, a world that is objective and which may therefore be shared by the minds of others. We come out of the cul-de-sac of subjective experience and share in the world of objective experience. It just remains to point out that that understanding was present in St. Thomas all along. As Maritain argues, for Aquinas, mind and reality are in "a nuptial relation." 

In fine, the Thomist view can join Kantianism in contesting empiricism, positivism and the various relativisms that populate the modern world, whilst at the same time showing how Kant’s ethical commitments need to be strengthened by a realist metaphysics and epistemology.

Sense experience and the mind – Aquinas’ moderate realism
The good thing about Aquinas is that he allows us to work from reality to mind and back again. Aquinas’ epistemological realism therefore achieves all that Kant’s idealism sets out to achieve, and does so on more stable grounds.

For Aquinas, human knowing starts with the recognition that something is. (Gilson The Philosopher and Theology.  Aquinas’ realism is not a crude, passive reflection of things in the mind but is an active and integral sensio-intellectual experience. The knower grasps the thing known through knowledge as a form of intelligibility. The dualism of subject and object is overcome.

Aquinas's philosophical concerns are quite different from those of modern philosophers since Descartes in the seventeenth century. Modern philosophers have been preoccupied with questions concerning not just knowledge but the possibility of knowledge. Walled up in the concepts of the reasoning mind, they have come to be sceptical of whether we can know anything and whether there is a real world distinct from our ideas. Aquinas certainly has philosophical views concerning knowledge, but he moves beyond the interminable questioning of what we know and how we can know to focus on other philosophical concerns. To Aquinas we may say what C. C. W. Taylor says of Aristotle. 

While Aristotle was certainly aware of sceptical challenges to claims to knowledge, whether in general or in specific areas, the justification of knowledge claims in response to such challenges, which has been central to most epistemology since Descartes, is at best peripheral to Aristotle's concerns.
In particular, the central problem of post-Cartesian epistemology, that of showing how our experience may reasonably be held to be experience of an objective world, is hardly a problem for Aristotle. The problem for the post-Cartesian philosopher is how, once having retreated in the face of Cartesian doubt to the stronghold of private experience, he or she can advance sufficiently far beyond that experience to recover the objective world. Aristotle, never having made the retreat, does not have the problem of the advance.

Taylor in Everson ed. 1990

And that point applies to the Aristotelian tradition that filtered into and through Hegel and Marx. This is the criticism I have made of Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s achievement is to have nearly pulled off the impossible task of supplying modernity with a viable morality. The problem with Kant’s self-legislation of practical reason is that reason comes to be detached from ontological nature. Walled up in the cognitive apparatus of the mind, Kant is faced with the challenge of constituting the universal realm out of subjective experience. Kant’s ethic is intersubjective. He conceives a realm of ends in which human beings, as moral beings, are co-legislators of the universal realm. But the world in which Kant’s morality is confined is a subjective one, a world which has lost the overarching moral good. Kant’s morality gains its plausibility from being set within the remnants of the traditional morality supplied by religion. The more that morality is dissolved, the more vulnerable Kant’s morality appears. The central problem of modern morality remains that of relating human subjective experience to the objective world. That is not a problem for the realism of Aquinas. In retrospect, Descartes’ cogito is less a solution to the problem of knowledge than an expression of modern scepticism. Having retreated into the private mind, modern philosophers seem unable to recover the objective world as something in which human reason is grounded. Aristotelians and Thomists never made the retreat in the first place. Kant’s philosophy of the highest good could have been all the more powerful had it been grounded in an epistemological realism. Since we have Hegel, why do we need Kant?

As against the empiricist account, Kant denies that the human mind is a tabula rasa, a blank sheet, ready, at birth, to be filled with sense impressions. On the contrary, in order to make sense of - to use - sense impressions, the human mind must already at birth be possessed of certain basic organizing categories or frames of reference into which those sense impressions are fitted or through which they are filtered. These organizing categories or frames of reference are often called 'innate ideas', 'innate' because they precede any individual human being's experience of life. (See my Kant’s Natural Teleology and Moral Praxis 2012).

Kant is plainly working in the tradition of Plato here, recalling the importance that Plato assigned to innate concepts as the key to being able to apprehend true reality. For Plato, reason, through our innate knowledge of concepts, can give us knowledge of the Forms. These are the ideal entities that are the true reality. These innate ideas or concepts come with all human beings 'out of the womb', and are independent of experience. We are born with them, they are part of our heritage as members of the species homo sapiens. These categories constitute the core of our faculty of reason. For Kant, human beings are knowing subjects who fundamentally shape the sense impressions they receive from the external world.

Thomas Aquinas takes the opposite approach, working from sense experience to the human mind. Nevertheless, the mind is just as active in Aquinas’ conception as it is in Kant. 

The difference is that Aquinas’ agent intellect is working with a real world, a world that is more than the conceptual apparatus of the human mind. Aquinas’ theory of knowledge is realistic in the sense that it affirms that human beings can gain knowledge about the world. Aquinas’ epistemological realism connects concepts with ontological nature. Kant’s idealism is vulnerable to scepticism in focusing upon the conceptual apparatus of the human mind, with the mind cut off from nature. Aquinas argues that cognition begins with sense experience, with human beings reflecting upon this experience.

In demonstrating the superiority of St. Thomas’ position over Kant here, Dennehy asks that if we are capable of forming veridical concepts, and if we cannot form them outside a historical context, and if historical contexts vary, then what is the criterion of the veridical? Kant’s epistemological idealism cannot supply an answer. St. Thomas’ realism can. The heart and soul of St. Thomas’ realism is that things are the measure of mind; mind is not the measure of things. Kant is struggling on account of his idealist approach to knowledge. He is trapped in a circularity which concepts alone cannot transcend. ‘There is no way of demonstrating that we form veridical concepts since demonstration operates entirely in the realm of pure concepts, and you cannot use concepts to justify the veridical nature of other concepts. For what could the putative confirmatory concepts display that the dubious concept lacked? On the contrary, the only way that concepts can be identified as veridical is by the primitive and direct apprehension of their veridical nature.’ (Dennehy in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

For the epistemological idealist, our knowledge of things proceeds from the cognitive apparatus of the human mind. And stays there. Kant’s reason can never break through to things in themselves. For the epistemological realist, our knowledge derives from our knowledge of things; the activity of the mind is the rationally systematic reflection on that experience. As St. Thomas argues, there is nothing in the mind that was not in the senses first. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, philosophizing begins with the primitive, direct experiential knowledge presented to the senses. Then the mind goes to work. In contrast, Kant begins his philosophizing with the intellect and its concepts. Dennehy compares Kant’s philosophical method to that of an astronomer who, rather than scanning the heavens to study the stars, starts with an examination of his telescopic apparatus to determine just what kind of data the latter is capable of attaining. That, for me, is not the problem. Methodological tools matter. The big mistake is to believe that the reality revealed by those tools is reality as such. Remaining within the idealist approach will reveal more about the sophistication of the methodological tools than about the reality supposedly being examined. ‘By starting within the intellect, you have walled yourself in with concepts. You are then left with the task of trying to determine whether your concepts match any extramental reality.’ (Dennehy in Hudson and Moran ed 1992). And this is an impossible task.

The moderate realism of St. Thomas takes our experiential knowledge as a given: we know and what we know are things, and we know that we know things. Descartes’ worried himself and generations of philosophers who followed him to such an extent that philosophy became detached from its birthright. Retreating into private subjective experience, modern philosophy is guilty of a paralysis through analysis.

For St. Thomas, epistemological realism conceives philosophy to be an act of reflection on experiential knowledge. Kantian epistemological idealism begins philosophizing with an examination of the intellect and its cognitive apparatus to discover what and how this apparatus can know. In contrast, St Thomas’ realism begins with knowledge of things, asking how this knowledge takes place. (Dennehy in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

St. Thomas’ approach reconciles both empiricism and rationalism in that the mind proceeds to work upon the data presented to the senses. Knowledge is therefore yielded not directly, through mere perception of sense data, something which would make us passive slaves of empirical nature. Rather, we obtain knowledge by abstraction from material things. 

our perceptions of the sensible world convey to us more than mere sensations; they convey the being of things: essence, existence, and the principles of being as well. Such knowledge—what I mean by "ontological" knowledge—escapes enslavement to historical context. No matter how things differ and vary, no matter how often they change from one state to another, they remain ways of being, and what belongs to being as being cannot be reduced to the prejudices of historical context and its material conditions. 

Dennehy in Hudson and Moran ed 1992

St. Thomas is therefore an empiricist in the sense that he thinks that all our concepts, all our understanding of things, are derived from sense-perception and a moderate realist in that he believed that there has to be a foundation for our knowledge. 

The mind therefore has an active role to play in St. Thomas’ conception. St Thomas rejects the Platonic view that the mind possesses a stock of innate ideas, a view that Kant shared with Plato. Rather, for St. Thomas, the mind is initially a capacity for knowing. The mind's capacity for knowledge goes to work upon the data it receives through sense-experience and sense-perception. The mind knows nothing except what it receives through or in dependence upon experience. It is then that the mind becomes active in producing knowledge in abstraction from material reality. Reasoning must start with Earth before it can go to Heaven.

In contrast to Kant, for Aquinas there is nothing in the intellect which has not been first in the senses. The intellect is then active in making sense of this experience. Aquinas avoids the split that has characterised modern philosophy in that he is both an empiricist and a rationalist.

Aquinas’ theory of knowledge can be defined as a moderate realism. Whilst cognition starts with the sense experience of particular things, the intellect’s recognition of concepts plays an active role in producing knowledge. Sense experience and intellect have equal status. 

The universal concepts that we derive from the sense experience of particular things are not pure abstractions created by human beings but possess an independent ontological status. For Aquinas, these concepts exist in the objects. Human beings, through thought, recognize only the concepts which are manifested in the objects. Universalia exist independently in the objects. By recognizing universalia, human beings gain insight into reality.

Human knowledge builds on the sense experience of particular things. These particular things have two aspects that can be distinguished by thought, form and matter.

We begin with Creation.

Thomas' doctrine of creation goes a good deal beyond Aristotle. It is already apparent that, though built upon such abstract foundations, his concept of God is much richer. God is not just an unmoved mover (or better: unchanged changer), moving other beings magnetically as final cause. He actually creates out of nothing. 

Next, we have to ask why God creates. It cannot be because he needs anything, being a perfect being. And being perfect he must have acted freely, without necessity. He created because of his goodness and goodness is diffusive of itself. It spills over, so to speak. The world, then, is intrinsically good, though it is limited by its unavoidable finitude. Whether this is the best of all possible universes we can hardly say, though since God is omnipotent he could always produce something better. Now all this generates too the problem of evil, for does not creating a cosmos in which actually there are real evils create (and indeed will) those evils?
Strictly according to Aquinas, evil is not a being, but a privatio - an absence of what ought to be there.
Aquinas' psychology is an adapted version of that of Aristotle. The soul is the form of the body, but the rational soul, because it is capable of knowing all bodies, is not pinned down to a special material type.

A nature is not its act-of-being; rather, the act-of-being is the act of nature. Thus nature itself stands in relation to its act-of-being as potency to act. However there is no difference with God between the act-of-being and what God is, hence God alone is pure act. St. Thomas thus destroyed the entire Aristotelian theology of Immovable Movers; he was erecting, above the essentiality of Plato's Ideas, above, even, the substantiality of Aristotle's pure acts, sublime in its solitude, the unique Pure Act-of-Being. (Gilson 1961 Pt 2 ch 2). 

That said, St Thomas affirms the efficacy of secondary causes. This is based on the distinction between act and potency. That which is capable of being a certain thing, but is not that thing, is that thing in potency. That which that thing already is, is so in act. (Gilson 1961 Pt 2 ch 3).





A consequence of this doctrine is to make its meaning true to what is called the "naturalism" or the "physicism" of St. Thomas. If no philosophy was so constantly busy safeguarding the rights of creatures, it is because it saw in this the one means of safeguarding the rights of God. Far from encroaching upon the Creator's privileges, the perfections attributed to second causes can only increase His glory, since He is their first cause and since this is a new occasion for glorifying Him. It is because there is causality in nature that we can go back step by step to the first cause, God.
As soon as we realize the significance of this principle, all shadow of antinomy between God's perfection and that of created being disappears.

Gilson 1961 Pt 2 ch 3

The teleological conception of the world
With St. Thomas, we inhabit the purpose driven world of Aristotle. Aristotle believed that purpose can ultimately be found in the world. Clouds exist to produce rain, rain to water plants, and plants to feed animals. In this conception, the natural world forms a rational system within which everything has a purpose. Nothing just is - it is always for the sake of something. For Aristotle, the ultimate end to which everything is directed is man - 'nature has made all things specifically for the sake of man'. Aquinas adopted and adapted Aristotle's view of a purpose-driven world to argue that the purpose each thing possesses is given to it by God. The entire creation, therefore, is imbued with divine purpose. This idea of a purpose driven world is a stimulus to reason. The careful examination of the world would uncover the essential natures of things and the laws determining their functioning. Through this rational knowledge we come to discern God's plan and intentions. Aquinas extends this teleological conception of the universe to humanity – human beings are made by God for a purpose. In coming to examine and reveal our essential natures, we come to discern God’s intentions and what we ought to be in light of that divine plan. We achieve knowledge of what corresponds to and what contradicts God's intentions, and therefore learn what is morally good and bad. 

Following Aristotle, St. Thomas analyzes the world as consisting of substances in which forms are embedded in matter. 

This hylomorphic new is important when taken together with other distinctions which Thomas wields - notably that between act and potentiality and that between essence and existence. These are overlapping polarities. This is because, important though the hylomorphic world is, it is not the only realm of existence. For Aquinas saw the universe as a hierarchy. There arc inorganic substances, vegetables, non-rational animals, up to the rational animal, human beings. At the summit of the hierarchy is the Divine Being - which is pure act or activity, is infinite, and whose existence and essence coincide. 

Smart 2008 ch 9

It is possible to achieve knowledge of this hierarchy of beings through reason, from philosophizing. Certainly, there are truths which are cannot be proved by way of rational argument, such as the doctrine of the Trinity. These truths have to be derived from revelation. So there is a distinction here between that body of knowledge based on natural reasons, 'natural theology'; and that which depends on revelation, 'revealed theology'.

The most obvious thing about our hylomorphic world is the way in which it is subject to change. Explanation of such change forms the chief basis of the ways or arguments to the existence of God. In turn there is the possibility of arguing from what we know of the relation of the Necessary Being to the created order to various conclusions about the nature of the former. Here Aquinas both elaborates and uses his famous theory of analogy and its types. So in all this the supposed proofs of God's existence as used by Thomas are crucial. We have an elaborate edifice.

In A History of Western Philosophy, Ralph McInerny defines hylomorphism:

In On the Principles of Nature Thomas sets down this doctrine in a swift, staccato way. Some things can be, some things already are; the first are said to be in potency, the second in act. There are two kinds of actual being, however, substantial and accidental; it is one thing to be a man and another thing for a man to be white, and something can be in potency to either kind of being; what is in potency can in either case be called matter, though that which is in potency to substantial being might be called the matter out of which (ex qua) something comes actually to be, whereas that which is in potency to accidental being might be called the matter in which (in qua) something comes to be.

Harvanek notes the difficulty of maintaining the philosophy of matter and form in the face of modern science. He notes the success of atomism (Harvanek in Hudson and Moran ed 1992). I have argued strongly in favour of essentialism against atomism and would go further and argue that this issue is the divided line and battle ground. Once purpose is driven out of the material world, and that world becomes no more than ‘dead matter’, we will have no option but to hope that Kant, after all, has the answer. In Immanence, Transcendence and Essence (2013) I give several reasons as to why mechanicism and atomism are in retreat and hold that science is beginning to introduce a moderate teleology in its approach. In Why Think Evolution of the Rational Mind, R de Sousa (2007) advances several strong arguments for the return of teleological explanation in biological science. Also worth examining is the work of biologist Rupert Sheldrake. Having come this far, hanging on for so long against the onslaught of the atomists, reductionists and mechanicists, it would be madness to abandon the purpose driven conception of the universe.

 Matter and form, along with efficient cause and final cause, are the fundamental Aristotelian principles of being in Aquinas’ metaphysics. It’s the doctrine of the four causes and it works. It was good enough to convert atheist Anthony Flew to theism. (Flew 2008).

With these principles, Aquinas analyses change and coming to be. Matter is a condition for motion and change. Further, matter individuates particular things, with each thing's matter occupying a space that another thing's matter cannot occupy at the same time. Two things can therefore have the same form without being identical. The form a thing recognizable. The form is a thing's structure and appearance. It is the form we recognize when we recognize something about an object. The form makes it possible to characterize the thing by what it is — square or circle, red or green, etc.

Things and mind – realism and idealism
At the core of Aquinas’ realism is the view that things are the measure of mind; mind is not the measure of things. The case against Kant’s idealism is that it is impossible to form veridical concepts within the realm of pure concepts; concepts cannot be used to justify the veridical nature of other concepts. The demonstration of veridical concepts can only be achieved by the apprehension of their veridical nature. (Dennehy 1992: 70-71).

The epistemological realism of Aquinas begins with our knowledge of things and proceeds to our systematic reflection on that experience. The active role of reason lies in mediating between reality and mind. 

Philosophizing for Aquinas starts from experiential knowledge and proceeds to rational reflection. Cognition is also recognition as an active mental process. Philosophizing for Kant starts with the intellect and its concepts and remains there. There is no stepping out of consciousness to know things in themselves.

Certainly, Kant’s conceptual sophistication is a great philosophical achievement. But starting within the intellect rather than from sense experience, Kant confines knowledge of the world within concepts. This dualism leaves us with the impossible task of matching concepts in the mind to an extramental reality. The active role of the human mind in shaping the world appears liberatory in pointing to the importance of creative human agency in a self-made world.

On closer analysis, by starting with concepts within the mind rather than things in the objective world, Kant risks enclosing human agency in a mental prison. Lacking a connection between veridical concept and veridical nature, Kant can never compare any concept to the object it supposedly represents. Instead of a genuine reconciliation of subject and object, knower and known, Kant collapses the two together as one, with the object becoming the concept. That is, the concept rather than the thing has become the object of knowledge; human beings can know the concept but not the thing.

The consequences are damaging, not just with respect to epistemology, but to Kant’s ethic on ends, virtue and the highest good. Kant’s view is intersubjective and appeals universally to all as rational beings. 

Whilst human beings have different subjective experiences, they have the same mental structure and therefore share the same a priori concepts and principles. There are, therefore, objective concepts that are universal to all human beings as rational beings. Kant’s view of a realm of ends as universal realm of co-legislators promoting the good of each and all is valuable and worthy of support. 

I would just question how stable Kant’s foundations are to support that view.

If all any individual can know is his/her own mental state, then there is no way of knowing if there are other intellects or, even if there are, whether these know the same things the same way. 

It depends on the extent to which we can escape the mental prison. Kant avoids such subjectivism. Reason and morality are universal. But without a grounding in ontological nature they cannot be objective. The self-legislation of practical reason is a solid foundation only if that reason is grounded in a natural teleology. In which case it is no longer self-legislation, it is an argument from rational nature – Aquinas’ natural law. 

The Concept in Epistemological Realism
Realism proceeds from sense experience and takes that we know and what we know as givens. The role of reason, therefore, is an act of reflection on experiential knowledge. Realism begins with the knowledge of things and then proceeds to determine how this knowledge takes place. 

In complete contrast, Kant begins with the question of knowledge, proceeding from the mind and its concepts to discern what the intellect can know. Kant’s reason lacks an ontological foundation and that makes him vulnerable in a way that Aquinas is not. 

Ontological and Sensational Knowledge
Aquinas avoids the antinomies of reason and nature that Kant is involved in. For Aquinas, human beings are not pure intellects but materially embodied intellects that gain concepts by abstraction from repeated contact with material things.

This comes out in Aquinas’ view of the soul as the substantial form of the living body. Aquinas’ moral anthropology affirms the substantial union of body and soul. The soul is a collection of living faculties, with all potency ordered to its act. 

The view that our knowledge consists merely of the perception of mere sensible properties entails subjectivism and solipsism. However, for Aquinas, our perceptions of the sensible world convey not just sensations but the being of things: essence, existence, and the principles of being – matter, form, efficient cause and final cause.

Aquinas’ epistemology is, therefore, grounded in the metaphysics of being as being. Aquinas’ knowledge is ontological. No matter how much things change from one state to another, they remain ways of being, and what belongs to being as being cannot be reduced to the mere perceptions of the sensible world and entails much more than the operation of contingent and mutable concepts. 
The intellect's capacity to form concepts that are necessary rather than contingent, immutable rather than mutable, depends not merely on the conceptual apparatus of the human mind but upon ontological nature. The existence of veridical concepts depends upon the existence of veridical nature. Reason, that is, has to rely on more than itself. Without that ontological foundation in nature, Kant’s reason is in danger of falling into subjectivism and solipsism. If our perceptual experiences of the sensible world cannot produce veridical concepts, then our concepts are contingent and mutable, representing objects rather than expressing the truth conveyed by those objects. Without a realist epistemology, there can be as many philosophical interpretations of the world as there are representations of the objects of that world. Kant cannot go beyond these representations to see if they correspond to the things they represent; he lacks an objective position grounded in nature and cannot access things in themselves. Only an epistemological realism in the manner of Aquinas gives us that position and thus avoids the irreducible pluralism of contingent and mutable concepts.

12 THE DIVINE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE
God as the Source of Being
For Aquinas, the evidence for the existence of God is to be found in the visible world. Aquinas’ view is founded on the conception of the universe as comprising both God and the material realm. This begs the question of how God is related to this material world. 

Creation
Aquinas bases his response to the question of how God is related to the world by arguing that God created the world. In both of the theological Summae, Aquinas moves directly from God's nature to the nature of the created world. The divine attributes that Aquinas identifies in Summa contra gentiles I and Summa theologiae indicate that God is the ultimate source of being. As the first mover in the causal chain, God must be the cause of all the motions in that chain. Whilst some such chains causes things to come into existence, God remains be the ultimate source of their existence. Thus, having proved the existence of a first cause as unmoved mover, Aquinas proceeds to argue: "We have shown that there exists a first being, whom we call God. We must, accordingly, now investigate the properties of this being" (SCG 1.14.1/116).

In addition to being this first cause as unmoved mover, God is also an eternal being, existing for at least as long as anything else existing in the universe. God is also an omniscient being, having the knowledge to produce whatever God likes. As pure actuality, God is ideally able to act so as to produce whatever God decides upon. As a good and loving being, God has a motive to produce other things, to spread and share that goodness. It is therefore consistent with God's nature to be the cause of things. Aquinas, however, wants to establish the stronger argument that God is and must be the cause of all other things.

Having established God's uniqueness (SCG 1.42; ST la 11), Aquinas sets out to establish that God is the one supreme being and the cause of all other beings:





This argument presupposes, firstly, God's existence as a first, uncaused cause; and, secondly, that there can be no infinite causal chains. It is not therefore a proof of God's existence. Aquinas defends these assumptions elsewhere. The soundness of the above argument becomes clear when considered alongside those defences.

The Created Order
Since the choice to create was a voluntary act of will, and since voluntary actions always have some end, then there had to have been some end or purpose in view. For Aquinas, the ultimate end for God is the ultimate end we all share, which is God himself: "God wills his own goodness as an end, and wills everything else as the means to that end" (SCG 1.86.2/718). 

Aquinas proceeds from here to describe three levels of explanation for why God wills the things that he wills:
1.	God wills the goodness of the universe because this fits with his own goodness.
2.	God wills particular goods in the universe for the sake of the good of the universe.
3.	God wills further details because they are entailed by choices at level.

Since lower levels depend on higher levels, the ultimate explanation for God's act of creation is that it fits (decet) with God’s own goodness. This is different to saying that God wills the universe because his goodness requires it, a view which contradicts Aquinas’ conception of divine freedom. So Aquinas argues only that God’s creation fits or suits God’s goodness, allowing for other equally suitable courses of action.

That said, Aquinas’ argument is much stronger than the claim of consistency between God's goodness and creation. Aquinas is expressing more than this, namely, that His goodness gives God a reason to create. Normally, when an action is done for some end, the action is considered to bring about that end in some way. This cannot be argued with respect to God, since God's goodness is eternal and unchangeable. The act of creation cannot make a contribution to achieving or improving upon God’s goodness. Aquinas therefore argues that God created the world in order for it to participate in His goodness.





To argue that a thing participates in another thing is to argue that it partakes or shares in it but, more than that, it is to affirm that a thing must necessarily share the character of the other thing, however much in an imperfect way. The one limit to God's omnipotence is that God cannot make another perfect being. The imperfection of the created world is therefore inevitable. Thus, the argument that the created world participates in God's goodness implies that the created world is good, but imperfectly so. It follows that since an infinity cannot be made greater by the addition of something finite, God's choice to create cannot be a way of adding to the amount of goodness in the world. Rather, the choice to create can be explained by God’s choice to spread out His goodness:

God wants creatures to exist so that in them his goodness is manifested, and so that his goodness, which by its essence cannot be multiplied, is at least spread out over many by participation in his likeness. 

QDV 23.1 ad 3

Bring about more good in the world cannot be a motive in creation given the eternal perfection of God's goodness. But if perfection cannot be increased, it can be "spread out over many." Usually, spreading something out without it being increased entails a dilution or diminishment. However, God can spread out His goodness without this goodness being diminished.

As to why God is spreading out His goodness in this way, Aquinas’ argument follows a Neoplatonist idea associated with Pseudo-Dionysius, the idea that things that are good are inclined, in virtue of their goodness, to share that goodness with others. By its very nature, goodness is self-diffusive. For many, this principle implies that God must necessarily create, God’s goodness requires that He must create. Aquinas explicitly subscribes to this Dionysian principle: "The sharing of being and goodness proceeds from goodness. ... Thus the good is said to be diffusive of itself and of being" (SCG 1.37.5/307).

Whilst this would seem to be part of the motive behind creation, it remains that God's spreading out His goodness in time and space does not and cannot increase the total sum of goodness. This spreading of goodness is a good thing, but not uniquely good. 

Taking an anthropomorphic perspective, we fail to recognise that God's ultimate motive is not human well-being but His own perfect goodness. Here, it may surprise many to read Aquinas making an argument which savours a great deal of the deep ecological argument for biodiversity within a planet conceived as an interconnected web of life.

The reasoning proceeds thus:
Since any choice that God makes must be suited to His perfect goodness it follows from God’s choice to create the world that the world must be good. The things that God chose to create must have been chosen with a view to making the universe good. For Aquinas, the most salient characteristic of the created world is its variety. The rich array of species supports Aquinas’ general principle that "a higher nature at its lowest connects with a lower nature at its highest" (SCG II.91.4/1775). It’s an argument for biodiversity and for interconnection. Indeed, Aquinas understands that species overlap, that human beings, for example, share features with other primates (beneath) and with the angels (above). 

Aquinas even has a sound argument for complexity that works both from a biological and theological perspective. Biologists have shown how the natural world is interconnected in such a way that the destruction of any one part has deleterious consequences for the whole. 
Theologically, the charge is that God could have made a much simpler world. James Lovelock refers to the human species as Gaia’s ‘intelligent elite’. ‘We are the intelligent elite among animal life on Earth and, whatever our mistakes, Gaia needs us.’ (Lovelock ch 1 2009). 

As Aquinas, following Aristotle, argues, human beings are unique in their rational capacity. So why does God need the other, supposedly non-rational, species? When asked what struck him most concerning God's creation, atheist scientist J. B. S. Haldane replied: ‘an inordinate fondness for beetles.’

So why didn’t God strip the species down to the most rational, and do without so many species of beetle? Aquinas has the answer, and it is very far from the anthropomorphism for which Christianity is routinely criticised. Nothing that God creates can adequately reflect God’s perfection, so to make just a few of the very best species would amount to a poor strategy. The best strategy would be to make a vast array of different kinds of things. Whilst the results will still be inadequate, in their complexity, they would better manifest God's perfection than would a simpler, more selective universe. Pasnau and Shields 2004: 139).

Subscribing to this logic, Aquinas argues explicitly that it is diversity among species rather than among individuals that makes the world better. Creating many different kinds of things is better than making many things of the same kind: "Many species adds more to the goodness of the universe than many individuals of a single species" (SCG II.45.6/1224). So much for God making the Earth just for the human species, so much for the uniqueness of human rationality giving licence to human beings to dominate and exploit the Creation. However much this may have applied in practice, it is an attitude that has no warranty in Aquinas. God could have reduced the species to the one rational species and concentrated on making more and more individual members of that rational species. God could have made more planets like the Earth and populated them with human beings. But goodness and perfection is all about complexity, diversity and balance. The best universe, the universe which most adequately manifests God’s perfection, contains fewer human beings and a greater variety of species. Biodiversity.

If it was open to God to create something or to create nothing, then it was also open to God create a world with or without intelligent life. Aquinas thinks it fitting that there are creatures with minds. God acts through will and intellect. Even the act of creation is a mental operation. It follows that whilst all human beings are a partial manifestation of God, just by being, only intellectual beings manifest God in their mode of operation (SCG II.46.3/1231). It is therefore natural that God would make some intelligent creatures. God can make the created world resemble himself through the creation of intellectual beings. Such beings have the potential to resemble God, not just by being, but also in their thoughts. Intelligent beings can form thoughts and volitions about God and, in doing so, form an element of goodness in the created world. Aquinas thus argues that "the highest perfection of the universe requires there to be some creatures in whom the form of the divine intellect is expressed by existing within intellect" (SCG II.46.5/1233). Given God's choice to create, it would have been inconsistent with His goodness not to have created intellectual beings.

Providence and Human Freedom
In fine God's goodness and God’s choice to create imposes a conditional necessity for things to be set up a certain way. To insist that all worlds are equally good (and therefore manifest God's creative energies equally, means that we would lack a basis for praising the beauty and harmony of this world. Aquinas, however, constantly praises the wisdom and justice with which God has ordered all things.





This is the doctrine of Providence, the idea that God orders all parts of creation for the best. Aquinas argues for providence in the strongest of terms.

Conservation
The doctrine of Providence follows from the argument that everything that exists comes ultimately from God; and from the argument that everything God does is done for the sake of His own goodness. It follows from these premises that God must be providently directing creatures to some end. Since God created all things for the sake of His own goodness, God’s Providence must extend over all things (SCG III.64.3/2386).

The real question concerns the extent of God's continuous and ongoing involvement with the world. And what role does human freedom play, assuming that there is even such a thing a human freedom.

Necessity and Freedom
Having argued for the doctrine of conservation, Aquinas proceeds to argue that "for all things that operate, God is a cause of their operations" (SCG 111.67). This is a strong claim. But, for Aquinas, it follows directly from claims he has already established. The first ground is the argument which shows that God is the cause of all being. Since "everything that operates is in some way the cause of being, either with respect to substantial or accidental being," in the very least, God is the remote cause of all creaturely operations (SCG III.67.1/2415). God is involved in creaturely operations having at some point played a causal role in any action. If God is ultimately responsible for the creation of all things, it follows that He must also be ultimately responsible for their actions.
The idea that God is a cause behind all creaturely operations also follows from the doctrine of conservation: "if the divine influence were to cease, every operation would cease" (SCG III.67.3/2417). Without God’s conservation, there would be no creatures and hence no creaturely operations. 
These two arguments establish Aquinas’s thesis only in a weak sense. The thesis is stated in its strong form with respect to Aquinas’ proof from motion for God's existence. 





Aquinas here reveals the full extent of God's providence. Not only does God foresee and approve of everything that happens in the universe, He plays a causal role in bringing it all about. This is God in the strongest sense, not merely as some remote enabling cause, bringing into existence and sustaining the substances that proceed to act on their own, but as the first mover in every individual causal series, beginning the series of events and directing everything that happens leading up to the ultimate intended event. "God not only gives things their forms, but also conserves them in existence, and directs them toward action, and is the end of all actions, as was said" (ST la 105.5 ad 3).

Aquinas argues that any event at the level of creatures must have some cause, which in turn also must have some cause, and so on, one cause having a further cause, until eventually we come to God. Aquinas does not, however, deny that there are true creaturely causes, that only God can exercise causal efficacy in the world. This is the view of certain Islamic philosophers which Aquinas is concerned to contest. For Aquinas, God and creatures cooperate in producing their effects (SCG 111.69-70). Nevertheless, creatures must act in virtue of being moved by God:





Aquinas proceeds to extend the argument to the human will and intellect. (SCG 111.91.2/2662). The role of Providence raises the question of human freedom. If God moves our will and intellect in ways which are consistent with our beliefs and desires, then maybe this is simply by virtue of the fact that God gave us those beliefs and desires in the first place. If all that human beings think and do is determined by God's providence, then the world lacks all indeterminacy and contingency, meaning that human thought and action lacks autonomy. Such a condition amounts to the complete denial of human autonomy, freedom and moral responsibility.

Aquinas can see the dilemma that providence and necessity pose for him:





But Aquinas doesn’t think that there is a problem since he doesn’t have to accept any of these claims. Certainly, in contradistinction to (a), Aquinas believes that all effects are subject to divine providence. He affirms that Providence governs the existence and operations of all things, including human choices (SCG 111.67, 75, 90). If this were not so, then we would hardly be in a position to say that God governed the created world at all. Against the claim made in (b), Aquinas argues that God's providence is utterly certain, infallible, and immutable. 





What God eternally wills to happen and what God sets in motion, always happens.

All of which points to the conclusion (c), the idea that all things happen of necessity. What Aquinas does is frame his argument in such a way as to combine freedom and necessity. Whatever God decrees, it happens contingently rather than necessarily. That is, necessarily in the sense of inevitability.
God has reason to create so as preserve contingency since the contingency of voluntary agents is a perfection. Aquinas shows how contingency is preserved:





Aquinas’ reasoning is essentialist, holding that there is a necessary line of development as potentialities become actualities. Nonvoluntary things are programmed to act in certain ways in order to grow and flourish. Plants grow toward the light, foxes make dens, and so on. The actions of human agents are independent of direct natural necessity. Whilst human beings do certain things in accordance with their social natures, this does not mean that humans are programmed to always act the same way. On the contrary, that social mediation and rational capacity means that human beings have the ability to change and modify thought and action to fit new circumstances. Aquinas argues that the only thing that human beings necessarily must will is happiness. (ST la 82.1). Admittedly, happiness is the ultimate earthly end, to which all things contribute. The key point to grasp is that Aquinas is arguing for a concept of necessity that entails more than inevitability by including contingency so as to preserve the sense of human autonomy and freedom. That human beings must necessarily do certain things in order to attain happiness does not mean that they will inevitably do those things on account of their inner programming.

By reasoning thus, Aquinas renders the strong case he makes for God's providence consistent with human freedom. The choices that human beings make count as free in possessing this sort of voluntary contingency. We, as human beings, have this voluntary contingency by virtue of God giving us intellects with which to discern various courses of action and form a judgement as to which course is the best to follow; and by giving us wills which we may use in order to act in pursuit of the course of action we have judged to be best. There is nothing given by our nature that determines that we will act one way rather than another, still less that we will act in the best way. However, our actions are necessary in the sense that, in the context of God's eternal and unchanging will and His providential governance of everything in the universe, our choices must be in accordance with whatever it is that God has decreed. It is from this broader perspective that we must act necessarily. 
Aquinas's conception of Providence is in the species of the ‘freedom is the appreciation of necessity’ that runs as the central thread throughout the rational tradition of philosophy, going all the way back to Plato. Aristotle argues somewhere that the value of philosophy lies in having human beings accept voluntarily what they would be forced to submit to protestingly. The tradition embraces Leibniz – all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds – Spinoza, Hegel and Marx. The freedom lies in the fact that the necessity entailed in the rational tradition is not an inevitability. Lines of development are necessary if a thing is to actualise its potential and thus become what it is. But those lines are frustratable, and do not unfold in the sense of inevitability. This is where contingency comes in, affirming the radical indeterminacy of the future. That future is always ours to create, through intellect and will. It’s just that to realise the ultimate end of happiness and thereby flourish as human beings, human beings must necessarily use their intellect and will and realise human potentials and purpose. 

To be in Accord with Creation
Aquinas’ examination of the relationship between a Creator as a perfect being and its creation raises many of the key problems in philosophy, covering time, causation, possibility, choice, infinity, freedom and determinism, good and evil, moral responsibility. The advantage of Aquinas' intellectual framework is that it allows for clarity in setting these problems in a broader frame. In many respects, Aquinas’ doctrine of creation contains arguments concerning diversity, complexity and the place of human beings in a universe containing other species that contradict the familiar criticism that Christianity is an anthropomorphic religion which gives licence to human beings to dominate and exploit. Leaving aside the extent to which this has been the case in historical practice – and even here things are nowhere near as simple as critics allege – there is no warranty for such a view in Aquinas, when his argument is set in context and considered whole. Most interesting of all, of course, is the way that Aquinas reconciles human autonomy and divine Providence so that freedom and necessity become one and the same thing. It is necessary that human beings be free, in order to be in accord with God’s creation – and thereby achieve the ultimate end of human happiness.

13 BODY AND SOUL

Human Uniqueness
In Aquinas's schema of the created universe, human beings, by their nature, stand between the brutes below and the angels above, straddling the profane and the divine like no other creature. As Aquinas argues in Aquinas's Questions on the Soul, human beings sit "on the boundary line between corporeal and separate substances" (QDA Ic). Human beings are unique in being rational animals, implicating them in both spiritual and corporeal worlds.

Human beings, though animals, are also the lowest order of the immortal. As animals, human beings are not angels, but are akin to the angels in that they can direct their intellect and will to the contemplation and love of God. 

"The soul and an angel have the same end—namely, eternal blessedness. ... But eternal blessedness is an end that is ultimate and supernatural" 

ST la 75.7 obj. 1 and ad 1

Human beings are corporeal creatures. However, they also have a rational nature which is realised in their bodies. The final good of human beings lies in the contemplation and love of God. Thus, Aquinas has a difficult task in reconciling the human body and the human soul, two essential aspects of human nature. Human beings are both animal and immortal. This means that being essentially animal entails human beings being essentially material whilst being essentially rational indicates that human being is also immaterial. Aquinas has therefore to reconcile essential features of human nature that point in diametrically opposed directions.

Aquinas’ integration of the human soul and body is remarkable the light it continues to shed on contemporary questions concerning the mind-body relation.

The Soul as a Principle of Life
The most striking thing about Aquinas’ treatment of the soul on first look is how it contradicts what most people think the soul is in Christian accounts. Our understanding of the soul tends to fit the dualism of body and soul. Aquinas recognises no such dualism. Rather, Aquinas follows Aristotle in conceiving the soul as a principle of life.
Aquinas proceeds from the simple, noting that some things are alive and some things are not. Aquinas counts both the dead and the inanimate among the non-living. 
All living things have an intrinsic end and this is their ultimate good, toward which they move themselves. Even thinking is a motion in this sense, an intellectual motion.





The idea that human beings are unique in having reason and the connection between soul and intellect would strike people as familiar. But Aquinas says much more than this. Assigning self-motion to all living beings, Aquinas maintains that all living creatures have souls, plants and animals, and non-human animals as well as human beings. Since Descartes it has been customary to think that human beings alone have souls. Aquinas's conception is grounded in a conception of a purpose driven universe whereas the body-soul dualism stems from the mechanistic conception that arose with the modern scientific revolution. Descartes’ soul-body dualism is akin to the Platonic dualism that Aquinas rejected.

Some of the difference can be explained by terminology. Those who argue that only human beings have souls could accept that plants and nonhuman animals are living organisms. But the argument that such creatures are animate implies, in Aquinas’ view, that they are ensouled. In Latin, anima means soul. Thus, to Aquinas, it is logical to consider all living things to be ensouled, since living things are, by definition, animate and since anima means soul.

Hylomorphism – matter and form related as body and soul 
Aquinas explains the phenomena of life within his four-causal explanatory framework. The doctrine of the four causes sheds interesting light on the body-soul relation. Aquinas adheres to what is known as hylomorphism, a view of the world as purpose driven, in which body and soul are related to one another as matter and form. In the Greek, hyle means matter, and morphe means form, hence hylomorphism is a holistic and non-dualistic conception of a purpose-driven world. Hylomorphism fits easily into Aquinas's four-causal explanatory framework. Indeed, the body-soul relation is understood in the first sense as a simple special case of the general relationship which obtains between form and matter. 

Therefore, what Aquinas writes on the matter and form relation informs his conception of the body and soul relation. In the first instance, then, a living body is that which is potentially alive; it is made actually alive by the presence of a form or soul. In other words, a body is a complex piece of proximate matter that only becomes an actual living being when informed by the soul - the form. To return to an earlier example, one can compare the form of a human being to the form of a house. It is the form whose presence makes something potentially something actually, that makes the bricks and mortar a house, that makes the body an actual living being.

The soul is an essential form whose presence makes a body into a particular kind of actual living being. The departure of the soul spells the demise of the entity whose soul it is. Nothing actually lives without the essential form of the soul. The hylomorphic conception of the soul is therefore a simple application of Aquinas's general explanatory framework concerning matter and form. As Aquinas argues in his Questions on the Soul:

Each being comes to be a member of its species through its essential form. Now, a human being is human insofar as he is rational. Therefore, a rational soul is the essential form of a human being. 

QDA 1 sc 1

Aquinas’ hylomorphism with respect to body and soul therefore draws its support directly from the conception of matter and form contained in the four-causal explanatory framework.

Organic versus Reductive Materialism
Hylomorphism is Aquinas’ basic approach to the question of the relationship between body and soul. There are, however, problems when it comes to reconciling hylomorphism, which is basically an Aristotelian naturalism, with the Christian cosmology, which involves a supernaturalism. It seems that Aquinas cannot avoid a dualism of some kind, in which the soul is separable from he body and has some form of postmortem existence. Yet dualism would seem to be clearly incompatible with hylomorphism. If the form of a house cannot exist without the bricks and mortar that actualize it, then it would seem to follow that the soul of a living body also cannot exist without the body whose form it is. Further, it is not clear how a soul, as the form of a body, could exist when separated from its body. If body and soul go together, as in Aristotle, then the soul dies with the body, something which contradicts Aquinas’ Christian beliefs. In the hylomorphic conception, the soul is the form of the body and therefore perishes with the body at death. 

Aquinas is therefore faced with the task of reconciling hylomorphism and his Christianity.

Aquinas rejects reductive materialism in the most emphatic terms. The reductive view seeks to explain all the properties of the soul in terms of properties contained in the material stuff that constitutes the body. Aquinas’ reasons for rejecting reductive materialism derive from his hylomorphic explanation of body and soul. Aquinas upholds a strong notion of form, marking off the souls of living organisms as distinct from the souls of nonliving hylomorphic compounds. A soul is a form, but it is a form that is responsible for the activities which characterise the living being whose form it is. This means that a soul has explanatory capabilities which are distinct from those of the forms belonging to inanimate objects. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 161).

Aquinas rejects the theories of Empedocles and Galen, for whom the soul is a kind of mixture or arrangement of simple elements, deriving its features from the properties of the elements constituting it.





In this passage, Aquinas establishes the adequacy conditions which an account of the soul must meet. Against Empedocles and Galen, Aquinas argues that the activities of soul must "transcend" the active and passive qualities of matter. The reasoning here is that material bodies have various dispositions: fire tends to rise, earth to fall, and so on. When mixed or simply arranged, the active and passive properties of the resulting mixture or simple arrangement will be a direct function of the relative contributions of the original elements and their basic dispositions. Aquinas's thought, then, is that no matter how complex a mixture becomes, it will always derive its dispositions directly from the dispositions of the elements in the mixture, with the result that all of its tendencies will be exhausted by just those elemental dispositions. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 163).

For Aquinas, reductive explanations are inadequate for the task of illuminating the nature of living systems and can make no sense of the directionality and patterned growth which characterises those systems. A human infant grows, but does not grow ceaselessly; growth ends with maturity. For Aquinas, this limited, patterned growth is common to many living systems and requires explanation. Since the elements, either singly or in combination, cannot account for this limited growth, reductive explanations which given in terms of the simple elements or their mixtures are inadequate when it comes to task of explaining life.
Aquinas’ critical comments are aimed directly at simple materialist frameworks, but have far-reaching implications. If Aquinas is correct concerning the need for an adequate account of the phenomenon of limited, patterned growth, it follows that an explanation counts as adequate only if presents a suitably rich explanatory principle. For Aquinas, simple forms of materialist explanations cannot offer such an explanation. Aquinas demands a richer, more sophisticated explanation that posits explanatory principles that go beyond those present in the basic elements. Such an explanation steers clear of narrowly reductive forms of materialism. Aquinas’ approach anticipates those biologists who working today who have been attracted to emergent properties in explaining life. (Krink and Vollrath 1998; Benton in Rose and Rose ed 2000: 209; Peacocke in Durant ed 1985: 127).

According to the emergentist view, systems of sufficient complexity exhibit properties and dispositions that cannot be derived directly from the properties manifested by the individual components of those systems. These emergentist approaches to life echo Aquinas's argument that the properties of living systems "transcend" or outstrip the properties of the elements composing those systems. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 163).

Which is to say that the Aristotelian approach to biology has survived the onslaught of reductionist mechanist science and continues to inform biological science, particularly by setting explanations of living systems within a holistic frame. (Sheldrake 1981; 1988; 1990; 2012).

Aquinas makes it clear that only an informed hylomorphism is adequate to addressing the difficult questions concerning life, body and soul. Souls are not just forms, they are essential forms whose activities as actualizers are incapable of being explained in reductive terms. Aquinas refers to the forms of simple material elements, "which are the lowest forms and those closest to matter, [and so are forms that] do not possess any operations exceeding active and passive qualities" (QDA Ic). In contrast, souls can explain the activities of living systems since they are principles that emerge from and act upon the material dispositions of the bodies whose souls they are. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 163).

Aquinas’ distinction between substantial form and nonsubstantial form is pertinent here. For Aquinas, a forms is an actualizer, making a thing that is potentially something actually something. However, not everything that is actually a thing, A, is actually a substance, something A. If a person is wan, then s/he has the form of wanness. But there is no substantial kind of wan things to which the person belongs in being wan. The forms that place a person into a substantial kind are substantial forms, making what is potentially a substance exist in actuality as a substance. Souls are substantial forms, making so much matter into a human body. Thus every living being is essentially alive: "Life is predicated not accidentally, but substantially" (ST la 18.3c); cf. InDA II.1.242-257; ST la 76.3,76.4, 77.6.)

Where in the Body Is the Soul?
Aquinas offers hylomorphism as capable of reconciling soul and body in such a way as to avoid dualism and reductionism whilst explaining a broad range of the phenomena of life. Aquinas rejects reductive materialism on account of its inability to account for the directionality and patterned, limited growth of a living system. He rejects Platonism for being unable to explain how the soul, as an immaterial substance imprisoned in the body, can play a part in the range of natural human states.

Descartes’ soul-body dualism is akin to the Platonic dualism that Aquinas rejected.

It is Aquinas’ emphasis on the natural functioning of the living system that allows him to answer the question as to where, on the body, is the soul. Aquinas exposes the question as crude and simplistic, expressing the very reductionist materialism that Aquinas has shown to be inadequate to the task of explaining the phenomena of life. The question implies the kind of body and soul dualism that Aquinas rejects and which belongs properly to the post-Cartesian scientific world. Insofar as that dualism is correct, it will be impossible to find the soul on or in the body. The soul is a spiritual and nonsubstantial thing, so, by definition, it cannot be found on the body. The question is as crude as the mechanistic science upon which it is based.

Given the tendency to think in dualistic terms, it is worth presenting Aquinas’ approach to the question of how the soul is present in the body. 

When I bang my knee, it seems obvious to say that the pain is in my knee. I rub my knee to ease the pain, so it seems clear that the pain is in the knee. Yet there is solid research which shows that people who have lost limbs feel pain as though that pain is in their lost limbs. The fact is that our nervous systems contain pain receptors which means that an injury suffered to the knee is processed as pain in the brain. Thus, although the injury is to the knee, we feel the pain in the brain. The pain is in the head, even though the injury is to a body part. 

For Aquinas, hylomorphism offers a rich and sophisticated approach to the questions of life, body and soul. 

Aquinas begins by setting out the view he will proceed to oppose— the view that the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. 

If the human soul is essentially characterized by intellectual and perceptual powers, then the whole soul is present in every part of the body. From this is follows that each of the soul’s necessary and defining powers must also be present in each part of the body. Which means that each of the soul's powers is present, for example, in our knees and that our knees have in them the power to perceive, including the power to see. 

This reduction to absurdity would seem sufficient to deal a fatal blow to hylomophism, but this is not Aquinas’ view, it is the view he opposes.

Aquinas does not think that our knees, or any other body part, thinks. He observes that the relation the soul has to the whole animated body is not the same relation it has to each part of the body. To understand Aquinas’ view, we can consider the soul in two ways. The whole soul and all of its powers are present in each part of the animated body, yet the individual powers of soul are operative only in those parts of the body that have functionally suitable matter. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 173). Thus, not every part of a car is itself a car (the shock absorbers are not cars, for example), and, further, no proper part of the car is a car. It is the whole car that is a car, so that when you look at any part of a car, you see a car. ‘That said, only some parts of a car are structured for internal combustion and the tires, which are round and rubber, cannot perform that function. So, says Aquinas, the soul's powers will relate to the individual parts of the body in terms of the sort of potentiality each presents in virtue of its proximate matter. Eyes will see, ears will hear, and teeth will tear and grind. No one of these is suited for a function discharged by any of the others.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 173).

In fine, Aquinas' hylomorphism considers the powers of the soul not in isolation but together as powers of an animated body. This does not mean that the soul can see, of its own accord. Rather, it is the eye that sees, on account of being so structured as to detect light. But the eye considered in isolation as so much matter cannot see by itself. An eye plucked out of its socket is an eye only equivocally. It is only an eye in the same way that an eye in a statue is an eye. It has the outward appearance of an eye, but it is not, in fact, an eye, since it cannot see. To see, the eye needs to be as a component in a properly functioning organism.

Aquinas’ hylomorphism therefore involves a holistic approach in which the whole soul is present in every part of the body. The soul is not attached to the body at some point, as a physical organ or gland which acts in some way as a causal conduit that moves back and forth between the corporeal and the spiritual. So the question as to where on the body the soul is located is a non-question, because it seeks to identify the soul as something it is not – an organ or a gland, a physical appendage. 

At the same time, not every part of the soul manifests every power in terms of which the soul is defined. This is because not every part of the body provides the sort of matter which is required for the discharging of the soul's various powers. ‘What perceives are hylomorphic compounds, not souls when considered in their own right, and not bodies when bereft of their souls.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 173-174). In fine, we live in houses – bricks informed in the appropriate way to qualify as a house. We do not live in the forms of houses and we do not live in a pile of bricks. With Aquinas, form and matter go together in an actualised existence.

Beyond Dualism
The hylomorphism of Thomas Aquinas steers a middle course between the twin reefs of the mind and body dualism, Platonic idealism and reductive materialism. Aquinas considers both to be inadequate when it comes to explaining the phenomena of life. The biggest problem with hylomorphism is the extent to which it seems to deny some of the key aspects of the Christian orthodoxy that is integral to Aquinas's complete philosophical system. Aquinas believes that an accommodation is possible given the special status of intellect, the unique psychic power that proceeds above and beyond the body and its physical operations. Here is a reason that operates at a degree of autonomy apart from the sensual world of natural necessity. Thus, in contrast to perception, thinking makes human beings spiritual and so brings them closer to the divine. It is in these terms that Aquinas renders hylomorphism consistent with Christian theism. This reconciliation is founded upon viewing the intellect to be unique among the powers of the soul. 

14 SENSE AND INTELLECT

The Nature of Cognition
The powers that most interest Aquinas are those that are distinctively human. Aquinas writes little about vegetative powers, he writes more about the senses, but writes most about intellect, the power that is uniquely human.

For Aquinas, conceptual questions concerning the nature of sense and intellect are more important than the physical processes that lie beneath the cognitive capacities. In explicating the usefulness of the human cognitive capacities, Aquinas proceeds from the assumption that these capacities were created by God for specific purposes. In describing the nature of cognition early in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas distinguishes between cognitive beings and non-cognitive beings in these terms. 





The passage indicates why cognition is useful. Things that lack cognition, such as rocks and trees, "have nothing other than their own form alone." In contrast, cognitive beings can acquire other forms.

Aquinas sets the question within his general explanatory framework, seeking a general conceptual account and not a specific physical story. At this general level, Aquinas defines cognition as the acquisition of information. To go further than this requires an examination of the ways in which living things cognize.

Cognitive Powers
The human cognitive powers divide into two, the sensory and the intellectual, and then again into nine sensory powers and two intellectual powers. This differentiation is the product of our need to acquire certain specific sorts of information about the world. Basically, there are two kinds of information that human beings need to acquire: 

1.	particular information about the world around us: how big a thing is, what color it is, where it is, and so on.
2.	general concepts that allow us to think about and talk about things in the world, the concepts large, yellow, or ten feet away, and so on.

Human beings need the sensory powers to acquire, retain, and process particular information about the world, and they need the intellectual powers to acquire, retain, and process general information. Once more, Aquinas applies his explanatory framework and the notion of final causality, his reference to human needs expresses the teleological conviction that human beings have and exercise their powers in order to flourish.

Sensation
At the sensory level, Aquinas distinguishes five external senses. These are the cognitive powers that directly receive external stimulus. Each of these five senses has its own kind of proper object; we distinguish between the different senses according to the differences in the sensible qualities they perceive: “The external thing making the impression is what the senses perceive per se, and the sensory powers are distinguished in terms of how that cause differs"(STla78.3c).






Touch: Temperature, and so on

In addition to the five external senses, there are the four internal senses. These store and process the sensory information initially acquired through the external senses:

Common sense: Compares impressions of different senses and reflects on the sensations themselves;
Imagination (also called phantasia): Stores sensory impressions received in the common sense;
Estimative power (known in human beings as the cogitative power): Responsible for instinctive reactions to sensory stimulus, such as fear of spiders Memory: Stores impressions produced by the estimative power.

Pasnau and Shields 2004: 181

Human beings and other animals possess all these powers since they need to do all these things in order to flourish: "Because nature does not fail in necessary things, there must be as many actions on the part of the sensory soul as are adequate for the life of a complete animal. And all of those actions that cannot be reduced to a single principle require distinct powers" (ST la 78.4c).

Human beings have a sophisticated cognitive capability on account of possessing these powers. Human beings are able not only to store and recall sensory information but can process that information in certain ways to achieve some purpose and gain some degree of self-awareness in the process.

The Immateriality of Cognition
Aquinas recognises the remarkable capacities that the sensory powers give to non-human animals. Nevertheless, these powers are limited since animals lack the human capacity for abstract, conceptual thought. At this point, the distinction between particular and general information leads Aquinas to draw a further distinction between sense and intellect. This distinction can be elaborated through two theses:

1.	The senses can be acted on by particular material stimuli—colors, sounds, textures, and so on—only if they are themselves material.
2.	The intellect can form abstract, general concepts only if it is immaterial.

Pasnau and Shields 2004: 182-183

The basic idea behind Aquinas's arguments for the intellect is contained in the following passage:





Aquinas distinguishes between cognitive beings and non-cognitive beings, the latter being "confined and limited." Aquinas here elucidates the idea behind that distinction. He identifies matter as that which is responsible for confining and limiting beings so that they can have "nothing other than their own form alone." Plants and such like are too material to have any sort of cognition, the senses are less material, and the intellect still less.

Aquinas thus argues for the immateriality of the intellect, as something distinct from the confines and limits of matter:





The argument can be set out schematically:

1.	Anything received in something is received in accord with the state of the recipient.
2.	Something is cognized in accordance with how its form is received in the cognitive power.
3.	The intellect cognizes the abstract nature of a thing, apart from its material conditions.
4.	Therefore, a form is received within intellect apart from its material conditions (from [2] and [3]).
5.	Therefore, the intellect exists in an immaterial state (from [1] and [4]).

Pasnau and Shields 2004: 183

The first three premises are straightforward enough. The first premise states simply that the way a thing is received is influenced by the state of what receives it – the water poured into a jug takes on the shape of the jug. The second premise repeats the conception of cognition stated earlier, that for a thing to be cognized is for its form to be received in a certain way in a cognitive power. The third premise asserts that the intellect grasps the abstract natures of things and then connects this with the thesis that matter is what makes a thing particular. 

If Aquinas can establish what (4) claims, then he would seem entitled to the intellect's immateriality. For (4) makes really quite a strong claim—that the intellect takes in forms that are entirely without matter. This must mean something more than what was meant when Aquinas claimed that the senses receive forms "without matter"; what that meant, as we have seen, was that the senses do not take on exactly the material conditions that the external object has. But here the claim must be something further — that the forms do not carry with them any "material conditions," which is to say that they do not bring about any material change in the thing they inform. This seems possible only if the thing they inform, the intellect, is immaterial. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion stated in (5).
Once (4) is given this strong reading, it becomes clear that the real weight of the argument rests on the inference to (4) from (2) and (3). Here we are told that the intellect's ability to think abstractly requires that forms be received abstractly in intellect, and since abstract thought is thought that strips away the matter, it is supposed to follow that the forms received in intellect will themselves be stripped of matter. All of this puts a great deal of weight on premise (2)—that how a thing is cognized depends on how its form is received.

If we were then to invoke (2) in the strong form that Aquinas needs, and hold that the way a thing is cognized matches how its form is received in the cognitive power, then we would conclude that a person’s visual powers altogether lack colour. There is no reason to accept a direct inference from how a thing is cognized (in black and white or immaterially) to what the cognitive faculty is like (black and white or immaterial). Construed in such a manner, the second premise is false. Thus, Aquinas can secure his conclusion only with another, defensible interpretation of this premise, or by advancing another argument altogether. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 184-185).

Cognitive Functions
Whether any of Aquinas's arguments for the intellect's immateriality are effective is questionable. However, the intellect's immateriality is just the first step toward a full account of human cognition. On his premises, Aquinas is committed to the view that human beings are a hybrid of two cognitive systems, a physical sensory system and a nonphysical intellectual system. This makes human beings unique in the created world. Human beings are distinguished from other animals in having an immaterial intellect, and are distinguished from God and the angels in combining this intellect with a physical system for detecting sensible qualities in the world around us. 

The Objects of Intellect
The unique hybrid status of human beings induces Aquinas to draw a number of conclusions with respect to the proper objects of the human cognitive powers:

The objects of cognition are proportionate to the cognitive powers. There are, however, three levels of cognitive powers, (i) One kind of cognitive power, sense, is the actuality of a bodily organ, and so the object of any sensory capacity is a form as it exists in bodily matter. Because this sort of matter is the principle of individuation, every capacity of the sensory part is cognitive of particulars only, (ii) There is another kind of cognitive power that is neither the actuality of a bodily organ, nor in any way connected to bodily matter.




Aquinas here takes us through three different levels of cognitive powers: 
(i) sensory powers; 
(ii) purely intellectual powers, as in an angel; 
(iii) intellectual powers that are connected to a body capable of sensation, as in a human being. 

The governing principle is that "the objects of cognition are proportionate to the cognitive powers." This means that the various kinds of cognitive powers are created to cope with the various sorts of information in the world. Having established this principle, Aquinas proceeds to make a series of claims about each level of cognitive power. 

First, Aquinas argues, with respect to the senses, that every sensory capacity is cognitive of particulars only. If the senses are physical, and if physical things are incapable of abstract, universal cognition, then it follows that the senses must be limited to particulars.
In the second place, Aquinas explains that the description of the objects of intellect as forms abstracted from matter implies different things depending on the kind of intellect in question. The passage above goes on to distinguish between angelic intellect and human intellect. From the simple observation that human beings have intellects that are attached to a physical system for detecting sensory stimuli, Aquinas delineates the consequences for our abilities to form concepts and thus achieve knowledge of both the material and immaterial realms. He asks us to imagine an angel, a being that possesses an intellect but lacks sensation, which is neither physical "nor in any way connected to bodily matter". He then asks how things are different for human beings. Angels, Aquinas maintains, think about forms that are entirely separate from matter, forms that are "subsisting without matter." A Platonist would interpret this as meaning that the angels spend their time thinking about the Form of the Good, and so on. Aquinas, however, is not a Platonist. He argues that angels spend their time thinking about each other and about God and God's ideas. Their intellects are not directly attuned to the physical world. In thinking about God's ideas of the world, the angels can gain information about the world. But this is not what they were designed to do. Imagine a philosopher as a being so occupied by the world of ideas as to be completely abstracted from what is described as "the real world." For the ‘ordinary’ man and woman of common sense, the figure of the philosopher as a ‘head in the clouds’ being is comical and strange. The angels, however, are such abstracted beings by design, as a mark of their superior intellects and their greater worth in general.

Whilst human intellects are non-physical, "not the actuality of any organ", the intellect belongs to a soul that is the actuality of a body, an integral part of the human body. The human intellect is a part of a composite substance that possesses sensory powers. The direct connection of the sense to the physical world means that the human intellect has direct access to a realm of information, something the angels have only in an indirect sense. This direct access to information indicates something about the proper operation of human beings. For Aquinas, it is natural for the human intellect is to understand the nature of material things, albeit in abstraction from particular cases. He this argues that the proper object of the human intellect is "a form existing individually in bodily matter, but not as it is in such matter" (ST la 85.1c). In other words, human beings have been designed to be physicists and biologists and astronomers. This is what human beings do best. Mathematics and philosophy continue this project to a higher level of abstraction.

These natural talents come at a price. For if human beings can take pride in their comparison to other animals, they should be humbled by their comparison to the angels. Whereas human beings are naturally oriented downward, toward the physical world, the angels are naturally oriented upward, toward God. Above beasts and below angels, human beings have the capacity to understand spiritual things, but only by looking through material things first. The problem is that human beings have a natural tendency to remain at the level of that first look, dwelling in the sensible world, the natural environment of beings ruled in the first instance by the senses. The sensible world is a window on the spiritual, but human beings have a tendency to fix their gaze where they look first – the sensible world. Theology may be the loftiest of the sciences, but human beings can see only dimly. 

These observations lead to a further thesis concerning the human cognitive powers. This is the thesis that the proper objects of the human intellect are the natures of material things, abstracted from their material conditions. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 187-188). 
The question in light of this discussion is concerns how this process of abstraction from the material world takes place. Before addressing this question, though, we need to consider another thesis that Aquinas presents with respect to the objects of intellect. Aquinas holds that the intellect is not only capable of abstraction but is actually bound by it, meaning it is incapable of directly grasping material individuals: "Our intellect is directly cognitive only of universals" (ST la 86.Ic). This entails the thesis that the intellect is limited to apprehending the universal in the same way that the senses are limited to apprehending the particular. In fine, the human intellect can directly apprehend natures only to the extent that they have been abstracted from their material conditions. Particular material things cannot, therefore, be directly apprehended.

Abstraction
The senses provide the data to the intellect, and the intellect uses this data to form universal concepts. 





By 'phantasms', Aquinas means sensory representations —sensible species — as they are manifested within the internal senses of the brain. These ‘phantasms’ supply the data for intellectual cognition, but they are unsuited to do so directly. Since phantasms are physical (that is, they inform the brain as a physical organ), they cannot inform something that is non-physical, the intellect. In other words, phantasms cannot have any direct causal impact on the intellect. Further, phantasms represent particular sensible qualities, "the individual matter" of the things that make up the world, the notes of a tune, the colour of a jumper and so on. However, this representational content is unsuited to the intellectual level. Phantasms, therefore, need to be transformed from sensible species into intelligible species, by which Aquinas means mental representations at the level of intellect. And this transformation requires abstraction. Here we see mind as an active agent for Aquinas.

Abstraction plays a central role in Aquinas’ philosophy. Aquinas distinguishes between two intellectual powers, agent intellect and possible intellect. Agent intellect is the active power that abstracts away from the particular material conditions of phantasms, thus uncovering the universal form; Possible intellect is the power that first receives the universal forms abstracted from phantasms and then reasons using them. 

For Aquinas, 'mind' is a cover term for three different immaterial powers of the soul: the cognitive powers of agent intellect and possible intellect plus the appetitive power of will.

Whilst this distinction between the two cognitive powers derives from Aristotle's De anima (III.5), Aquinas presents his own version of the distinction as against contemporary commentators. Whilst some thought that the agent intellect to be a divine power and not a power of the human soul, others, such as Averroes denied that even the possible intellect belongs to the human soul. Aquinas’ response was that such views would make it impossible for human beings to think as individuals. He took it to be self-evident that human beings do so think, therefore these commentators must be wrong.





Amongst those who accepted that both agent intellect and possible intellect to be powers of the human soul were those who questioned that they are distinct powers. Aquinas replied that these powers have to be distinct, since the agent intellect is active whereas the possible intellect is passive, and no one power can be active and passive in the same respect. (ST la 79.7c.)

Drawing the distinction in this way, Aquinas regarded the possible intellect to be initially a blank slate (tabula rasa), void of all ideas but potentially cognizant of any universal concept. In contrast, the agent intellect is actualized from the start. 
It is apparent that it is difficult to place Aquinas on either side of the empiricist and rationalist debate that would come to characterise the problematic of modern philosophy. As Aquinas argued, there is nothing in the intellect that hasn’t first been in the senses. Aquinas affirms a view of the mind as active in the process of abstraction. Possible intellect is a blank state but agent intellect is actualized from the start. 
Aquinas does not, in the manner of Plato before him and Kant after him, uphold a belief in innate knowledge on the part of the agent intellect. For Aquinas, we can have knowledge only when intelligible species are received in the possible intellect. Further, it is not knowledge that the agent intellect has but the capacity to draw out universal ideas from sensory stimulus. The agent intellect can do nothing without such stimulus in the form of phantasms. Therefore, Aquinas concludes, "it is necessary to say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from phantasms." (ST la 85.Ic). Aquinas states the point directly: "the whole of our intellect's cognition is derived from the senses" (InDT1.3c).

The capacity on the part of agent intellect to elicit universal ideas from sensory stimulus is the capacity for abstraction. Aquinas indicates how this abstraction proceeds. 

And this is to abstract the universal from the particular, or an intelligible species from phantasms: to consider the nature of the species without considering the individual principles that are represented by the phantasms. 

ST la 85.1 ad 1

Abstraction is therefore a process of selective attention, in which the agent intellect focuses on one thing (the form alone) and brackets off the rest (the particular material conditions). Aquinas takes this capacity to be something that we do, requiring no further explication. Abstraction is something that human beings need to do, given their cognitive orientation, as a condition of intellectual cognition. Human beings are not angels, detached from the material world; human beings have no option but to think through matter, if they are to think at all. And this requires that human beings engage in the process of abstraction.

Illumination
Aquinas makes one further move when it comes to explaining the agent intellect's capacity for abstraction. Responding to the question of how the agent intellect has the capacity to transform phantasms the way it does, Aquinas remarks that the human intellect participates in the light of the divine intellect and as a result comes to receive the capacity to illuminate phantasms through its own light: "That intellectual light that is in us is nothing other than a certain likeness of the uncreated light, obtained through participation" (ST la 84.5c).

In making this argument, Aquinas goes beyond the naturalist explanation of human cognition to make a supernatural appeal. In light of this shift it becomes clear why Aquinas doesn’t think that the capacity for abstraction can be analyzed further. Invoking the divine light, Aquinas is moving beyond the naturalistic and into the realm of the supernatural. Up to this point, Aquinas’ account of cognition had been thoroughly Aristotelian. Now, he draws upon St. Augustine, for whom human understanding requires some sort of divine illumination. In On the Teacher (De magistro), St. Augustine wrote: "When I speak the truth, I do not teach someone who sees these truths. For he is taught not by my words but by the things themselves made manifest within when God discloses them." (12.40).
In Aquinas’ version of this doctrine, human understanding requires divine illumination only at the moment of creation and therefore not as something which is ongoing over the life course. Divine illumination is something that God pours into us at the start, not something that is continuously poured into us. Aquinas holds that all human capacities are God-given. God’s involvement need not be ongoing. Human beings have been equipped with an agent intellect, which in turn has been created with the innate capacity to grasp the universal in the particular. Human beings can attain understanding by virtue of having and employing this agent intellect. 

The Cooperation between the Senses and the Intellect
In addressing the question of the distinctive characteristics of human beings, Aquinas highlights the fact that, in contradistinction to other living things, human beings are unique among the animals in having immaterial intellects. Human beings are distinct from other animals on account of having an intellect. At the same time, human beings are distinct from other intellectual beings — God and the angels — on account of having an animal body. Aquinas's theory of cognition therefore amounts to an explanation of the cooperation between the senses and the intellect to aid the our human understanding of ourselves and the world around us.

15 THE END OF HUMAN LIFE

Fulfilment
Aquinas’ position is characterised by a pervasive theism; he defines the ultimate end of the human being as union with God: "Final and complete happiness can consist in nothing other than the vision of the divine essence" (ST Ia2ae 3.8c). This should not, however, be taken to mean, as Shadia Drury charges, that Aquinas betrays the natural law by subordinating earthly happiness to supernatural happiness. Aquinas takes pains to argue that natural things have natural ends which are to be realised if those things are to flourish. The poet Dante has been praised, rightly, for his humanist, even secular approach to human happiness (Auerbach 2001). The truth is that Dante follows Aquinas’ arrangement of natural and supernatural ends in their appropriate order. Aquinas, in short, realises Aristotle’s earthly happiness in the first place, and then directs us to supernatural ends in addition. The charge of subordination of the one to the other amounts to no  more than that earthly happiness as human fulfilment points necessarily to complete fulfilment in a spiritual sense. 

Further, beatitude as the final final end, as it were, is not a matter of blind faith for Aquinas. Nothing was a matter of blind faith for Aquinas. Drury argues that whenever reason clashes with faith, Aquinas had no compunction in sacrificing reason to faith. Aquinas is, however, noted for reconciling the claims of faith and reason. He is aware, however, that there are points beyond which reason cannot go and must remain silent. Blaise Pascal was himself a scientific and mathematician of note, but he too came to realise that ‘the heart has its reasons’. The problem with a narrow rationalism such as that espoused by Drury is that it is too brittle to deal with the richness and complexity of the human condition and quite often overextends reasons, inviting a reaction as an irrationalism.

Aquinas advances his claims in accordance with the interlocking concatenation of facts concerning human nature, the divine essence, the relation between creatures and their creator, and the structure of the human will. These are all facts he considers himself to have demonstrated rationally and which are all grounded in and supported by his general explanatory framework. Hardly irrational. 

In a general sense, Aquinas’ investigations into human conduct articulate a broad teleology that is perfectly intelligible and reasonable: human beings are teleological beings in that they do things for reasons which reflect their goals. Human behaviour is goal-driven. In this vein, Aquinas argues that people act in order to attain their goals.

It is reasonable, then, to ask what sorts of goals human beings should best adopt in order to realise their purposes as human beings, both with respect to local decisions and to organising their long-term and ultimate life plans. Aquinas therefore sets the investigation of human conduct within the broader frame of what is the best end of human beings. By end, Aquinas means more than actions finish or conclude, but of pursuing some activity with a defensible intention or goal in view, achieving one's ambitions, and concluding one's affairs by attaining these goals. For Aquinas, the end of an action is its goal, and the end of a human life gives that life its overarching purpose. That notion of an overarching purpose may strike some as rather grand. But the basic idea that human beings are teleological beings acting with some purpose in view is readily understandable. Human beings do things with some goal in mind or with various ends in view. Those who are still sceptical should ask themselves why they are reading this book? The act of reading cannot be purposeless, even if the reason given is nothing better to, that still remains a reason. Even stated negatively, as ‘reading with no good purpose in view’, implies purposive behaviour as the norm.

Aquinas is concerned to argue that once it is accepted that some actions are done for the sake of achieving certain ends, then it should be a straightforward enough task to show that human beings have a single overarching end, a purpose that a rational person, capable of reflecting upon ends, should embrace. This is an important point, given the tendency of some critics to argue that Aquinas sacrifices reason and subordinates human freedom to a supernatural dogma. There are, in truth, two conceptions of freedom in collision here. A libertarian conception identifies freedom with individual choice on this earth. Any notion of ends which human beings ought to attain precludes such a notion of choice and therefore stands convicted of contradicting human freedom. There is a misunderstanding here which betrays a certain philosophical ignorance. 
For Aquinas, the end of human life is not chosen by individuals but embraced. Human beings do not and cannot choose their ultimate ends; these ends follow from the natures or essences which define human beings as human. These natures or essences are not chosen. Human beings cannot choose to be rabbits, oak trees, cars or houses, the potential to become so does not exist in the human essence. Human beings are not free to choose in this, the most profound, sense.

Once it is accepted that human beings have an end, it remains to specify what that end consists in. Aquinas’ teleological approach to the human end culminates in the beatific vision of God as forming its ultimate content. Aquinas’ reasoning connects natural and supernatural ends leading to the ultimate end.

That There Is a Human End
Aquinas begins by demonstrating that there is such a thing as a human end. 
Conceiving an end as what a thing is for, an end is effectively a function. When we ask what a computer or a TV is for, we are searching for its function. When we come to ask what a human being is for, we may meet the objection that since a human being is not an artefact like a computer or a TV, and therefore will lack a function conceived as an end imposed by conscious design. It isn’t obvious, therefore, that a human beings is for anything at all in this sense. 

But this is not the sense in which Aquinas reasons. Aquinas does not assert that human beings act uniformly for the sake of something whenever they act intentionally and the proceed to infer that there is one final end for human beings. Rather, Aquinas proceeds from what he considers to be an established fact concerning human beings, that all human beings have a single and unified nature:





Aquinas affirms the fundamental unity of human beings. Since human beings are unified beings, each human being is some one determinate entity. Central to this conception of unity is human beings organizing their various activities around some one end state.

The conception of a unifying intrinsic end allows Aquinas to identify a single final good for human beings. Certainly, Aquinas is well aware that each human being is drawn in the immediate sense to that form of life s/he has chosen or simply developed: the fisherman wants to fish, the philosopher wants to philosophize, the footballer wants to play football, the doctor wants to doctor. For Aquinas, however, these are subordinate activities in that they are desired and pursued not as ends in themselves but make a contribution to a more comprehensive good, the ultimate end of human beings: "the end has the nature of the good" (InNE 1.5.58). Aquinas thus argues: "There must be some ultimate end on account of which all other things are desired, while this end itself is not desired on account of anything else" (InNE 1.1.22). The ultimate end for human beings is their final good, something that is done for its own sake and not for the sake of something other than itself. The ultimate end is that final good which, upon its attainment, leaves a human being complete, lacking in nothing (InNE 1.9.106). Aquinas therefore cites Aristotle approvingly when commenting all "philosophers have rightly declared that the good is what all desire" (InNE 1.1.9). Aquinas therefore conceives a complex interimbrication of connections which bind human desire, the human end, and the complete, fulfilling human good together. Aquinas’ logic is sound. All human beings desire their own good; this good is the end of human life; therefore all human beings desire their own end. With end conceived as function, we can say that all human beings desire to function well, which is to argue that all human beings desire to attain the best form of life available to them as human beings, to flourish well in accordance with their natures or essences.

Happiness
Identifying the human end as the ultimate object of desire, Aquinas has no trouble demonstrating that what human beings desire in this ultimate sense is happiness. To the extent that a person is lacking something essential to well-being, then s/he will regard himself/herself as unhappy rather than happy, lacking in something worth having. Indeed, "since happiness is the ultimate end of all of our activities, it is the perfect good and self-sufficient" (InNE 1.9.117).
In presenting this argument, Aquinas is well aware that a person may well be happy and yet consider additional and unattained goods to be desirable. Aquinas responds thus:





Indeed, a happy life could be made better by the addition of further goods, and could be made still more desirable, since "the greater the good, the more desirable it is" (InNE 1.9.116). However, happiness is such a condition which is already utterly complete and self-sufficient, although it could be augmented by further goods.

Aquinas is well aware of the obvious contention that people disagree, profoundly and substantively, about what happiness is and about what qualifies as happiness. Anyone can "admit that happiness is the very best of things," believing even "that it is the ultimate end and the perfect self-sufficient good." However, "it is rather obvious that some clarification must be made about happiness to give us knowledge of its specific nature" (InNE 1.10.118). Aquinas relates these familiar questions to the biggest question of all, what, ultimately, what constitutes the complete and comprehensive good for human beings.

Answering the question as to what happiness is, is preliminary to deeper investigation of the ultimate end. We need to know what happiness is to be able to accept it as our final good, structuring our lives in accordance to that end. Aquinas begins by showing what happiness is not.

What Happiness Is Not

For Aquinas, happiness does not consist in the satisfaction of desire as such. 

Aquinas identifies two conceptions of happiness which have attracted and which continue to attract many followers: pleasure and honour. We may read these in the familiar terms of hedonism, the pursuit of wants, and power, the pursuit of worldly position.

Aquinas demonstrates that neither pleasure nor honour meets the criteria for being the ultimate good and therefore fail to deliver happiness in the complete sense. Aquinas’ critical comments on pleasure make clear the extent to which his conception of happiness affirms certain metaphysical and psychological principles grounded in human nature:





Aquinas’ criticisms are not directed against sensuous pleasure as such. An ethical position that denies and sets itself against the pleasure of sexual intercourse is hardly persuasive. Aquinas has not missed the obvious. Rather, he is criticising hedonism, the view that identifies happiness with sensuous pleasure and no more. For Aquinas, this falls short of complete human happiness; the hedonists effectively reduce themselves and human beings to pigs, attaining pleasure in the sensuous sense but falling short of all that human beings are capable of. This may appear mean, even priggish. In The Naked Ape, zoologist Desmond Morris noted that ‘the human animal .. was still finding it hard to come to terms with its biological nature.’ Morris details our main ‘animal urges’ and insists that the criticism that these urges ‘make us bestial or brutish is wilfully to misrepresent the zoological way of looking at human behaviour.’ It is also to misrepresent human beings. Morris concludes:

A quarter of a century later, the message remains the same - you are a member of the most extraordinary animal species that has ever lived. Understand your animal nature and accept it.

Morris The Naked Ape Intro

But, of course, for Aquinas the question is not so simple. Human beings are between beasts and angels, meaning that human nature points upwards and downwards. Aquinas understands bodily pleasure as a good, he just denies that bodily pleasure alone is the best life available to human beings. Human beings, like other animals, are built to seek pleasure. But human beings, unlike other animals, are equipped with a rational capacity which makes the best life something more than the pursuit of the pleasures of the flesh. This capacity for reasoning differentiates human beings from other animals so that human ends are different to pig ends. Thus, the hedonistic pursuit of a life of pleasure befits only an animal with a perceptual soul. Human beings possess rational souls and therefore aim at a true happiness beyond sensuous pleasure.

Bodily pleasure is a good thing for human beings, but pursued on its own and in itself, it can leave human beings unfulfilled as human beings, and hence unhappy. Aquinas is not arguing against bodily pleasure as such, but against a life of perfect hedonism which identifies happiness as no more than the pursuit of bodily pleasure. Aquinas’ claim is that a better life is available to human beings as rational beings.

Aquinas subjects the life of honour to similar criticism. Again, Aquinas is not arguing that honour as such is a bad thing, no more than he was arguing that sensuous pleasure is, in itself, a bad thing. Honour, like pleasure, is a good thing. However, like pleasure, honour cannot qualify as the good. 
Aquinas begins by noting that honour is not something a happy agent does. It is not a condition of happiness or fulfilment intrinsic to the person who is honoured. The bestowal of honour is dependent not upon the character of the person upon whom it is bestowed, but upon the attitudes of the bestower. "Therefore honour is something more extrinsic and superficial than the goal we are seeking" (InNE 1.5.64). Further, it is perverse to seek honour from people whom we despise. Rather, we seek honour from people whom we esteem, people whose character we admire and whose judgment we respect. It is character, then, that is worthy, not honour. Honour is subordinate to something that is more worthy than itself, and therefore cannot be considered as something which constitutes the ultimate good of human beings:





The ultimate good, as ultimate, is sought for itself, not for anything beyond it. Since it is pursued for something beyond itself, honour cannot be the supreme good. As with power, so with money. Those who identify their final good with money are misguided and cannot attain complete happiness. Since money is essentially an instrument for procuring things beyond itself, it is not even an end at all, let alone something which constitutes the final or ultimate end. (InNE 1.9.70).

In fine, happiness is neither pleasure nor honour, nor anything which is a mere means to an end.

What Happiness Is
In defining what happiness is, Aquinas focuses upon those aspects of human nature that undergirds his conception of happiness. For Aquinas, the question as to what constitutes human happiness is an aspect of the general question as to what makes a thing a good thing. The answer as to what the ultimate good of a thing is is contained in the premises of the question, that is, in the nature of the kind of thing whose good is being sought.

Thus, a good television is a television that operates well, as televisions are supposed to operate. Here, we understand operate in the sense of functioning well. Similarly, a good knife is one that does well what knives are designed to do. A good road operates as roads are intended to operate. It’s all about a thing functioning well according to the way it is designed. In general:





The ‘proper operation of man’ is different from the proper operation of artefacts. Human beings adopt various occupations for themselves whereas artefacts have derived functions. To ask what it is to be a good musician, we ask a question about human beings considered as musicians, and come therefore to focus on the activity of playing an instrument in forming a judgment.

Human beings, however, have functions and therefore operations as human beings, not just as musicians or any other occupation. Aquinas responds to scepticism concerning this point by considering and rejecting the possibility that human beings should be naturally functionless:





In this passage, Aquinas makes two points. In the first place, if humans can arrange for things to have functions, then God can do so to an even greater extent. In contrast to artefacts, living things have functions as a result of God's creating them. In the second place, human beings, like artifacts, are what they are on by virtue of their forms. Going back to a point made earlier, a form is something the presence of which makes a thing what it is in actuality. Further, a form specifies what a thing does. A television form makes the material elements of a television – the plastic, metal, and silicon – an actual television, and this form also specifies a television’s operation. This form sets the conditions for being a good television, one that succeeds in realizing the operations of the form. The question, then, is what a human form specifies as a human being's operation. Aquinas proceeds on the basis of his metaphysical and psychological foundations, noting that a human being has a special character:





Aquinas’ point here is in the same manner in which we identify the operation of a television by singling out its form, so we discern the proper operation of a human being by identifying the human form, which is the human soul. A human soul, however, differs from an artefact's form in that the soul brings life and not just structure to a material system. A soul is that on account of which human beings are alive. However, a human soul involves more than the bare principle of life. A human soul demarcates human beings from nonliving entities but also from other sorts of living creatures, as a living entity that shares some activities with vegetable and animal life but holds other activities uniquely - the activities of reason. 

This demarcation allows us to determine the human function, and hence the human good, and then, finally, human happiness. Aquinas holds that reason and its expression are implicated in a fundamental sense in human flourishing, since the proper operation of a human being lies in the activity of reason. The human function is identified by reference to what is unique and essential to human beings, and that is reason. Since a human being is essentially an entity which is capable of reasoning, it follows that the human function lies in the proper expression of reason and that, therefore, reasoning well is the final good of a human being.

To attain the human good, therefore, a human being should participate in a life of rational activity, a life orchestrated by and is an expression of reason. Since human beings are social beings as well as rational beings, the question arises of the extent to which a person’s goodness relates to the well-being of others, given the possibility that what is required for the flourishing of one person can, in certain circumstances, come to conflict with the conditions for the flourishing of others. Given the central role of charity in Aquinas's scheme of Christian virtue, and given that human beings want to seek their own happiness by living lives that are rich in rational activity, Aquinas needs to show why individual human beings should be motivated to engage in other-regarding virtuous activity. Aquinas thus shows how we move beyond the individual human good to apprehend an objectively given and attained happiness via the transition from the expression of the human function to the practice of human virtue.

Happiness and Blessedness – Aquinas’ Beatific Vision
Up to this point, Aquinas follows Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in identifying the goal of human life. Now, however, Aquinas leaves Aristotle and philosophy behind and turns to theology. On the philosophical plane, Aquinas remains firmly within the terms of Aristotelian philosophy, confirming Aristotle’s view that human happiness is attained through the proper exercise of reason. But Aquinas’ final specification of the most true and most elevated expression of rational human nature takes Christian form. In Aquinas’ view, human beings reach their cognitive peak when, having died in a state of grace, we enjoy the beatific vision. Aquinas distinguishes between happiness generally (felicitas) and a more elevated happiness, which is blessedness (beatitudo). In the main, Aquinas refers to happiness as the best condition that human beings can attain on earth, and to blessedness as the state attained, if at all, after death, when the intellect comes to gaze upon God. At times, though, Aquinas refers to 'happiness' as a generic term which covers both natural and supernatural happiness. Simply stated, Aquinas regards earthly happiness as the final or ultimate end of human beings on earth; the final final end, the ultimate end as the complete human good is blessedness, something which transcends earthly existence.

For Aquinas, the highest human good is consonant with the highest human capacity. When it comes to the various intellectual activities, Aquinas distinguishes between practical and theoretical reasoning. Practical reason refers to the rational activity of human beings which is directed toward the acquisition of some end outside of itself (IV SENT 49.1.1.1 ad 4).

The final good, Aquinas makes clear, is something desired for itself, not for the sake of something else. Aquinas therefore argues:





In the end, the human good lies in the contemplation of the highest object in the universe, which is God. To reach this conclusion, Aquinas makes two points: 





A final end is final in that its presence renders the person whose end it is complete and lacking in nothing. Aquinas demonstrates this claim by reference to the knowledge-seeking essence of human beings. 





For Aquinas, there is nothing that could be more final than God. The created universe in its entirety is an effect of God's divine activity in creation. Moreover, Aquinas argues, the human intellect is designed to understand the nature of the physical world in which human beings are situated. The natural intellectual orientation of human beings is downward, toward bodies, and not upward, toward God. Nevertheless, in seeking to understand the physical world, human beings seek knowledge of its causes, and this leads them eventually to God as the ultimate cause. Human beings are satisfied only in coming to know the essence of the cause of the effects whose explanation they seek. Aquinas's second point is developed from his first — that the perfection of any capacity derives from the nature of its object. ‘What makes the capacity of vision actually engaged in seeing at any given moment is the presence of some appropriate object of sight, some color. Similarly, what makes the intellect fully actual is the presence to it of its object, something intelligible. Since God is purely intelligible, God's presence to an intellect prepared to receive it makes that intellect fully actual, or perfect.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 273).

The idea is that human beings know first that God exists, not by experiencing God directly, but by encountering the effects of God's activity in sense perception and then seeking to know their proximate causes. Having identified these proximate causes, human beings are drawn by nature to seek the explanation of those causes in turn. This is consistent with the a posteriori character of Aquinas's proofs for God's existence and his claim that no a priori proof for God's existence is possible. If any of those proofs succeeds, and we therefore know that God exists, this would still not give us knowledge of God's essence. This knowledge is gained only by direct acquaintance. ‘Someone born and raised in the tropics might know that there is such a thing as snowy weather without ever having experienced it. On a first trip to a wintry climate, the encounter with snowy weather affords a kind of experiential knowledge not given in the bare knowledge that snowy weather exists. Something is lacking before that direct acquaintance brings with it firsthand knowledge, knowledge not merely that something or other exists, but knowledge of what that thing is. Eventually, if not immediately, one hopes to acquire knowledge of what that thing is in its essence.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 274-275).

The same reasoning applies with respect to God. If human beings know that God exists, then they know only in the indirect sense, through having experienced God's effects in creation and then coming to reason about them. To knowing God directly is to bring our intellect into a higher state of knowledge, achieving a state of perfect contentment, which leaves nothing more to desire.

This direct acquaintance with God is not possible in this lifetime. However, Aquinas, with his teleological conception of God’s purpose driven universe, affirms the possibility of having knowledge of the divine essence (SCG 111.41-48, 51). Aquinas rejects the idea that the God who would endow human beings with reason, and a concomitant desire to know, would leave human beings incapable of fulfilling their highest aspirations. Since human beings are structured for intellectual seeking it follows that they can attain knowledge of God's essence. Neither God nor in nature is effort expended in vain, to no end at all (SCG 1.56). It follows, therefore, that the intellectual seeking of human beings has its proper end in the knowledge of God. Human beings are so constituted as to seek understanding. The possibility of such understanding is made manifest in the beatific vision.

Happiness and Telos
Aquinas's conception of happiness is, from first to last, thoroughly teleological. He starts from the simple premise that all human beings desire what is good for them. He goes further to distinguish what is really good for human beings from what merely appears to be good. Aquinas proceeds to argue that judgments concerning goodness always identify a thing to be a good thing of its kind, according to its function. Aquinas thus identifies the kind of thing human beings are, going on to determine their ends. He identifies human beings as teleological systems, creatures which have determinate functions and hence specifiable end states, according to which human goodness can be determined. Since the human function is to reason, the human good can be identified as reasoning well. With this definition, Aquinas rejects the various other goods which are often offered as candidates for the human good. Whilst pleasure and honour may be good things in themselves, they cannot constitute the human good. The human good is the final and complete good that every human constitutionally seeks. Pleasure and honour are neither final nor complete in themselves. When it comes to reasoning, the distinctive human capacity, it exists in both higher and lower forms, as practical and theoretical reason. Theoretical reasoning is higher and more final than practical reasoning since it is not subordinated to an end which lies beyond its own activity. It follows, then, that the final good for human beings lies in contemplative activity. Further, the highest form of contemplative activity consists in grasping the essences of the causes of those experienced effects whose explanations we seek. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 275). Aquinas ends by drawing the conclusion that since God is the highest and first cause, then the highest and best form of contemplation is our blessedness, to be attained by apprehending God's essence. This blessedness is the final culmination of human striving. It cannot be attained in this earthly life but is, in some cases, given after death. It is in this sense that Aquinas is in full agreement with I Corinthians 13:12: Now we see through a glass, darkly, but then face to face.

16 Being and Ends

This essay has approached Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant with a view to recovering ethics in light of the nihilism and disenchantment of the modern Weberian world. The focus falls firmly upon the good and the good life, the summum bonum, and how human beings must live in order to flourish. The very nature of these issues identifies ethics as a knowledge of both a theoretical and practical type. Ethics is theoretical in its structure, in that it needs to be grounded in objective reality; ethics is practical in its object and its aim – the human act and its direction. 

Theoretical and practical truth
Just as practical reasoning is different from theoretical reasoning, so practical truth is different from theoretical truth. Both are adequations, but different kinds of adequations. Aquinas writes of truth as ‘a certain adequation of intellect to thing'. To understand the difference, we must place them in context with the Thomasian ontology. 

The ontology of Aquinas gives being a threefold structure: there is the actuality of things, that is, the particular things that are in actual existence; there is the potentiality of things, that is, the formal possibility of the plenitude of being characteristic for each kind of thing; and there is the movement that connects actuality with potentiality by turning possibilities into act, that is, the way of movement characteristic for each kind of thing in existence and on its way to whatever possibilities it has ahead. The characteristic possibilities of a thing are its natural good, and when a thing moves it seeks its natural good as the end of its activity. 
The human mode of movement is action; a human being seeks its end by doing things by its own choice. Hence the object of human actions is to bring into actuality whatever unfulfilled possibilities one has. Thus the point of practical reasoning is to make a possibility become an actuality by a given action. It follows that the central criterion of success for practical reason is whatever the action which is its conclusion actually changes the intended possibility into actuality; it is the action that must be adequate to its end, whereas in theoretical reason it is the statement that must be adequate to corresponding reality. Practical truth is a property of actions rather than statements. If we appreciate this insight, we can confidently give up the vain search for universally valid statements and theories of what is right and wrong, and concentrate again on the real task of practical reason, namely, doing the right thing here and now. 
A further difference between theoretical and practical truth is that where truth in matters theoretical is an adequation of a statement to a reality that is in actuality prior to the statement, truth in matters practical is an adequation of an action to a possibility that can only become an actuality as a result of the action. This highlights the difference in certainty between practical and theoretical reason: practical reason cannot simply look behind and check whether it was right, it must look ahead and make an attempt at making its intention come true. But it also highlights a more fundamental characteristic of practical truth: if we phrase it in Aquinas's own terms according to which practical truth consists in conformity with right appetite, we can see that it is not enough that an action is effective to whatever its end is, but it is also required that the end it seeks is a real human good, a good to which one's will rightly inclines. This insight brings to the fore a consideration modernly marginalized, namely, the equal importance of right will to right reason. Where modern ethics is most often an ethic of reason over irrational passions, Thomasian ethics is an ethic of will and reason brought into harmony. The most important consequence of this is the central role that must be reserved for virtue in a successful ethic.

Rentto in Hudson and Moran ed 1992: 153

The roots of Aquinas’ holism are to be found in his conception of ontology. ‘That being is conceived of as a movement in which potentiality becomes actuality entails the view that the characteristic end of any being is growth in one's capacities, fulfilment of one's potential, plenitude of one's being.’ In other words, each being seeks its wholeness. From this it follows that seeking one's integral plenitude, the fullness of one's whole being, possesses an intrinsic moral quality: that is one's ultimate good, and the ultimate end to which one's seeking of any particular ends ought to be integrated. (Rentto in Hudson and Moran ed 1992: 154-155). 

The Is and the Ought
This implies that for Aquinas there is no significant division between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’, fact and value. Aquinas is not disabled by the philosophical convention that it is impossible to derive an ought-to-be from an is. Moral philosophy from Hume to Moore and after has floundered on this convention. Unable to ground any rational statement in empirical reality or ontological nature, morality has been adrift and unmoored. Kant proposed a self-legislating reason but, without a grounding in reality, that reason has become vacuous, inflated, irrational. Aquinas is clear on this, being and value are two parts of the one integral reality, ‘where that which is is in movement toward that which is in its nature to seek.’ (Rentto in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

The idea that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is such a well established philosophical convention that non-philosophers can be heard repeating it. In truth, it is a convention that is floundering. It derives from Hume, for whom the existence of God was the ‘is’ he wished to challenge. God was the original target of those who subscribe to this is-ought dualism. Ironically, the result of that convention has been to detach ethics from ontological nature. If the ought-to-be cannot be derived from the is, it has to be made up. The sceptics have invited the very thing they set out to destroy – a fictional God.

Certainly, what is in act cannot logically be derived what ought to be in act. I will later show that St Thomas agreed with the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ on this point of logic. But this point is overextended when it is turned into a general philosophical statement. It is not the logical relationship between ‘is’ and ‘ought-to-be’ that matters but their ontological connection. The overemphasis that modern moral philosophy has placed on Hume’s convention culminated in Moore’s Prinicipia Ethica and the naturalist fallacy. It is becoming clear that this dualism of is and ought has sent modern moral philosophy into a cul-de-sac. The myopic focus on logic has caused moral philosophers to completely miss the point that ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are two aspects of the one reality. The issue of whether they logically entail each other is beside the point. It remains to point out that the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, running through not only Thomism but German philosophy, especially Hegel, never fell for this convention that an ought cannot be derived from is. That time has been used to address more substantive questions. (Bowie 2003; Kelly 1969; Knight 2007). 

I do not wish to say that there is no hurdle between is and ought at all, but that if there is a hurdle, it is not a problem of ethics. Undeniably there is no logical entailment between theoretical is and practical is-to-be, and between merely practical directiveness and moral ought, as Germain Grisez, Joseph M. Boyle and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 127, suggest. But entailment or not is not a central consideration at all. For, as the aforementioned authors also point out, the "is-to-be of the first principles of practical knowledge is itself an aspect of human nature," and the "moral ought is nothing but the integral directiveness of the is-to-be of practical knowledge" (ibid.)

Rentto in Hudson and Moran ed 1992: 156

Aquinas is clear that the end of all things is good. 

It is common to regard the creative act as having no other effect than to produce all created being from non-being. Such a view of creation is incomplete. The efficacy of the creative act cannot be restricted to that impulse which causes beings to issue forth from God. At the very moment when creatures receive the movement which gives them a being relatively independent of and exterior to the Creator's, they receive a second movement which puts them on their way back to their point of departure and tends to return them as close as possible to their first source. We have examined the order by which intelligent creatures come forth from God and have denned their characteristic operations. It now remains to establish the terminus toward which these operations tend and the end to which they are ordered.
The truth of this conclusion is obvious. It is manifest that the end corresponds to the principle. If, therefore, we know the principle of all things, it is impossible not to know their end. Now we have already demonstrated that the first principle of all things is a Creator who transcends the universe which He has created. The end of all things, then, must be a good, since only the good, and a good exterior to the universe, can play the role of end. This end is God. It still remains to know how creatures not endowed with intellect can have an end outside themselves. In the case of an intelligent being, the end of its operation is established by what it proposes to do or by the goal toward which it tends. But a being wanting intellect can only possess an end outside itself either by possessing ft effectively without knowing it or by representing it. Hercules is thus called the end of the statue depicting him. In this sense too the Sovereign Good exterior to the universe can be called the end of all things insofar as it is possessed or represented by them. Insofar as they are and insofar as they operate, all creatures tend to participate in and to represent the .Sovereign Good, but each within its own limits.
But man's case is different because he has free-will, that is, intelligence and will. The inclination which God implanted in him at the moment of his creation is not natural. It is a voluntary inclination. It follows, therefore, that man is a creature who, though an image of God like all the others and more excellently than many of them, is master over his choice of acts. We have now to inquire what is his last end and by what means he can come to it. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1 p 251

The Last End
Gilson comes to this last end and what human beings need to do in order to attain it.

All creatures come from one cause and move toward one end. We can expect, therefore, that the same principle will regulate both moral action and physical laws. It is the same deep cause which makes the stone fall, the flame rise, the heavens turn and men to will. Each of these beings is seeking by its operation to achieve its own perfection and, at the same time, to realize its end which is to represent God: "Everything tending to its own perfection, tends to a divine likeness." 
However, each being is clearly defined by its own essence and it will have its own way of realizing the end common to all. Since all creatures, even those devoid of intellect, are ordered to God as toward their last end, and since all things attain their last end in the measure in which they share in its likeness, intelligent creatures must attain their end in a manner peculiar to them, that is, by the operation proper to them as intelligent creatures. They must know it. It is immediately evident, then, that the last end of an intelligent creature is to know God. This conclusion is inevitable, and other arguments equally direct could be found to convince us of its necessity. To be completely convinced, however, we shall have to see how this last end gathers together all intermediate ends and orders them to itself, and how each particular happiness is but a premise of this beatitude. 
Man is a voluntary and free being. He always acts in view of an end, and his acts are specified by this end, that is, his acts are arranged into various species according to the ends which are both their principle and end. Now it cannot be doubted that there exists, over and above the host of particular ends, a last end of human life looked at as a whole. One end is ordained and willed because of another, and, if there were no last end, the series of ends would have to be taken to infinity. It would be the same as if the series of movers and of things moved were infinite, and nothing would ever be desired and no action would ever be brought to an end. Every act starts from an end and comes to rest in it. Therefore we have to conclude that there is a last end.
At the same time it can be seen that whatever man wills, he wills in view of this last end. The last end moves the appetite in the same way as the first mover moves all other moveable things. Now it is clear that while the second cause transmits movement, it can only do so in so much as it is itself moved by the first mover. In the same way, second ends are only desirable and only move the appetite inasmuch as they are ordered toward the last end, which is the first of all desirable objects. Let us see in what this last end consists. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6

Gilson rules out various desirable objects as candidates for this last end. Human beings have continually taken riches, health, power, all the corporeal goods that they can imagine for the highest good and the last end. But they are mistaken. ‘Man is not the last end of the universe. He is a particular being ordered, like all the rest, in view of a higher end. Neither the satisfying of his body nor its conservation can be constituted his Sovereign Good or his last end.’ The last end of man is beatitude and this cannot be seated in a corporeal good. 

Let us say then, as a general thesis, that man's beatitude cannot consist in any created good. It can only reside in a perfect good, one fully satisfying the appetite, for indeed it could not be the last end if, once acquired, it still left something further to be desired. Now, since nothing can fully satisfy the human will save universal good, which is its proper object, no created and participated good can constitute the Sovereign Good and last end. Therefore man's beatitude is in God alone, who is the first and universal good, the source of all other goods. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6 

This implies that true and essential beatitude is not of this world. Beatitude transcends man and nature. It can only be found in the clear sight of God's being. How?

Inversely, all goods come together again, sublimated and put in order, in heavenly beatitude. Even when he sees God face to face in the beatific vision, even when the soul has come to resemble some separated Intelligence, man's beatitude is not that of a soul separated from its body. The composite will turn up once more within the very glory of heaven: "For since it is natural for the soul to be united to a body, the natural perfection of the soul cannot exclude the perfection of the body." Before beatitude, the body is the soul's minister; it is the instrument of those lesser operations which facilitate its approach thereto. But during beatitude, the soul rewards its servant, confers incorruptibility upon it and lets it share in its own immortal perfection. "The soul's beatitude redounds to the body so that it too may taste of its perfection." 
The soul, which is united to that body which was once animal but is now spiritualized in glory, has no longer to pursue the material goods which are ordained on earth to the animal life. She no longer needs any other friend than her God who comforts her with His eternity, truth and love. We can believe, however, that the joy of heaven is not solitary, and that heavenly beatitude is accompanied by the vision which the blessed have of one another's joy, and that is embellished with eternal friendships.
Thus Thomism continues nature into supernature. When it has described the total man, and not merely the human soul, as the immediate object of philosophy, it goes on to deal with the destiny not merely of the human soul but of the total man. For St. Thomas, the Christian's beatitude is the beatitude of the whole man. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 6

Ultimately, then, we move into the realm of pure transcendence.

The problem is that the character of ethics has become uncertain in the modern world, principally on account of the crisis of the notion of the Good. It is difficult enough to state a conception of the good which is grounded in ontological nature, let alone one that, ultimately, transcends man and nature. 
Kant’s ultimate agnosticism on the good stems from his attempt to secure the basis of morality on practical reason. I will argue that this is an insecure basis for morality and invites degeneration into subjectivism and relativism. I will show how Kant and Aquinas are closer than may be thought, to the extent that a realist metaphysics can be restored in order to make good Kant’s distinctive ethical claims concerning the moral law and the realm of ends.

The Highest Good
The extent to which the question of Good has come to be sidelined in modern philosophy is well known. To the extent that we have substituted the passions for the virtues, we have come to live in a world of Hobbes and Hume, a world in which the good is merely a private desire or want, not a scheme of virtue that enables human flourishing. Modern practical philosophy is characterised by the shift from the Aristotelian and Thomist concern with the teleological orientation of human action toward the Good to the critical-justificatory discussion concerning obligation, demonstrating a deontological concern with rules or the utilitarian concern with the means for obtaining (individual, private) happiness. Whilst Kant is considered to be the principal instigator of this shift from character and virtue to a rules-based deontology, I have shown Kant’s position to be much more nuanced. Kant is well aware that this shift entails the abandonment of the problem of the summum bonum. 'The question of the summum bonum seems to have fallen into disuse, or at least it has become a merely secondary question." (Critica della ragion pratica (Bari: Laterza, 1963)

Kant retains the centrality of the summum bonum. For Kant, this is the key question: ‘How is the summum bonum practically possible?" still remains an unsolved problem, notwithstanding all the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made.’ (CPrR ch 2). 

The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well as its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. 

There is the sense in which, like Descartes and his cogito, Kant understands that his reason is not self-validating or self-justifying. In the same way that Descartes took his stand on the certainty of God, so Kant calls on The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.

Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum is a being which is the cause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the summum bonum; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.
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The doctrine of Christianity, even if we do not yet consider it as a religious doctrine, gives, touching this point, a conception of the summum bonum (the kingdom of God), which alone satisfies the strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy (unyielding) and demands holiness of morals, although all the moral perfection to which man can attain is still only virtue, that is, a rightful disposition arising from respect for the law, implying consciousness of a constant propensity to transgression, or at least a want of purity, that is, a mixture of many spurious (not moral) motives of obedience to the law, consequently a self-esteem combined with humility. In respect, then, of the holiness which the Christian law requires, this leaves the creature nothing but a progress in infinitum, but for that very reason it justifies him in hoping for an endless duration of his existence. The worth of a character perfectly accordant with the moral law is infinite, since the only restriction on all possible happiness in the judgement of a wise and all powerful distributor of it is the absence of conformity of rational beings to their duty. But the moral law of itself does not promise any happiness, for according to our conceptions of an order of nature in general, this is not necessarily connected with obedience to the law. Now Christian morality supplies this defect (of the second indispensable element of the summum bonum) by representing the world in which rational beings devote themselves with all their soul to the moral law, as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morality are brought into a harmony foreign to each of itself, by a holy Author who makes the derived summum bonum possible. Holiness of life is prescribed to them as a rule even in this life, while the welfare proportioned to it, namely, bliss, is represented as attainable only in an eternity; because the former must always be the pattern of their conduct in every state, and progress towards it is already possible and necessary in this life; while the latter, under the name of happiness, cannot be attained at all in this world (so far as our own power is concerned), and therefore is made simply an object of hope. Nevertheless, the Christian principle of morality itself is not theological (so as to be heteronomy), but is autonomy of pure practical reason, since it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the summum bonum, on condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper spring of this obedience in the desired results, but solely in the conception of duty, as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences.

This is reason as its own legislator, not as grounded in either God or Nature. The question is then begged, why are we obligated to pursue the summum bonum? Kant’s reasoning, ultimately, seems tautological – we only realise the highest good if we pursue it in the first place. The question is why is the summum bonum good? It’s in our interests, it fulfils us as human beings. So what is it in ontological nature, in human nature, that qualifies the highest good as the highest good? This must involve an essentialist argument in some form. Kant instead offers self-legislating reason. Reason is its own reason.

It is commonly held that the Christian precept of morality has no advantage in respect of purity over the moral conceptions of the Stoics; the distinction between them is, however, very obvious. The Stoic system made the consciousness of strength of mind the pivot on which all moral dispositions should turn; and although its disciples spoke of duties and even defined them very well, yet they placed the spring and proper determining principle of the will in an elevation of the mind above the lower springs of the senses, which owe their power only to weakness of mind. With them therefore, virtue was a sort of heroism in the wise man raising himself above the animal nature of man, is sufficient for Himself, and, while he prescribes duties to others, is himself raised above them, and is not subject to any temptation to transgress the moral law. All this, however, they could not have done if they had conceived this law in all its purity and strictness, as the precept of the Gospel does. When I give the name idea to a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in experience, it does not follow that the moral ideas are thing transcendent, that is something of which we could not even determine the concept adequately, or of which it is uncertain whether there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the case with the ideas of speculative reason; on the contrary, being types of practical perfection, they serve as the indispensable rule of conduct and likewise as the standard of comparison. Now if I consider Christian morals on their philosophical side, then compared with the ideas of the Greek schools, they would appear as follows: the ideas of the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Christians are: simplicity of nature, prudence, wisdom, and holiness. In respect of the way of attaining them, the Greek schools were distinguished from one another thus that the Cynics only required common sense, the others the path of science, but both found the mere use of natural powers sufficient for the purpose. Christian morality, because its precept is framed (as a moral precept must be) so pure and unyielding, takes from man all confidence that be can be fully adequate to it, at least in this life, but again sets it up by enabling us to hope that if we act as well as it is in our power to do, then what is not in our power will come in to our aid from another source, whether we know how this may be or not. Aristotle and Plato differed only as to the origin of our moral conceptions.
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Happiness and the Complete Good
We have another name for the attainment of our ends; we describe it as a state of 'happiness'. For Kant, the ‘complete good’ is the combination of happiness in accordance with our worthiness to enjoy it (Banham 2006 ch 4). The complete good, therefore, is not ‘happiness’ as such. Here, Kant distinguishes his position from the ancients (or so he thinks). Kant does not believe that the relationship of goodness to happiness can be presented as analytical. In contrast to the Epicurean reduction of morality to prudence and to the Stoic reduction of happiness to moral contentment, Kant argues for heterogeneity between goodness and happiness, a heterogeneity that entails that the concept of the summum bonum is a synthetic concept, just like the moral law itself. (Banham 2006 ch 4). 

I would just ask how Kant differs from Aristotle and Aquinas, in terms of the rational moral end. Remember that eudaimonia is only misleadingly translated as ‘happiness’. Eudaimonia means ‘flourishing’, and flourishing well in relation to ultimate ends. 

St Thomas is very clear to define his ‘happiness’ in contradistinction to the hedonists. For Aquinas, those sensualists who conceive happiness entirely in terms of the flesh put human beings as rational beings on the same level as animals.





St. Thomas’ remarks here may appear somewhat caustic, priggish even. Since Darwin, we have come to accept that human beings differ from other animals only by degree, not in kind. But that degree remains, and is defined by that capacity for reason which Aquinas, following Aristotle, identified as the distinguishing characteristic of the human species. Aquinas, then, isn’t denying that sensuous activities bring pleasure so much as insisting on the capacity of human beings, on account of their uniqueness, to achieve a richer and more fulfilling form of pleasure. Aquinas is really criticising hedonists — those who seek happiness in sensuous pleasure alone — as selling human potential short of the greater enjoyment that comes from fulfilment. The hedonists effectively regard human beings as pigs. 

Aquinas adheres to the eudaimonistic definition of happiness. It is the virtue tradition. And character matters in this tradition. To flourish well entails that the human agents have acquired the virtues and earned that worthiness to be happy that Kant demands. Through virtuous rational activity, human beings become good in the process of achieving the highest good, happiness as flourishing well. The fact is that Aquinas and Kant are, on this question of goodness and happiness, united against the hedonists. It should still be emphasised, however, that Aquinas differs markedly from Kant in holding that taking pleasure in the action is part of what gives the action moral worth. Remember that for Aquinas there is no dualism between duty and inclination. Reason works with inclinations from the inside. Kant took a stand completely against sensualism in insisting that only those actions done from duty, over and against inclination, have absolute moral worth.

As Gary Banham’s reconstruction of Kant’s thought here makes clear, Kant’s transcendentalism follows in the line of descent from Plato, not Aristotle. Kant is rationalist whereas Aristotle is essentialist. Aquinas follows Aristotle; reason educates the passions from the inside, in alliance with the appetites, not against them.

Since, for Kant, this combination of happiness and worthiness to be happy is cognized as a priori – hence as practically necessary rather than as derived from experience - and since, therefore, the possibility of the highest good does not rest on empirical principles, it follows that the deduction of this concept must be transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary to produce the highest good through the freedom of the will: the condition of its possibility must therefore rest solely on a priori grounds of cognition. (Ak. 5:113)

We arrive at the notion of the summum bonum by a transcendental means through the thoughts produced by the moral law's relationship to its object, the 'good'. This metaphysical deduction of the notion of the summum bonum to be complete requires a demonstration of the validity and possibility of the thought thus given, that is, a transcendental deduction. Such a deduction demonstrates the possibility and validity of the concept in question but since this concept is, in fact, produced by the combination of Ideas the deduction of it can only take place through an antinomy. (Banham 2006 ch 4). 

In this manner, the moral laws lead through the conception of the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions, that is to say, arbitrary ordinances of a foreign and contingent in themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in itself, which, nevertheless, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being, because it is only from a morally perfect (holy and good) and at the same time all-powerful will, and consequently only through harmony with this will, that we can hope to attain the summum bonum which the moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our endeavours. Here again, then, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions. The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of my will with that of a holy and good Author of the world; and although the conception of the summum bonum as a whole, in which the greatest happiness is conceived as combined in the most exact proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection (possible in creatures), includes my own happiness, yet it is not this that is the determining principle of the will which is enjoined to promote the summum bonum, but the moral law, which, on the contrary, limits by strict conditions my unbounded desire of happiness. 
Hence also morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not unworthy of it. 
A man is worthy to possess a thing or a state when his possession of it is in harmony with the summum bonum. We can now easily see that all worthiness depends on moral conduct, since in the conception of the summum bonum this constitutes the condition of the rest (which belongs to one's state), namely, the participation of happiness. Now it follows from this that morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happiness, that is, an instruction how to become happy; for it has to do simply with the rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness, not with the means of attaining it. But when morality has been completely expounded (which merely imposes duties instead of providing rules for selfish desires), then first, after the moral desire to promote the summum bonum (to bring the kingdom of God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on a law, and which could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when for the behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken, then this ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness because the hope of happiness first begins with religion only. 
We can also see from this that, when we ask what is God's ultimate end in creating the world, we must not name the happiness of the rational beings in it, but the summum bonum, which adds a further condition to that wish of such beings, namely, the condition of being worthy of happiness, that is, the morality of these same rational beings, a condition which alone contains the rule by which only they can hope to share in the former at the hand of a wise Author. For as wisdom, theoretically considered, signifies the knowledge of the summum bonum and, practically, the accordance of the will with the summum bonum, we cannot attribute to a supreme independent wisdom an end based merely on goodness. For we cannot conceive the action of this goodness (in respect of the happiness of rational beings) as suitable to the highest original good, except under the restrictive conditions of harmony with the holiness of his will. Therefore, those who placed the end of creation in the glory of God (provided that this is not conceived anthropomorphically as a desire to be praised) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing glorifies God more than that which is the most estimable thing in the world, respect for his command, the observance of the holy duty that his law imposes on us, when there is added thereto his glorious plan of crowning such a beautiful order of things with corresponding happiness. If the latter (to speak humanly) makes Him worthy of love, by the former He is an object of adoration. Even men can never acquire respect by benevolence alone, though they may gain love, so that the greatest beneficence only procures them honour when it is regulated by worthiness.

My argument is, that to make good his ethical claims with respect to the moral law and the summum bonum, Kant also requires a realist epistemology and rationalist metaphysics of efficient causality, both in the manner of Aquinas. With these in place, Aquinas and Kant emerge as allies rather than antagonists concerning the good.

The position of modern philosophy on the Good is wanting, with noncognitivist currents offering procedural and "weak" versions of the Good at best. If one defines ethics in terms of the universal, then the inadequacy of this position is soon apparent. There is a failure to specify the universal on which the good is based, a flaw that is soon exposed when confronted with an irreducible pluralism of conflicting ethical codes. 

The Three Categories of Rational Activity
One can conclude, then, that practical reason is grounded in theoretical reason for all the reasons that Aquinas gives. Aquinas proposes three great categories of rational activity: theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, and participated rationality. These entail three kinds of virtue in designating the human agent good. Much of moral philosophy is engaged in spelling out the specific kinds of these generic virtues, as is clear from the second part of the Summa Theologiae. Aquinas, following Aristotle, argues that this is an ordered set of virtues, with some more perfectly fulfilling the human agent than others. 

It is clear that moral philosophy for Thomas is a reflection on how we can act well, how we can achieve the end we naturally desire, call it happiness. The moral task is to acquire a character which enables us to maneuver through the contingencies of life in such a way that we act well and thus achieve what is perfective of us. The desire for the good is a given, that is what is meant by calling it natural. However, reflection not only reveals the notion of ultimate end, but makes clear that we must do those things which truly constitute our fulfillment and perfection. The criteria for the true good must be sought in our nature as rational agents. How do we go about finding the true guidelines for our actions?
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In answering the question of how to be happy, we need to define happiness properly as ‘flourishing’, something determined in relation to the realisation of the perfect and fulfilling good. 

In the first place, moral good is a particularization of ontological good. Without that ontological good, there is nothing for morality to be about. For generation, Aquinas follows Aristotle’s set of four causes and does not use participation to name the causality generative of a nature in a new subject. He also explicitly rejects Plato’s view that ideas external to the subject could generate these newly arising natures. (Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992). 

The principles of being in the ontological order (prima principia essendi) are the four causes, the material cause, the formal cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause. The question is how St Thomas can use participation in a causal sense that is not the rejected Platonic sense?

The answer resides in an explicit doctrine of creation which entirely surpasses the Aristotelian framework and involves another type of efficient causality than movement from potency to actuality: creation, not movement from potency to act; exemplary, not formal causality. What I think he is doing is purging the doctrine of participation of all aspects of formal causality, so as to see it as a communication of being, with no trace left of a "form divided among different subjects" as for Plato. 

Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

The proper sense of participation in Thomistic metaphysics is the dependence of all things on God. This does not mean that "creatures have a part of God's existence" but rather that "some other nature (not God's nature) is brought out of nonexistence, is made to exist." That is, the one nature of being makes all other things be, through efficient causality. This is a dependence that explains even why natures are natures (namely, that things can only have a nature is they are designed, that is, formed according to an exemplar in a creative, knowing intellect) and that accounts for the doctrine of natural inclinations so crucial to the natural law debate (namely, their being-related-to-God includes their directedness back to their origin and goal). Thomas can make the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial forms and prime matter a starting point for metaphysics, and agree with any Greek that "from nothing, nothing comes" in the natural order. But he also has a doctrine of creation as an equally important source of his metaphysics, and even if he entertains the possibility of an eternal world on Aristotelian grounds, he is convinced of the complete dependence of every creature on God. 

Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

In the second place, all those fundamental notions which, along with the Good, give structure to ethics - value, aim, norm, law, freedom - possess analogical meaning within a rational metaphysics.

Goodness is analogically realized in each of the different classes of beings, and in each case God is the exemplary and efficient cause of the goodness which is found in each thing by its formal perfection. This I take to be the heart of Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals, namely, that a being is true, because there is a being which is true in the maximum degree, and a being is good because there is a being which is good in the maximum degree, and so on. It is a position at the basis of the Fourth Way. 

Koterski in Hudson and Moran ed 1992

For Aquinas, metaphysics is the most intelligible and directive science; it deals with the whole and the ordering of the parts. The subject of metaphysics is being as being. Aquinas delineates the relation between the essence and existence of a substance, examining potency and act. Metaphysics is the culminating science. Aquinas concludes that to be is to live.

This brings us to Thomas' teaching on the relation between the essence and existence (esse) of a substance. This is often presented as a novelty of Thomistic metaphysics, but it should be pointed out that Thomas himself exhibits no sense of being an innovator when he holds that essence and esse must be really different. He attributes the distinction to Plato, Aristotle, and of course Boethius. It is in the De hebdomadibus of Boethius that Thomas finds what he takes to be a capsule statement of the real distinction: diversum est esse et id quod est (to be and what is differ). In Aristotle a phrase which conveys the point is found in the second book of On the Soul: vivere est esse viventibus (for living things to be is to live). Thomas approaches the matter by saying that the essence or nature of a physical substance is composed of matter and form; neither of these alone is the nature of the thing. For a thing of such a nature to exist is for there to be a conjunction of its essential components or principles (ipsum esse ret resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis). (De trin., q. 5, a. 1) In a living thing essence is composed of body and soul, and this conjunction makes the thing live. To live is of course a determinate kind of existence following on an essence of a given type. When Thomas speaks of a distinction between essence and esse, he does not mean simply that there is a difference between a possible man and an actual man; he does not mean simply that there is a difference between the abstract nature (for example, humanity) and a concrete instance of it (for example, this man). What he intends is this: in an actually existing substance we cannot identify its essence or nature and the actuality or existence which is a consequence of the essence and measured by it. The essence of a thing relates to its esse as potency to act. Thus, Thomas will say that esse is the actuality of all other acts, even of forms. The form is act with respect to matter as potency, but for the act which is form actually to be in matter is an act other than the act the form is. This absolutely fundamental actuality is what Thomas means by esse, and it can be equated neither with form nor with essence in material substances. 

Ralph McInerny A History of Western Philosophy ch 38

In the third place, existential moral truth is determined by the rectitude of will, directed toward the ultimate end of human life.

The end of all things must be a good, since only the good, and a good exterior to the universe, can play the role of end. This end for Aquinas is God. It remains to be shown how we may come to God as the ultimate end. 

Aquinas describes intelligence and will as voluntary inclination. He proceeds to examine intention, showing how the will moves the faculties to their end. The end is willed in itself and for itself.

Thus the will moves all the faculties toward their end. To it belongs properly the first act of "tending toward," in aliquid tendere, called intention (intention). Insofar as it performs this act of intention, the will turns toward its end as toward the terminus of its movement. Since, in wishing the end, it necessarily wills the means, therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means constitute but one single act. It is not difficult to see why. A means is to the end as the middle to the terminus. Among natural beings, the movement which passes through the middle is the same as that which reaches the terminus. The same is true of movements of the will. To-will-a-remedy-in-view-of-health is one single act of willing. The means is only willed because of the end. The willing of the means, therefore, blends with the intending of the end.
The proper object of the intention is the end willed in itself and for itself. It constitutes, therefore, a simple act and, so to speak, an indecomposable movement of our will. But voluntary activity becomes extremely complex when we pass from the intention of the end to the choice of means. It tends by one act to the end and to the means, when it has opted given determinate means. But opting particular means does not belong properly to the voluntary act of intention. This opting is the actual electing or choosing, and is itself preceded by deliberation and judgment. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1 p 251

None of these means for attaining the ultimate end are available to practical reason in the absence of theoretical reason and a conception of being. It is the conception of being in the Thomist metaphysics which renders the search for ends meaningful.

Heidegger - Ethics as Ethos
Heidegger’s emphasis upon being has had the merit of reminding philosophy of its birthright. (Dreyfus 1991; Dreyfus and Wrathall 2007; Schmitt 1969). However, Heidegger’s influence is sterile, to the extent that his concern with being remains at the level of philosophical purity. Heidegger fails to resolve the issues he raises with respect to be-ing. Socrates always insisted that he didn’t know the truths upon which human life is based, but that by philosophizing as an active process, an ethos, that he could come to know them. The same spirit is apparent in the dialogues of Plato. According to Werner Jaeger, the credo ut intelligam also lies behind Aristotle's more systematic and organised philosophy, his Metaphysics.

I would argue strongly that this tradition of ethics as ethos is alive and well in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant, the role of the philosopher is not to rule the people, but to goad the people into using their reason. Kant points to the common moral reason that each and all human beings possess on account of their essential humanity. (Kant 1959: 20; KGS IV, p. 404.) (KGS XXIV, pp. 212,330.) Kant’s Socratic spur to human self-knowledge is also a legislating of the difference between wisdom about ends which arises from common moral reason, and theoretical knowledge or science. (KGS XVIII, Reflection 490).

The question is, is practical reason sufficient when deprived of its connection to theoretical reason?

In retrospect, it seems that Kant’s ethical commitments gain their cogency less from Kant’s idealist philosophy than from the religious context in which they were set. It should come as no surprise, then, that eight years after the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant should come to refer to the New Testament an "imperishable guide of true wisdom," wherefrom reason gets "a new light with regard to all, that always remains in darkness but about which nevertheless it needs instruction."

The question is how long faith can survive alone when separated from reason. Aquinas put faith and reason, theology and philosophy together. Kant, overimpressed by the rise of mechanistic science, rent them apart. 

Being as Being
Ways of knowing and ways of being are bound together for Aquinas. Not only does Kant separate the two, he denies the ontological significance of nature, hoping that his reason would be self-sufficient. 

Aquinas is able to connect reason and faith, putting what we know alongside what we believe. Aquinas can do this since metaphysics, in his conception, is the culminating science concerning being as being. What Kant reduces to ‘necessary presuppositions’ that cannot be proved by way of scientific knowledge are, for Aquinas, presuppositions that can indeed be considered rationally by way of theoretical science (speculables) and practical science (operables). Above all, however, Aquinas goes from essence as a static and passive entity to existence. Ways of knowing and ways of being are integrated so that being as being is actualised under the conditions of concrete existence. (Pieper in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

Heidegger criticizes Western philosophy generally and metaphysics in particular for their "forgetfulness of Being." There is much to be said for Heidegger’s position here. It is interesting to note that Heidegger's early upbringing and education was in the Catholic church. Hugo Ott has shown that Heidegger's first publications appeared in 1910-12 in Der Akademiker, a Catholic journal that faithfully followed the line of Pope Pius X. In his twenties, Heidegger fulminated against the danger of "Modernism" in a series of book reviews, defending the timeless wisdom of the Catholic tradition. Heidegger cites with approval the saying of "the great [Josef von] Gorres": "Dig deeper and you will find yourself standing on Catholic ground." (John Caputo Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982).

For Aquinas, ‘Catholic ground’ is being as being, which is indeed ageless. Catholicism, the universal, is the ground of our being. It is in this sense that Thomism is the philosophia perennis, the perennial philosophy. If something is good, it is good regardless of time and place. Which doesn’t mean that Aquinas denies that human beings have a history, they do. That history is all about human agency, concrete acts, the acquisition of the virtues and formation of habits as super-added determinations which shape how a being realises its own definition.

Man's efforts to attain his end are not reduced to nothingness but are inscribed in his name and leave their mark upon him. Man's soul as well as his body has a history. It conserves its past in order to enjoy and utilize it in a perpetual present. The most general form of this fixing of past experience is called habit. Habit, as St. Thomas thinks of it, is a quality, that is, not the very substance of man but a disposition added to his substance and modifying it. The characteristic which differentiates this disposition or habit from other species of quality is that it is a disposition of the subject in relation to its own nature. In other words, a being's habits determine the manner in which it realizes its own definition. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1

There is plenty to be said for Heidegger’s critique of modernity from the perspective of being. But Aquinas could have said as much and more. For Heidegger fails to get round to answering the fundamental Thomist questions, "Why are there any beings around to shine forth at all, and why do they thus shine forth to us as though mind and being were made for each other?" As Aquinas argued with respect to first and common being, Being is not an independent cause producing beings, but depends on them as they on it. 

Ways of Being and Ways of Knowing
Putting knowledge, faith and the soul together, Aquinas argues that the world is good.

Heidegger traps himself in his own philosophical problem. Heidegger argues that human beings are confined within the finite horizon of human experience and that philosophical effort is unable to transcend that experience to attain something that is beyond this finite circle. In a Thomist manner, let us call this something God. If God exists, Heidegger argues, He can reveal himself to us. However, human beings cannot transcend the finite horizon to reach Him by powers of reason. Here, Aquinas could use a causal argument, such as efficient causality, to transcend the finite horizon of human experience and argue for an Infinite Being in order to ground our finite world. Heidegger cannot make this move from a phenomenological perspective. But Aquinas can do this on the basis of his metaphysic. It was the doctrine of the four causes that Anthony Flew found persuasive, and it is this doctrine that shows the way out of the impasse into which philosophy has fallen. The criticisms made against Heidegger here apply also to Kant and the way that his concern with the summum bonum is walled up behind concepts. I am tempted to draw an analogy between the conceptual prison Kant finds himself confined within and the iron cage of modernity that Weber sees as the fate of all of us in this disenchanted, dis-godded landscape.

Heidegger has little to say about causal arguments in getting to God. The reason? Norris Clarke cites a former student of Heidegger’s, who quotes Heidegger’s response to this question: "All right, I'll tell you. I'm still too much of a Kantian to accept efficient causality as revelatory of the real. The revelation (or 'mittence') of Being that includes efficient causality belongs to a medieval epoch of Being that is no longer accessible to us." (Norris Clarke in Hudson and Moran ed 1992: 101-103)

From Ubiquity to Eternity
Being as being is universal, timeless and transcendental. God is everywhere; God is changeless/unchangeable; God is eternal. For Davies, these three beliefs are absolutely fundamental to St. Thomas' thinking. (Davies 1993 ch 6).

God is Everywhere
The belief that God is everywhere, sometimes known as the doctrine of divine ubiquity, has always been part and parcel of Judeo-Christian theism. In his scheme of things, however, belief in God's omnipresence takes on a special importance. For he invokes it constantly, and it is much more prominent in his system that it is in the thinking of many other theistic writers. As he understands it, it also means something different from what it does to some theists. For he does not think that God is present just in the sense of knowing what is going on everywhere and being able to interfere. He thinks that God exists in everything and is in every place. He also thinks that God is wholly in everything and that being everywhere only applies to God. 
The intellectual foundation of his position here lies in …. the notion that God is the cause of the existence of everything other than himself. God's proper effect, says Aquinas, is existence (esse), which he causes, not only when creatures begin to exist, but as long as they are preserved in being. In speaking of existence as God's 'proper effect', I mean 'effect which he produces by virtue of being what he is essentially'—his characteristic effect, if you like.

God is in every place simply because He makes all places.

Drawing on his doctrine of divine simplicity, Aquinas maintains that God has no parts. He therefore concludes that, if divinity is present anywhere, it is there entire and undivided. He also concludes that, since only God is wholly undivided (since only God is entirely simple), and since only God is the maker and sustainer of everything, only God can be wholly everywhere. If it were the only thing that existed, a given physical thing might be said to be everywhere, for its constitution would be that by virtue of which there was any place. If there was nothing but a single grain of wheat, say, it could be said to be everywhere, since places would be established only in terms of its make-up. But it would not, says Aquinas, be everywhere as God is. Even a solitary grain of wheat would be divisible. Being composed of parts, it would not exist entirely in every part of itself, and, therefore, it would not be wholly everywhere. God, however, is indivisible, and, if he is present at a place, he is entirely present there. Or, as Aquinas suggests, he is 'everywhere essentially'. 

Davies 1993 ch 6

God is Changeless
According to Aquinas, God is unchangeable or immutable. He also thinks that only God is unchangeable. 'Only God is altogether unchangeable', he writes. 'Creatures can all change in some way or other.' In his judgement, this conclusion follows from the fact that God is the first cause of change in things (as the first of the Five Ways argues). It is also part and parcel of the doctrine of divine simplicity. 
With respect to the point about God as cause of change, Aquinas's basic position is that only an unchanging and unchangeable God can account for there being a world in which change occurs. A mutable individual, he reasons, would simply be part of the changing world and, as such, would point to something beyond it, something wholly unchanging.
As for the bearing on God's changeableness of the doctrine of divine simplicity, we only need to remind ourselves that, according to that doctrine, God can undergo no accidental or substantial change. He cannot be modified, and he cannot perish. It is not just that, as a matter of fact, God is identical with what he is (that he is the same as his nature). Aquinas thinks that there can be no attribute added to what he is by nature or essence. And this, he says, means that God is immutable or unchangeable and not just (as a matter of fact) unchanging. He is sheerly actual, unmixed with potentiality, while any changing thing is always somehow potential. Changing things are composite since they persist over time as being first like this, and then like that. But God is not composite. Changing things acquire something previously not attained, but God is fully actual, which means, once again, that he cannot change. 

Davies 1993 ch 6





In medieval theology, there is a virtually constant tradition according to which eternity is distinct from time. This tradition owed a great deal to earlier Greek thinking about eternity, especially to that of Neoplatonism. According, for example, to Plotinus, things subject to time are changing things, which may, therefore, be contrasted with Intelligence (nous), which is not subject to time and is therefore eternal. Time, says Plotinus, is 'the life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another', and eternity is the life of the intelligible world without successiveness. 
In the Latin West, this conception of eternity emerges very clearly in Augustine and Anselm, and it was classically formulated by Boethius. In his famous slogan: 'Eternity is the complete and total possession of unending life all at once' (Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tola simul et perfectapossessio). Boethius himself is here echoing Plotinus, and also Proclus, for whom eternal existence 'is simultaneously present in its entirety', so that 'there is not one part of it which has already emerged and another which will emerge later, but as yet is not'.
Aquinas's teaching on eternity needs to be located against the background of this tradition (he quotes the Boethian formula in la. 10. i). So he thinks that God is eternal in the sense of being distinct from time. As he puts it, 'time and eternity clearly differ'. To understand the significance of his view of God's eternity, however, we must first consider how he conceives of time. 

Davies 1993 ch 6

There is no ‘medieval epoch of Being’. Here we see how the Kantian rejection of metaphysics damages not only ontological knowledge but casts morality, freedom and philosophy itself adrift. Being is always accessible to us. We need to access Being in order to defend the claims and commitments of practical reason in politics and ethics. Without Being, we slide into the world of relativism and subjectivism.

And if we must accept that Being has a history, are we not entitled to argue that the scientific epoch that has been in denial of Being is closing? The time is ripe for a new epoch of Being; the modern epoch that rejected metaphysics is drawing to a close. The most powerful contribution that Aquinas can make in the world of contemporary philosophy is to help us restore efficient cause, necessary being, and final cause to the status of fundamental principles of being. Against Kant, this would be to restore the validity of causal explanation, enabling us to transcend not just the horizon of our ordinary experience but also our conceptual prison so as to be able to access Being. This would amount to a genuine transcendentalism in the Thomist sense of Being as universal and transcendent, offering truth as both realist and transcendental. It is entirely possible in Thomist terms to explain human experience by reference to a cause outside of it. This would be to affirm what Aquinas called a transcendent cause, a knowledge that is beyond experience, a transcendent God that can be discerned apart from sensible things. 
Aquinas affirmed the unity of the true and the good so that the ways of knowing and the ways of being were one. In locating existence beyond essence in the heart of the real, Aquinas establishes the links between philosophy and concrete reality so as to offer human beings a place in the home of human knowledge and human being.
Kant rejected realistic efficient causality, leaving his commendable work on freedom and morality vulnerable to scepticism and subjectivism once the pretensions and illusions of a self-legislating reason were exposed. If one wishes to save freedom and morality, there is every reason to restore efficient cause, necessary being and final cause to the centre stage. 

Speculative Knowledge and Practical Knowledge
Moral philosophy therefore requires theoretical philosophy. Rational metaphysics is an illuminating support which discloses the sense of practical philosophy.

The precarious status of morality in the modern world can be attributed to the separation of morals and freedom from metaphysics and ontological nature. Ultimately, the longer it seems that ethics has no connection to the good and the true, the more it seems that the true and the good do not exist and that ethics is merely the realm of value judgements. And that spells the end not only of both morality and moral philosophy but also of civilisation. ‘Apart from metaphysical presuppositions there can be no civilisation’ (Tomlin 1947:264).

This is why Kant’s rejection of metaphysics matters. Without that connection to metaphysics and ontological nature, Kant’s practical ethics lack any grounding other than a self-legislating reason. There is a need to pay close attention to metaphysics and epistemology since the rejection of the Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy began at the theoretical level with the critique and abandonment of notions of essence, potentiality and its actualisation, telos, ultimate ends and the possibility of knowing and realising the good.

In Aquinas, as in Aristotle, the possibility of practical knowledge requires the availability of theoretical knowledge, although this does not mean that the former is deduced from the latter in any simple or direct sense. There is a role for moral choice, deliberation and judgement. That is morality as the realm of human freedom.
The situation of ethics becomes parlous since, as Hume was quick to point out, moral laws cannot be derived from empirical facts. 

In retrospect, the view that one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ is less a philosophical convention than the product of a world characterised by a split between morality and freedom on the one hand and ontological nature and metaphysics on the other. But this is no longer a question of morality, merely the sociology of morality. Hume was right, but only about modernity, not moral philosophy. (MacIntyre 1981). 

[It is worth pointing out here that Finnis (1980) is concerned to argue that Aquinas did not derive the ought from the is in any simple sense. I would love to examine this crucial question further, but have run out of time and space.]

The Hidden God
In this context, Kant’s achievement is to have almost rescued rational natural teleology whilst nevertheless rejecting Aristotelian metaphysics, causality and finality. Kant’s resolution of the difficulties in which moral philosophy found itself is ingenious and almost, almost, pulls off the impossible. Without the old metaphysics, the telos and the good can no longer be known through theoretical reason. It is in this respect that Kant, ultimately, is agnostic on the good. Theoretical knowledge cannot illuminate the good. Yet Kant wants to retain commitment to the highest good as essential to morality and moral life. He has no option but to ground the imperatives of the moral law on themselves. Kant’s solution celebrates human freedom and carves out a role for human beings as acting, rational, moral beings, co-legislators who affirm and promote each other’s ends in a universal realm of ends. Nevertheless, there is a certain circularity in the reasoning. The self-legislation of pure practical reason is reason defining the good for itself. Coherence is achieved by self-justification. On closer analysis, the cogency of Kant’s moral position is attributable less to its philosophical strengths – Kant, ultimately, cannot identity the good in an ontological sense and show how this informs reason? – than to the continuing strength of the Judaeo-Christian moral tradition. The ethic of ends is a clear rationalisation of the religious ethic. 

It has been claimed that Marxism is a disguised or concealed religion. William Connolly argues that the search for the perfect community in Rousseau, Hegel and Marx shows the existence of a hidden god at the heart of political philosophy. For Connolly, this reveals an authoritarianism that puts politics on ice in an enclosed society (Connolly 1989:130). It needs to be pointed out here, though, that in this Foucaultian and postmodernist critique, any such notion of the ‘good’ or the 'true' betrays a totalitarian impulse (Connolly 1989:86/115 127/8 129/31; Lyotard 1984).

That the common good could so easily be dismissed as a form of repression rather than flourishing indicates the extent to which freedom and morality have come to be distanced from ontological grounds. The strength of Kant’s position lies less in self-legislating reason than in its religious frame. The degeneration of morality into a congeries of legislating selves forms no part of Kant’s intersubjective ethics.

However, the notion of self-legislating reason amounts to basing morality on itself, and that, apart from the reality of ontological nature, invites an endless reworking of moral positions so that, finally, it loses any cognitive value. In the end, we are forced to acknowledge that since moral philosophy cannot know the good, it cannot direct action in any rational sense, that is, towards an identifiable end. Once ethics loses its cognitive character, practical ethics loses its point and meaning. We end up in the modern world in which morality is merely a relativism and emotivism, an irrationalism. As opposed to the "directing" of human action according to ends, there is a "letting" things go according to accident and, behind it all, power. That’s a Nietzschean world without moral significance. My point is that Nietzsche was right about the modern world and the condition of morality within it, but wrong about morality as such. 

I therefore conclude that Kant’s attempt to elude the bankruptcy of modern moral science ultimately fails on account of the failure to restore the connection between ontological nature and ethics, thus retaining a whole series of dualisms such as duty and inclination, nature and reason, that prevent the full realisation of the natural rational teleology that grounds Kant’s practical ethics. 

The situation is salvageable. I argue for the recovery of the Aristotelian ethical tradition in its Thomist form, thus avoiding a self-enclosed naturalist immanence by reference to a supernatural transcendence.

I have argued that Hegel’s most telling criticisms of Kant stem from Aristotelian principles. 
Further, I have argued that the persistence of Aristotelian thought throughout the ages suggests a tradition that has tapped into the roots of human moral experience in a way that modern moralities have so singular failed to do. (Knight 2007; Finnis 1980; MacIntyre 1981). 

I have also argued that St. Thomas Aquinas deepened that connection with respect to the ineliminable human concern with transcendence.

The Restoration of Rationalist Metaphysics
In taking a Thomist approach to Kant, I argue for the restoration of rationalist ethics concerning being as being; for the existential conception of act-of-being; for the connection between ontological nature and ethics; for epistemological realism as against idealism. This, clearly, is not the work of a summer’s day. I have only sketched the outlines, often doing little more than signposting future directions. But I am clear that Kant’s practical philosophy can be revalued in Thomist terms and can deliver on its considerable promise once metaphysics and concepts such as telos, nature, causality, finality, good, necessary being and so on are restored as necessary to the constitution of an ethics worthy of the name. 

For Aquinas, the fundamental law of morality is the lex naturalis, the natural light. It is worth emphasising this point, since in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle lacks a complete position of what is in force according to nature rather than convention. Aquinas supplies that missing element. Aquinas expounds the concept of lex naturalis with respect to notions of participatio, vis illuminativa et directiva, inclinatio and connaturalitas. These are all determined in metaphysics and anthropology.

Natural law bridges the fields of ethics and metaphysics, deepening them both. Lex naturalis takes its place alongside the natural law to buttress the common good which is the aim of political society, what Aristotle called politikon bion. I have cited just a few of the key texts in the vast and growing literature in this field. Names such as Raskin (1986) Finnis (1980), Sandel, Taylor, Raz, Walzer, Sandel. I would throw in the outstanding work of Martha Nussbaum in articulating the centrality of Aristotelian essentialism in the cause of social justice, flourishing well and the human good (1992, 1986). 
Liberal theorists have begun making an attempt to overcome the demoralised condition of liberalism in the modern world by making explicit 'the full theory of the good latent within liberal practice’ (Galston 1982:627). If liberalism was capable of realising the good, it would have done so by now. The problem is not so much the theory as the reality from which it emerged and to which it is adapted. If you want the full theory of the good, go direct to Aristotle and start to work forwards from there.

During the Cold War, the great political concern was with totalitarianism. That era is over. The encroachment upon freedom and morality now comes from within rather than from without. This was what MacIntyre was pointing to when he argued that the barbarians are already ruling us and have been for some time.

Ultimately – and I am with Aristotle and Aquinas when it comes to being directed towards ultimate ends – liberal ‘neutrality’ and agnosticism with respect to the good are thin and precarious notions and have proved utterly incapable of sustaining civility and the moral life.
The renaissance of political philosophy, practical reason and public life will in large part be a recovery of an abandoned ideal order. But, anticipating accusations of reaction, this tradition can itself flourish only if it is also informed and enriched by moralities which have sought to come to terms with the modern world. Here, I offer Kant as a philosopher who almost succeeded in an impossible task – providing modernity with a coherent and cogent morality.

I am neither arguing for the absorption of Kantianism into Thomism not for a Kantian update of Thomism. I am arguing that the great deal that is true and worthwhile in Kant’s moral and political philosophy would benefit from reason being more securely grounded in Aquinas’ realist epistemology and metaphysics. Much that Kant writes with respect to natural rational teleology cries out for a restoration of efficient causality, necessary being and final cause. 

In the Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant seeks to identify the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole. He finds it in the realization of the highest good as presented in his moral theory. Kant assigns human beings a special role in realising this highest good by virtue of their rationality and morality. The highest good can only be realized by human beings as rational and moral beings, which means that humankind is the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole (CJ 427). Kant therefore defines a moral praxis at the heart of nature. Whereas in the second Critique, Kant argued that the highest good could be fully realized only in the eternal world of noumena, he is now arguing, in the Appendix, that the realisation of the highest good is the ultimate purpose of nature, realised through the moral praxis of human beings as rational agents. Kant thus conceives humankind as Nature’s children developing under the guidance and protection of nature’s providence. 

The problem is that this teleological conception cannot be adequately grounded in Kant’s own epistemological idealism and his rejection of metaphysics. In arguing for the highest good as the ultimate purpose of nature, Kant is back on nodding terms with the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas. It is time to recover that tradition in order to provide the rational foundation of the moral society that Kant sought in order to realise human freedom. My point is not merely that Aquinas has a substantial contribution to make to a rational theory of morality. Such an observation should be clear enough. My point goes further to argue that a thorough and systematic recovery of Aquinas’ whole work is essential to make good the claims in modern rational philosophy. The good society which is the Holy Grail or hidden God of philosophers such as Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Marx cannot be found where it has been sought, on a disenchanted and godless modern terrain. It can be found in Aquinas’ work on the unity of philosophy and theology, on logic and intellectual knowledge, on nature, act and potency, the efficacy of secondary causes, becoming; on epistemology, the knowledge of things through their causes, active and passive reason and sense objects; metaphysics as concerning the principles of being, coming to be and change; moral and philosophical anthropology, the substantial union of body and soul, the powers of the soul, the ordering of all potency to its act; the moral order, happiness, virtue, disposition, habits and habitus, deliberation and discourse; political and social life; natural ends and supernatural ends; the spiritual life … 






In the words of Roger Trigg, ‘morality matters’ (2005). Morality certainly mattered to Aquinas. In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas devotes 15 questions to human nature, and 303 questions to ethics.

Aquinas's ethics is not easily summarised, in that it combines natural law and virtue ethics, with a role for divine commands too. In courses of ethics it is customary to divide moral theory into three main theories – deontology, utilitarianism and virtue theory. Aquinas’ ethics combines elements of all of these, with rule-based and consequentialist aspects undergirded by a strong teleological component. As a result, Aquinas presents something that amounts to a complete theory of ethics. Aquinas’ ethics is a course in itself and can be summarised only in a superficial, dry and monotonous manner. It is easy to see why such reduction could be designed to turn people off Aquinas’ ethics rather than ease understanding. Aquinas’ complete position is immensely rich, but avoids the clear and bold statements that permits easy presentation.

Aquinas does maintain the existence of ethical first principles, which are known to all. Nevertheless, he considers that such principles are too general to be able to offer much by way of substantive ethical guidance when it comes to particular cases. Aquinas’ ethics avoid being broken down into simple formulae. Aquinas does identify a single, ultimate end for human life, blessedness, which he conceives as eternal life with God in heaven. Right actions are those actions that contribute to the attainment of blessedness as that ultimate end. Stated thus, Aquinas’ ethics possess a structural similarity to John Stuart Mill's doctrine that right action is that which best achieves the ultimate end of human life. But, of course, Mill’s end, like Aristotle’s before him, is that of earthly happiness. Limited to earthly affairs, it is fairly straightforward to draw concrete conclusions concerning right action from the conception of ultimate ends. In contrast, Aquinas identifies the goal of eternal life as the ultimate end. That is best attained by human beings coming to do what God wants them to do. And that is far from clear. Indeed, a strong strand of ethical thinking, logical positivism and the varieties it spawned, would argue that that end identified by Aquinas is not even meaningful. Even if we can identify the contours of that end, it is still not clear how such knowledge, such as it is, could be applied in particular moral contexts.

It comes as some relief, then, to find that Aquinas acknowledges the complexity of the question, developing a theory that is appropriately complex and multifaceted. Aquinas’ ethics contain two components, a natural law theory and a virtue theory. These are often treated as the same thing. They are not. In Aquinas’ hands, however, the two theories are interlaced so that each depends essentially on the other.

The Natural Law
Nature and the Eternal Law
Aquinas conceives the universe to be purpose-driven and governed by God. Providence is at work, with God directing all things to their right end. In this respect, then, Aquinas’ natural law is in connection with the eternal law, with purposes unfolding in accordance with God's plan for the universe, fixed and unchangeable through all of eternity. The good for human beings, as for all creatures, consists in acting in accordance with this eternal law. Since God created the universe in order to manifest and spread His glory, then God is the end of all things. Such a conception identifies the good for human beings as to act in the way that best promotes and attains this end. The human good is also, therefore, the manifestation of God's glory.

Having established the end, the question concerns how human beings can best contribute to God's glory, and why that should constitute the human end in any case.

For Aquinas, the human and the divine end are one and the same. God has so designed the universe that human beings best serve their own ends by serving His end. The attainment of human excellence is simultaneously the manifestation of God’s glory. Aquinas argues for the unity of human interest and God’s interest, leaving no cause for resentment with regard to divine power as some idealised, alienated human power (in the manner of Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche), since the good for human beings (the good which yields human happiness) is the same as God's goodness. And the human good, Aquinas argues, lies in human beings exercising their rational powers to the best of their capabilities:





Aquinas’ reasoning is impeccably Aristotelian, identifying the good of a thing according to its proper function, the proper function distinguishing a thing as a thing of a certain kind. Following Aristotle, Aquinas identifies the proper function of a human being to be rational. It follows that the human good consists in human beings using their capacity for reason well. Aquinas thus adopts two modes of ethical evaluation. In the theological mode, wrongdoing is sin, and consists in giving offence to God; in the philosophical mode, wrongdoing is immorality, and consists in acting against reason. 

The theologian considers sin principally as an offence against God, whereas the moral philosopher considers it as contrary to reason. 

ST Ia2ae 71.6 ad 5





every rational creature grasps the eternal law in virtue of its shining forth, to a greater or lesser degree. For every grasp of the truth is a kind of shining forth and participation of the eternal law, the unchangeable truth.

ST Ia2ae 93.2c 

Since God's eternal plan applies to the universe in all its aspects, any truth human beings may discover forms part of that plan.

Aquinas does, however, affirm a conception of universal knowledge, pertaining to certain basic ethical principles that are universally known. Such knowledge is possible since God has imprinted certain aspects of the eternal law upon the human mind. This universal knowledge enables human beings to live well, flourish well, in the way that God intended.

Those who reject such eternal law as irrelevant in the secular age would do well to consider at length the next part of Aquinas’ argument. Remember, Aquinas argues that the human end and the divine end are one and the same, mutually compatible, each dependent upon the other. To lose one is to lose the other. To understand how this is so, we need to understand how Aquinas enmeshes human and divine ends. 
The natural law is the imprint of the eternal law upon the human mind, and is apprehended through "the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is bad" (ST Ia2ae 91.2c). In the Treatise on Law (Summa theologiae Ia2ae 90-108), Aquinas distinguishes between the various kinds of laws that assist human beings to engage in right action and thereby attain their ends. Human laws are laws which are legislated by governments or other political and social institutions. Divine law refers to those laws, such as those in scripture, which God has revealed so as to give guidance whenever matters reach beyond the limits of human reason. Natural law forms the central component of Aquinas's ethical theory, and offers a standard for judging actions according to the light of reason, not because they reflect the will of the state (and its rulers) or the word of the Bible. The natural law applies within the limits of human reason. Wherever the remit of reason runs, the natural law applies. The charge that Aquinas denied the natural law by subordinating reason to faith (Drury 2008) can only be made by completely distorting or (wilfully?) misunderstanding what Aquinas actually wrote. The charge only has substance if – and it’s a big if – human affairs are wholly rational and that complete rational knowledge of the universe is possible and available at all times. In How to Relate Science and Religion, Mikael Stenmark offers any number of reasons why such a view is ill-balanced, absurd even, likely to bring about the very irrationalism that rationalists accuse religion of expressing. (Stenmark 2004). 

It may surprise many ‘rationalists’ that, despite describing the natural law as something impressed upon the human mind by God, Aquinas’ conception can be understood and presented in naturalistic terms. We remain within the realm of philosophy and do not, where reason applies, need to move into the realm of theology. Only when we reach the limits of reason does Aquinas take us into the world of faith. At no point does Aquinas deny or decry reason. The only charge against Aquinas is that he held a truly philosophical conception of reason. As Kant would argue many centuries later, it is only in knowing the limits of reason that we can know the extent of what reason can explain and what reason can do.

Aquinas’ idea that the natural law is something impressed upon us by God savours a great deal of Kant’s notion of the moral law which is implanted within each and all. It also sounds like the idea of innate categories, to which both Plato and Kant subscribed. But, as has been argued, Aquinas is not an innatist in this Platonic sense. He is clear that there is nothing in the intellect that has not been in the senses first. The mind then proceeds to work upon the sense data it receives. Aquinas is both empiricist and rationalist, not one thing or the other. His position is too sophisticated to be divided easily in the modern fashion.

Aquinas does not subscribe to an ethical innatism, the view that human beings knowing the difference between right and wrong in some immediate sense since God has programmed that information into the human design. Such a view would deny the moral autonomy of human beings. If human beings knew good and bad, right and wrong in some automatic sense, they wouldn’t need to exercise moral activity and judgement. There would, in short, be no morality, just a natural reflex. 

What is innate within human beings, Aquinas argues, is the capacity to understand the truth of ethical principles, to differentiate between right and wrong, a capacity which human beings are charged with a moral duty to exercise. It is the responsibility of human beings to develop a moral framework. This moral framework is not given, only the moral capacity. 

This moral framework is concomitant with Aquinas's conception of rational thought as the distinctive feature of the human species. Human beings are moral beings in the same way that they are philosophical beings. Aquinas argues that theoretical knowledge is developed on the basis of first principles, such as the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, and that human beings possess an innate intellectual ability to apprehend such first principles through the light of agent intellect, a light that is given to us by God. In the same way, human beings possess an innate moral ability to apprehend moral truths. Aquinas defines this capacity for apprehending ethical first principles by the term synderesis. 





Aquinas identifies the first principle of practical reasoning as this: The good should be done and pursued, and the bad should be avoided. (ST Ia2ae 94.2c). The question is how this principle could take practical form.

Natural Inclinations
In answering the question as to how more substantive moral principles be established, Aquinas proceeds on the basis of certain assumptions about what human beings desire. That the good should be pursued and done and bad be avoided is foundational in that it is grounded in facts about human desire. The principle would appear to what Kant came later to call categorical imperative, something that must be done unconditionally. On closer analysis, however, the principle is a hypothetical imperative, requiring additional assumptions about the universal desirability of the good to hold true. For Aquinas, those assumptions form the necessary background, and obtain by definition of 'the good', which means that the principle is capable of categorical formulation. For Kant, only categorical imperatives counted as moral, with hypothetical imperatives providing practical guidance to achieving one's ends. Hypothetical imperatives are conditional, concerning what must be done if a goal is to be obtained. Kant, therefore, draws a distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives.

All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will). A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end.
Every practical law represents a possible action as good and therefore as necessary for a subject whose actions are determined by reason. Hence all imperatives are formulae for determining an action which is necessary in accordance with the principle of a will in some sense good. If the action would be good solely as a means to something else, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical.

Kant GMM 1991: 78

Hypothetical imperatives, therefore, concerned practical action as a means to something else; categorical imperatives concerned action which is good in itself and therefore necessary for a will in accordance with reason. Kant, of course, is famous for separating duty and inclination, with an action counting as moral only if it is performed out of duty. In contrast to Kant, Aquinas argues that morality and natural inclination are inextricably connected:





This is a crucial argument in explaining the difference between Aquinas and Kant. Whereas Kant set up moral duty in outright opposition to natural inclination, Aquinas considers our natural inclinations to be the best guide to the natural law. Kant’s separation of duty and inclination has reason educating desire from the outside, Aquinas’ derivation of natural law from natural inclinations has reason educating desire from within. The human good, for Aquinas, is therefore to act in such a way as is best to satisfy the natural inclinations. The precepts of the natural law are those rules which tell us how we should act so as to achieve the human good. This is far from Kant’s moral duty, which tells us how to act against our natural inclinations, in order to transcend those inclinations. For Kant, morality is categorical. The problem is that it is difficult to see what power reason separated from natural inclinations has to educate and guide those inclinations. Kant’s reason is external, on the outside of desire, impersonal and impotent. For Aquinas, however, normative principles are always conditional upon certain facts about what we desire. Such principles cannot be true in independently of facts about human nature. The abstraction of Kant’s categorical imperative may achieve a certain purity but it is bought at the expense of irrelevance. They work against the grain of human nature, which is only one part rational. For Aquinas, those acts that best allow human beings to achieve the ends they desire, ends which correspond to the human good, count as morally good. This does not require Kant’s moral duty as some abstracted rationalism. Human beings can be good simply by being rational, not by acting in obedience to a rational moral duty legislated externally to desire. 

Aquinas proceeds to classify the various kinds of natural inclinations, showing the precepts they give rise to. First, human beings have an inclination for self-preservation, which they share with all substances. Second human beings have those inclinations that are shared with all other animals — such as the inclination for sexual intercourse between male and female, and for the rearing of children. Finally, there is the inclination to live in society and to grasp the truth about God.

Whilst this is not an exhaustive list concerning natural inclinations, it does cover the broad areas of human behaviour. Human beings are animate beings, sexual beings, social beings, rational beings and spiritual beings, and are equipped with inclinations that generate desires that cause human beings to seek fulfilment in all these areas of being. Human beings seek to survive and thrive, they seek to preserve themselves, they seek to have sex and procreate, they seek to associate, they seek to understand the world around them, they seek an overarching meaning of life. There is nothing wrong with natural inclinations as such. The problem is excess which unbalances the proper arrangement of the inclinations and true fulfilment of desires with a view to attaining the human good.

Whilst the list is not complete, it covers the whole range of human inclination and desire and can therefore support Aquinas’ ambitious and comprehensive ethical theory. It is striking how Aquinas’ conception of morality is connected with human health and well-being. That is, it can be embraced even by those who tend to run a mile at the mere mention of God. Overindulgence in food and drink is immoral since it is bad for the health and thus contradicts the desire for self-preservation. (ST 2a2ae 146.1c) Excessive behaviour as such is disruptive to those with whom one, as a social being, must live, thus contradicting the desire to live in society. Since human beings are social beings with a desire to live in society, it contradicts the natural law "to offend others with whom one needs to associate" (ST Ia2ae 94.2c).
Sexual promiscuity is bad because it leads to children without a supportive family, or because it breaks up a family, depriving a child of a mother and a father, therefore contradicting the desire for raising children. 





Aquinas’ work is frequently condemned for its arid intellectualism. Certainly, Aquinas’ arguments are noted for the rational frame and logical rigour, but it is clear that Aquinas grounds his normative principles in those things which form the very stuff of everyday human life. At every point, Aquinas refers to those things which human beings do every day as human beings. Aquinas succeeds in showing the moral import of everyday activities, emphasising that morality is something that human beings do. Morality is not something that is defined as some abstract law to be obeyed out of duty, but is something that human beings do out of inclination. These are all dictates of the natural law since human beings, through "the light of natural reason," are able to see why such conduct is conducive to the human good. Not moral duty legislated and imposed from the outside, the ‘light of natural reason’ that lies within each and all as human beings is the indispensable human guide to the good.

At this point we can see clearly how Kant’s separation of duty and inclination severely hobbles his ethical system. Kant’s morality seems doomed to be forever on the outside, lecturing impotently as to what is to be done for human beings to attain the good life. Aquinas’ ethical theory works with natural inclinations on the inside, providing an in-built dynamic leading human beings to moral behaviour and hence the human good. 
This immanent dynamism possesses some intriguing implications with respect to bringing about the good society. If human actions count as right and wrong in relation to the extent to which they alter our ability to achieve the ends we desire, then it follows that social and technological changes entail changes in what is right and wrong. It seems clear that technological advances, making it possible to have sex without procreation, and hence unwanted children, have undermined at least some of Aquinas’ reasons as to why sexual promiscuity is bad. Admittedly, other reasons, concerning family breakdown and anti-social behaviour remain in place. But the central point to be made here is that Aquinas's natural law theory is not written in stone as something given for all time, unchangeable and insulated from historical changes. On the contrary, Aquinas’ natural law is highly responsive to changes in the world and places the onus on human beings as moral agents, capable of working out what is required to advance and attain the human good. Whilst some ethical principles are so fundamental as to be timeless, this does not apply to all such principles. Etienne Gilson, writing of the way that habits shape experience, writes that ‘Man's soul as well as his body has a history. It conserves its past in order to enjoy and utilize it in a perpetual present.’ Natural law, through human action, has a history. ‘Habit, as St. Thomas thinks of it, is a quality, that is, not the very substance of man but a disposition added to his substance and modifying it. The characteristic which differentiates this disposition or habit from other species of quality is that it is a disposition of the subject in relation to its own nature. In other words, a being's habits determine the manner in which it realizes its own definition.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1 256-257). 

Gilson writes that ‘man is a discursive being.’ Ethics is thus the product of rational deliberation between human beings as to what is likely to best achieve the ends to which human beings aspire, and what is likely to interfere with or inhibit those ends. This discursive aspect, placing the accent on human moral agency, is a highly appealing aspect of Aquinas’ ethical theory, but is apt to be overlooked in favour of simplistic conceptions of a natural law written in stone for all time. The natural law is the expression of human inclinations and desires, is shaped by habits and habitus and, in sum, has a history.

Aquinas’ rationale condemning sexual promiscuity seems to have been rendered redundant as a result of advances in birth control, but Aquinas’ case doesn’t just rest on unwanted offspring. Aquinas argues that sexual intercourse is morally acceptable only when carried out for the end human procreation, and even then in the right manner.





Use of a spouse is against nature when it bypasses the proper vessel, or the proper manner insmuted by nature in terms of the position. The first case is always a mortal sin because offspring cannot result and so the intention of nature is totally frustrated In the second case it is not always a mortal sin, as some say, but can be a sign of deadly concupiscence. Sometimes it can even be without sin when the disposition of the body does not allow the other way [the position instituted by nature]. Otherwise, the gravity is in proportion to the distance from the natural manner.

Quoted in Nye ed 1999

This is an aspect of Aquinas’ sexual morality that seems to be not only untenable but to be so contrary to reality of human sexuality, in all of its variety, as to expose Aquinas’ natural law theory as a whole to ridicule and rejection. Aquinas’ position not only rules out the use of any form of birth control, but denies all sexual activity that is not directed to the proper end of procreation. But, of course, as biologists and zoologists have long since revealed, sex isn’t just about procreation at all. Above all, it is about emotional bonding, cementing relations between couples. Sexual activity can hardly be called unnatural and immoral for no other reason than that it is not aimed at the procreation of the species.

Aquinas's position, however, is not so absurd as it would appear in light of these anomalies alone. For Aquinas, deliberate human actions are never morally neutral. That is, either human actions are aimed at an appropriate end, in which case they count as good, or they are not, in which case they count as bad.





On the basis of this principle we can begin to see why Aquinas could condemn certain forms of sexual behaviour as immoral and unnatural; we can also see how, by changing the interpretation of the natural law in light of what we have come to know about sex, we can see certain behaviours once condemned as immoral and unnatural as moral and natural. Overall, Aquinas’ case is not against bodily pleasure as such but against the excessive pursuit of pleasure. As an emotional experience that bonds people together, sexual behaviour counts as a good. The end of sex, in other words, is not just procreation. Such a narrow view would imply that sexual activity between couples ends with fertility, condemning men and women to sexless and loveless marriages. The view is just plain wrong.

Aquinas condemns homosexuality as contrary to nature. In his defence he claims that no other animals exhibit homosexual inclinations. We now know that this too is just plain wrong. Insofar as evidence is required here – there is a wealth of it – try Mother Nature Natural Selection and the Female of the Species by Sarah Hrdy (1999 chapter 9).

It has long since been time to cease reading moral principles against biological fact and instead live up to the promise of the natural law by ensuring proper mediation between reason and nature. There is nothing in the biological and zoological evidence that scientific advance has uncovered that invalidates the natural law, only the way it has been read by particular institutions in particular times and places. Natural law, like human beings, has a history.

Aquinas’ view seems overly rational, valuing only those actions which contribute directly to the end of procreation. Aquinas seems to imply that all those acts which are preliminary to the actual sex act are a waste of time, and therefore bad. Such behaviour may seem morally neutral in that it doesn’t harm other people, but, for Aquinas it counts as bad in that it harms those involved in that they waste time in activity that does not contribute to their own good. The use of birth control would be criticised as bad in this sense. But the view presumes that the only end of sex is procreation. Aquinas completely misses the possibility that sex with birth control might have the end of cementing a relationship between two people. So let’s take that observation as a given, that sex brings a couple together and keeps them together, and recognise that Aquinas was not presenting sexology as a demonology, and try to understand what Aquinas was really trying to get at.

Aquinas is not opposing morality to nature at all. He is working within the natural inclinations of human beings, trying to guide them in accordance with reason to attain the human good. We can proceed from Aquinas’ famous statement that grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. That is, grace does not extinguish sensual desire but puts it perfectly under the control of reason. That itself may seem a lofty ideal, but it is still worth emphasising that Aquinas’ goal is not the elimination of sensual desires. On the contrary, such desires are legitimate, are an integral part of what it is to be human, and have their uses in achieving the human good. Human beings would hardly be human if they did not experience thirst, hunger, the desire to procreate. These are good things in themselves, Aquinas argues. Sensual desires are the primary means by which other animals pursue their good. In contrast, the human being has the capacity to regulate these primary desires in accordance with reason, as once happened in the state of innocence which prevailed in the Garden of Eden. It is as a result of our fallen nature, Aquinas reasons, that human beings are subject to two laws, the law of nature and also the law of sin (or the law of desire) (ST Ia2ae 91.6). It may seem odd to regard the law of desire as the law of sin, and it would seem to contradict the view that Aquinas seeks to work with natural inclinations, not against them. Such a law is a part of the eternal law in that it is God’s intention that human beings be subject to these desires, as part of the way that we come to differentiate between good and bad as moral beings. The various desires that human beings have for sensual pleasure is therefore part of how the world is supposed to be, with human beings as moral beings having to work out the right course of action and come to act accordingly. Aquinas’ view, then, is that reason ought to guide and rule natural inclinations.

The principal object of Aquinas' animus is not sensual desire and pleasure as such but hedonism, the idea that pleasure is an end in itself. The view that if an act feels good to those who perform it, is consensual between two or more people, and harms no-one, then it cannot be bad. Such a view seems innocuous enough. However, for Aquinas this view is mistaken and constitutes a danger to human well-being. 
If all aspects of human nature are good on account of being a part of God's eternal providence, this does not mean we should put equal trust in all of our beliefs and desires. The natural law is not the law of nature read directly from biological fact, but nature seen through the eyes of reason. Thus, human beings are charged with employing their reason to judge what the senses reveal about nature. In other words, the rational desires human beings come to judge the sensual desires. Some sensual desires are good, some are bad. It depends on proper use, moderation, the avoidance of excess. The pleasures of food, drink, and sex are essential to human health and well-being, but may also be a trap that leads to a life of excess that is inimical to health and well-being. Sensual desires and pleasures form an essential part of the flourishing human life but, pursued as ends in themselves, are inimical to the excellent human life. The principal ethical responsibility of human beings lies in using reason to see those desires for what they are and judge them according to the extent to which they contribute to the human good, or contradict it.

Aquinas’ natural law is ultimately grounded in facts about our natural inclinations. The challenge to Aquinas as a moral philosopher is to formulate a principle which allows him to distinguish the natural inclinations which count as good and can therefore ground the natural law from those inclinations that count as bad and found the law of sin. 

Aquinas suggests that we differentiate between good and bad inclinations by deciding the extent to which they are in accord with reason. Sensual desires count as good only insofar as they are regulated by reason. This is in accordance with Aquinas’ principle "the good of a human being qua human being is that his reason has completely cognized the truth and that his lower appetites are regulated as reason's rule requires" (QDVC 9c). Thus, Aquinas can differentiate between good and bad inclinations by seeing the extent to which they are in accord with reason. To use reason well leads to the human good, with reason recommending some inclinations to some extent determined by reason, and not others. 

The question then is how to determine the grounds for claiming that some inclinations are in accord with reason and others are not. The rational evaluation of inclinations requires a knowledge of the goal the agent desires. Hence, if the goal is self-preservation, then gluttony is clearly contrary to reason. But if the goal is sensual pleasure, then excessive concern with self-preservation is also contrary to reason. Reason alone, in other words, is insufficient when it comes to evaluating competing inclinations. We require some independent way of judging between inclinations.

Ruling out an appeal to God so as to remain within a philosophical frame, Aquinas can identify those goods which are worthy of pursuit by reference to the proper function argument. The principle of proper function enables Aquinas to distinguish between the various inclinations according to the extent to which they are rational or sensual. Aquinas sets up a hierarchy on this basis, with the lower inclinations for self-preservation, sexual intercourse, and children taking second place to the higher inclinations for knowledge and companionship. Knowledge and companionship count as higher in being distinctively rational, and hence distinctively human, that is, as those things which demarcate human beings from other animals. Actions that fulfil the lower desires will accord with the natural law to the extent that they do not conflict with the higher inclinations. Where there is a clash between the two, the higher inclinations have priority. Aquinas confronts the objection that "even what belongs to the inclination of the concupiscible appetite will have to pertain to the natural law" (ST Ia2ae 94.2 obj 2). Aquinas replies: "All such inclinations belonging to any part of human nature, including the concupiscible and irascible appetites, pertain to the natural law inasmuch as they are ruled by reason" (ad 2).

By this principle, Aquinas can show why the sensual pleasures of sex, drugs, and so on, are unworthy of pursuit and immoral to pursue. Such pleasures, pursued immoderately, get in the way of a life of knowledge, friendship, and virtuous rational activity in general. This affirmation of moderate as against immoderate behaviour indicates how we may read the natural law so as to develop a view of the place of sexuality and sensual pleasures that is richer and more sensitive than that given by Aquinas. 

In arguing that nature is good on account of being created by God, Aquinas stated a principle with the potential to revolutionize Christianity, putting an end once and for all for the Manichean hatred of the body to affirm the value of life in this world. Unfortunately, Aquinas, pointing in the right direction, only got so far. His antipathy, even abhorrence, of sexual love meant that his sexual morality is characterised by an asceticism that has the natural law punching well below its weight.

McInerny tells the story of how Aquinas resisted the temptations of the flesh that his brothers put in his way:

They introduced a woman of easy virtue into Thomas's room, seeking to appeal to the young man's reason through his concupiscence. As the story is told, Thomas snatched a brand from the fire and drove the poor girl from the room. Then, with the charred end of the stick, he traced a cross on the wall and fell on his knees before it. He had passed what his brothers regarded as the supreme test. An angel is said to have appeared to him and tied a cincture around his waist, and from that time Thomas was untroubled by carnal temptation. This as much as his subsequent theology of the angels is the origin of his title as the angelic doctor. 

McInerny 2004 Pt 1

To be ‘untroubled by carnal temptation’ seems curiously inhuman, and hardly forms the basis of an ethic that is likely to have much appeal to ‘ordinary’ flesh and blood men and women. Aquinas's meagre appreciation of sexuality is unpersuasive and implausible. It makes much more sense to suppose that sexuality and other such sensual pleasures can make a positive contribution to human flourishing as rational and moral beings. 
Aquinas’ general point remains valid. Aquinas is not against bodily pleasures as such, but against their pursuit in themselves and to excess. Pursued in moderation, such pleasures serve to sustain and deepen the bonds between human beings, on an emotional and even an intellectual level through pleasurable enjoyment as a shared experience. The eastern religions have a long tradition of sacred sex as a spiritual achievement. 
The point is that Aquinas's ethical framework is rich enough and flexible enough to allow us, as rational and moral beings, to draw normative conclusions which differ from those of Aquinas himself. It all depends on how broad or narrow we define the end of the human good we ought to pursue. If sexual intercourse is confined to the narrow end of procreation, then an awful lot of human behaviour stands condemned as immoral and unnatural. It is difficult to see how such a narrowly defined ethic is likely to garner much by way of popular support. Broaden the end of sexuality by introducing physical and emotional bonds, and natural law theory will pick up adherents.

There is nothing here that contradicts the basic principle that one should act in accord with reason. But to be in accord with reason also involves human beings as moral agents employing their reason in order to evaluate natural inclinations. This determination of the natural law remains connected with normative rules of conduct.

The natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas therefore supplies the foundations of morality and makes these available to all as rational beings. In fine, Aquinas’ theory of the natural law is grounded not in moral knowledge but in fundamental moral principles which can be grasped by all human beings as moral beings, not just professional philosophers who understand all the intricacies involved in stating and defending moral principles. Who these mythical philosophers are, in the aftermath of G.E. Moore and the myriad relativisms and subjectivisms he spawned, I should like to know. Aquinas shows why it is better to trust the innate moral reason that all human beings are born with and which is common to all.

Virtue
Aquinas’ natural law theory seems to be a complete and fully developed ethical account, explaining the foundations of ethics and the human knowledge of its fundamental principles. Actions are right to the extent to which they are conducive to the ultimate human end – flourishing well as rational beings – and are wrong to the extent to which they contradict that end. The natural law is thus in accord with human inclinations, promoting the end of human flourishing. The natural law is also capable of being intellectually apprehended, in that all human beings have such fundamental normative principles imprinted on their hearts and minds. 

In addition to the natural law, however, Aquinas has need of a virtue theory.

Why Virtue is Needed
Aquinas defines a virtue as a fixed disposition which causes human beings to do the morally correct thing. Aquinas gives a more exact definition in the first article of his Disputed Questions on the Virtues in General:

A virtue is a habitus that informs a reason-governed power in such a way as to perfect the activity of that power.

Habitus is a key concept. A habitus is a context that channels the dispositions this way or that; it is an acquired skill or practice or habit, rather than something natural. A habitus brings human beings some way toward actuality, turning what was hitherto the potential to act in a certain way into the ability to perform that action well: “Sometimes the intellect stands midway between potentiality and actuality, and then the intellect is said to have a habitus" (ST la 79.6 ad 3); "a habitus and a power differ in this, that through a power we are able to do something, whereas through a habitus it is not that we are made able to do something, but that we are made ready (habilis) or unready to do well or badly that which we can do" (SCG IV.77.4/4114).

The moral virtues always inform a power that is either rational itself or under the control of reason. Such powers contain the capacity for conceiving and generating alternatives. Exercising this capacity is a condition of human moral responsibility. As Aquinas argues:

It is distinctive of a rational power that it is capable of opposites and that it has control over its own acts.
QDVC I ad 12

The virtues perfect the rational powers of human beings, meaning that these powers will bring about the right sort of action, insofar as they possess and employ the relevant virtues. 

We can now see why Aquinas requires a virtue theory. For Aquinas, human beings need virtuous dispositions for three things:

1.	For uniformity of action. For what rests on the action alone changes easily if it has not been stabilized by a dispositional inclination.
2.	To perform a perfect action readily. For unless there is a disposition somehow inclining the rational power in one direction, then whenever we have to take action, we will always have to take up first an inquiry into the action. This is clear in the case of someone who wants to reflect on something and hasn't yet acquired the dispositional knowledge, and in the case of someone who wants to act virtuously and lacks the virtuous disposition.




Aquinas here presents a kind of desiderata for any sort of action. Appealing not to abstract moral principle but to a moral reason that is shared by all human beings as human beings.

Here we see how Aquinas and Kant differ. Aquinas has no objection in taking pleasure in a moral action. Indeed, such pleasure will increase the chances that the agent will engage in such moral action more often. Aquinas goes even further when he argues that it is the taking of pleasure in the action that in part gives the action its moral worth. In complete contrast, Kant argued that only those actions done from duty, in contradistinction to inclination, possess moral worth. The shopkeeper who treats his customers honestly is worthy of moral praise by virtue of doing the right thing. Whether or not he takes pleasure in so acting has no moral significance for Kant. His pleasure or absence of pleasure makes the action no better and no worse. (Kant 1991 GMM ch 1).

Kant’s argument is fine if the accent remains exclusively focused on the act. But what about the agent. I have argued that Kant is himself a virtue theorist, in which case the character of the agent matters in addition to the moral worth of the act. 

Here we see the Aquinas’ ethical theory in all its richness. Aquinas’ eclecticism is able to accommodate virtue theory, consequentialism and deontology. The moral worth of the act and the agent fit seamlessly together in Aquinas’ view. For Aquinas, it is not just rules framing the act, but the character of the agent, that matters. Aquinas needs no lessons on moral duty. He agrees that it is good struggle against and ultimately resist temptation. But he considers it more morally worthy not to be tempted in the first place. Temptation indicates a certain confusion as to good and bad, a certain tendency to see the bad rather than the good as desirable. For Aquinas, the good person has a good character and therefore chooses the good with pleasure, not discord. In Kant’s account, a person perceives the moral law and wills to do it, over and against the natural dispositions that pull in the other direction. In Aquinas’ account, these dispositions have been made virtuous through the acquisition of a habitus, with the result that the choice a person makes is so natural and effortless as hardly requiring will. Kant’s agent exhibits a good will, but Aquinas’ agent exercises virtue. Aquinas’ agent acts well out of possessing a good character and is therefore far more praiseworthy than the agent who acts out of wilful choice and duty. The dispositions of Aquinas’ agent are virtuous and so the question of being tempted by and having to resist the bad doesn’t arise in the same way that it does for Kant’s agent. In this respect, moral rules and duty are there for those who are deficient in character. For Aquinas, the morally good agent possesses a good character and will therefore have no need to think through all aspects of a situation before making a choice. Whilst the natural law is available to all and grounds the rightness or wrongness of actions, in the main it exists in the background, with the virtues guiding the agent toward the good.

Acquiring Virtue
Aquinas makes the strong statement that the virtues guarantee right action. He rejects the accusation that the virtues could ever obstruct right action, since he affirms the capacity of the virtues to be right on every occasion:





The logical corollary of this is that there can never be a case where an agent would be better off by discarding the ingrained dispositions and adopting a more flexible approach. Aquinas is committed to the strong view that no action caused by virtue can be immoral. 
Further, Aquinas affirms that human beings can acquire virtues that are as perfect as naturally feasible.





Aquinas needs to give an account of how a person can come to have virtues that are close to being perfectly reliable in all circumstances.

For Aquinas, good actions yield virtues, not in the way that a demonstrative proof yields knowledge, but in the way that probabilistic arguments build up conviction over time. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 233-235). Aquinas thus argues:

Accordingly, in the realm of practical activities too, a single act is not enough to cause virtue. Instead, many are needed. The reason is that in this case the soul's activities are not efficacious as they are in the case of demonstrations, because practical activities are contingent and [merely] probable. 

QDVC 9 ad 11

‘Acquiring a virtue is not like learning the answer to a math problem. The right action in one circumstance contributes to the development of a virtue, but it contributes only one small piece, relevant to a narrow set of circumstances. Full possession of a virtue consists in being disposed to behave properly over a wide and diverse range of cases—a range so wide and diverse that one might wonder whether anyone could ever actually have such a virtue.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 234).

Rather than adopting a fine-grained approach, Aquinas holds that the virtues are interconnected, meaning that it is impossible to have one of the virtues without having them all. The virtues are, then, mutually entailing. (ST Ia2ae 57.4c, 65.Ic, and QDVCard 2; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.13.)

This seems rather an ambitious claim, nothing short of moral perfection, begging the question as to how anyone — other than God – can achieve such a state.

Prudence and the perfection of virtue
Aquinas backs his claim by making the one virtue of prudence responsible for fine-tuning all the other virtues. This means that the just person will have a certain broad disposition, roughly described as an equal regard for others, but that this disposition will yield the right results only if it is exercised by an agent who possesses the intellectual virtue of prudence. Prudence is the skill at practical reasoning that enables a person to see what ought to be done in a particular circumstance. In Aquinas’ conception, prudence takes the general orientation provided by the other virtues, as dictated by right reason, and arrives at what ought to be done in a given case. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 235).

Prudence perfects all of the moral virtues in the appetitive part, each virtue producing an inclination in appetite to some kind of human good. Thus, justice produces an inclination toward the good of equality in matters of the common life, temperance produces an inclination toward the good of restraint in one's sensual desires, and so on and so forth with respect to each virtue. Since these goods can be attained in various ways, human beings need prudence of judgment so as to establish the right way. (QDVC 6c; cf. ST 2a2ae 47.4c).

Prudence, then, plays the role of fine-tuning all the other virtues. Aquinas thus argues that "prudence perfects all the moral virtues." He proceeds to argue:





Aquinas’ theory is not as demanding as it would seem. To argue that the virtues never err is not to make the claim that the virtues are omnipotent, only that they are infallible. Aquinas argues that a virtuous disposition "must be the source of a good act in such a way that it can in no way be the source of a bad one" (QDVC 2c). This claim is compatible with the idea that a virtuous person is virtuous in only a limited domain. Outside of this domain, this person may lack the sort of prudent judgment that the moral virtues require for their "rightness and full goodness." (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 235).

Since it is prudence which "perfects all the moral virtues," Aquinas requires an account of how prudence works in order to support his virtue theory. We assume that, in line with the definition given earlier, that prudence is the kind of knowledge that has practical implications. The prudent person acquires the sort of knowledge that enables him/her to employ the moral virtues. Aquinas quotes Augustine with approval: "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid" (On 83 Questions Q. 61; ST 2a2ae 47.1sc).

Nevertheless, Aquinas’ own view is quite distinct from Augustine’s. Prudence, for Aquinas, is not just a body of practical knowledge, but the capacity to put that knowledge into action. Aquinas thus considers prudence to be a single disposition, not a collection of associated dispositions. The prudent person has the virtue of prudence. Aquinas also maintains that prudence is lost not by being forgotten, but by being corrupted by passion. To forget some part of practical knowledge would be an impediment to prudence but not the loss of prudence, since prudence entails more than knowledge. Prudence, that is, is a kind of bridge between knowing and doing. The role of prudence is to connect knowledge with desire and action.





Aquinas spells out what this means in replies to two of objections with respect to prudence. The first objection claims that prudence cannot be a virtue, since practical knowledge is of "little or no value" for virtue (the objection quotes Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics II4,1105b2). Aquinas accepts this claim in his reply:

Practical knowledge includes universal judgments about what one should do (for instance, that fornication is bad, that one should not steal, etc.). Still, even with this knowledge, it happens that reason's judgment is intercepted on the way to a particular act, with the result that reason does not judge rightly. This is why practical knowledge is said to be of little value for virtue: because, even with it, it happens that people sin against virtue. 

QDVC 6 ad 1

The universal judgments that Aquinas refers to are those which human beings possess in virtue of the natural law. However, as this passage argues, the knowledge of such principles does not form a central component of prudence, which is to say that such knowledge does not form a central component of intellectual virtue. Aquinas thus argues that  "prudence involves more than practical knowledge," carrying on to explain:

Prudence includes judging rightly about particular acts insofar as one should perform them now. Any sin corrupts that judgment. Therefore, as long as one has prudence, one does not sin. That is why prudence contributes not a little, but a great deal to virtue. In fact, as was said, it is a cause of virtue itself. 

QDVC 6 ad 1

Prudence is a ‘cause’ of the other virtues to the extent that it is required for these virtues to perform as they should. The question is how is such prudence is not the same as practical knowledge. Aquinas has remarked that the judgment of reason is sometimes "intercepted on the way to a particular act", hijacked by the passions, as it were. It is for this reason that practical knowledge alone is of little value. It is therefore prudence that guarantees that reason arrives at its final destination: the particular act that is right to perform now. (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 239).

The second objection maintains that one can be virtuous without prudence so long as one can obtain advice from others. Aquinas replies to a similar objection elsewhere by arguing that one must at least be prudent enough to ask for that sort of help and to know how to distinguish good advice from bad advice (ST 2a2ae 47.14 ad 2). He replies in a different way in this instance:

One person can take general advice from another about what to do. However, only the rightness of prudence enables one to sustain one's judgment rightly throughout the act itself, against all passions. Without this, there can be no virtue. 

QDVC 6 ad 2

Prudence’s task is not the cognitive task of knowing the right thing to do. ‘The prudent agent not only has that practical knowledge but is also able to focus on that knowledge at the right time, for as long as necessary.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 240). One sees here the extent to which Aquinas's virtue theory and natural law theory are interconnected. Human beings, to a very large degree, all know what the right thing to do is, for reasons given earlier. The reason that people still go wrong so often is that they fail to make right use of the knowledge they have. Human beings let their knowledge be hijacked by our passions. Hume thinks that reason is the slave of the passions. That, for Aquinas, is the problem to be overcome.

Prudence, for Aquinas, is an intellectual disposition, but a disposition which is unlike knowledge. Aquinas explains that knowledge is not a virtue in the truest sense, since it lacks an appetitive component. This makes it more akin to Kant’s reason as something apart from natural inclination. Knowledge would be a virtue in the proper sense if it made an agent positively desire to grasp the true. But this is not the case: "Having knowledge does not make one want to consider the truth; it just makes one able to do so" (QDVC 7c). 
Whilst, deep down, we all know the difference between right and wrong, we do not all desire to embrace this knowledge and let it guide our lives. ‘The disposition of prudence guarantees that our intellect will attend to the relevant information we possess. Guided by the virtue of justice, the prudent person will fasten on those aspects of the situation that bear on treating others fairly and equally. Guided by the virtue of temperance, the prudent person will dwell on resisting temptation.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 239-240).
It is cases such as these, Aquinas describes the intellect as "following the will." The underlying disposition "more truly has the nature of a virtue inasmuch as it gives a person not just the ability or the knowledge to act rightly, but also the will to do so" (QDVC 7c). ‘Prudence does this, not because it is a virtue of the will, but because it holds intellect steadfast in its orientation, allowing the will to act in accord with right reason so as best to pursue the ends that the virtuous person desires by a kind of second nature.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 240).

‘No one is more virtuous because she understands more of the natural law or sees more deeply into its far-reaching consequences. We all grasp the natural law, more or less, and we are all perfectly capable of applying it to particular circumstances. The good person is not good because she can do that better than the rest of us—she is not some kind of moral sage. Instead, the good person knows what she is looking for and is steadfast in focusing on that. The rest of us have too much on our minds, and too many desires, and we make hard what is really quite simple. The overall tenor of the theory is therefore very far from the sort of intellectualism with which Aquinas is often associated. Although it is true that wrongdoing is always the result of ignorance, it is also true that such ignorance is the product of a failure at some other level. God gives each of us plenty of information about right and wrong, not just in Church teachings and holy texts, but written into our very hearts and minds. When we go wrong, it is because we ignore all of this.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 240).
Aquinas’ Comprehensiveness
Unlike Kant, Aquinas's ethical theory gives us no memorable theses or formulae by which to encapsulate his thinking. Instead, Aquinas’ ethical theory is eclectic and expresses a complicated interimbrication of elements which can be found in natural law theory, virtue theory, deontology and consequentialism/utilitarianism. This means that only a thorough and painstaking analysis of what Aquinas actually writes will do justice to the complexity and intricacy of his thought. Anything less will give us shorthand and shortcuts, which are easily expressed in their simplicity, and easily criticised and rejected. This is Aquinas as the straw man of ethics, routinely set up and knocked down by those with moral and political axes to grind (compare the quality of John Finnis’ Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory  1998, and Mary Keys’ Aquinas, Aristotle and the Promise of the Common Good, 2006, with Shadia Drury’s tendentious Aquinas and Modernity The Lost Promise of the Natural Law 2008. The shorthand ‘Aquinas’ has been knocked down more than a few times.

I find it interesting that the principal architects of the modern worldview – Kant, Marx, Weber, Nietzsche – either knew little or nothing of Aquinas or just refused point blank to do the difficult thing and engage with him on the philosophical level. I know of no reference by Marx to Aquinas, none by Kant, and certainly not the extensive treatment one would have expected, not in any of the critiques. I can find general comments in Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, but no extended commentary. Nothing in Nietzsche, which is significant given Nietzsche’s assault on morality. The scattered half dozen or so references I can find in Max Weber are more of a sociological and historical than philosophical and theological nature. 

I find this paucity of commentary and critique with respect to Aquinas curious. It means one of two things. Either Aquinas’ work is so wrong headed as to be absurd and irrelevant. His thought was a product of the Middle Ages and that age has now passed. Or Aquinas’ thought is so profound and difficult as to require a substantial effort of criticism. In which case the prophets of modernity simply chose to bypass him altogether. A read of Gilson and Maritain is sufficient to prove the intellectual quality of Aquinas’ thought. 

Having studied Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Rousseau, Hegel, Kant and Marx with some distinction, I think I am in a position to form some kind of judgement with respect to who counts as a great philosopher. I concur with Anthony Kenny’s view:





I would just disagree with respect to the view that Aquinas’ philosophy of nature has been antiquated. I believe that as the limitations of mechanicist and reductionist science become increasingly obvious, the idea of nature as a purpose-driven universe will return, not necessarily in the form that Aristotle and Aquinas left it, but with nature as alive all the same. 

Kenny’s claim, however, makes it clear that Aquinas is a philosophical heavyweight. If this is so – and I believe it to be true – then Alasdair MacIntyre was right about Nietzsche, modernity and morality. Nietzsche has succeeded in exposing the hollowness of modern morality, not morality as such. And this clears the way for a proper recovery and appreciation of Aristotelian and Thomist morality – both of which Nietzsche failed to engage, let alone defeat.

What is particularly appealing about Aquinas is his comprehensive eclecticism. He absorbs the best of past theories, reconciles their differences. ‘Rather than supposing that earlier theories of ethics got things wrong, Aquinas's tendency is to suppose that these theories were partially right and need only to be synthesized into a more comprehensive theory that does justice to the full complexity of moral behavior. Here as always, then, we can see on display his marvelously systematic mind, coupled with his constant insistence on the importance of argumentation.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 241).

As one who has frequently zig-zagged between Plato and Aristotle, it is not the least of Aquinas’ achievements that he allows us to have both Plato and Aristotle, reconciling the human longing for both immanence and transcendence. And he gives us a little Plotinus and Neoplatonism to boot!! 

18 The Eudaimonistic conception

Hedonistic enjoyment and eudaimonistic fulfilment

There must indeed be one ultimate end for man insofar as he is man because of the unity of human nature, just as there is one end for a physician as physician because of the unity of the art of medicine. This ultimate end of man is called that human good which is happiness. (St Thomas Aquinas InNE 1.9.106)

Scientific researchers have been examining the distinction between hedonistic happiness and eudaimonistic happiness for decades now. Hedonistic happiness refers to egoistic or selfish activities such as private material gain, consumption, selfish interest, personal aggrandizement. Eudaimonistic happiness involves trust, networks, relations to others, other regarding activities, a creative and productive approach to the world. The research consistently records that the hedonists are unfulfilled, unhappy, unsatisfied whilst the eudaimonists are healthy, happy and balanced. 

The concept of well-being - optimal human experience and functioning – has been examined extensively in a number of scientific investigations in recent years. (Ryan and Deci 2001; Biswas-Dienera, Kashdanb and King 2009: 208-211). 
In the past, research on well-being has tended to concentrate on the hedonistic approach, for the simple reason that it is more amenable to the quantitative methods of scientific research. In recent years, however, research has distinguished between hedonistic happiness and eudaimonistic happiness. The conclusions drawn have been clear, consistent and very interesting with respect to the way we currently live our lives and the way we ought to be living our lives. It is becoming increasingly clear, that, in the very least, the concept of eudaimonia is adding an important perspective to our understanding of well-being and is full of practical possibilities. (Deci and Ryan 2008: 1-11).

Hedonistic happiness defines well-being in the utilitarian terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance, the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect; Eudaimonistic happiness well-being in the Aristotelian terms of flourishing, examining the degree to which a person is fully functioning. The hedonistic approach focuses upon material pursuits and self-interest; the eudaimonistic approach focuses on meaning and self-realization, living life in a full and deeply satisfying way. 

There is a clear distinction between a hedonic enjoyment which is self-centred and a personal expressiveness (eudaimonia) which is achieved in relation to others. The conclusion is clear that personal expressiveness, and not hedonic enjoyment, is a signifier of success in the process of self-realization. (Waterman 1993). 

Administering something known as the Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) to quantitatively assess the hedonic dimension of happiness, the research of Delle Fave et al (2011: 185-207) show that the different life domains, family and social relations were prominently associated with happiness and meaningfulness. The analysis of quantitative research finds highlighted the relationship between happiness, meaningfulness, and satisfaction with life, showing the different and complementary contributions each component make to well-being. 
Delle Fave et al conclude their research by stressing the importance of jointly investigating happiness and its relationship with other dimensions of well-being, so as to detect differences and synergies among them. 
This conclusion can be strengthened at the level of politics and ethics, what Aristotle identified as the field of practical reason. The conclusion points to the creation of the moral order composed by forms of the common life, integrating the various dimensions of well-being so as to create the conditions of human flourishing. This, of course, isn’t new. It’s all in Aristotle.

Economists have started to notice that the key figure of their science might actually be a complete fiction. They are looking at something called ‘the hedonistic paradox’ and are asking ‘is homo economicus happier?’ (Konow 2008: 1-33). Research completely contradicts one of the central assertions of economic science. The “Hedonistic Paradox” states that homo economicus, or someone who seeks happiness for him- or herself, will not find it, whereas the person who helps others will. In fine, greed most certainly is not good. Why these research findings should be a surprise says more about the moral condition of modernity than it does about the acumen and insight of our research skills. This should not be news. The fact is, we haven’t so much made a discovery here so much as started to remember what we know, both in terms of the practical wisdom of past societies and in terms of our own tacit knowledge of our social experience and interaction.

The eudaimonistic approach to well-being eschews hedonistic self-interest and self-maximisation in favour of self-determination and self-realisation, focusing not on outcomes but on the process of living well. 

Ryan et al (2008) characterise eudaimonic living in terms of four motivational concepts: 

(1)	pursuing intrinsic goals and values for their own sake, including personal growth, relationships, community, and health, rather than extrinsic goals and values, such as wealth, fame, image, and power; 
(2)	behaving in autonomous, volitional, or consensual ways, rather than heteronomous or controlled ways; 
(3)	being mindful and acting with a sense of awareness; 
(4)	behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy. 

The first three aspects of eudaimonic living deliver positive effects in terms of psychological and physical wellness on account of facilitating satisfaction of basic, universal psychological needs. The conclusion drawn from the research is that people high in eudaimonic living tend to behave in more prosocial ways, benefiting both themselves and others, and that conditions both within the family and in society contribute toward strengthening rather than diminishing the degree to which people live eudaimonic lives. (Ryan et al 2008). 

These research findings make it clear that the distinction between eudaimonistic happiness and hedonistic happiness is a distinction between the full life and the empty life. (Peterson, Park, Seligman 2005: 25-41).

It’s about creating forms of the common life which enhance rather than inhibit human flourishing, the central theme I develop through Aristotle and Aquinas. It is the tradition of rational freedom, the idea that human beings attain fulfilment and flourish the more that reason comes to regulate the appetites.





This is a conception which is entirely opposed to the organised hedonism which governs modern politics and economics, pathetically misnamed as ‘freedom to choose’. Voters and consumers may feel as thought they are choosing beings but the truth is that they have been targeted at the level of their desires and egos and have come to be enchained to empirical necessity. They are on the hedonistic treadmill. And studies are increasingly revealing the truth. (James 2007; James 2008; Barber 2007). 

On the basis of a rich data set concerning multiple measures of subjective, psychological and material well-being, these studies clearly indicate that greater emphasis should be paid to membership of and participation in a public life, stressing the benefits (beyond the material ones) of policies that promote charitable works, volunteerism, service education, and, more generally, community activity, political action, and involvement in social institutions. All these indicate an active, creative and productive orientation to the environment and point to the existence of a public life that fosters material, physical and psychological well-being. 

The conclusions drawn from the research support the Aristotelian thesis on eudaimonia. There only surprise is that people should be surprised and that research is still needed in this area to point out the obvious. Happiness, like justice, is a social virtue. Human beings are social beings who need each other to be themselves and flourish well. 

The social context of flourishing well
For Aquinas, as for Aristotle before him, human beings are social and rational beings, implying that cooperation, solidary exchange, language, communication are essential components of the truly human life.
For Plato and Aristotle, human flourishing is based on justice, and justice is the social virtue par excellence in that it governs relations between human beings. Justice is a permanent disposition of the will to render to each his right. Human beings are always just or unjust in relation to each other but as the effect of justice is to ensure that human beings act rightfully toward another in accordance with reason. Justice is therefore a virtue. In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that every virtue is justice and justice is all the virtues. Aristotle is thinking of legal justice pertaining to the citizen, how law prescribes how each person should act with a view to the common good of the city. The individual is therefore considered to be part of the greater whole, the social body of which all individuals are members. Since the quality of a part and all the parts effects the quality of the whole, even the personal virtues which each and all are capable of acquiring contribute to the common good toward which the justice of law ordains all citizens. Since human beings are members of the social body, all their virtues pertain to justice in a general sense, as a social virtue comprising all the virtues. (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 4).

The moral life of man consists in the highest development of the potentialities of his nature by acting at all times and in all circumstances under the direction of his reason. Accordingly, man's perfection and happiness consist now not so much in deducing knowledge from its principles as in regulating and ordering his actions in view of their common end. To the science of the general principles of morality must be added an art of applying them. Now it is the virtue of prudence which permits us to choose means in the order of practical reason. Hence we can regard prudence as a kind of general moral virtue whose duty it is to guide the other virtues themselves in choosing the means leading to their ends.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 Ch 3 288-289

Human beings are social beings and rational beings, endowed with reason and will, and naturally capable of exercising these in social relation to others. In addition to allowing human beings to exercise dominion over things, reason is the image of God in humanity. With virtuous government or public life, human beings attain the noblest form of that virtue of justice described by Aristotle as virtue itself, the right rule of our relations with others within the social life. Aristotle’s virtue thus concludes in a system of morality directed to orienting individuals to their social nature by having them attend to the common good of the city. St Thomas’ moral doctrine has aims which go beyond the earthly city. (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 4). 

The good of the earthy city is a common and indispensable good, but falls within an order toward an even more indispensable common good—a good that is in the class olbonum honestum, noble, choiceworthy for its own sake, a good which is perfective of the human agent. (Maritain 1966: 53; Maritain 1952: 142; Maritain 1963: 149).

Aquinas, following Aristotle, identifies this common good with the life of political community itself. This community is what Aristotle called Politikon bion, public life, a communion of persons, in which each individual finds an essential element of his or her flourishing. The political community is therefore a basic human good (ST 1-2 94.2). Indeed, to the extent that it is perfect, this public life contains all other natural human goods and can therefore be considered an ultimate end. The love and association of others is an integral part of flourishing, meaning that the political common good has the character of an ultimate end. The life of the political community is therefore a form of friendship, philia and amicitia. Aquinas is therefore in agreement with Aristotle in conceiving the city to be an ultimate end. It’s just that Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle here to point to the absolute ultimate end beyond the political community. (Froelich in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

Nourished by the personal and interpersonal life of a religious community in the larger community of a Church, the Cartesian project would have held no appeal to Aquinas. Aquinas’ view of the natural law is that by using our reason and reflecting on our nature, human beings can come to formulate general principles of action which bring about the perfect and fulfilling good. The natural law shows us how to be happy. 

As Ralph Mclnerny observes:

This for Thomas is the peculiar mark of the human agent, that he puts his mind to what he does and consciously directs himself to the goods he recognizes as fulfilling of him ... From the nature of the human agent so considered we can formulate great ungainsayable truths about the human good.

For Aquinas, human law derives from the natural law. It is a framework within which people can make particular choices on particular occasions in particular circumstances. And for this reason it needs to be supplemented by sound practical reasoning, the working of conscience, and by what Aquinas calls 'human law', i.e. institutional legislation ('laws of the land') designed to promote the well-being of people in concrete societies. (Davies 1993 ch 12).

The Person and the Common Good
In The Person and the Common Good, Jacques Maritain distinguishes between individualism and personalism, avoiding the twin reefs of individualism and totalitarianism to embed a genuine personality in the social and moral matrix of the common good. Maritain notes that ‘personality tends by nature to communion’.

For the person requires membership in a society in virtue both of its dignity and its needs. Animal groups or colonies are called societies only in an improper sense. They are collective wholes constituted of mere individuals. Society in the proper sense, human society, is a society of persons. A city worthy of the name is a city of human persons. The social unit is the person.

Maritain presents the standard Aristotelian argument that human beings are social beings who need to cooperate for material ends and who possess an inner urge to the communications of knowledge and love which require relationship with other persons. ‘In its radical generosity, the human person tends to overflow into social communications in response to the law of superabundance inscribed in the depths of being, life, intelligence and love.’ Maritain proceeds to the common good as constituted by ethics, above and beyond material and natural needs and imperatives.

Among the bees, there is a public good, namely, the good functioning of the hive, but not a common good, that is, a good received and communicated. The end of society, therefore, is neither the individual good nor the collection of the individual goods of each of the persons who constitute it. Such a conception would dissolve society as such to the advantage of its parts, and would amount to either a frankly anarchistic conception, or the old disguised anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in which the whole function of the city is to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving to the strong full freedom to oppress the weak.

The common good is something ethically good. Included in it, as an essential element, is the maximum possible development, here and now, of the persons making up the united multitude to the end of forming a people, organized not by force alone but by justice.

This is why ethics and politics matter. Practical reason concerns the right ordering of human affairs and is integral to the creative unfolding of the human ontology. The disappearance of morality from public life comes at a price with respect to fundamental humanity. Maritain spells out what is implied by the common good.

We have just stated that the common good is what it is only if it is redistributed to persons. Let us now add a consideration which is derived from the same principle but goes farther, namely, that the common good of the city or of civilization -- an essentially human common good in which the whole of man is engaged -- does not preserve its true nature unless it respects that which surpasses it, unless it is subordinated, not as a pure means, but as an infravalent end, to the order of eternal goods and the supra-temporal values from which human life is suspended. This intrinsic subordination refers above all to the supernatural beatitude to which the human person is directly ordained.
We see, then, that the true conception of political life is neither exclusively personalist nor exclusively communal. As we wrote many years ago, it is both personalist and communal in such a way that these two terms call for and imply one another. Hence, there is nothing more illusory than to pose the problem of the person and the common good in terms of opposition. In reality, it is posed in terms of reciprocal subordination and mutual implication.

The point is that human beings are social beings and require warm, affective ties and bonds to others in society in order to fulfil themselves as individuals. Hence Maritain’s distinction between individuality (I would term it individualism) and personality. Individualism confines the individual to the ego and blocks the social matrix required for a genuine personality. The person is a social unit, meaning that the common good of civil society is also an individual good. From a Thomist perspective, Maritain brings about material and perfect communion, uniting part and whole.

In short, though the person as such is a totality, the material individual, or the person as a material individual, is a part. Whereas the person, as person or totality, requires that the common good of the temporal society flow back over it, and even transcends the temporal society by its ordination to the transcendent whole, yet the person still remains, as an individual or part, inferior and subordinated to the whole and must, as an organ of the whole, serve the common work.
Man is constituted a person, made for God and life eternal, before he is constituted a part of the city; and he is constituted a part of the family society before he is constituted a part of the political society. This is the origin of those primordial rights which political society must respect and which it may not injure when it requires the services of its members.
The person as person insists on serving the community and the common good freely. It insists on this while tending toward its own fullness, while transcending itself and the community in its movement toward the transcendent Whole. The person as an individual is necessarily bound, by constraint if need be, to serve the community and the common good since it is excelled by them as the part by the whole.

The contention of my argument is that the moral impasse of the modern world is inevitable and irrevocable in its own terms. Morality ceases to matter in a world which is characterised by the inversion of means and ends, a world in which ‘progress’ is defined in the one-sided materialist terms of ‘things’ as against persons and the realisation of the human ontology. 

Maritain spells out the deleterious consequences that individualist and materialist moralities have in terms of practical social life. 

Blind to the realities of the spirit, responsive only to what belongs to the world of matter, they see in man no more than the shadow of true personality, his material individuality. This alone in man are they able to express. Actually, they jeopardize the person either by dissolving it in anarchy or, as inexorably happens under the pressure of political necessities, by subjecting it to the social body as Number, economic community, national or racial state.

‘Another misleading dichotomy of modern practical philosophy, as well as of social theory at large, is the one between individual will and reason, which allows us to think that human beings are like machines driven to action by the reactions of a fundamentally amoral will to external stimuli, while the universal reason acts as if it were an external and apparently objective restraint on it. When we combine this with the modern notion of freedom as being at liberty to do whatever an individual wants to do, rather than as freedom to the right thing, we land with a further modern dichotomy, namely, that supposed to obtain between individual and community. 
When modernity made the individual the central theme of social thought, it made the society appear as a battle-ground of different individuals against each other, and even of individuals against the community. The result is that modern societies are commonly considered not quite unlike zero-sum games where the individual preferences of individuals are at stake. I find very illuminating Maclntyre's account where he shows how the desire for finding a scientifically objective ground for political considerations, combined with modern individualism and the dualistic self-conception of modern personality, has led to the modern amoral image of the political community as an impersonal mechanism for making trade-offs between conflicting individual interests; what seems important for modern citizens is that the society satisfy as many of their wants as can be, rather than help them in integrating their personal pursuits and interests into a more comprehensive scheme of common good. Therefore citizens are no longer conceived of as autonomous members of the political community, they rather appear individual subjects of egotistic pursuits, reduced into political objects that can be manipulated by a political management of the market of individual preferences, and lured to act in the desired manner by providing incentives. The unhappy result of all this is that citizens tend to lose sight of their shared responsibilities, and learn to consider it their vested right to defend their individual interests against those of others, and take pride in doing so. The foreseeable outcome is a moral deterioration of the political community and a dissolution of every significant notion of the common good. 
From the Thomasian view, there is no incompatibility between the individual and the community, for the good of a part is the good of the whole, and vice versa. The political community is a whole, and citizens are its parts. It follows that it is not right for a citizen to seek his individual good, a merely partial good, at the cost of the common good, the good that in this context represents the notion of whole good. But it is not so that the citizen ought to seek the common good over and above his individual good. For the common good is no different from his real personal good: the common good is not other people's good, it is one's own true good, wherefore it is also the proper end of one's actions. Appreciating this insight will open for us the possibility of looking at the human polity anew as a shared enterprise for the common good rather than a mere conglomerate of conflicting interests seeking short-term bargaining equilibria. With a view to the new kinds of common problems not only single societies but the whole human community is facing and will face in an ever-accelerating pace, the need for such a new direction is evident.’ (Rentto in Hudson and Moran ed 1992; Gould 1988).

Individualism and totalitarianism are two sides of the same coin. Atomism within society forms the counterpart of centralism at the level of the state. Maritain targets the materialistic philosophy of society in its three principal forms; bourgeois individualism, communistic anti-individualism, and totalitarian or dictatorial anti-communism and anti-individualism. All three focus on the material individual alone and hence come to disregard the human person. 

It has been frequently noted that bourgeois liberalism with its ambition to ground everything in the unchecked initiative of the individual, conceived as a little God, and the absolute liberty of property, business and pleasure, inevitably ends in statism. The rule of the Number produces the omnipotence of the state.

Where the natural law unites the whole and the part, materialism and individualism separate the parts and cannot see the whole. As a result, social life comes to be destroyed by the individual whose selfishness looks to the state machinery for the satisfaction of social needs, crushing liberty by crushing the person. ‘Thus in different ways, all that is proper to the human person as person and to society as the city of persons is eliminated.’

Our own day, we might add, seems to witness the tragedy of these three conflicting forms of social and political materialism. The moral crisis of our occidental civilization and the disastrous spasms of our liberal, capitalistic economy exhibit all too clearly the tragedy of bourgeois individualism.

In the final analysis, the relation of the individual to society must not be conceived after the atomistic and mechanistic pattern of bourgeois individualism which destroys the organic social totality, or after the biological and animal pattern of the statist or racist totalitarian conception which swallows up the person, here reduced to a mere histological element of Behemoth or Leviathan, in the body of the state, or after the biological and industrial pattern of the Communistic conception which ordains the entire person, like a worker in the great human hive, to the proper work of the social whole. The relation of the individual to society must be conceived after an irreducibly human and specifically ethicosocial pattern, that is, personalist and communalist at the same time; the organization to be accomplished is one of liberties. But an organization of liberties is unthinkable apart from the moral realities of justice and civil amity, which, on the natural and temporal plane, correspond to what the Gospel calls brotherly love on the spiritual and supernatural plane.

This follows from the fact that the principal value of the common work of society is the freedom of expansion of the person together with all the guarantees which this freedom implies and the diffusion of good that flows from it. In short, the political common good is a common good of human persons. And thus it turns out that, in subordinating oneself to this common work, by the grace of justice and amity, each one of us is still subordinated to the good of persons, to the accomplishment of the personal life of others and, at the same time, to the interior dignity of ones own person. But for this solution to be practical, there must be full recognition in the city of the true nature of the common work and, at the same time, recognition also of the importance and political worth -- so nicely perceived by Aristotle -- of the virtue of amity.

Which is to say that St Thomas Aquinas allows us to realise the lost promise of Aristotle’s natural law, whilst pushing on to achieve so much more. It’s a win-win situation, a positive sum game in which the attainment of the ultimate end defined in naturalist terms flows effortlessly into the attainment of the ultimate end conceived in supernaturalist terms.

It is this intersubjective dimension that points to the need for a context for the common good of each and all. Aquinas sets out a moral and philosophical anthropology that is thoroughly realistic and which supports a view of the individual as part of a common social and moral order. Human beings realise their ends when set within an ultimate end. In that framework the individual is able to connect with an objective good, locating his or her place within a social world.

The Final Good
Aquinas’ end is happiness as the perfect and fulfilling good. Aquinas shows us how to be happy in the sense of flourishing. Aquinas conceives human beings to be creatures endowed with reason and will, drawn to goals which attract them. Properly human action (actiones humanae), which Aquinas also refers to as 'moral action', is a voluntary aiming for an end perceived as good. It follows that since goodness is perfective or fulfilling, properly human action is a movement to an end which is fulfilling or perfecting of the agent whose movement it is. Human beings by nature desire or are attracted to what perfects and fulfils them. 'Because in all things whatsoever there is an appetite for completion' he says, 'the final end to which each moves marks its own perfect and fulfilling good.' (ia2ae. I. 5.)

This appetite for completion forms the foundation of the moral life. Human beings are happy when they are perfect, fulfilled, and good. Behind this simple answer is a complicated ethical structure, a habitus, in which virtues are acquired, habits are formed, dispositions are canalised to bring about human flourishing.

'Were there no ultimate end, nothing would be desired, no activity would be finished, no desire would come to rest.' For Aquinas, since there cannot be endless ends, there must be some final good at which we aim. Without that final end, human beings would be for ever aiming and never be satisfied or at rest. For Aquinas, only God can be called 'the final good at which we aim'. (Davies 1993 ch 12).

Aquinas’ views follow Aristotle’s but go further. Aristotle’s eudaimonia is often translated as ‘happiness’ but is best translated as ‘flourishing’. Eudaimonia  is a goal of human action which is perfective and fulfilling. Umson is at pains to point out that 'happiness' is a misleading translation of Aristotle's eudaemonia since, for Aristotle, 'to say that somebody is eudaemon is the very same thing as to say that he is living a life worth living' and 'is emphatically not to say, as might be the case when one describes somebody as happy, that he is, at the time of speaking, feeling on top of the world, or any other way.' (Umson 1988).

Aquinas is in fundamental agreement with Aristotle’s idea of eudaemonia, but goes further and establish the ultimate goal for people beatitude, which involves knowing and enjoying (loving) God. Flourishing in the Aristotelian sense may be described as imperfect beatitude from Aquinas’ perspective. (Cessario in Hudson and Moran ed 1992). 'Complete happiness (beatitudo), Aquinas writes, 'requires the mind to come through to the essence itself of the first cause. And so it will have its fulfilment by union with God as its object.' (ia2ae. 3. 8.)

The Means for Attaining the Final End
The question concerns how to achieve this true fulfilment. This is the realm of practical ethics, dispositions and their channelling, habits as permanent dispositions which determine how a being realises its own definition.

Man's efforts to attain his end are not reduced to nothingness but are inscribed in his name and leave their mark upon him. Man's soul as well as his body has a history. It conserves its past in order to enjoy and utilize it in a perpetual present. The most general form of this fixing of past experience is called habit. Habit, as St. Thomas thinks of it, is a quality, that is, not the very substance of man but a disposition added to his substance and modifying it. The characteristic which differentiates this disposition or habit from other species of quality is that it is a disposition of the subject in relation to its own nature. In other words, a being's habits determine the manner in which it realizes its own definition. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1

There is, in other words, plenty for human agents as moral agents to do in order to bring about the perfect and fulfilling good. And this moral action proceeds within a habitus that brings human beings together, requiring none of the hysterical self-assertion of Nietzsche’s superman. The emphasis on habits introduces a dynamic element of progress and organisation into the moral life. 

This leaves, then, only the intellect, in which habits can conveniently be placed. Only in it do we encounter that multiplicity of indeterminate powers capable of being combined and organized among themselves according to widely differing arrangements. And as it is, indeed, potency which provides a basis for habits, we must ultimately decide that they reside in that part of the mind called the possible intellect. The will, too, must be judged a subject of habits since it is a faculty of the rational soul with free indetermination based on the universality of reason itself. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1

This view affirms the radical indeterminacy of the future. The accent is upon the creative moral agency of human beings, human beings coming forward as moral beings to earn eudaimonia and beatitudo. Habits complement nature and are ‘super-added determinations’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 Ch 1 257).

The point is that Aquinas’ emphasis is upon the social and moral matrix within which virtues are acquired and exercised, habits are formed, and dispositions are directed to the end of flourishing and beatitude. This habitus is a public realm. Human beings are not alone and isolated as individuals, having to choose and act unaided. Human beings are rational beings and social beings, they become what they have the potential to be only in relation to each other.

As Erich Auerbach argues:





Aquinas proceeds to define the human good as virtuous rational activity, so that happiness, as flourishing, is an activity and not merely a capacity or state. 
The emphasis is upon practical knowledge and prudence.

Nietzsche could see religion as merely a curb on action. For Aquinas, however, the natural law is conceived to be a spur to action, comprising not only the good which must be done, but the non-obligatory good it would be well to do. The approach here is prescriptive but not imperative. Human beings have moral freedom and are, or have the capacity to be, moral agents. For Aquinas, human virtues are habits (habitus sunt).(ia2ae. 55. i; cf. ia2ae. 55. 2). In fine, virtues are learned responses by which human beings come to naturally act well. Virtues elicit the capacity for good that is innate in human beings. (I shall deal with these points at length later on).

In contrast, the Nietzschean individual is pure fiction and fantasy, the Ubermensch, the superman who transcends all social, affective ties and bonds. Such an individual identifies his own good, determines his own law, defines his own virtues. Nietzsche’s Ubermensch transcends habitus, relationships to others, social activities and affective ties. This is made clear in note 962 from The Will To Power. 'A great man —a man whom nature has constructed and invented in the grand style-what is he? ... If he cannot lead, he goes alone; then it can happen that he may snarl at some things he meets on the way he wants no "sympathetic" heart, but servants, tools; in his intercourse with men he is always intent on making something out of them. He knows he is incommunicable: he finds it tasteless to be familiar; and when one thinks he is, he usually is not. When not speaking to himself, he wears a mask. He rather lies than tells the truth: it requires more spirit and will. There is a solitude within him that is inaccessible to praise or blame, his own justice that is beyond appeal.' (MacIntyre 1983 ch 18)

That view completely contradicts Kant. In its various formulae, Kant’s categorical imperative requires that we act only on "maxims" or principles of action that can be "universalized," since that is the way to treat every person, always as ends and never merely as means. Kant’s formulation thus requires that the moral agent act always so that the will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as 'making universal law' (Kant GMM 1991:94). Kant’s moral agent is thus a very different person to Nietzsche’s Ubermensch, a figure which is beyond social ties and moral obligation connecting each individual and all individuals. As for the claim that the ‘great man’ is ‘always intent on making something’ out of others as ‘servants’ and ‘tools’, such instrumentalism is a key characteristic of capitalist modernity. Marx had identified this in 1843. Whilst the individual ‘regards himself as a communal being’ in the abstracted political community of the state, in ‘civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers.’ (Marx OJQ 1975:220)

And that applies to the great man also. Capitalist instrumentalism reduces all to tools and servants of external powers, the superman no less than all others. What lies behind the fantasy of 'the great man' is Nietzsche's view that morality since Socrates has been merely a variety of disguises for the will to power. For Nietzsche, objective moral judgments are merely masks covering the will-to-power of those too weak and slavish to assert themselves with archaic and aristocratic grandeur (MacIntyre 1981: ch 1).

For Nietzsche, the idea of objective morality is merely an attempt to constrain ‘the great man’ within relationships based upon shared standards or virtues. Nietzsche seeks to transcend such relationships in a world beyond good and evil. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche castigates the uniform social levelling of individuals as the 'animalization of man' which would subdue the noble man to the values of a faceless herd. Stated positively, Nietzsche’s joyous ethic is commendable, certainly in contrast to the egalitarian levelling he rejects. Nietzsche is attempting to outline the contours of a life-affirming ethic that no longer requires a moral system to constrain individuals to the good. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche presents artistic activity as the paradigm of creative yes-saying practices. Art, in its purest form, is free from resentment and hence does not require moral constraints to compensate for weakness. It is in art that we transcend the limitations of given circumstances and come to fully to realize our potentialities, becoming the person we are.

What is there to disagree with? Nietzsche end is a noble enough vision, but the gap between ideal and real is prohibitive. There is no habitus, no social context, no cooperation, nothing of a moral matrix in which human beings aid each other to the realisation of the human good. 

Whereas Kant’s self-legislated reason referred to a realm of ends in which rational individuals cooperated as co-legislators, Nietzsche sees the great man as his own only authority. Such relationships as there to others are a matter of the exercise of that own authority. 

From the perspective of the virtue tradition that this book defends, the delusions of Nietzschean greatness are apparent. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber writes of the ‘convulsive self-importance’ of individuals living in a modern world characterised by ‘nullity’ (1985). Nietzsche’s ‘great man’ is such an individual, self-absorbed and isolated, detached from others and charged with the impossible responsibility of being his own self-sufficient moral authority. I would certainly distinguish such a legislating self from Kant’s notion of self-legislating reason and rational agents. Whatever the difficulty there is in grounding such a view – hence my recourse to Aquinas - Kant’s view is intersubjective and concerns rational agents as co-legislators. Kant retains the universal character as definitive of morality.

But if Kant is not Nietzsche, his failure to ground reason in ontological nature leaves him vulnerable to his universal realm dissolving into a congeries of self-legislating atoms. My argument is that Kant’s morality of ends can only be vindicated if his natural moral teleology draws on the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition that highlights practice, habits, and the ultimate end of a human life, laws that integrate the individual within the common good and virtues that can be acquired and exercised only within social relationships to others. The Thomist view sets the flourishing individual within the constitution of communities whose integrating bond is a shared vision of and understanding of goods that individuals hold in common as human beings. 

Aquinas is clear that human beings act on the basis of dispositions toward the good, within a habitus in which the virtues are acquired and become habitual through practice. Nietzsche’s ‘great man’ is really the modern individual, the individual exhibiting a ‘convulsive self-importance’, divorced from the shared practices and activities in which the virtuous rational activity crucial to the human good and happiness is learned, separated from the communities which give a point to such practices and activities, and hence unable to find any good outside of the isolated self. Nietzschean greatness thus finds its most characteristic expression in the modern world as a solipsism, a self-importance that is certainly convulsive, but neither great nor good. 

Virtue Ethics in a Demoralised World
Nietzsche may succeed in exposing the moral inadequacies and failures of the modern moralities of deontology and utilitarianism, but this does not mean that he succeeds in going ‘beyond good and evil’. On the contrary, Nietzsche has more in common with Kant and the idealist rejection of objective morality than Nietzschean notions of a radical break with morality would suggest. Nietzsche, that is, stands in the line of descent from Kant, or a certain dominant reading of Kant. 

I want to propose an alternative reading of Kant. Kant is conventionally considered a deontologist, concerned with rules. (Sandel 2009 ch 5; MacIntyre 1981:219. Cf. 42,112.) Kant is a deontologist, but he is more than this. I argue that Kant is also a virtue theorist concerned with the character of the agents, not just with acts. And this reading places Kant in an older Aristotelian tradition. Recovering that tradition not only restores Kant’s natural rational teleology to the heart of ethics but also exposes the misconceptions and mistakes at the heart of the Nietzschean position and, most of all, at the core of Weberian modernity. From this perspective, Nietzsche’s morality of the Ubermensch is merely a fantastical attempt to escape the depersonalised, disenchanted landscape of liberal individualist modernity, not a coherent alternative to it. It is merely one form that convulsive self-importance can take, an internal unravelling which affects individuals but changes nothing in the overall structure of society. 

My argument traces a line of depersonalisation and demoralisation from Kant through Nietzsche to Weber and a disenchanted Weberian liberal modernity. I argue that Kant is not as far from the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition as may be thought, and that Kant’s teleology can be re-thought in terms of that older tradition in order to make good Kant’s claims for the highest good. Kant, that is, is also a virtue theorist as well as a deontologist. That said, Kant’s rejection of rational metaphysics leads to an agnosticism with respect to the good, an agnosticism that undermines Kant’s moral system and prevents him from being able to make good his moral claims. It is this dominant reading of Kant that justifies Nietzsche’s rebuttal of modern morality as a failure, and which leads us to a modern world in which reality has been stripped of moral purpose. A world in which morality has become a polytheism of irreducible value judgements with no means of deciding between them is a world of power and struggle, as Nietzsche so clearly saw.

My view is that Nietzsche’s nihilism beyond good and evil is merely a fantastical, deluded, and even desperate attempt to escape the very demoralised liberalism which Nietzsche thought himself to be an inveterate opponent. Bellamy writes of liberalism having to relieve itself of substantive and ethical themes and values concerning the nature of the individual in a demoralised modern terrain. Instead, liberalism should focus upon 'fair' institutions and procedures (Bellamy 1992:7/8 253/4). Despite its evident shortcomings with respect of the human ontology and the human good, Bellamy presents this deontological liberalism to be the only option we have within the parameters of the disenchanted Weberian world. He may well be right, but that, as Nietzsche saw so clearly, merely begs the question. Bellamy gives us a neutralised and demoralised liberalism which fits the contours of a neutralised and demoralised world. Such a liberalism of rules and procedures may be able to hold the ring for a while, but ultimately it is unsustainable. It lacks a basis in philosophical anthropology and offers nothing for the creative realisation of human potential. In Nietzschean terms, it is a form of legal levelling, and equality and diversity imposed by legislative fiat, not achieved by a genuine flourishing. Bellamy’s demoralised, neutered liberalism may fit the contours of a meaningless Weberian world, but it is an expression of the crisis of liberal modernity, not a solution to it. 

It is difficult to see how such liberalism can avoid being engulfed in the long range trend towards a top down totalitarianism. John McDermott writes of the emergence of a corporate form which is in the process of erasing liberal society (McDermott 1991: ch 1 76-77 100-101 143). Stauth and Turner set the sociological context of Nietzsche’s ‘joyful’, life affirming critique of modernity.

The history of rationalization can be seen in terms of a growing regulation of the body through dietary management, scientific exercise, gastronomy and the technology of medicine; these developments bring the body under a detailed control of the state and other institutions, precluding the possibilities of primitive experience, untutored spontaneity and unrestrained pleasures. These developments are regarded as simply the final extension of the spirit of ascetic control which Weber had located in monasticism, army discipline and the spiritual teaching of Calvinism. A parallel development is seen to be the loss of privacy, the growing regulation of the individual and the decline of real ethical autonomy on the part of citizens. From de Tocqueville's analysis of American democracy and J. S. Mill's analysis of the problems of liberalism, the individual and privacy have been considered to be under threat from the extension of state regulation, the cultural uniformity of modern democracies, the detailed surveillance of the individual by centralized agencies (such as schools, factories, hospitals and the police), the growing documentation of the individual by bureaucratic means and the professionalization of custodial institutions. The autonomous individual is increasingly regulated by the rationalizing process of the iron cage as the system of public domination grows in relation to the private space of domestic life. Modern society is seen to be a network of disciplines which police the individual from birth to the grave (Stauth and Turner 1988: ch 1 Moral Society, p45). 

This is the context of the demoralised liberalism offered by Bellamy. It’s a proceduralist liberalism shorn of ends, a liberalism which asserts the primacy of right over the good. A liberalism which can say nothing on the good. That liberalism will simply be absorbed into the network of management and manipulation of individuals delineated above, which Nietzsche rightly rejected.

In which case, the crucial antagonism lies between individualist liberal modernity in its various forms and the communitarian position with its origins in Aristotle. One could refer to Walzer (1983, 1987), Taylor (1979, 1989), Sandel (1982, 1998, 1984), Raz (1986) and others here. The problem is that in the main the communitarians are liberals concerned with the social dimension. They are seeking to rescue 'liberal' values from their contractarian and individualist foundation. If this can be done, we need to ask why these substantive values had to take legalistic form in the first place. The exception is Alasdair MacIntyre, whose rejection of liberalism and modernity is total (After Virtue 1981 second edition 1984; 1988). MacIntyre is clear that liberalism cannot be supplied with a communitarian foundation on the modern terrain and must be rejected along with the society from which it arose (MacIntyre 1981 ch 17). Unlike communitarian liberals such as Sandel, MacIntyre can discern no liberatory potential in modernity, seeking 'the construction of local forms of community' so as to escape 'the new dark ages which are already upon us' (1981:263).





Nothing that has happened in the thirty years since MacIntyre wrote these words have contradicted MacIntyre’s central thesis; plenty has confirmed it. Liberalism? It has been reduced to a tick box identity politics, the cultural support for the aggressive privatism and economic liberalisation associated with globalisation of investment, employment, finance and production. Liberalism has ceased to be a political philosophy in the true sense of the word.

19 The Eudaimonistic Moral Order

Natural Ends
Aquinas’ argument presupposes that if a thing has a natural end, then it is right and natural to engage in such activity as to bring about the realisation of its end. It also follows that it is wrong and unnatural voluntarily to engage in such activity as to frustrate the attainment of its end. 

The reasoning with respect to the 'natural end' of a process is Aristotelian. Aquinas plainly adhered to Aristotle’s conception of a purpose-driven universe. The natural end of a thing is to achieve the state of maturity which is characteristic of its species. ‘What each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature’ (Aristotle). Each stage from potentiality to actuality is real, it’s just that we only know the nature of a thing when it is fully developed. The same reasoning applies to the parts of a thing. The natural end of the parts is to contribute to the efficient flourishing of the whole. 

Given the suspicion in which teleology has fallen since the rise of mechanistic science, there is a need to emphasise that there is nothing in the Aristotelian conception which implies a conscious purpose at work within nature. Nature is not an artificier. (Aristotle, Physics, II, 199 b 25—31). The brave soldiers of the world of science can sleep easy. At least for a time. For there are indeed conscious purposes in nature, in intelligent beings, human beings as rational beings. However, most natural ends or purposes are not conscious. '[T]hose things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some completion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance completion; but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if there is no impediment.' (Aristotle, Physics (tr. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye) II, 199 b 15-19).

The general point is clear enough. The clear implication that it is right to realise natural ends or purposes and wrong to frustrate them. But the point needs further elaboration. When sheep munch the grass they prevent that grass from completing its natural growth; when human beings slaughter and eat the sheep, they prevent them from completing its natural growth. The rightness and wrongness of realising and frustrating nature is relative to reason – Aquinas follows Aristotle in arguing that the sub-rational part of nature is for the use of the rational part.

We come, then, to the operation of conscious purpose in nature through the activities of intelligent beings.

"There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operations of the will." 

We recall the four orders Thomas distinguished at the outset of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. We have said something of the first two orders. The third is the moral order, to which we now turn. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

"There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operations of the will." The locus of morality is human acts, acts of will directed by reason. Clarity about the human act, accordingly, is clarity about the moral order. The human agent is part of the ordered cosmos and is indeed that cosmos writ small, a microcosm.

The locus of morality is human acts, which are acts of will directed by reason. The human act therefore constitutes the moral order. 
Aquinas bases himself on Aristotle's statement in the Ethics that the good is the end that all things seek. 

We see here the extent to which Kant’s moral philosophy has been seriously hobbled by his acceptance of the natural scientists’ conception of the mechanistic universe. Instead of a purpose-driven universe, Kant sees nature shorn of efficient and final cause. The philosophical problems that Kant seeks to resolve stem from the chasm that has opened up between physical nature on the one hand, blind and stripped of purpose, and human action, morality and freedom on the other. Kant’s thinking is teleological. The question is, to what extent can Kant uphold a teleological conception of human agency in the moral world in a mechanistic universe in which natural science has eliminated efficient causality and final cause? How long can practical reason survive without a grounding in theoretical reason? Moral knowledge requires ontological knowledge.

For Aquinas, there is no dualism between nature and human action. Human action is a special case of a universal fact in that it is undertaken for the sake of an end. And as Gilson makes clear with respect to the human act, the end of all things is good. Human agents are unique in being free and thus answerable for their actions. Aquinas conceives intelligence and will in terms of voluntary inclination. With deliberation and judgement on the part of the intellect, the will moves the faculties to their end. The object of will is the good known by intellect. The intellect and will generate voluntary action; they reciprocally include and move each other so that acts come under the sway of reasoned will, as commanded acts. The free will is thus in conformity with reason; human acts and moral acts are identical. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

Ultimate End
Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that there is an ultimate end for the sake of which any action is undertaken. "First, he shows from what has already been said that there is some best end in human affairs" (Ethics 1.2, n. 19). Aquinas cites this as a proof that there is an ultimate end. 

Aristotle and Aquinas are in agreement that the ultimate end is an inescapable fact of human life and action. To make God the author of nature and hence the starting point of the moral life entails a theistic view that is sufficient to have many philosophers, with their own faith in reason, running for the hills. So it is worth looking closely at the ultimate end in Aquinas.

There are particular ends and these are good in themselves. However, such actions are undertaken with some notion of the overall good of the agent. The particular goods fall within a greater good. The ultimate end is therefore the complete fulfilment or perfection of the agent. Whatever is sought under the aegis of the good, sub ratione boni, is either ultimate or a constituent of the ultimately fulfilling good. The existence of an ultimate end of human action is an absolute requirement of its being reasonable. That begs the crucial questions of ultimate fulfilment, flourishing, happiness with respect to all human beings as rational beings.

I reply that it must be said that we can speak of ultimate end in two ways, either according to the notion of ultimate end or in terms of that in which this notion is thought to be realized. With respect to the notion of ultimate end everyone seeks it because everyone seeks to achieve his perfection which is what ultimate end means, as has been said. But with respect to that in which this notion is thought to be realized men are not in agreement, for some seek wealth as the consummate end, some pleasure, some other things. 

ST, lallae, q. 1, a. 7





St Thomas’ argument is grounded in the natural law. Here, he builds upon but supersedes Aristotle’s naturalism.

Aristotle's moral theory is naturalistic in the sense that it sees the good for man in terms of what is part of human nature, and of what is natural for men to aim at, as rational beings. Men as political animals and in society are governed by human laws, which are, in a sense, a sort of image of the divine law that governs the universe. But individuals can be regarded in themselves as an analogous system subject to laws which govern the relationships between their parts. The law that governs this is natural law, and it lays down what must be done and not done to further the ends of man. As such, this law, as is the case with human laws, is prescriptive, but the basis of what is prescribed is to be sought in what is natural (or supposed to be natural) for human beings. Aquinas thus attempts to derive the moral laws that govern human conduct from a conception of human beings and what is natural for them. 

Here, Hamlyn opts out of the philosophical controversy as to whether this sort of 'ought' can be derived in any way from this sort of 'is'. Logically, the philosophical convention that an ‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’ is correct. St Thomas would agree with this as a logical point. But the important thing for St Thomas is the ontological connection. Returning to Hamlyn’s general presentation of the natural law.





The end of all human action is happiness. The question is what do we do to attain happiness. For Aquinas, human beings are equipped with permanent dispositions that tend us to the good. Habits introduce a dynamic element of progress and organisation and determine how a being realizes its own definition. Within the appropriate habitus, habits ensure that our dispositions are developed in the direction of complete fulfilment and functioning. Habits may be conceived as super-added determinations.

For Aquinas, virtuous rational activity is the human good. He distinguishes between intellectual virtues, moral virtues and cardinal virtues. Understanding, knowledge, wisdom and prudence fit seamlessly together so that virtues form habits which dispose us to perform good actions. The role of virtue, here, lies in schooling human beings so that they may judge correctly as to what is fulfilling of them and inspiring them to pursue that fulfilment.

Aquinas puts positive or human law, natural law and divine law together within the overall aim of the common good.

Human law prescribe particular acts which natural law imposes on individuals for the common good. Natural law shows what is natural for human beings to aim at as rational beings. 

The theological conception of natural law sees it as the uniquely human participation in God's provident direction of creation. This view assumes a benevolent universe in all things seek the good and in which human beings are rational beings, sharing many drives and desires with lesser agents, but are distinguished by the possession of reason. Aquinas thus reconciles Providence and human freedom through the fact that human beings are rational agents able, through knowledge and will, to direct themselves to that end which is fulfilling of their nature. This conception conceives the natural law in terms of the relation of rational creatures to God. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

The naturalist conception locates the precepts of natural law in nature and human nature. This entails knowing what we are and how we are to act, a form of practical knowing, making informed choices and decisions, in the realm of prudence. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

Natural law aids us in doing the good that is to be done. Germain Grisez emphasises the natural law as a principle that is prescriptive but not imperative. Grisez holds that commentators are mistaken in holding that St Thomas regards the particular precepts of the natural law as conclusions derivable from a single first principle. Aquinas' first principle, Grisez insists, is not a command to do moral good and avoid moral evil, an imperative in the manner of Kant; rather, it is a principle of all practical reasoning, that good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. In other words, St Thomas’ first principle is prescriptive but not imperative, referring to moral good and evil but also to many other human values and disvalues.

The natural law is therefore a spur to action, with reason working from the inside, not from the outside as with an imperative.

The basic principles of the natural law are self-evident appreciations of these values; they are not derivable from the first principle, but related to them in the way that self-evident truths of theoretical reasoning are related to the principle of non-contradiction. Aquinas, unlike the utilitarians, thought that morally good action had intrinsic worth; unlike some deontologists, he did not think it was the only thing which had intrinsic worth. The natural law as conceived by Aquinas is not only a curb on action, but a spur to action; it includes not only the  good which  must be  done,  but the non-obligatory good it would be well to do.




The addition of will to theoretical  knowledge can never make it into practical knowledge. It is in this sense that Hume and modern moral philosophers are correct in holding that there is a distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘is’. On point of logic, St Thomas would have agreed. But the real issue concerns ontological connection, not logic.

Aquinas distinguishes between intellectual knowledge and practical knowledge. The theoretical intellect concerns the perfection of knowing and the practical intellect concerns the perfection of some activity other than knowing, e.g. willing (On the Soul, III. 10). Practical knowledge builds upon intellectual knowledge in that knowing is to understand the form of another as other and to make true judgements about natures. The perfection of intellectual knowledge lies in its truth. Practical knowledge is an extension of this, the goal being to guide and direct activities other than knowing.

Aquinas adds two other criteria, object and method, to deal with the fact that there are degrees of these two kinds of knowing. Theoretical knowing, knowing as such, concerns those things that we do not make or bring about by our actions. Practical knowing concerns how to make or bring about make-able or do-able things by our actions. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

Morality is a form of practical knowledge, taking us into the realm of prudence and practical reason.

Since both principles and rules are in the practical order, they are not sought for their own sake but point beyond cognition to the perfection of our choices. Thomas follows the lead of Aristotle in saying that beyond the common principles, naturally and easily knowable, and beyond moral rules which might be taken to be the domain of moral philosophy and of human law, there is a third level of moral knowledge, completely practical knowledge, where we are cognitively engaged in applying principle or rule to a concrete set of circumstances. By calling this area the realm of prudence, completely practical knowledge, we are suggesting that it saves all three of the criteria of practical knowledge mentioned earlier. With Aristotle, Thomas calls the discourse of prudence a practical syllogism. 
The practical syllogism, the discourse of practical reasoning in the concrete direction of choices, is analyzed as follows. The major premise is a generality, a principle or rule; the minor premise is an assessment of our present singular circumstance in the light of the principle or rule relevant to it. The conclusion, ideally, is a choice in accord with this assessment. As soon as we move away from the major premise, we move away from generality and into an area where the state of our appetites becomes influential. The principle or rule expresses an object of appetition, a good, at a level of generality, and we can assent to such judgments in a way that does not engage us fundamentally where we live. Practical discourse, the practical syllogism, when it moves into the area of the concrete and singular, will reveal the actual condition of our appetites, what for us is really considered good.

In order to move from the principle to an assessment of our circumstances in the light of it and to a choice in accord with that assessment, we must effectively love the good expressed in the principle. That is why Thomas will say that the truth of the ultimate practical judgment is to be read, not as a conformity with the way things are, but as a conformity with rectified appetite. In short, only the virtuous man will easily and without pain make the transition in practical discourse from principles to choice. One can see why Thomas places such importance on moral training and upbringing; it makes a great deal of difference what objects of aspiration are placed before us in our early years. Mature reflection on human action always takes place against a background of formation and education, of ideals which have become familiar because of habituation. It is not the case that the ideal can be recognized to be such only by those who strive to incorporate it into their lives, but Thomas will insist that when it comes to how the ideal can be realized here and now, our ability to know this is a function of our past moral history. 

Ralph McInerny A History of Western Philosophy 

The Moral Law, Natural Law and Natural Inclinations
The various precepts of natural law are based upon the first precept that good should be done and evil avoided.

On this are based all other precepts of natural law, such that other things to be done or avoided pertain to natural law which practical reason naturally apprehends to be human goods. Because good has the character of end and evil is its contrary, reason naturally apprehends as good all those things to which men have a natural inclination, and consequently as things to be pursued; their contraries are perceived as evils to be avoided. The order of the precepts of natural law is based on the order of natural inclinations. (ST lallae, q. 94, a. 2)

The first precept of natural law is implicit in all practical judgments. The secondary precepts of natural law are other judgments of what is to be done and are based on natural inclinations. 
Totally absent in Aquinas is Kant’s flat distinction between duty and inclination. Where Kant has reason educating desire from the outside in an attempt to curb and restrain inclinations, Aquinas establishes a hierarchy of natural inclinations. These inclinations are permanent facts of human nature and are natural in that we have them whether we wish to or not. Rather than saddle morality with the difficult, indeed, well-nigh impossible task of inhibiting inclinations, Aquinas integrates them within a conception of the overall good. They are ineliminable features of human nature and need to be organised for the common good. The first inclination is one which human beings share with all things and that is the inclination to preserve themselves in being. Next there the more special inclination which human beings share with the other animals - sexual union, the raising of young, etc. Ultimately, there is the inclination unique to human beings as rational beings and that is to know the truth about God and to live in society. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

The Moral Law
To begin, I wish to express agreement with the view that Aquinas’ version of the scholastic theory of natural law is relevant to non-Christian moral philosophy. (Donagan 1969).

It is possible to distinguish the duty to obey the moral law from purely religious duties that fall outside common morality. It is possible to read Kant in light of Aquinas without losing the sense of the moral law as universal. Aquinas acknowledged that only some precepts of the divine law (the revealed positive law of God) are also precepts of the natural law (the law of reason 'whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil'). As Donagan argues, those precepts of the divine law that are not precepts of natural law are not binding on non-Christians. If Aquinas is right, then there is no reason why the scholastic theory of natural law could not become common ground for both Christians and non-Christians.

Aquinas derives the first precept of the natural law, bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et maium vitandum, from a non-ethical statement about the nature of good, bonum est quod omnia appetunt. 

Donagan explains that this does not necessarily deny the autonomy of ethics. Aquinas’ statement that good is that which all things seek pertains to good as that which all things by nature seek. Aquinas is very far from arguing that all individuals ought to do and promote whatever they in fact seek. Aquinas is well aware that many individuals seek what is evil. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle before him and Kant after him, human beings are rational animals. So the statement can be interpreted to mean that good is that which all human beings seek by virtue of their nature as rational animals. (Donagan 1969).

Aquinas conceives natural law in theological terms. Arguing that a rational creature is subject to divine providence in a higher way than a brute he lays it down that 'such participation of the eternal law in a rational creature is called natural law'. The eternal law, being 'the very Idea of the government of things existing in God the ruler of the universe', is studied by theology rather than by philosophy. 

But it does not follow that since Aquinas defines natural law theologically in a theological work that natural law cannot be defined philosophically. But Aquinas’ argument that 'all men know . . . the common principles of the natural law' implies the possibility of a purely philosophical conception of natural law. It is also worth pointing out that in none of his derivations of the various precepts of the natural law does Aquinas make any appeal to revealed theology.

Donagan’s argument is fine, and certainly goes a long way to giving us an Aquinas for the consumption of the philosophers. The only problem with it is that it misses out what is essential in Aquinas, that sense of transcendental being that draws us out of and beyond our own reason and experience into the last end for human beings, the end which is common to all, which is to represent God. This is the perfect good which satisfies the appetite - man’s beatitude. Aquinas is clear that the natural end of man achieves only an imperfect earthly happiness and needs to be completed by perfect (divine) happiness. To remove this aspect of Aquinas is not to give us Aquinas at all, only Aristotle.

Donagan, of course, knows this. He quotes a Thomist textbook of Ethics in order to contrast Aquinas with Kant:

The distinctive thing about the rationally free agent is not, as Kant thought, that he is a law unto himself. Man is not the ultimate source or principle of the moral law. Rather, human reason is subject to the laws of reality, which come from the divine reason.

For Donagan, these remarks are based on a misunderstanding which is precisely the opposite to the misunderstanding that Aquinas has no strictly philosophical conception of natural law. (Donagan 1969). Kant defines the moral law philosophically. Defining an objective principle as ‘valid for every rational being as such' (Kant GMM 1991: 77/8), Kant proceeds to argue that if there is to be a moral law for men, i.e. a categorical imperative:

If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and—so far as the human will is concerned—a categorical imperative, it must be such that from the idea of something which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end in itself it forms an objective principle of the will and consequently can serve as a practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as an end in itself. This is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence: it is therefore so far a subjective principle of human actions. But it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is valid also for me; hence it is at the same time an objective principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will. The practical imperative will therefore be as follows: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

Kant GMM 1991: 91/2

Kant is clearly not arguing that a rational being is a law unto himself. A rational being as such must determine for himself what the law is, but must do so according to objective principles. Such principles are ‘valid for every rational being as such’ precisely because they have an objective foundation in 'something which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself.’ 
I agree. But I’m not sure that the substance of the charge contained in the Thomist text pertains to a Kantian subjectivism in the manner of each rational being being a law unto himself. Kant so clearly affirms an intersubjective ethic based upon the objective principles of the universal moral law that the substantial charge must go deeper. That subjectivism could result from the failure of Kant to ground his self-legislating reason in objective nature is a possibility that I have outlined throughout this book. This is not Kant’s ethics but it is a subjectivism and a relativism into which the self-legislation of practical reason could fall given the inability to ground universalism in a disenchanted, nihilistic modernity – the world of Weber and Nietzsche.

The Thomist charge relates to humanity in general, ‘man’, and not to atomistic individuals as legislating selves. And here, the Thomist text on Ethics is quite right, for Aquinas, ‘man’ is not the ultimate source or principle of the moral law, reason is not autonomous in some self-legislating sense. For Aquinas, reason is grounded in being.

 The ultimate end for Aquinas is quite distinct from Aristotle’s naturalist end. The perfect and fulfilling good through union with God is the ultimate happiness, the highest activity and special goal for human beings. 

Donagan is simply trying to distinguish philosophy and theology so as to put natural law and divine law in their appropriate realms. That approach is certainly valid and would certainly go some way to widen the appreciation of Aquinas’ achievement as a philosopher. But since one of Aquinas’ greatest achievements was to integrate theology and philosophy, one is left wondering how much would be lost by turning Aquinas into just another philosopher. And Aquinas does actually order philosophy and theology in their appropriate realms in any case.

Donagan writes something interesting here. ‘Writing as a philosopher, Kant defined the moral law without reference to God. Yet he held, as a theologian, that the moral law is derived from the divine reason. In the Groundwork he was at pains to point out that the divine will cannot be said to be subject to the objective principles of the moral law as to imperatives, because it is 'already of itself necessarily in harmony with [them]'. (Donagan in Kenny 1969: 330)

A perfectly good will would thus stand quite as much under objective laws (laws of the good), but it could not on this account be conceived as necessitated to act in conformity with law, since of itself, in accordance with its subjective constitution, it can be determined only by the concept of the good. Hence for the divine will, and in general for a holy will, there are no imperatives: 'ought' is here out of place, because will is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. Imperatives are in consequence only formulae for expressing the relation of objective laws of willing to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being—for example, of the human will.

Kant GMM 1991: 78

In seeking to distinguish natural law and divine law, philosophy and theology, the argument that Donagan quotes from Kant shows the extent to which the two are integral to each other, inform, enrich and ground each other. We can study philosophy and theology as autonomous disciplines in their own right, and Aquinas and Kant did that. The question, though, is whether the philosophy of reason is sufficient in itself to defend the moral law that Kant defined?

For Donagan, Kant and Aquinas do not differ in any significant way about the relation between the 'natural law' and the 'eternal law'. ‘From the point of view of moral philosophy, the natural law is a set of precepts the binding force of which can be ascertained by human reason; from the point of view of theology, it is that part of what God eternally and rationally wills that can be grasped by human reason as binding upon human beings (Kant would say, upon all rational beings). Just as in theology Kant may agree with St. Thomas that the moral law is a participation of the eternal law in a rational creature, so in moral philosophy St. Thomas may agree with Kant that in determining what the precepts of the natural law are, theological considerations are out of place.’ (Donagan in Kenny 1969: 330/1).

All of which is true. It just leaves us with Aquinas’ insistence upon the unity of philosophy and theology. I want, instead, to focus further on how Aquinas and Kant compare and contrast here. I agree with Donagan that Aquinas and Kant do not differ as much as many seem to think, hence my Thomist reading of Kant. There is plenty in Kant that has a Thomist flavour, certainly with respect to the moral law. But the foundations are different.

There is nothing here that distinguishes Aquinas and Kant in any fundamental sense with respect to the moral law. Where there is a distinction comes with respect to the understanding of nature and the natural law. Kant separates duty and inclination in a way that Aquinas does not and cannot. 

Kant is concerned that human beings are able to overcome the inclinations that keep them chained to physical necessity and thus affirm themselves as free, rational beings. Universality requires that freedom be grounded in something that transcends empirically limited inclinations. Kant argues that moral values cannot be drawn from nature and must inhabit some supersensible, 'ideal', realm. Only in relation to this 'noumenal' realm could individuals become moral beings (CPuR 1965 B.334/6 498ff; CPrR 1956 50ff).

Kant was seeking to bring together the worlds of Newton and Rousseau, combining the mechanistic conception of a causally ordered, 'deterministic' nature with the belief in the free will. Freedom is the capacity of human beings to act independently of natural causality and against natural 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects in the natural world (CPuR 1965 B.561f; cf. CPrR 1956:72 118f 161). Kant’s rational will is thus free from any ground of determination in nature (Taylor 1975:368/9). This might look like a statement of human moral freedom as autonomy. The problem is that it really is groundless and hence in a precarious condition of being.

Freedom, for Kant, is the capacity of reason to initiate action, lawfully, apart from natural inclination and hence independently of ‘blind’ natural causality (Kant CPuR 1965 B.46 50 B.566ff). Kantian autonomy may be defined in terms of the idea of freedom as the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law as a 'fact of reason' (e.g. GMM), a 'necessary' concept which human beings must construct on account of knowledge of the moral law (CPuR 1965 B.476 585f; CPrR 1956:21-29 32). Human beings, therefore, are capable of autonomy, in the sense of acting according to laws they have given themselves. This is the position that Kant develops at length in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).

Kant is employing the language of metaphysics here, but has detached it from nature and given it to reason. In the metaphysics of Aquinas, first, efficient and final causality are anything but blind. Further, any causality of reason is located in ontological nature. Knowledge of the moral law is constructed out of knowledge of being. Reason is a necessary concept only in relation to necessary being. Human beings achieving autonomy through acting according to laws they have given themselves simply begs the question, how can we know that such laws are good? Reason is its own judge in the Kantian conception; it is groundless. As I have argued, there is a rational natural teleology at work in Kant. There has to be. It is just that Kant requires more by way of ontological knowledge in order to support his claims for freedom and morality more firmly.

One could write ‘natural’ desires and the like here, but this would give the misleading impression that Kant is asserting a simple reason/nature dualism. Not so. For Kant, reason is as innate as desires, inclinations and impulses and can be employed to transcend these appetitive limitations by enabling us to recognise the universal duties commanded by the moral law. Kant shows us how we can transcend our natural urges, desires and inclinations and create a moral society of cooperation with a view to the common good.

That is my Thomist reading of Kant’s realm of ends. But there are reasons to doubt whether such a society can be achieved on the basis of Kant’s sharp separation of duty and inclination. 

Duty and Inclination
Hegel was quick to identify the problem. For Hegel, Kant’s pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from everything that comprises a real life, from the desires, interests, and needs of individuals in their social existence. For Hegel, the good needs to be made an integral part of everyday life in connection with the empirical desires and self-satisfaction of individuals. Hegel's conception follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons, to feel pleasure or pain at certain things (PR para 150R; Aristotle NE 1065al2 1106bl5-30). Hegel considers Aristotelian virtue to transcend Kant's dualism of duty and inclination. Coming from this Aristotelian perspective, Hegel’s criticism of Kant could have been the Thomist view. He is therefore worth quoting at length.





Whereas for Aristotle reason had to persuade desire as to what it should want, for Kant, a truly moral act is performed out of respect for the moral law, without regard to inclinations. For Kant, reason is immanent in the mind of the autonomous moral agent and is unrelated to external objects. The problem is that if reason is noumenally structured, the empirical realm is left free from moral significance. Whereas Aristotle is able to establish individual self-realisation within the polis as the essential field of human interaction, Kant's approach assumes a set of rational ideas inherent in the human mind from which the state as the prime political object derives. In the Aristotelian conception, reason persuades the empirical world from within, in the Kantian conception, reason teaches the world from without. Hegel thus charges Kantian ethics with being an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R) within the social world. Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake' providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R). Immanence is the key question – is Kant’s reason active in the empirical world or outside of it?

For Aquinas, reason is active in the natural world of causality, of potency and act, of purpose. In his work on appetite and will, Aquinas locates desire in the soul. 

Natural inclinations are, for Aquinas, predispositions by which human beings are led to the good. 

Aquinas refers to the soul’s appetitive powers so that rational nature, cogitative power and sensitive appetite are bound to the good by necessary connection. The understanding and the will reciprocally include and move each other so that the free will is will in conformity with a reason grounded in nature. There is no duty outside of and apart from inclinations, no reason which is lacking in ontological foundation. 

Here, St. Thomas takes a position which is markedly different from Kant, for whom freedom transcends the world of empirical reality through the power of human reason. Kant defines morality in contradistinction to natural inclinations. Natural inclinations keep human beings chained to empirical necessity. For Kant, moral values cannot be drawn from nature. Only in relation to the supersensible, 'noumenal' realm could individuals become moral beings (Kant CPuR 1965 B.334/6 498ff; CPrR 1956 50ff). Freedom, for Kant, is the capacity of human beings to act independently of natural causality and transcend natural 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects in the natural world (Kant CPuR 1965 B.561f; cf. CPrR 1956:72 118f 161; Taylor 1975:368/9).
It is not that Kant is wrong to argue that human beings act morally and achieve the good when they eschew behaviour which is bad for them or bad in itself – the seven cardinal sins. But Kant overstates. For St Thomas and those in the Aristotelian tradition, human beings are desirous beings. Appetite, will and intellect are joined to canalise human desire into the direction of the good and away from the bad. This is a part of natural causality. Kant’s rational will is thus free from any ground of determination in nature. For Kant, a free act counts as being morally significant in being exempt from 'blind causality' in both physical and psychological senses (CPuR 1965 B.826f; CPrR 1956:95). 

For St. Thomas, natural causality is not blind causality. Kant can see no moral significance in nature and natural inclinations. St Thomas can and does. In the Summa he asks whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. St Thomas answers in the affirmative. He sees the eternal law operating within nature and its causality.

There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above (A. 5): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e., by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle; and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law …. But since the rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (A. 2), it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law, for "we are naturally adapted to be the recipients of virtue" (Ethics ii. i).

Human beings as rational beings have some knowledge of the eternal law. Human beings are naturally adapted to be the recipients of virtue, meaning that they have a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law. There is nothing in this which is drastically contrary to Kant, who argued that the moral law within allows human beings to access the universal law without. Kant referred to the rational nature of human beings. What Kant misses is the extent to which natural inclinations, desires, appetites etc are more than egoistic proclivities or cardinal sins which chain individuals to immediacy and necessity. It is entirely natural for human beings to desire virtue and attain the summum bonum. Kant’s failure to attach his moral ideal to the natural means for its realisation risks rendering his morality devoid of social relevance and hence impotent.

St Thomas has this relevance because he makes the fine distinctions with respect to natural inclinations. By nature, human beings can turn to sin; by nature, human beings may turn to God. St Thomas distinguishes between ‘direct inclination’, which is the inclination Kant is at pains to distinguish morality from, and rational inclination. Both are natural.

As stated above (A. 2; Q. 90, A. i ad i), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured, so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law is called a law by participation ….
And so the law of man, which, by the divine ordinance, is allotted to him according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason; and this law was so effective in the primitive state that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses—in fact this happens to each one individually the more he deviates from the path of reason—so that, after a fashion, he' is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality.
So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.

Summa, Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

Even as a ‘direct inclination’, natural inclination is justified in terms of the common good of a species, preservation.

Summa. 3. This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called the "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason.

St. Thomas challenges the assertion that there is no natural law within us. The objection reads like Kant’s position, which is not surprising since it comes from Augustine, heavily influenced by Plato. The objection is therefore worth quoting, along with St. Thomas’ reply.

Whether there is in us a Natural Law?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law; for Augustine says that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature does not abound in superfluities, as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man. 
Obj. 2. Further, by the law man is directed in his acts to the end, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man. 

That reads as the Kantian position, reason and will acting against and transcending natural inclination. St. Thomas replies to the objection:

Now among all others the rational creature is subject to divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the eternal reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.

thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

The natural law is the rational human being’s participation in the eternal law and works through a natural inclination proceeding to its proper act and end. Human beings possess natural reason and the use of that reason forms part of appetite, intellect and will working in unison.
The natural law is not something different to the eternal law. Seeing nothing in nature other than ‘blind causality’, Kant makes a distinction where none applies.

Reply Obj. 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature …. for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Aquinas Summa 2 Kinds of Law

In fine, Aquinas conceives the human being as a rational being by nature, striving to actualize potentialities immanent in human nature. Human beings have certain basic inclinations, grounded in human nature, some for the good, some for the bad. Kant defines morality in contradistinction to this nature, with the result that reason has to educate desire from the outside. St Thomas sees morality as emerging out of this nature, so that intellect works with will and appetite to attain the good. The advantage of the natural law position is that reason is active on the inside of human nature, not detached. Kant’s ethical system is at risk of bifurcation between real and ideal, resulting in the famous Kantian dualism of Sein and Sollen, ‘is’ and ‘ought-to-be’. The natural law avoids such dualism.

For example, as a living organism man naturally strives to preserve himself in life, while as a rational being he has the capacity for apprehending truth. Reflecting on such basic tendencies the reason can promulgate such precepts as 'life is to be preserved' and 'truth should be sought after'. Most people, of course, do not explicitly formulate such precepts to themselves. But they can be formulated and used as premises in the deduction of more particular precepts. The totality of such precepts is the 'natural law". 

Copleston 1990 ch 12

Where Kant sees natural inclinations as one thing, a thing to be avoided, St. Thomas from a natural law position sees gradations from direct immediacy and sensuality up to reason.

Granted this, it is clear that the precepts of natural law correspond exactly with our natural inclinations and that their order is the same. Man is, to begin with, a being like all others. More particularly, he is a living being, like all other animals. Finally, by the privilege of his nature, he is a rational being. Thus it is that three great natural laws bind him, each in its own way. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1

Had Kant been able to make these distinctions he would have found it easier to have his moral system work with the grain of human nature, rather than seek to constrain that nature from the outside. Kant’s writing displays an abhorrence of the flesh. This leaves his morality as curiously inhuman, saintly. Gilson makes it clear that ‘natural law is literally and indelibly written on the fleshy tablets of the heart.’ There is nothing direct in the line that leads from natural inclination to the summum bonum, the inclination for virtue and to the good needs to be canalised. This is where human law mediates between natural law and eternal law. ‘Human laws aim at prescribing particular acts which natural law imposes upon individuals for the common good, and they only bind in the measure in which they are just, that is, to the extent they satisfy their own definition.’ (Gilson 1961).

For St. Thomas, law is a rule conceived by reason and promulgated with a view to the common good. This reason is a part of the nature of human beings. As St Thomas writes, natural law is a 'participation of the eternal law in a rational creature'. (Summa Theologiae, I—II, 93, 2.) 





In other words, God sees eternally in human nature the activities which correspond to and constitute its objective unfolding and the acts which contradict this unfolding. If the moral law depended entirely on God, then it could be known only by revelation. Since, however, the natural law is participation in the eternal law, the divine will for human beings logically presupposes the idea of human nature. The divine will can therefore be known by the human reason. Nature and reason are at one.

Aquinas and law
It is also worth noting that Aquinas does not define law as an imperative for the common good, but as an ordinance of reason for the common good etc. Id. at q. 90, a. 4, c. Aquinas defines a law as 'an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated'. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.2.90.4; Finnis 1980: 194-195).

Aquinas defines three kinds of law, linking each to the other. The most important law is the eternal law, which consists of the moral rules laid down by God himself from all eternity. Some, but not all, of the eternal law can be known by reason, and this is the natural law. In applying what they know of natural law to their practical affairs in time and place, human beings create the human law. Thus, for instance, it is part of the eternal law that one must not kill. Since everybody knows this, without God having to tell them, this is part of the natural law also. In the process of drawing up various rules to clarify what counts as murder, human legislators come to create the human law.

The important element, of course, is that all law derives ultimately from God. Aquinas comments:

Now God, by his wisdom, is the creator of all things, and he is to all things what a craftsman is to the things his art has made... Moreover, he governs all the actions and movements that are to be found in each single created thing... So just as divine wisdom, inasmuch as everything is created by it, has the character of art, prototype, or idea, so too divine wisdom, inasmuch as it moves all things to their proper ends, has the character of law. So the eternal law is nothing else than the divine wisdom, directing all actions and movements.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1.2.93.1.

As we will see in the next chapter, Aquinas thinks of these rules as issued for our benefit. That is, following the eternal law is the route to a happy life.
Aquinas avoids Kant’s strict distinction between duty and inclination and thus avoids the problems and confusions that beset Kant’s formulation of the moral law. Kant argues for a moral that is distinct from nature as expressed in desires, wants, appetites, yet knows well that the rational capacity that lies behind duty is itself a natural attribute. Aquinas retains the connection between reason and nature and is thus able to incorporate inclinations in the pursuit of the ultimate end. Natural inclinations are not precepts of natural law, but form the basis for these precepts. In other words, the precepts of natural law are the formulation of principles based on natural inclinations for guiding actions.

Virtue and Law
One can see now how Aquinas founds the moral life on natural law and virtue so that human beings. The moral task for Aquinas is not to define an abstract moral code in which duty is formulated over and even against natural inclinations but to so organise human dispositions and form habits by way of virtuous activity so as to form the character that enables human beings to do well and flourish. 

Philosophers since the seventeenth century and the scientific revolution have divorced ‘ought’ and ‘is’, reason and nature, duty and inclination, value and fact. All these dualisms follow the separation of freedom and morality from ontological nature, practical reason from theoretical reason, moral knowledge from the knowledge of being. I have focused on Kant for the simple reason that Kant is the greatest of the modern philosophers. If Kant fails, modern philosophy fails. Kant’s achievement is to have very nearly pulled off the impossible. The best of Kant concerns the highest good, the moral law, the ethic of ends, the rational natural teleology and it can all be found better supported in the realist metaphysics of Aquinas.
Modern philosophers have argued as though moral duty is divorced from the human desire for happiness and have engaged in interminable, tedious discussions, with descending levels of obscurity, which purport to show that judgments that a thing is good has nothing to do with what the thing is. If I say Françoise Hardy is good, it merely means that I like Françoise Hardy. 
This is the dissolution of morality into feelings, emotions, opinions. Kant was right when he wrote that the rejection of morally necessary ends 'would do away with all moral philosophy'. (Kant 1964 43, Ak. 384). The problem is that Kant himself rejected the essentialist metaphysics he required to make good his own moral claims. Kant’s thinking is teleological. The problem is that he has detached morality from the Aristotelian and Thomist vision of a purpose-driven universe. This involves Kant with the impossible task of having to resolve a series of dualisms which characterise the modern age.

Aquinas avoids these dualisms. For Aquinas, the desire for happiness, the pursuit of the good, the realisation of natural ends, are all integrated within the action-guiding judgments of the natural law.

Aquinas holds that by synderesis we can know general moral principles, and we can apply them to cases at hand. 
Practical reasoning begins with general principles which the intellect immediately recognizes as true. St Thomas gives the example, 'Good is to be done and evil avoided.' These principles are grasped by 'synderesis', which St Thomas considers a disposition. Thus, like all knowledge, knowledge of fundamental moral principles arises as the result of sense experience. Moral knowledge is not innate, in the sense of being born knowing fundamental moral principles. However, synderesis involves more than bare capacity. To argue that human beings are able to understand the first principles of morality means more than claiming that it is logically possible for human beings to understand and assent to these principles, or that they may do so from time to time should they so choose. St Thomas argues the stronger case that human beings have a natural tendency to understand and assent to first principles at any time. For Aquinas, synderesis 'is a natural disposition of the human mind by which we apprehend the basic principles of behaviour, parallel to that by which we apprehend the basic principles of theoretical disciplines, and in both cases these principles are apprehended without inquiry'. (Potts in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg 700.)

As Aquinas puts it:





For St Thomas, synderesis is infallible, not because human beings can look inside themselves and recognize basic moral principles. Synderesis is not an inner awareness in this sense. St Thomas’ argument is that there could be no body of knowledge if synderesis is not infallible. His view is that 'the whole edifice of knowledge whether theoretical or practical, rests upon basic principles, so that, if we could be wrong about these, nothing would be certain'. (Potts 1980). As St Thomas puts it:

Nature, in all its works, aims at what is good and at the maintenance of whatever comes about through the working of nature. Hence, in all the works of nature, its first principles are always permanent and unchangeable and conserve right order, because first principles must endure ... For there could be no stability or certainty in what results from the first principles, unless the first principles were solidly established. Anything which is variable goes back, accordingly, to some first fixed thing. So it is, also, that every particular apprehension comes from some absolutely certain apprehension about which there can be no mistake. This is apprehension of basic general principles, by reference to which all particular apprehensions are tested and in virtue of which everything true wins approval but everything false is rejected. If any mistake could occur about these, then there could be no certainty in the entire subsequent apprehension. Hence, in order that there can be some rightness in human deeds, there must be some enduring principle which has unchangeable rightness and by reference to which all deeds are tested, such that this enduring principle resists everything evil and gives assent to everything good. This is what synderesis is, whose job it is to murmur back in reply to evil and to turn us towards what is good. Hence, it is to be admitted that it cannot do wrong.

De ver. 16. 2

However, St Thomas does not believe that the use of reason alone is sufficient to ensure that people are truly good or that they come to live a truly moral life. This requires the virtues. (Davies 1993: 239).

The theological virtues -- faith, hope, and charity -- are infused; natural virtues, whether intellectual or moral, are acquired by exercise in the actions pertaining to such virtues. Whilst the aptitude for these virtues, along with the general aptitude for virtue, is part of the natural endowment of human beings, the virtues need to be acquired and exercised. Intellect and will require habits. The intellectual virtues and the moral virtues dispose human beings towards fulfilment and perfection, their ultimate end. Intellect and will are the specifically human powers and capacities. These are not developed and realised in some direct and automatic sense but require certain habits (a type of Aristotelian first actuality) which serve to dispose them toward their complete or perfect actuality. These habits are the intellectual and moral virtues, and these dispose a human being toward the actual performance of the activities which lead to and constitute human perfection: prudence is the habit of reasoning correctly about what is to be done; temperance and courage are habits inclining the appetitive powers toward appropriate ends. The emphasis is therefore on the acquisition of the virtues as an integral part of the life which aims at attaining the highest good for human beings.

The acquisition of the virtues and their exercise is part of the formation of habits which dispose us to perform good actions, leading to and constituting the human good. 
St Thomas’ ethics is Aristotle with modifications and additions. Human beings on this view always will the good or what they see as good, and the ultimate good is happiness. Here, St Thomas builds on but adapts Aristotle.





Aristotle argues that virtuous people act as they ought and when they ought, and so forth according to other circumstances (Ethics, 2. 3.)

The virtues, their acquisition and exercise, concern what is required for human action to be good, do good and achieve the good. Aquinas holds that we can be properly guided in our actions by reason.

The intellect and will are specifically human powers and capacities which require certain habits which serve to dispose them towards their complete and perfect actuality. Aquinas examines the intellectual and moral virtues as virtues which dispose human beings towards perfection and fulfilment. For instance, prudence is the habit of reasoning correctly about what is to be done, whilst temperance and courage are habits inclining the appetitive powers toward appropriate ends. 

The acquisition of the virtues, therefore, is an integral part of a life aimed at attaining the human good. And this life is a public life, a habitus, formed in communion with others. Aquinas does not believe that the use of reason alone is sufficient to ensure that people are truly good or that they live a truly moral life. In addition to reason, we need virtues. (Davies 1993: 239)

Aquinas argues that any virtue (virtus) is 'a good quality of mind by which one lives righteously, of which no one can make bad use'. (Summa Theologiae ia2ae. 55 4 ff.) For Aquinas, virtues are 'dispositions', abilities, tendencies, or capacities which make it easy for human beings to do certain things and behave in certain ways. These dispositions can be bad, leading human beings to act in ways which fall short of or take us away from the well-being of which we are capable. Virtues are good dispositions, abilities, tendencies, or capacities which help us to act in those ways required for well-being. Virtues contribute to and help attain the human end of flourishing well. Through the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, human beings attain fulfilment, functioning to the best advantage, satisfying essential needs. Human beings attain their end of fulfilment through moral action in a social context. As Aquinas puts it in Summa Theologiae. 'Virtue is a habitus which is always for good.' (ST ia2ae. 55. 4.) Virtue 'is a habitus by which a person acts well'. (ST ia2ae. 56. 3). For Aquinas, virtue is a certain perfection of a power and therefore an 'operative habitus’ (ST i a. 77 ff).

Human beings have certain powers or faculties which imply functioning in certain characteristic ways. 





Virtue denotes a determinate perfection of a power... Now there are some powers which according to their very natures are set towards their acts, such as inborn active powers ... The rational powers, proper to people, however, are not determined to one act, but in themselves are poised before many. It is through habits (per habitus) that they are set towards acts ... Human virtues, therefore, are habits (habitus sunt).

ia2ae. 55. i; cf. ia2ae. 55. 2

In fine, virtues are learned responses by which human beings come to naturally act well. Virtues elicit the capacity for good that is innate in human beings.

If we know the nature of habits, we know the nature of virtues, because virtues are habits which dispose us in a lasting way to perform good actions. We have said above that habits are dispositions either for better or for worse. Since a habit draws an individual either toward or away from his end and brings him into greater or less conformity to a given standard, we must distinguish between habits which dispose him to perform acts consistent with his nature and those which dispose him to perform acts not consistent with his nature. The former are good habits and therefore also virtues; the latter are bad habits and also vices. But for a fuller definition of virtue, we have to be quite sure just what kind of acts are more consistent with human nature. Then we shall also know in what moral good and evil consist, and how to distinguish vice from virtue.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1 257-258

Intellectual Virtues
Under the heading of 'intellectual virtues', Aquinas acknowledges three virtues of what he calls 'speculative intellect', and two virtues of 'practical intellect'. By 'speculative intellect' he means the mind as understanding at a purely theoretical level, and, under this heading, he distinguishes between 'understanding' (intellectus), 'science' (stientia), and 'wisdom' (sapientia). By 'practical intellect' he means the mind as understanding with a view to action. Under this heading he distinguishes between 'art' (ars) and 'prudence' (prudentia). 'Understanding' is a matter of grasping basic principles of reasoning. 'Science' is a matter of good reasoning using these principles to arrive at truth regarding different kinds of things in the world. 'Wisdom' is a matter of good reasoning concerning God. 'Art' is correct reason about things to be made. 'Prudence' is correct reason about things to be done and aims at the good of the agent. (ia2ae. 57. 2ff. in Davies 1993: 241).





The moral virtues introduce into the will the same perfections which the intellectual virtues introduce into knowledge. Some moral virtues regulate the content and nature of our operations themselves, independently of our personal dispositions at the moment of acting. This is the particular case of justice, which assures the moral value and rectitude of all operations in which ideas of what is due and not due are implied. Thus, for example, the operation of buying and selling supposes the acknowledgment or rejection of a debt to a neighbor, and depends upon the virtue of justice. 
Other moral virtues bear upon the qualities of acts, considered in relation to the one performing them. Thus, they deal with the interior dispositions of the agent at the moment of acting. They deal, in a word, with passions. If the agent is drawn by passion toward an act contrary to reason, he has to call on that virtue whose particular function is to restrain and check passion; namely, the virtue of temperance. If the agent, far from being drawn into action by some passion, is actually prevented from acting by fear of danger or of effort or the like, he needs another moral virtue to strengthen him in the resolutions his reason dictates. This is the virtue of fortitude. These three moral virtues, together with one intellectual virtue—prudence—are commonly known as principal or cardinal virtues. They alone imply both the faculty to act aright and the actual accomplishing of the good act. They alone, consequently, perfectly fulfil the definition of virtue.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1 p 263

In speaking of moral virtues Aquinas says that they are named from the Latin word mos where that means 'a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action'. (ia2ae. 58. i.) So he is thinking about dispositions which lead one to act well, and not of those which might enable one to act well only if one chooses to. (Davies 1993: 243).

‘For people to act well, it is requisite that not only their reason be well disposed through a habitus of intellectual virtue, but also that their appetite be well disposed through a habitus of moral virtue.’ (ia2ae. 58. 2; Davies 1993: 243). 
‘That is to say, knowledge is not enough to make people fully virtuous or good as people…. it is not Aquinas's view that you are good just because you are clever or quick witted. You may have doctorates from Oxford and Yale, but you might not be good. You also have to act in the light of what you know, which means that you must be engaged at the level of will as well as intellect, that you must actually pursue or be drawn to what you see to be good— which, for Aquinas, is where prudence comes in again.’ (Davies 1993: 243.)





Prudence means more than practical knowledge. That has to do with making a general judgement about what to do, as when one sees that fornication is bad or that it is wrong to steal and so on. Even where this knowledge exists, the judgement of reason can be intercepted in a particular action so that it does not judge properly. So prudence is equally a matter of virtue because with knowledge alone someone may sin against virtue.

De virt. 6 ad. i.

Indeed, Aquinas argues that prudence is at work at the same time as the other virtues. For virtue, in general, helps us to act well and prudence is displayed by actually acting well. 'Nobody can be virtuous without . possessing prudence ... The other virtues can never be true virtues unless their seeking is prudently conducted.' (aa2ae. 47. 14.) A person can be morally good whilst lacking some intellectual virtues such as wisdom, science, and art. But a person cannot be morally good without choosing well in action. And choosing well depends on acting in accordance with prudence. (Davies 1993 ch 12).

People may be virtuous without their reason being vigorous as to everything, but merely as to those things which have to be done virtuously. And to this extent all virtuous people use reason soundly. Hence even those who seem to be simple, by their lack of worldly shrewdness, can be prudent.

ia2ae. 58. 4 ad. 2.

To two objections which claimed that one can be virtuous without prudence inasmuch as one can always get advice from others, Aquinas replies that one must be prudent enough in the first place to even ask for that sort of help and to know how to discern good advice from bad (ST 2a2ae 47.14 ad 2). He develops this point in another reply:

One person can take general advice from another about what to do. However, only the rightness of prudence enables one to sustain one's judgment rightly throughout the act itself, against all passions. Without this, there can be no virtue. 

QDVC 6 ad 2

‘Prudence's task is not the strictly cognitive task of knowing the right thing to do. The prudent agent not only has that practical knowledge but is also able to focus on that knowledge at the right time, for as long as necessary. Here again, Aquinas's virtue theory meets up with his natural law theory. To a considerable extent, as we saw in the previous section, we all know what the right thing to do is. The reason we nevertheless go wrong so often is that we fail to make use of that knowledge as we should. We let our knowledge be hijacked by our passions, which call to mind other pleasant truths that, in turn, lead our wills astray.’ Pasnau and Shields 2004: 239).

This is not to remove prudence from intellect. Prudence is an intellectual disposition as well as a moral disposition. The point is that prudence is a disposition quite unlike knowledge. This is because knowledge is not a virtue in the truest sense defined by Aquinas, since it lacks an appetitive component. Knowledge would be a genuine virtue if it made one positively desire to grasp the true. But knowledge is not appetitive in this sense: "[H]aving knowledge does not make one want to consider the truth; it just makes one able to do so" (QDVC 7c). ‘We all know, in some sense of 'know', the difference between right and wrong. But we do not all desire to embrace this knowledge and let it guide our lives. The disposition of prudence guarantees that our intellect will attend to the relevant information we possess. Guided by the virtue of justice, the prudent person will fasten on those aspects of the situation that bear on treating others fairly and equally. Guided by the virtue of temperance, the prudent person will dwell on resisting temptation. In these cases, Aquinas describes the intellect as "following the will." The underlying disposition "more truly has the nature of a virtue inasmuch as it gives a person not just the ability or the knowledge to act rightly, but also the will to do so" (QDVC 7c). Prudence does this, not because it is a virtue of the will, but because it holds intellect steadfast in its orientation, allowing the will to act in accord with right reason so as best to pursue the ends that the virtuous person desires by a kind of second nature.’
‘Prudence turns out to have an interesting and complex relationship to the other three cardinal virtues (justice, courage, and temperance). Moral knowledge gets pushed to the side, overshadowed by an account of how we manage to make use of what we already know. This shows something very interesting about the relationship between Aquinas's virtue theory and his natural law theory. Moral knowledge (what the natural law gives us) is pushed to the side, not because it is unimportant, but because it is not the basis of moral evaluation. No one is more virtuous because she understands more of the natural law or sees more deeply into its far-reaching consequences. We all grasp the natural law, more or less, and we are all perfectly capable of applying it to particular circumstances. The good person is not good because she can do that better than the rest of us—she is not some kind of moral sage. Instead, the good person knows what she is looking for and is steadfast in focusing on that. The rest of us have too much on our minds, and too many desires, and we make hard what is really quite simple. The overall tenor of the theory is therefore very far from the sort of intellectualism with which Aquinas is often associated. Although it is true that wrongdoing is always the result of ignorance, it is also true that such ignorance is the product of a failure at some other level. God gives each of us plenty of information about right and wrong, not just in Church teachings and holy texts, but written into our very hearts and minds. When we go wrong, it is because we ignore all of this.’ (Pasnau and Shields 2004: 239 ff).

Virtuous Action
Human beings as rational beings are characterized by intellect and will, by virtue of which they aim at the overall good, the ultimate end. For Aristotle, it is the end or good of a process that makes it intelligible and gives a criterion for its rational appraisal. Knowing the purpose of a function (ergon, opus) makes it possible to appraise it rationally, discern whether it is well or badly done. This reasoning applies to human action as to any natural process. The human agent is unique in being rational and in acting rationally. It follows that the end or good for human beings is fulfilment through the perfection of rational activity. In this context, virtue means that the function is performed well, that human beings flourish well.

The strength of conceiving the good in this way lies in its capacity to recover moral philosophy from the intuitionism of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica and the myriad relativisms and subjectivisms and irrationalisms it has spawned. At a time when modernity exhibited a perfection of means and a confusion of ends, to quote Einstein, the moral philosophers went missing in inaction. In this respect, moral philosophers are merely reflecting the condition of the world under a modernity characterised by the inversion of means and ends. The classic statement that the (modern) world lacks intrinsic meaning comes from Max Weber: 'The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the "disenchantment of the world"‘ (Weber SV 1991:155). As the world is stripped of purpose, so philosophy is stripped of its normative dimension in relation to the world. It is in this context that J.L. Mackie’s defence of subjectivism in Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) needs to be understood. Underlining the 'queerness' of the view that such a disenchanted world could contain values, Mackie asks how objective values could relate to or co-exist with those characteristics revealed by science; how we could come to know of them; and what possible relevance they could have to our existence (Mackie 1977:38/42). 
Indeed. This cluelessness on the part of moral philosophers can be seen in a myriad of ever more arcane, obscure, even plainly irrational accounts of modern ‘morality’. Kant was right to foresee that the abandonment of morally necessary ends 'would do away with all moral philosophy'. (Kant 1964 43, Ak. 384). The good cannot be understood apart from the point of the process called good, hence the confusion and aridity of modern moral philosophy. My overall point is that what Kant describes as morally necessary ends need to be securely located in a metaphysics in which efficient causality, necessary being, first and final cause have central place. The problem with Kant is that he accepts the mechanistic universe presented by the natural scientists, a world stripped of purpose and intrinsic meaning. It is difficult, in this context, to avoid morality fragmenting into a quagmire of value judgments, arbitrary in floating free of any natural properties of a thing. Goodness and badness are just things we see or feel, an expression of our tastes or opinions, likes and dislikes. This is good means I like it. Whatever else this is, it isn’t morality, it isn’t moral philosophy. To argue that something is good means that it fulfils or performs well the purpose for which it was made. 

Aquinas follows Aristotle in arguing that reason is the unique characteristic of human beings. The good performance, or virtue, of rational activity is what identifies a person as good. 

Aquinas identifies three categories of rational activity.

1.	Theoretical reasoning, the perfection of which is truth;
2.	Practical reasoning, the perfection of which is achieved through guiding and directing other faculties (which also have natural ends of their own) to the overall good of the person;
3.	Participated rationality, activities other than reason, such as choosing, fearing, desiring, which are rational to the extent that they come under the sway of practical reason.

These three kinds of reasoning imply the existence of three kinds of virtue identifying the human agent as good. 

The Nicomachean Ethics and the second part of the Summa Theologiae are concerned to elucidate the specific kinds of virtues entailed. For Aquinas, as for Aristotle, this is an ordered set of virtues, in that some virtues more perfectly fulfil the human agent than others. (McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50).

We can conclude from this that for Aquinas, moral philosophy is a rational reflection on how human beings can act well in order to achieve the end they naturally desire in order to flourish well. The task is to create the moral society which enables human beings to acquire the virtues and develop the character to be able to live in such a way that they act well and thereby attain what is perfective of them. The desire for the good is natural, it is innate. In contrast to Kant, reason does not educate desire or appetite from the outside in Aquinas’ conception. There is no split between duty and inclination. Aquinas does, however, retain an active role for reason, for agent intellect. Rational reflection illuminates the notion of ultimate end – Aquinas’ conception of lex naturalis is fundamental – and establishes what things human beings must do to achieve fulfilment and perfection. The criteria for the good is to be found in our nature as rational agents. 


‘Thus we arrive gradually at the notion of virtue in its most perfect form. It owes its quality of moral good to the rule of reason, and operations and passion are its matter: "moral virtue derives its goodness from the rule of reason." It is this, too, that makes moral and intellectual virtues consist in a just mean. The act regulated by a moral virtue is in conformity with right reason; and what reason does is to assign a just mean, equally removed from excess and defect in each given case. Sometimes it happens that the mean fixed by reason is the mean of the thing itself, as in the case of justice which regulates operations relating to external acts, and must assign to each his due, neither more nor less. Sometimes, on the contrary, it happens that the mean fixed by reason is not the mean of the thing itself, but one that is a mean in relation to us. It is thus with all the other moral virtues bearing not on operations but on passions. Temperance and fortitude have to take into account internal dispositions which are not the same in all men, nor even in the same individual at different times. They fix a just mean in conformity with reason, in relation to us and to the passions affecting us. It is the same with the intellectual virtues. Every virtue follows the determination of a measure and a good. Now the good of an intellectual virtue is truth, and the measure of truth is the thing. Our reason attains truth when what it says exists does actually exist, and when what it says does not exist does not exist. It errs by excess when it affirms the existence of what does not exist, and by defect when it denies the existence of what does exist. Truth, therefore, is the just mean, determined by the thing itself. And it is this very truth which confers moral excellence upon a virtue.
Voluntary acts dictated by practical reason, habits, and especially virtuous habits: these are the internal principles which regulate our moral activity. We have now to deal with the principles regulating this activity from without, that is, with laws.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 1 p 263-264).

"There is a third order that reason in deliberating establishes in the operations of the will." The locus of morality is human acts, acts of will directed by reason. Clarity about the human act, accordingly, is clarity about the moral order. The human agent is part of the ordered cosmos and is indeed that cosmos writ small, a microcosm.
He shares characteristics with the inanimate - he can be weighed like a rock; and with the vegetative - he takes nourishment and reproduces himself; and with the animals, sharing with them sense perception and the emotions that follow on them. Of course he is not the only thing in the cosmos that acts. Everything acts and to act is to pursue an end. Thomas accepts and endorses Aristotle's statement at the outset of the Ethics that the good is the end that all things seek. Teleology is not then a unique feature of human agents as if they were somehow inserted in a mechanistic universe from which final cause has been eliminated. Under the influence of natural science, philosophers since Kant have seen a chasm between nature and human action. Thomas by contrast sees human action as a special case of a universal fact insofar as it is undertaken for the sake of an end. What is unique to the human agents is that they are free and thus answerable for what they do. It is the good known by intellect that is the object of will. These two faculties or capacities generate voluntary action, either as the act of will itself, elicited voluntary action, or the acts of other capacities insofar as these come under the sway of reasoned will, commanded acts. Human acts and moral acts are identical. 
A moral appraisal is always relevant to any human act but only some of them come under such technical appraisals. And even when they do that is never the full story about them. So the identification of human acts and moral acts stands. 

McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50

So there are three great categories of rational activity: theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, and participated rationality. On this basis, we would have to say that there are three kinds of virtue involved in designating the human agent good. Much of the task of moral philosophy and moral theology is spelling out the specific kinds of these generic virtues, as is clear from the procedure of the Nicomachean Ethics and the second part of the Summa Theologiae. And Thomas like Aristotle will argue that this is an ordered set of virtues, such that some more perfectly fulfill the human agent than others. We will return to this.

McInerny 2004 Pt 2 30-50

To conclude, virtuous action and a life of virtuous rational activity amounts to acting well and flourishing well as human beings. This is happiness in the eudaimonistic sense defined by Aristotle.

It is clear that moral philosophy for Thomas is a reflection on how we can act well, how we can achieve the end we naturally desire, call it happiness. The moral task is to acquire a character which enables us to maneuver through the contingencies of life in such a way that we act well and thus achieve what is perfective of us. The desire for the good is a given, that is what is meant by calling it natural. However, reflection not only reveals the notion of ultimate end, but makes clear that we must do those things which truly constitute our fulfillment and perfection. The criteria for the true good must be sought in our nature as rational agents. How do we go about finding the true guidelines for our actions?





Aquinas: Faith and Reason

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that we can use the pure concepts of the understanding to conceive of objects that lie beyond the limits of our sensible intuition through our power of inferential reason. We can, for instance, imagine a spatio-temporal universe that has a kind of completeness that our indefinitely extendable actual intuitions can never have; we can imagine objects that cannot be represented in sensory experience at all, such as freedom, God or an immaterial soul.

However, Kant emphasises that such conceptions do not amount to knowledge, and the claims that they do involve traditional metaphysics in a series of errors.

 Kant therefore issues a denial of claims to knowledge on the part of metaphysics. He nevertheless proceeds to affirm a view of human powers which holds that none of these pure concepts fails to have a proper use if only we understand it correctly (G, 4:395). Kant proceeds to argue that the field of moral experience yields evidence for a reality that underlies and yet is beyond the phenomenal world. This is the world of 'noumena', the world of things-in-themselves. Kant’s point is that whilst knowledge of the existence of our own freedom, as well as God and the immortal soul cannot be theoretically demonstrated, neither can they be disproven. These ideas are necessary presuppositions of moral conduct — objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge. 
Kant’s reasoning is coherent. But whether it is a stable solution is another question. Kant achieves an uneasy peace between science and religion. In demonstrating that the traditional proofs for the existence of God rest on an unconscious faith, Kant opens a split between reason and faith. With Aquinas, faith and reason complement one another. For Aquinas, God is the supreme object of metaphysics, with faith coming to have a transcendent influence on reason. Transcendence enables us to avoid being self-enclosed in matter. Uniting faith and reason, believing and knowing go hand and hand in the Thomist perspective.

Kant, however, was dealing with the problem of morality in a world in which science had stripped nature of its ontological significance. Kant is firmly working in the tradition of Plato (Kant CPuR, A312-20/B369-77), arguing that the ideas of pure reason have a legitimate use, or yield a "canon" (A 795—831 /B 823—59), but in morality rather than science. Knowledge of the existence of God, of immortality and of the immaterial soul is impossible; these are incapable of rational theoretical demonstration. That, for both rationalists and empiricists, would seem to bring the matter to a negative conclusion. Not so, Kant argues. Knowledge of human freedom is also incapable of theoretical demonstration, but this is not the end of freedom as a value. Human beings continue to think and act as though human freedom is real, an integral part of Being, implying that there is an underlying moral truth which is beyond rational scientific demonstration but which, in its practical effect, is no less real for that. Kant’s solution is to argue that whilst God, immortality and freedom cannot be theoretically proven, neither can they be disproven. They are objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge, necessary presuppositions of moral conduct. Hence Kant’s statement that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (CPuR B xx). 

Kant’s solution is cogent on its own premises. But it renders morality vulnerable. Denied a basis in theoretical reason and ontological nature, morality as no more than a series of ‘necessary presuppositions’ could just as easily be dismissed as a series of ‘necessary illusions’. From a scientific perspective, moral concepts could be said to be ‘made-up’. We have been searching for the grounds of moral science ever since. Kant found it necessary to deny knowledge to make room for faith. A scientific perspective could more easily turn this round and just deny faith as a ‘made-up’ illusion. And this is the condition of moral science in the modern world.

The instability of Kant’s resolution is apparent in Kant’s own agnosticism with respect to the good. For all of Kant’s insistence on the summum bonum, Kant is clear that knowledge of the good is incapable of theoretical demonstration. Practical moral reason is shorn of its basis in theoretical reason. Kant cannot ground his moral position in ontological nature. It is difficult to see how Kant can avoid his intersubjective principle of self-legislation of practical reason degenerating into the relativism and subjectivism of atomistic legislating selves.

Kant’s point is that what theologians understood to be reason was in fact faith. The reason for the mistake was not a logical deficiency, but a result of reason being rooted in existence. Thomas and the theologians were living in an age of faith in which philosophy was integrated within theology. But, surely, this integration was itself a moral and intellectual achievement based on first philosophy. The good and the true belong to no age and are not relative to time and place. Which means there is nothing to block their being recovered now.

Is there a "natural morality," founded on natural moral virtues? For Aquinas every moral virtue worthy of the name is a supernatural infused moral virtue. (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5). 

‘The role of the good in morality is the same as that of undemonstrable principles in science. Sciences are derived from such principles. Now if we are mistaken about these principles, can we acquire a true science? Assuredly not. If, then, we are mistaken about the end, can we acquire virtues deserving of the name? No, and for the same reason. The Gospel alone has revealed to men that their true end is union with God. Hence it is essential to purely natural moral virtues that they have ends that fall short of man's supernatural end. Since all natural moral virtues suffer this limitation, none of them is fully capable of satisfying the definition of virtue. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 5 339/40

On his own premises, Kant’s idealist position is correct. If the intellect is for itself and if we cannot know things in themselves, then no mediation is possible which allows mind to cross over to things. The question whether our ideas conform to things is illogical if things can only be known to us through ideas. Kant’s idealist argument is cogent in its own terms. But what if Kant’s own premises are faulty? Idealism is attempting to solve a problem entirely of its own making. From an entirely different angle, Aquinas has resolved a problem so as to prevent the Idealist problem emerging in the first place. Aquinas is not attempting to determine the conditions for knowledge but instead is identifying the conditions which are necessary if we are to have an abstract notion of any thing whatsoever. The possibility of knowledge lies in the conformity of the concept to its object. Against idealism, we may know whether or not our ideas conform to things by means of a realist epistemology in which the condition of the conception of ideas is the presence of things in us. The problem to which Kant addresses himself in the Critique simply cannot arise for Aquinas.

When the ground is cleared by this preliminary explanation, it would seem that for St. Thomas a complete theory of knowledge does not require what since Kant's time has been called his Critique. There is knowledge, this knowledge is true, at least under certain conditions. It is true each time it is formed under normal conditions, by a normally constituted mind. Whence it arises that agreement among minds may be reached, and that beyond the conflict of opinions, there is a truth. The intellect, in search of this impersonal basis of given truths, reflects upon its act and judges that this basis lies both in the specific identity of nature which connects all human reasons and in the impersonal objectivity of things known by these reasons.’ 

Gilson 1961 Pt 2 ch 7 235

The keystone of Aquinas’ epistemological realism is the unity of mind and reality. Truth is determined by the adequation of the intellect to the real.

For Aquinas, the intellect reflects upon itself and finds that it is capable of becoming reality. ‘From the moment when the intellect, which judges things, knows that it can only conceive them at the price of its union with them, no scruple can prevent it from affirming as valid the judgments in which the content of its concepts become explicit. The initial factor in knowledge, which this analysis but tries to penetrate, is the direct grasping of intelligible reality by an intellect served by a sensibility.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 2 ch 7). 

The Autonomy of Philosophy 
In A History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell dismissed Aquinas’ philosophical credentials with a disdain that didn’t even border on contempt.

There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If. he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times. 

Russell’s History was the book most responsible for sparking my interest in philosophy. It is well written, lively, entertaining and, well, quite opinionated and frankly tendentious. As I read more, I came to realise that Russell’s conclusions on Aristotle, Plato, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey were just plain wrong. I came to understand that not only did he get Aquinas wrong, he had no interest in getting him right. So much for the philosophic spirit.

Is St Thomas a philosopher and does his work constitute a philosophy?  It depends on what is meant by philosophy.

Jacques Maritain described the philosophy of Aquinas in this way.





None of us stand alone, none of us work alone, all of us stand on the shoulders of giants. Those, such as Shadia Drury (2008) who can see in St Thomas’ Catholicism only the subordination of reason to faith, are seeing nothing at all beyond their own reason hardened into dogma and faith. In point of historical fact, Aquinas was challenging the faith and dogma of the day by assimilating Aristotle to the Christian cosmology. His views challenged orthodoxy, were briefly banned and enjoyed the briefest period of ascendancy. Those who think that the Middle Ages were Thomist are simply mistaken, as any check in a decent history book will attest.

What we have in St Thomas Aquinas is a mind that is part of a tradition that empowers us to think when discerning the reason at work in the universe, to reflect upon what we discover about the world around us and to understand the significance of these encounters in the most profound sense.

This is to stress the autonomy of philosophy. For Aquinas, philosophy was the handmaiden of theology. However, far from subordinating reason to faith, St Thomas was clear that to perform this role of handmaiden, philosophy had to be genuine philosophy, free from dogma, autonomous in its right.

Bernard Lonergan stresses this autonomy of thought. 





Consciousness and Social Being
The point is that Aquinas taught the lesson that truth is discoverable through thinking and learning as an experience. It is a form of teaching in the truest sense of the word. The Thomist conception of teaching is grounded in the view of human beings as social animals; "and the teacher's art, like the doctor's, co-operates with nature, so that the principal agent in the art of instruction is not the teacher imparting knowledge to his pupil and producing it in his mind, but the understanding, the intellectual vitality of the pupil who receives, that is to say, assimilates, the knowledge actively into his mind and so brings knowledge to birth there." (Maritain, Preface to Metaphysics, p. 10.) 

The adequacy of a philosophical outlook is to be judged in terms of whether its emphases are properly placed and its distinctions are properly drawn. Colapietro argues that the emphasis on the transcendent capacity of human reason (that is, the ability of reason to rise above the contingencies of history) and the immutable character of some truths needs to be balanced by an emphasis on the historical rootedness of this reason and on the corrigible nature of our judgments.

It is one thing to acknowledge a truth; it is quite another to accord a truth the place it deserves within our lookout. If we reflect, in the light of our own practice of philosophizing, upon the traditional roots of virtually all philosophical reflection and also upon the fallible nature of our own intellectual resources, we need to highlight our continuing dependency upon some intellectual tradition, even if it is not the one in which we were brought up.
In the final analysis, I judge what is so on the basis of what is revealed by my reason and through my experience. This emphasis is linked to the radical responsibility I must take for my own intellectual life. It also brings into view one of the most important bases of my dignity as a person. 

Colapietro in Hudson and Moran ed 1992: 129 ff

The task of the philosopher is to ensure that each of "the ever-recurrent themes" (Maritain's expression) receives its due. The question is: has the emphasis on the transcendent capacity of human reason (the ability of us to see for ourselves and, thereby, to transcend our dependency on others) come to deflect our attention from more substantive themes in philosophy, particularly the connection of knowing and being. In other words, the epistemological concerns of modern philosophers has served to detach philosophy from its true purpose in addressing and even giving meaning to life. For St Thomas, as for Aristotle before him, epistemology is always part of ontology, knowing is a question of being.

Philosophy today is marked by a slow but steady return to examining the traditional ‘meaning of life’ questions. (Flew 2008; Blond 1998). For Karl Popper 'genuine philosophical problems are always rooted in urgent problems outside philosophy, and they die if these roots decay. In their efforts to solve them philosophers are liable to pursue what looks like a philosophical method or technique or an unfailing key to philosophical success. But no such methods or techniques exist; in philosophy methods are unimportant; any method is legitimate if it leads to results capable of being rationally discussed. What matters is not methods or techniques but a sensitivity to problems, and a consuming passion for them; or, as the Greeks said, the gift of wonder.’ (Popper 1972: 71-72). Popper demonstrates this proposition by explaining Plato's theory of forms as a response to the crisis caused in Greek physics and mathematics by the discovery of irrational numbers. Imagine the stir that concern with global inequality and environmental destruction could cause.

The precise intellectual technology or methodology employed matters much less than having the root of the matter in you – an understand of and a groping towards the ultimate end. To repeat, knowing and being, epistemology and ontology go together in genuine metaphysics.

For, this situation is obviously characterized not so much by a specific emphasis on one or another properly philosophical problem, not by the predominance or by the recession of certain philosophical topics or questions; it is characterized much more decisively by the position of philosophy in general within the whole of society and especially within the whole of human search for truth, within la recherche collective de la verite. 

Pieper in Hudson and Moran ed 1992

The status of philosophy has become more and more problematic, the more philosophy has come to see distant from the problems which beset the world. First impressions are, however, deceiving. A quick look reveals that philosophy is in the field of practical concerns. The issue of environmental crisis and climate change has attracted substantial philosophical coverage, bringing clarity to this most contested areas, an area where politics, science and ethics collide and maybe, with rational resolution, coalesce. (Jardins 2001; Benson 2000; Jamieson 2008; Hulme 2009; Atterton and Calarco 2004; Norton ed 2003). This is philosophy taking its cue from the problems generated by social life. It’s all grist to the Aristotelian mill, integrating theoretical and practical reason. Human beings as social and rational beings are also, in some sense, philosophers. Philosophy is always grounded in social reality in this sense. It is this everyday social and moral praxis of human beings that demonstrates the value of philosophy, revealing philosophy to be integral to human life. ‘Sometimes one may be tempted, quite understandably, to ask oneself whether it is really right to insist on the claim that it nevertheless belongs to the elements of a truly human life to keep present and alive the question of the ultimate meaning of the whole of reality, which means: to philosophize.’ (Pieper in Hudson and Moran ed 1992).

But praxis is more than mere practice. Philosophizing does more than unquestionably fit in with the functioning of the given workaday practice; it seeks to ensure that that everyday practice enables and enhances human flourishing. Virtuous rational activity is intended to lead us to the flourishing society of flourishing human beings. The realisation of purposes is more than fitting human beings to functions.

At this point it comes to light at the same time, that we ourselves have to think anew, at least to formulate anew one fundamental thought to the great philosophical tradition—a thought which has, as it seems, more or less disappeared out of our range of vision. I am speaking of the Aristotelian thesis: that of all human activities the philosophical alone has the quality of freedom. This idea which at first sight indeed sounds somewhat strange, shows its enormous timeliness precisely in the confrontation with the totalitarian claim of the modern working state. This idea itself, to be sure, includes a whole philosophy of life, which cannot be explained here. But I must speak of two elements of that philosophy. The first element is the conviction that cognition of truth and freedom belong together in a very definite way; the second element is the conviction that the will to truth nowhere manifests itself more radically than in the philosophical act. 

Pieper in Hudson and Moran ed 1992

In 1960, Karl Jaspers declared, in an academic address, that philosophy had become an embarrassment for all. His specific target was academic philosophy as practised within the universities. This was a philosophy detached from those real world problems which Popper stressed as supplying philosophy’s raw material. Analytical philosophy, the philosophy of logical positivism, defining logic and language with a mathematical precision clearly models philosophy on the natural sciences. Alfred North Whitehead, who had written Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell, came to understand that: 'The exactness is a fake."

The organic philosophy that Whitehead came to embrace was not an irrationalism. Rather, Whitehead had come to understand that mathematical rationalism was but one form of reason, not the only one. Whitehead had come to realise that the problems of life are deeper and the questions are harder than those dealt with by the physical sciences. Whitehead had come to exchange the idea of the perfection of human knowledge through science by a genuinely philosophical understanding. As Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas say, "the least insight one can obtain into sublime things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge of lower things." The point is that it is not the modus of perceiving that is decisive, but the nature of what you perceive. This is where Aristotle and St Thomas (and Hegel for that matter) have the edge over Immanuel Kant. Kant had been led astray by the triumphs of mechanistic science stripping nature of its telos. Kant couldn’t ground reason in nature because science had revealed nature to be nothing more than dead matter and ‘blind causality’, with no moral import. Whitehead developed his organicism upon realising that science has overplayed its hand.

Universal Becoming and Transcendental Being
It remains to point out that, ultimately, reason cannot give us knowledge of God. The existence or otherwise of God is, in the end, a question of faith. Faith, however, does not deny human understanding. On the contrary, understanding must necessarily rise from knowledge of the material to the immaterial.

In our present state of life there is no way we can know the quiddities of immaterial things whether we are speaking of natural knowledge or of revelation, because the light of divine revelation, as Denis says, comes to us according to our own manner of knowing. Hence although revelation elevates us so that we know things we otherwise would not know, we do not know them otherwise than by way of sensible things. 

Exposition of Boethius's On the Trinity, q. 5, a. 4

St Thomas reminds us that knowledge alone cannot bring us to perfection and fulfilment. The combination of faith and reason tempers knowledge with humility. We may return to God; we do not become gods.

St Thomas provides an explanation of the universe and of human beings from the point of view of human reason. But knowing in this sense is also being in its most profound sense. The texture of Thomism is made from a very small number of principles which are finely interwoven. However, as Gilson argues, ‘all these principles are various aspects of one central notion, the notion of being.’ Gilson stresses the unity of knowing and being in the completed work of Aquinas. ‘To say what is true is to say what is, and is to attribute to each thing the very being which it is. Thus it is the being of a thing which founds its truth; and it is the truth of a thing which underlies the truth of thought.’ (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7). 

We find exactly the same thing in the case of the good. Every being insofar as it is knowable is the basis of truth. But insofar as it is defined by a certain quantity of perfection, and consequently insofar as it is, it is desirable and presents itself to us as a good; and hence the movement to take possession of it which arises in us when we find ourselves in its presence.

Gilson addresses the many ways of being. The one most immediately given to us is our own and that of corporeal things among which we pass our life.

However imperfect such a being may be, it does possess perfection to the extent that it possesses being. We already find in it transcendental relations of unity, truth, goodness and beauty which are inseparable from it and which we have defined.

Gilson is defining the spirit of Thomism in terms of the religious life. He develops the idea of universal becoming in terms of the transition from potency to act. 

This universal becoming is normally expressed in terms of the distinction of potency and act, which extends to all given beings within our experience. These notions add nothing to the notion of being. Act always is being; potency always is possible being.

Now we cannot reflect upon an experience like this without becoming aware that it does not contain the explanation of the facts it places before us. This world of becoming which grows active in order to find itself, these heavenly spheres continually seeking themselves in the successive points of their orbits, these human souls which capture and assimilate being by their intellect, these substantial forms forever searching out new matters in which to realize themselves, do not contain in themselves the explanation of what they are. If such beings were self-explaining, they would be lacking nothing. Or, inversely, they would have to be lacking nothing before they could be self-explaining. But then they would no longer move in search of themselves. They would repose in the integrity of their own essence realized at last. They would cease to be becoming and enjoy the fulness of being. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7

Crucial in this growth leading to beatitude is transcendent cause.

It is, therefore, outside the world of potency and act, above becoming, and in a being which is what it is totally, that we must look for the cause of the universe. But this being which thought can reach is obviously of a different nature than the being we have been talking about, for if it were not different from the being which experience gives, there would be no point in positing it. Thus the world of becoming postulates a principle removed from becoming and placed entirely outside it. (Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7). 

Gilson conceives universal becoming in terms of a movement from sensible things to a transcendent God.

Each of these degrees has its own mode of operation since each being operates according as it is in act and as its degree of actuality merges with its degree of perfection. The orderly and arranged hierarchy of beings is thus made complete by the orderly and arranged hierarchy of their operations, and in such a way that the bottom of the higher degree invariably comes into close contact with the top of the lower. Thus the principle of continuity gives precision and determination to the principle of perfection. Actually, both of these principles but express the higher law governing the communication of being. There is no being save the divine being in which all creatures participate; and creatures only differ from one another by reason of their greater or lesser degree of participation in the divine being. Their perfection must, accordingly, be measured by the distance separating them from God. It is in thus differentiating themselves from one another that they arrange themselves into a hierarchy.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7

Lest St. Thomas’ notion of participation in the divine be read anthropomorphically as the old delusion of ‘men as gods’, it should be emphasised that St. Thomas emphasised the diversity of things on account of no one species being able to achieve perfect likeness to God. Through the theological axiom that the world was created in God's image, St. Thomas could achieve ultimate unity whilst affirming the diversity of things. Given the fundamental imperfection of created things, no one species of created things can possibly achieve likeness to God. For this reason, a diversity of created things is necessary. In their totality, this diversity of things approach a perfect likeness to God:

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided; and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever. 

Summa theologica i. 47

That line bears repetition, in the context of the hubristic human assault against the planet currently underway in the name of ‘progress.’

the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.

Human beings have reason not to dominate other creatures and exploit and destroy the Creation, but to discern the human place in the divine order. Our intelligence can arrive at a transcendent God from sensible things only by way of analogy.

In Platonism there is the affirming of the extreme independence and almost complete aseity of the soul; this allows for Platonic reminiscence and even for the momentary return to the One through the ecstatic union. But in Thomism there is a most energetic affirming of the physical nature of the soul and vigilant care to close all paths which might lead to a doctrine of direct intuition of the intelligible in order to leave open no other road than that of sense knowledge. Platonism locates mystical knowledge in the natural prolongation of human knowledge; in Thomism, mystical knowledge is added to and co-ordinated with natural knowledge, but is not a continuation of it. All we know about God is what our reason teaches us about Him after reflecting upon the evidence of the senses. If we want to find a neo-Platonic doctrine of knowledge in the Middle Ages, we will have to look elsewhere than in St. Thomas. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7). 

Where, then, does human knowledge find itself at home? When is human knowledge in the presence of its own object? The answer is only at that point where knowledge comes into contact with the sensible. St. Thomas places the proper object of the human intellect in the sensible order. However, he does not consider the study of this order to be the highest function of the knowing faculty. The proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of the sensible, but its proper function is to make the sensible intelligible. From the particular object on which its light falls it draws something universal. 

At this point we see how St Thomas breaks the impasse created by epistemological idealism and brings philosophy back to its roots in concrete reality.

All great philosophies, and St. Thomas's is no exception, present a different front according to the particular needs of the age which turns to them. It is hardly surprising, then, that in a time like ours when so many minds are seeking to re-establish between philosophy and concrete reality bonds which idealism has broken, Thomists of different varieties should be insisting upon the notion of the act-of-being in his philosophy.

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7

Jacques Maritain stressed that all human knowledge begins from sense knowledge and ultimately returns to it, "not in order to know their essence. It (i.e. metaphysics) does so to know how they exist, for this too metaphysics should know, to attain their mode of existence, and then to conceive by analogy the existence of that which exists immaterially, which is purely spiritual." (Maritain 1943: 24).

Philosophy degenerates into scholasticism the moment when, instead of taking the existing concrete as object of its reflections in order to study it deeply, penetrate it, throw more and more light upon it, it applies itself rather to the statements which it is supposed to explain, as if these statements themselves and not what they shed light on, were the reality itself. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7

But to equip it for exploring and conquering this kingdom, he invites it to prefer another which is not merely the kingdom of man but of the children of God. Such is the thinking of St. Thomas. If we grant that a philosophy is not to be defined from the elements it borrows but from the spirit which quickens it, we shall see here neither Platonism nor Aristotelianism but, above all, Christianity. It is a philosophy that sets out to express in rational language the total destiny of the Christian man. But it has constantly to remind him that here below he travels the paths of exile where there is no light and no horizon. Yet it never ceases to guide his steps toward that distant height from which can be seen, far off in the mists, the borders of the Promised Land. 

Gilson 1961 Pt 3 ch 7

The Implicit Philosophy
Times change and knowledge expands, but the themes with which Aquinas deals are perennial. Aquinas’s perennial philosophy is in some way implicit philosophy, a philosophy which reads from and speaks to the common moral reason of all human beings. Antonio Gramsci wrote:

Accepting Croce's definition of religion as a conception of the world which has become a norm of life … it follows that the majority of mankind are philosophers in so far as they engage in practical activity and in practical activity (or in their guiding lines of conduct) there is implicitly contained a conception of the world, a philosophy. The history of philosophy as it is generally understood, that is as the history of philosophers' philosophies, is the history of attempts made and ideological initiatives undertaken by a specific class of people to change, correct or perfect the conceptions of the world that exist in any particular age and thus to change the norms of conduct that go with them; in other words, to change practical activity as a whole. 

Gramsci SP 1971: 345

The natural law tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas is based on a normative concern with creating the appropriate regimen for fulfilment of human beings as rational beings. This tradition looks to work with the natural dispositions to the good of human beings, creating the habitus in which virtues are acquired and exercised so that virtuous rational activity leading to the good society takes the form of good habits. All men and women may indeed become philosophers. They realise the philosophical life as the good life for rational beings. Aristotle calls it flourishing, Aquinas calls it beatitude.

This savours more than a little of the attitude which has characterised Thomism over the years, what Fides et Ratio calls "implicit philosophy." This is the idea that knowledge is in some way shared by all, if only in an unreflective sense. To be intelligible, the words of philosophers need to be in direct and continuous relation to the knowledge that each and every human being possesses in the sense indicated by Gramsci. The role of the philosopher is to activate this implicit knowledge and render explicit what is tacit. 

In Modes of Thought (1938), A N Whitehead established the value of the whole philosophical enterprise in these terms:

The sort of ideas we attend to, and the sort of ideas we push into the negligible background, govern our hopes, our fears, our control of behaviour. As we think, we live. This is why the assemblage of philosophical ideas is more than a specialist study. It moulds our type of civilization.

The promise of the natural law tradition is that it contains the potential to build a civilisation in which philosophy is realised in terms of the unity of knowing and being, that is, as a fundamental components of a communal modus vivendi committed to the flourishing of each and all.

Beyond Philosophy
In December 1273, Aquinas experienced some kind of revelation while saying Mass. He ceased working on the third part of his Summa theologica, telling his secretary that he had reached the end of his writing. He gave as his reason the fact that 'all I have written seems to me like so much straw compared with what I have seen and with what has been revealed to me'. He never resumed this work, and within a few months he was dead. Some may be inclined to assume that Aquinas had suffered a crisis of faith, reading the ‘so much straw’ remark as Aquinas realising that his entire life's work had been in vain. This would have Aquinas’ ultimate view as an admission that none of the eight million words he had written were worthwhile. 
But that would be a superficial view, missing the real point entirely. Theology is the loftiest of sciences, but Aquinas knew well that it is one that human beings can pursue only feebly, at best. Aquinas knew well, and had written at length on the point, that we can only have knowledge of God by analogy and by saying what God is not. Aquinas was keenly aware of the limits of our earthly theological understanding. The senses cannot yield complete knowledge of something that is beyond the senses. Words are a necessary but ultimately blunt instrument. As Aquinas writes in the closing passage of his commentary on the Gospel of John:

Infinitely many human words could not attain the one Word of God. For from the beginning of the Church, Christ has always been written about, but not adequately. Indeed, even if the world were to last for hundreds of thousands of years, books could be made about Christ, but his deeds and words would not all be completely expressed. (Injoh 21.6)

And one should also be careful of reading the reference to ‘straw’ in a derogatory sense. Aquinas quotes Aristotle with approval, "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (NK W), and then Gregory, "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind" (Horn. IVin). 
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